Mr. Dadabhai Naoroji, a Member of the Commission, examined.
Will you state what public position you have held, and what opportunities you have had of becoming practically acquainted with public affairs relating to India, and to what class of questions you have given special attention?—From my early days I have been associated with those who have been working for the social, political, and material improvement of India, and was a member of various reform associations in Bombay, sometimes as president and secretary; in 1851, I founded the “Rast Goftar,” a cheap weekly journal in Bombay, of which I was proprietor and editor. After some years’ service in the Educational Department, I was in 1854 appointed Professor of Mathematics and Natural Philosophy in the Elphinstone College, being the first Indian appointed to a professor’s chair. In 1853, I was one of the founders of the Bombay Association, and at the inauguration I declared my political creed of faith in the conscience and justice of the British people. In 1855, I and two other Parsi gentlemen opened the first Indian business firm in England, in London and Liverpool, and I remained in business as a merchant and commission agent till 1881. In 1867, I, with others, founded the East India Association in London, and induced some leading Indian Princes to subscribe an endowment for it. In 1869, we founded the Bombay Branch of the East India Association, and some years subsequently, the Bombay Presidency Association. In 1873, I gave evidence before Mr. Fawcett's Select Committee on Indian Finance. In 1874, I was Dewan, or Prime Minister, of Baroda. In 1875-6 and afterwards in 1881 to 1885 I was a member of the Town Council of Bombay, and in 1885-6, I was appointed a member of the Legislative Council of Bombay. In 1885, I was one of the founders of the Indian National Congress and presided over the Meeting at Calcutta in 1886. In 1892, I was returned M.P. for Central Finsbury, and was a member of the House of Commons till 1895. In 1893, I visited India to be President over the Ninth Indian National Congress at Lahore, and on the occasion was accorded a reception of a marked kind in various parts of India. For the last 40 years I have paid special attention to the material condition of the masses in India, and have published books, pamphlets, and speeches setting forth my views on the subject.
In what form would you prefer to give your evidence?—I have handed in to the Commission six printed statements. These statements contain the facts, figures, and authorities upon which I rely, and I am prepared to be cross-examined upon them.
The statements which you have put in deal with a variety of subjects which perhaps hardly fall within the scope of the reference to us. Of course you are aware our Commission only permits us to inquire into the administration, management and apportionment of expenditure, and I should like to ask you to let it be understood between yourself as a witness and the Commission that you are prepared to limit yourself within reasonable bounds to the instructions of the Commission?—Oh, I am quite within the instructions of the Commission in what I have said and in what I propose to say.
Perhaps you could place before us in some concise form the leading facts and figures upon which you rely in those statements?—The headings under which my evidence falls are: the Administration of Expenditure, the Apportionment of Charge, and Practical Remedies. Upon each of those headings I am prepared to state categorically my most important contentions on behalf of India.
Will you state your propositions with reference to the first heading you mentioned, the Administration of Expenditure ?—Yes. I consider that the Act of 1833, confirmed by the pledges contained in the Queen's Proclamation of 1858, conferred upon Indians a right to their full claim and share of public employment and emoluments and voice in their own expenditure, in order to secure their happiness and prosperity and good government, and attachment to British Rule, and the prosperity of the British people themselves. I maintain that the administration of Indian expenditure is not conducted according to the principles thus laid down, and that the non-fulfilment of these pledges has produced poverty and degradation; the inherent and essential defect of British Administration being the financial, political, and intellectual drain, which is inseparable from a remote foreign dominion exercised in disregard of the sound principles above stated. In my six statements I set forth the facts of India's poverty, as shown by the comparative production and consumption of each Province, by calculating the average production of Indian per head, by analysing the trade returns, and by reference to the small amount of revenue obtained after exhausting all sources of taxation. I maintain that the impoverishment and degradation of British India has been caused by the compulsory employment of costly foreign official agencies and foreign capital (represented by the public debt, political and commercial) beyond the means of the taxpayer, resulting in a drain from British India, financial, political, and intellectual—aggravated by heavy frontier Imperial war expenditure—and that, indirectly, the foreign dominion has caused a further drain by creating a practical monopoly in favour of foreign private capital, which reaps the advantage of British India's material resources.
That is a general statement from your point of view upon the administration of India; but it does not give us your opinion on the questions more immediately before us, namely, upon the different branches of expenditure, to explain the details of which we have had before us the official witnesses. Have you anything to state upon those branches of expenditure, and upon the official evidence that has been placed before us ?—Yes. Shall I wait until later, or shall I give my views now?
