Chapter V

—The Export of Opium from India

The Truth About Indian Opium, G. Graham Dixon, 1922 · from page 16 · about 28 minutes

Read by machine, not yet checked by a person. It may hold small errors.

India now exports no opium to China, but the old trade to China cannot be passed over in silence. Great interest attaches to its origin and growth, to the agreement for the progressive reduction of Indian exports side by side with the suppression of cultivation in China, and to the dramatic stoppage of exports by the Government of India in 1913, an action that involved Indian revenues in an annual loss of 4,000,000l. sterling, and that has unfortunately entirely failed to benefit China.

The first reference to the manufacture of opium in China occurs in the 15th century, the knowledge of the drug having no doubt been introduced to the Chinese, as to the Indians, by the Arabs. When, at the beginning of the 16th century, the Portuguese first entered the China Seas, they found opium an important article of the trade carried on by Indian and Arab merchants.

During the 17th century, Dutch, French, English and Danish merchants purchased Bengal opium from the Mughal Government for export, and when in the early part of the 18th century the Mughal monopoly fell into disuse, the Europeans drew their supplies from the ring of native merchants at Patna.

The establishment of a monopoly in Bengal opium by the East India Company has already been referred to. In 1775 it was decided that the monopoly should be a revenue measure for the benefit of India, and that all opium delivered at Calcutta, apart from a fixed number of chests disposed of to the Dutch, French and Danish companies, should be sold at auction for export only.

Import duties on opium are entered in the Chinese trade books of the years 1589, 1615 and 1687, and in the Hoppo book of 1753.1 According to the historical note compiled by Dr. Edkins, of the Chinese Customs Service, in 1889, a Chinese author writes that “In the Ming dynasty, 1360–1644, the pill called “golden elixir came into use, and was found to be very “deleterious if much was taken.” But it was not until the practice of smoking opium began to spread throughout China that Indian opium began to be imported in large quantities. Tobacco was imported into China from the Philippines in 1620, and early in the 18th century the Chinese had progressed from the Javan and Formosan habit of smoking opium impregnated tobacco to smoking opium itself. The habit spread from China to the Shan States of Burma, and cultivation in China itself began to increase rapidly in the West.

In 1729 a severe Imperial edict was issued against opium smoking, and from that time onwards raw opium from India was often seized as contraband, though it was free to be imported as foreign medicine. More usually it was passed by the Canton mandarins on payment of a bribe, and as the same procedure continued when the Emperor in 1796 began to prohibit import, it is not surprising that the foreign merchants failed to be impressed by the reforming intentions of the Chinese Government, and indulged in smuggling on such a scale as to precipitate the conflict that was bound to occur sooner or later in view of the intense dislike of the Chinese for foreigners.

By 1790 opium smoking had reached Peking, and the demand had become so great that foreign merchants had hit on the device of paying for their purchases in opium, a ready substitute for coinage. As the demand went on increasing, the balance of trade turned against China, and silver began to flow out of the country. The Imperial Government viewed this state of affairs with alarm, and an edict was issued in 1796 prohibiting the import of opium, and referring to the drain of silver as the reason. The East India Company at once forbade any opium to be carried on their ships, though they imposed no conditions regarding the cargoes of private traders, to whom they gave licences for the China trade.

The trade in opium continued to increase, and in 1816 the Select Committee of the East India Company stated “that “the officers of Government (the Chinese Government) are “never sincere in their declared intentions of suppressing illicit “traffic, more particularly the trade in opium, as it is con- “sidered one of the principal advantages of their situations. “While it remains notorious that the Imperial edicts for the “prevention of this trade are annually issued by China with “one hand while large bribes are received by the other, it can “never be imagined that any new regulations are framed with “a view to the injury of such a trade, or that they for one “moment consider the moral habits and welfare of the people.”

The close of the East India Company’s monopoly of the China trade in 1834 gave a great impulse to the trade in opium as well as in other goods. In the period 1830-35 the total average combined exports of Bengal and Malwa opium (to China and other countries) amounted to something between 20,000 and 25,000 chests a year, and the period 1835–36 to 1843–44 showed an average annual export from India of about 34,000 chests. In 1847–48 the figure had risen to 46,000 chests, two-thirds of which was Bengal, and for the three years 1852–55 the average figure was 73,000 chests. After this date there was little change for 38 years; Chinese-produced opium having begun to catch up with the demand and beginning to compete with Malwa, though not with Government Bengal opium. From 1895 onwards China produced so much opium that the Indian export figure fell steadily, until it reached the figure of 50,000 chests.