I will take the question, if you wish it, later; I am only anxious at the present moment to know how far you intend, by the answer you have given, to express your opinion upon the administration of expenditure?—Yes, that is the general answer I have given; shall I go now to the question of the machinery?
I think, if you are prepared to go on with that subject, perhaps you had better take it at this point?—Very well, I will give such criticisms as I can offer upon the administrative machinery of the expenditure of India. When in August 1894 we asked for an inquiry, Sir Henry Fowler said that a very strong indictment of the British Government of India had been brought before the House and the country (15th August, 1894). And then Sir Henry Fowler, when promising a Select Committee, himself challenged: “The question I wish to consider is whether that “Government, with all its machinery, as now existing in India, “has, or has not, promoted the general prosperity of the people “in its charge; and whether India is better or worse off by being “a Province of the British Crown.” And this is the question to which an answer has to be given by this Commission, whether the present machinery of administration and management of the military and civil expenditure incurred in both countries “has or has not,” as one of its results, “promoted the general prosperity of the people” of British India. I say that it has not promoted the general prosperity of the people. In the statements I have given in I have considered every aspect of this fact, which was the most important point of the inquiry. The most important criticism, therefore, to which this machinery is subject is that it is based on the basis of foreign domination. This is its worst evil. It is a machinery for what Lord Salisbury very correctly calls bleeding. However perfect the mere rules of the work to be done by the officials may be, the system or machinery is a crushing machinery. It produces in the words of Lord Salisbury a “terrible amount of misery.” The machinery not only “bleeds” directly, but by the economic exhaustion of the people, leaves the resources of the country entirely at the mercy and disposal for exploitation by foreign capitalists. I have in my six statements shown this fully. India cannot afford to be governed by this crushing machinery. The Duke of Devonshire and Sir William Hunter have quite truly pointed out that India must be governed by its own native labour and at native rates. In the rates, although with equal efficiency, there will be at least one-third saving according to Government's own scale, but I feel that more saving can be made. In reality, the employment of a native is a whole saving to the country, inasmuch as it provides a native, and the money remains in the country to fructify in the people's own pocket, instead of its being consumed and carried away by somebody else. This machinery inflicts the triple calamity of depriving the Indians of wealth, employment, and experience.
How do you propose to improve the machinery in the way you desire ?—One of two ways, or partly both ways, must be adopted to improve this machinery and remove its chief fundamental evil. Both these ways I have already indicated. 1. That native labour must replace foreign labour ; and, 2. If any amount of foreign labour is considered as absolutely necessary as it is insisted on, as being necessary for the maintenance of British Rule in India, and British Supremacy in the East, the British Government ought, in justice, pay a share for its common interest with that of India. The machinery may be divinely perfect in its rules, but in its constitution or personnel it has a deep evil, and this evil ought to be remedied if Britain is to be a blessing and a benefit both to India and itself. At present this machinery renders Britain an evil to India instead of a benefit and blessing. I have not much intervened in examining details of departmental expenditure which have been examined with much trouble by the Chairman, and so also the question of financial control. Such examination at proper intervals, as used to be the case in the time of the Company, serves the important purpose of keeping the Government up to mark in case of expenditure. But unless the whole administration of expenditure is put on a natural basis, all examinations of details of departmental expenditures, &c., will be only so much “palliating with symptoms,” and will bring no permanent good and strength either to the Indian people or to the British Supremacy. However much you may change the rules or system of work, as long as this evil lasts as at present there cannot be good or beneficial government of India. My statements fully prove this. As this Return (192 of 1892) on the salaries shows, there are about Rx. 15,000,000 paid annually for salaries, &c., above Rs. 1,000 per annum. Add to this all that is paid to the European soldiers, and in a rough way it can be said that about 18 or 20 millions of Rx. are paid to Europeans every year. I asked for the correct amount but have not obtained it. Economically it is a loss to Indians, and more especially the portion that goes clean out of the country as savings and pensions and salaries paid in this country. I take an instance: Suppose a European servant draws a salary of Rs. 1,000 a month. He uses a portion of this for all his wants of living, comfort, &c., &c. All this consumption by him is at the deprivation of an Indian who would and could, under right and natural circumstances, occupy that position, and enjoy that provision. This is the first partial loss to India, as, at least, the services enjoyed by the European are rendered by Indians as they would have rendered to any Indian occupying the position. But whatever the European sends to England for his various wants, and whatever savings and pension he ultimately, on his retirement, carries away with him, is a complete drain out of the country, crippling her whole material condition and her capacity to meet all her wants, a dead loss of wealth together with the loss of work and wisdom, i.e., the accumulated experience of his service. Besides, all State expenditure in this country is a dead loss to India. This evil of bleeding must be removed from the present machinery of administration of expenditure as I have said, by treating India fairly for common purposes and by substituting native labour for foreign or European labour. The Rx. 20,000,000 are not by themselves the only evil. They return in the shape of capital and drain away a great deal more.