It is interesting to note that in 1830 and 1833 a Select Committee of the House of Commons examined the subject of the East India Company’s China trade, affirming in 1830 that the prohibition edicts were disregarded by the Chinese people, and in 1833 approving the Indian revenue from the export of opium.

In 1836 a memorial to the Emperor from the Vice-President of the Chinese Sacrificial Court begged that the trade might be legalised on a foundation of barter, as notwithstanding the fact that opium smokers were liable to be punished with transportation and death, the practice had spread through the whole Empire, and the rise in the value of silver owing to its export led to acute economic disorganisation. The memorial was concurred in by other higher officials, who also suggested that the foreign opium should be combated by relaxation of the prohibition of cultivation in China. They were clearly more concerned for silver than for morals. In fact, as Captain Elliot (the British representative) pointed out, the Chinese were far more anxious about the coast missions and the dissemination of tracts than about opium as such.

A Chinese statesman had stated that Yunnan alone produced annually several thousand chests of opium, but that passed unheeded. The silver crisis had become acute, and the Chinese regarded the arrogance of the foreigners, now free traders, not under the influence of the East India Company, as intolerable. The strangers demanded diplomatic relations, contrary to “custom”; they were outside the law, except as regards homicide; their missionaries claimed to protect converts, and were an offence; they brought foreign women to Canton, employed native servants, and rode in sedan chairs. Conflict was inevitable, and as opium formed three-fifths of the imports, it was bound to occur over opium. A strong prohibition edict was issued in 1837, and in 1839 a strong Viceroy was sent to Canton. He seized the British representative and the Canton merchants, confiscated and burnt 20,283 chests of opium which Captain Elliot had collected and surrendered in order to save the lives of the Europeans, and in spite of Elliot’s proposals for a complete abandonment of the opium trade, let loose war junks on British vessels. China had decided to teach the foreigner his place. Britain declared war in 1840.

The history given above should prove that the war was not undertaken to force opium on China, and a few sentences from Lord Palmerston’s instructions to the British representatives at the peace negotiations of 1841 show that the result of the war was not to compel China to take Indian opium: “ . . . “You will state that the admission of opium into China as an “article of legal trade is not one of the demands which you “have been instructed to make . . . It is evident that “no exertions of the Chinese authorities can put down the “trade . . . It is equally clear that it is wholly out of “the power of the British Government to prevent opium from “being carried to China; because even if none were grown in “any part of the British territories plenty of it would be “produced in other countries.” It was, therefore, suggested that the trade should be legalised. In fact, opium was not mentioned in the Nankin Treaty, which closed the war, and remained a prohibited and flourishing business.

The war of 1857 had no connection with opium, but when at the Treaty of Tientsin in 1858 (finally ratified in 1860) a new tariff was drawn up, the Chinese voluntarily legalised the trade by entering opium in the tariff at an import duty of 30 taels per picul or chest, double that on other articles, and subject to local transit duty in addition. The following extracts make the responsibility for the legalisation quite clear. Mr. Long, the Chinese Secretary to Lord Elgin’s Mission, wrote to the Times on the 22nd October 1880: “When I came to opium, I enquired what “course they proposed to take in respect to it. The answer “was: ‘We have resolved to put it into the tariff as foreign “medicine.’ I urged a moderate duty in view of the cost of “collection, which was agreed to. This represents, with strict “economy, the amount of ‘extortion’ resorted to. The Chinese “Government admitted opium as a legal article of import, not “under constraint, but of their own free will deliberately. Mr. Long’s statement was confirmed by Mr. Laurence Oliphant, Secretary to Elgin’s Mission, in a letter to the Times on the 25th of the same month. The latter further stated: “When “we came to the article ‘opium,’ I informed the Commissioner “that I had received instructions from Lord Elgin not to insist “on the insertion of the drug in the tariff, should the Chinese “Government wish to omit it.”

In 1885 an additional Article to the Chefoo Convention consolidated the import and transit duties into a lump sum of 100 taels per chest, payable before the opium went out of bond, with the further stipulation that foreign opium should not be subject to any taxation that was not levied on native opium.

In the negotiations preceding the Chefoo Convention, it had become clear that the Chinese Government had ceased to wish to prohibit import of opium, and had discovered the possibilities of an opium revenue. They plainly said that opium smoking could not now be eradicated, a statement fully borne out by the observations of Vice-Consul Spence regarding cultivation in South-West China in 1882. Spence considered the arguments of the Anti-Opium Society regarding opium cultivation in China, the attitude of the Imperial Government, and the effect of opium smoking to be “absolutely untrue,” and for the following reasons. The cultivation of poppy was carried on in nearly every district of Szechuan. In country hamlets almost every second house was an opium shop, and in the whole region Indian opium was unknown. In face of this, the people were healthy, well housed, well fed, and well clad, though probably six-tenths of the adult male population were opium smokers. The production of Szechuan, Yunnan, Kueichow and South-West Hupei, Ichang Fu, and Shih Nan Fu came to 224,000 piculs, or 29,866,666 lbs., from 850,000 acres. This was 2¼ times the whole Indian import into China.

Here it may be noted that in view of the present conditions in China, and the recent recorded prices of the native drug, it looks as if, by depriving China of Bengal opium, we have prohibited champagne, but not affected gin. By 1905 one Chinese province showed a production two or three times the total Indian imports, and for many years before the stoppage of export in 1914 Malwa opium was suffering heavily from the competition of the China crop.

Spence added that Shensi was producing top grade opium in the very year that the Governor was reporting that he had uprooted the poppy everywhere in his jurisdiction. He concluded his report with the following prophetic remarks :—

“The right of the people to grow and smoke opium has been for years unquestioned by their officials : to compel them to surrender the right now, would be to provoke a rebellion. Even if the Government were willing to incur this risk, and determined coûte que coûte to be rid of opium, which it would be at present nonsensical to affirm, success would require a vigorous executive, free from venality and opium smoking, having under its orders armies of constables equally free from these faults. But China has no such executive and no such armies. Of the local official class, their attendants, hangers-on and constables, it may truly be said that if there is one quality more conspicuous than their venality, it is their love of opium smoking. Even were the prospect of a bonâ fide effort not a chimera its success would be impossible.

“What, under the circumstances, would be the practical effect of the rigorous prohibition of opium cultivation in India, and the attempted exclusion by China of foreign opium, it is easy to see. Its effect on opium smoking in Yunnan, Kueichow, Szechuan, Kansuh, Shenshi and Western Hupei, where Indian and foreign opium are all but unknown, would be nil. Amongst the poor smokers in the East, who now use the native drug, its effect would be equally nil. Many who now use Indian opium would take to native, and one effect would be to give a great stimulus to production in the West. But well-to-do smokers in the East and seaboard provinces, amongst whom I include all who at present spend 10d. a day on Indian opium, would everywhere seek for a high-class smuggled opium. Smuggling would be organised all along the coast, Chinese desperadoes would find willing associates in running foreign opium into the country in European and American adventurers, the Maritime Customs service would have to become an armed force, quiet seaports would be turned into hells of disorder, and international relations between China and foreign Powers would be embittered to an intolerable degree. The opium which could not be grown in India would come in part from Turkey and Persia; new fields for its growth would be opened in Mozambique and similar latitudes in Africa; and the profits of the trade, instead of passing, as they do now, to the support of our beneficent rule and civilisation in India, would become the incentive to, and the reward of, lawlessness, disorder and crime."

The attitude of the British Government towards China during these years was well expressed in the declaration in Parliament of Sir J. Fergusson on 10th April 1891, that, “if the “Chinese Government thought proper to raise the duty on “opium to a prohibitive extent, or to shut out the article “altogether, this country would not expend 1l. on powder and “shot, or lose the life of a soldier in an attempt to force the “opium trade on the Chinese,” and in Mr. Gladstone’s statement of the 30th June 1893, that “we have left that matter to “China herself. . . . The opium which we allow to be “exported . . . is sent to that country to be received by “China if she chooses to receive it."

In section I. (c) of their findings, the Royal Commission of 1893–95 stated that, in their opinion, it was not found that satisfactory reasons existed for unsolicited action by the British Government for the destruction of the trade in Indian opium with China, and they agreed in not recommending any action that would have that effect. If at any future time the Chinese Government declared a wish to prohibit import, however, they thought that the question would be changed and should be reconsidered.

The question changed in 1906, when, for the first time since 1858, the Government of China decided to prohibit the cultivation and consumption of opium.

Whatever the real causes of the anti-opium movement in China, and however badly that movement has failed, it seems true that both the Imperial Government in 1906 and the young China party in the best days of the Republic were earnest in their desire to suppress the importation, cultivation and use of opium; and when the British Government were approached by China with a view to the reduction and ultimate extinction of the Indian import, there were no two courses open.

The result was the conclusion of an agreement at the beginning of 1908, by which, with effect from the 1st January 1908, the Government of India undertook to diminish progressively the total amount of opium sold at Calcutta by 5,100 chests a year for a period of three years, which it was expected would indirectly diminish the amount imported into China; and if the Chinese fulfilled their share of the agreement to reduce cultivation in China to a similar extent, they further agreed to continue annual reductions of 5,100 chests until the total export reached the figure of 16,000 chests. Over the five year period 1901–05 the average annual export to all countries was 67,000 chests, of which China took 51,000, so that progressive annual reductions of 5,100 chests would have brought export to China to an end in 1917, the limitation having begun in 1908, when the total export to all countries was 61,900 chests. The difficulty presented by the Malwa trade was overcome by a decision to throw the greater part of the burden of reduction upon the Bengal monopoly, and the situation was further eased by the fact that owing to bad seasons and the competition of the native Chinese drug cultivation had for a long time been declining in the Indian States. The net result was a very great diminution in Indian cultivation.

Mr. Leach, Councillor to the Peking Legation, reporting to Sir J. Jordan in November 1907, stated that the appreciable amount of success obtained up to that date by the Chinese Government in their “stupendous task of attempting by “legislation to eradicate a national and popular vice in “a country whose population is generally estimated at “400,000,000,” showed that the task could be fulfilled, and that the Chinese people in general considered opium smoking a vice. In a further report, transmitted to London by Sir J. Jordan in June 1908, Mr. Leach remarked that since his previous report the chief feature of the situation had been the continued energy of the Central Government and the growing apathy of provincial officials, but he produced gratifying evidence of a reduction in cultivation from many provinces. In November 1908 Sir Alexander Hosie reported that there was no question as to the continued sincerity and zeal of the Central Government, which was backed by public opinion and a young but growing patriotism, and Sir J. Jordan agreed that, “considering the magnitude of the task, the success “which has so far attended the movement is as great as could “reasonably be expected.” In October 1909 Mr. Max Muller, Councillor to the Peking Legation, reported that distinct progress had been made, especially in Shansi and Yunnan, and considered that the great test would arise in the case of Szechuan, the chief opium province, where sowing in the autumn of 1909 had been prohibited. In April 1910 it was reported that cultivation in Szechuan had been greatly checked, and it was then arranged for Sir Alexander Hosie to make an extensive tour of inspection during the 1910 season. In March 1911 Sir A. Hosie reported that cultivation has been suppressed in Szechuan “for the present”; that there had been a reduction of 75 per cent. in the production of Yunnan, where raw opium had risen to six times its value in 1907; that in Kansu production had increased in some districts and had been energetically diminished in others; that very little decrease had been effected in Shensi, but that cultivation had been entirely suppressed in Shansi.

Negotiations were begun at Peking in the latter half of 1910 for a continuance of the 1908 arrangement, the Government of India agreeing that there was sufficient general evidence that cultivation had been substantially reduced in China to warrant their waiving statistical proof, and a new agreement was drawn up and signed on the 8th May 1911. Under the terms of this agreement the Government of India agreed (1) to the payment of an import duty three times the existing amount in return for the promised abolition of provincial taxes; (2) to the partial closure of China to Indian opium by provinces, including not only stoppage of transit passes, but also treaty port closure, Shanghai and Canton excepted; (3) to the total extinction of trade before 1917 on proof of total cessation of opium production in China; and (4) to revision of the agreement on due notice by either party. On her side China agreed, amongst other things, to reduce production in China pari passu with the reduction of exports from India.

In addition to the limit to the China trade imposed by the agreement, the Government of India agreed, in order to lessen the danger of smuggling into China, and as an earnest of their desire to assist that country, strictly to confine the remainder of the Indian exports to the legitimate demands of the non-China markets. The figure arrived at for these markets, the result of elaborate calculations based on Board of Trade statistics and the average exports for the period 1905–09, when no inducement for smuggling to China had existed, was 14,000 chests; the Government of India cut down their non-China exports to this figure in 1911, and in order to make assurance doubly sure, spontaneously reduced this to 13,200 chests in 1912. The whole of the very large revenue from the China trade was now lost to India, as well as the revenue from that part of the exports to non-China markets which was sacrificed as an unsolicited and indirect contribution to China’s success.

Then followed the revolution in China, Szechuan being among the first provinces to revolt. Poppy began to be grown again everywhere. Cultivation in Yunnan was reported to be continuing as early as November 1911, and in the Cheng Tu district of Szechuan in January 1912. In May and August 1912 the matter was the subject of questions in the House of Commons, but the Government declared its determination to carry out the British side of the 1911 agreement irrespective of events in China, in the hope that when a settled Government emerged in China it would take up the work of suppression where it had been left by the Manchus.

The hoped for change came towards the end of 1912, when the Republican Government was at last firmly in the saddle, and began to surpass the rigours of the Manchu rulers in the suppression of the opium habit. The movement had, as might have been foreseen, become indiscriminate, a hatred of native opium being accompanied by a hatred of imported, and the conditions of the 1911 agreement were lost sight of in the fervour of the moment.

This movement, holding up the stocks at Shanghai, led to an accumulation of 30,000 chests at that port. The situation became serious, and in April 1913 the Government of India stopped export to China. On the 7th May 1913, Mr. Montagu, at that time Under Secretary for India, stated that “we are “prepared not to send any more opium to China not only this “year, not only while the stocks are being absorbed, but never “again, with the single exception that we desire to be satisfied “that China . . . . is steadfast in the pursuit of her “present policy and determined to get rid of her indigenous “poppy.”

The closure of provinces now, of course, only affected the disposal of stocks at Shanghai and the general situation as far as it was affected by the stocks question, and the remainder of the history of the poppy in China is of academic interest only, so far as the 1911 Agreement is concerned. Throughout 1913 the suppression of cultivation went on, marked by violent methods of intimidation and repression, which were directed as much against the purchases of Indian opium as against the native cultivators and dealers, and by this time probably nobody except the Anti-Opium Society believed that poppy cultivation could be permanently suppressed in China. In 1917 the Chinese Government closed the whole of China to Indian opium, holding that the 1911 Agreement had automatically expired.

On the 17th October 1918 it was stated in the House of Commons that no official information had been received of any increase in the production of opium in China since 1917, but civil war and the breakdown of the machinery of central control were soon to lead to a change, in which native opium came to be regarded as the chief means of raising money for troops.

In 1918 considerable recrudescence of growing took place in five provinces, and in Kansu the price of opium had fallen 50 per cent. Large quantities of the drug were also produced in Russian territory and imported into China, thousands of Chinese themselves crossing the border to grow the crop.

Further reports of planting and harvesting were received in April 1919, together with confirmation of the fact that cultivation in Fukien was connived at by the local officials. Fukien, however, being in the hands of the Southern Government, Sir J. Jordan considered it useless to protest to the Chinese Foreign Office at Peking. In May information was received of extensive growing, with official support, in Szechuan and Shensi, cultivation being permitted on payment of a tax, and Sir J. Jordan admitted that his representations would be likely to have little effect. It is worth noting that the Chinese armies were credited with reintroducing the opium smoking habit in all districts they occupied, and that the military governors and commanders were saddled with the responsibility of fostering the cultivation and consumption of the drug.

In June 1919 a remarkable letter was received from Sir J. Jordan, in which he said that Mr. Easte, travelling to take up his duties at Chengtu, reported that 30 to 50 per cent. of the fields in his line of march through Szechuan were full of poppy, and added that there appeared never to have been any real effort at eradication.

In spite of a formal protest to the Chinese Foreign Office, warning them that the continued and growing cultivation constituted a “grave infringement of the solemn pledge “entered into by the Chinese Government by the 1911 “Agreement,” reports received in July 1919 more than confirmed all that had gone before, and it was estimated that in 1918 the acreage under poppy in Kirin Province (North Manchuria) alone was 40,500. Affairs were rapidly returning to the position of affairs at the time when Vice-Consul Spence wrote his report in 1882.

The year 1920 continued the tale of flourishing cultivation, on the profits and extortions from which most of the armies in China appeared to be subsisting, while in spite of heavy taxation the price of opium remained generally only half the rates that had obtained in 1918. In Chinese Turkestan it had fallen from 45 taels to 15 taels per lb., and in Yunnan it was stated to be selling at 30 cents an ounce, less than the cost of production in India.

The reports of His Majesty’s Consular officers, corroborated and strengthened by missionaries, private firms of standing, shipping companies, and the Shanghai Chamber of Commerce, point conclusively to the fact that China is now much the greatest opium-producing country of the world.

The end of the China trade reduced the Indian export trade to extremely small proportions. Smuggling to China was guarded against by the imposition of a voluntary limit on exports, as has been stated above. It was decided in 1911, after a systematic examination of all the available data, to accept the lowest estimate of the legitimate requirements of the non-China markets, namely, 14,000 chests annually, although evidence was produced to the effect that 16,000 chests would not be too high a figure, and to refuse to permit exports in excess of that amount. In 1912 the number of chests was cut down to 13,200.

In 1915 the Government of India embarked upon a policy of entering into agreements with the Governments of importing countries for the direct supply of the bulk of the opium requirements of those countries. These Governments are thus made publicly responsible for limiting their imports to the legitimate requirements of the territories under their control, and for the prevention of re-export. The system has the further advantage of eliminating the possibility of smuggling in respect of the greater part of Indian exports. Agreements of this kind are now in force with Hong Kong, the Straits Settlements (whose requirements include the Federated Malay States), British North Borneo, Ceylon, the Dutch East Indies and Siam. Efforts are at present being made to extend the system to the remaining importers of Indian opium, Japan, French Indo-China and Portugal (for Macao), and, if these attempts are successful, the disposal of opium by public auction at Calcutta will in all probability cease. The agreements contain a clause that the importing Government is not bound to take a minimum quantity of opium. Exports to the Portuguese Colony of Macao are at present regulated by a Treaty of 1913 with Portugal, prescribing maximum limits for the amount of Indian opium which may be imported by the opium farmer at Macao, but this Treaty was denounced on behalf of His Majesty’s Government by the British Minister at Lisbon on the 4th February 1922. The denunciation takes effect one year from that date, when the amount of Indian opium which may be annually exported to Macao will be subjected to a lower limit than the present one of 500 chests.

More than three-quarters of the total exports are now sent direct to responsible Governments, and the amount of opium sold by auction at Calcutta, which was 48,000 chests in 1901, fell to 19,840 in 1912, and in 1921 amounted to 705 chests only. Even in respect of this small quantity importing Governments have full power of control, and the Government of India would willingly co-operate in any measures suggested by those Governments in order to make that control more effective.

The table on page 27 gives details of exports to a number of countries since the year 1870, and shows both the enormous diminution of the trade and its present exiguous proportions. The column for China includes also Hong Kong and Macao, and the figures for the years 1914–20 represent exports to those Colonies. As stated above, no Indian opium has been exported to China proper since 1913. The increasing figures for the United Kingdom from 1913 onwards represent medicinal needs

TBL-010 · FOLIO 31Diplomatic CSV · Tidy CSV
Year.China (including Hong Kong and Macao).Straits Settlements.United Kingdom.East Coast of Africa.Mauritius.Natal.Reunion.Aden.Ceylon.French Indo-China.Dutch East Indies.Philippines.Australia.Other Countries. (See p. 28.)Total.Year.
Chests.Chests.Chests.Chests.Chests.ChestsChestsChestsChests.Chests.Chests.Chests.Chests.Chests.Chests.
1870–7177,1058,05454139—101034—224—5—85,5181870–71
1875–7677,18611,00560719———68———5—88,3501875–76
1880–8182,3929,62230143915384—————92,1901880–81
1885–8676,11510,728—71927—771,000————87,9561885–86
1890–9170,85513,9154717551——103480—280——85,7531890–91
1895–9645,61712,529—8322——1231,450750245—8060,8601895–96
1900–0149,76116,77950717385—11811,720590——1069,7081900–01
1905–0648,00712,368427134023——179500770—7153862,9361905–06
1906–0750,59012,95331516241——178580930—24943866,2741906–07
1907–0847,74913,1951161525———1949401,285——24163,7601907–08
1908–0952,75811,174211721———3451,600970——5166,9571908–09
1909–1041,46811,140—115———3121,8951,360———56,1911909–10
1910–1131,3239,1384728———2311,0152,125——5043,9211910–11
1911–1225,3986,68415423———1202,1252,195——1,62538,1891911–12
1912–1319,5755,09811—10———508053,010——2,81531,3741912–13
1913–144,0611,537115—19———1058753,265——1,92911,9061913–14
1914–151,3501,355498—23———802,6902,650——3,16011,8061914–15
1915–168243,155199—65———652,0351,835——3,24811,4261915–16
1916–178653,989——120———803,4401,965——2,36612,8291916–17
1917–188555,174——15———603,0501,800——2,64813,6021917–18
1918–191,0014,003——42———703,4902,400——3,82214,8281918–19
1919–208694,025——35———609952,000——2,52510,5091919–20

caused by the war. At a later stage, in response to urgent appeals, the Government of India sent large quantities of medical opium direct to the Home Government. These are not recorded in the table, but amounted to 10,476 chests in all. No Indian opium has been exported to Great Britain by private merchants since 1916.

The principal importers recorded under the head “ Other Countries” in the table are Japan, Siam and British North Borneo. No opium is exported from India to the United States of America or to Great Britain. The Governments of British North Borneo and Siam both entered into agreements for the direct supply of opium in 1918. During the three calendar years 1918–20 the former has taken 120, 120 and 192 chests, while Siam has imported 1,700 chests annually. Japan, who has not yet entered into an agreement with the Government of India, and therefore purchases at the Calcutta auctions, began to import opium from India in 1911, and has taken the following quantities since that time :—

TBL-011 · FOLIO 32Diplomatic CSV · Tidy CSV
Year.No. of Chests.Year.No. of Chests.
1911–124251916–17963
1912–139501917–18971
1913–147991918–191,936
1914–159001919–20980
1915–161,080

As it has been asserted that India is administered on the proceeds of opium, and that the policy of the Government of India is biassed by consideration for the opium revenues, a table is appended which shows the gross revenue derived from sales of opium for export during the period 1910–21 :—

TBL-012 · FOLIO 32Diplomatic CSV · Tidy CSV
Year.£Year.£
1910–117,240,4071916–172,455,442
1911–124,898,1511917–182,135,810
1912–133,320,3491918–192,454,321
1913–141,279,4781919–202,386,305
1914–151,230,4861920–211,953,167
1915–161,500,215

The effect of the cessation of the China trade in 1913 is strikingly shown by these figures, which effectively prove that the policy of the Government of India in opium matters is not swayed by considerations of revenue. The increase in revenue since 1915–16 is due to the rise in the price of opium.

The revenue obtained from licence fees and the excise duty on opium is under the control of Provincial Governments, but for purposes of comparison the excise revenue figures, which were given in Chapter III., may be added to those given above, and the total may be compared with the gross revenue of British India. In every case rupees are converted into sterling at the rate of 15 to the pound.

TBL-013 · FOLIO 33Diplomatic CSV · Tidy CSV
Year.Excise Revenue plus Sales for Export.Gross Revenue of British India.
££
1910–118,216,54080,682,473
1911–125,908,28482,835,750
1912–134,470,81586,862,598
1913–142,635,44485,207,175
1914–152,603,15281,157,666
1915–162,924,81584,413,537
1916–173,828,50898,050,430
1917–183,593,010112,662,347
1918–194,042,054123,257,744

Notes

  1. 1. A compilation of tariffs, of which an interesting account is given by Dr. Edkins in his Historical Note (see Bibliography).
  2. . This column includes exports to Hong Kong and Macao. Export to China was stopped altogether in 1913, and the figures from that time onwards relate to exports to Hong Kong and Macao alone.