I beg your pardon. Would you explain that statement more fully? —There is regularly a transfer of a large portion of this Rx. 20,000,000 to this country adding to its capital; a portion of that again comes back to India as capital. Well, we are left entirely helpless, because we cannot make any capital, and, therefore, the foreign capitalist exploits, or uses to his benefit, all the resources of the country and carries away so much more in profits, in interests, and in every way. If we were free to accumulate our own capital fully we should be able then to compete on equal and fair terms with the foreign capital coming in, and there would be perhaps more benefit than evil by the foreign capital. At present we suffer it as an evil because we are helpless and on the ground, and foreign capital comes in and develops the resources for their benefit, and carries away the whole profit that is obtained out of those resources. We are simply used as common labourers, mere hewers of wood and drawers of water. That is the only position to which we are reduced.
That goes a little bit beyond my question. I understand the ground upon which you base your opinion, but I do not quite connect it with this Rx. 20,000,000. Do you think that a soldier who receives his part of the Rx. 20,000,000 immediately lends it out in India again, and do you make that a grievance?—No, it comes indirectly in the usual economic way.
I want to connect it with this particular Rx. 20,000,000. I want to connect it with the soldiers' or civilians' pay, and I cannot follow you when you say that the soldier with his 1s. a day or 1s. 6d. a day, and the civilian with so many rupees a month lays it out so that it returns in the shape of capital and drains away a great deal more. I confess that I am unable to connect the two things?—It does not do it directly, but the economical result of that is that a large portion of the capital of the wealth of India is drained to this country and goes back to the other country in the shape of capital not exactly ear-marked that it is the 1s. of the soldier or that it is the 100l. of the civilian that exactly formed that capital, it all comes into the great reserve of the capital of this country and from it again the capitalist takes it away back.
And therefore, you do think it an evil if the soldier, out of his large surplus income, invests it in any Indian securities, that is a mischief to India, is it?—The evil is in this way, that India therefore is unable to make any capital to make any benefit out of its own resources. The foreign capitalist comes in, both European as well as native—there are capitalists from Native States—and works up those resources and carries away the profit out of the country again. It is so much additional loss to the country on account of its helplessness. The original cause being these Rx. 20,000,000 drawn from them.
And the deduction which I must draw from that is that the investment by the soldier of his surplus pay in Indian securities is an evil to India?—Yes, in a way, I say that it comes indirectly.
I only want to follow that—that you regard the investment by the soldier of his surplus pay in Indian securities as an evil to India?—It comes in indirectly, it is economically an evil.
To illustrate your meaning, if there is a gold mine in Mysore which yields 10 per cent., the Indians there, having no accumulated capital, are not able to undertake that enterprise, and this 10 per cent. profit goes to English capitalists instead of to Indian capitalists, so that India gets no benefit from her gold mines. That, I understand, is the sort of idea?—Yes, and so with regard to all resources.
I was under the impression that that was the meaning in Mr. Naoroji's mind. Only you observe that he connects it with the particular payments made to the soldier and civilian; and it seemed to me that to connect the question of investment of capital with the surplus pay of the soldier and the civilian, and with what they do with that surplus pay, is really building too big an overstructure on a narrow foundation. If Mr. Naoroji puts it to us in the form in which you have put it to him, we should understand it. I only want to make quite clear what he means with regard to this particular Rx. 20,000,000.
It is a pure assumption that India is helpless and has no capital?—That is what I have proved in my six statements.
No, you have asserted it—not proved it I think?—But it is there.
Would you consider the fact that almost every year in India four or five crores of rupees are raised as a public loan? How much of that comes from the Native States, we should like to know.
But you do not know how much?—Well, that is what I want to know from the India Office and from the Government of India. I shall have a remark to make about our not knowing certain things further on.
Yes?—But, with regard to that, when you consider that out of the 300 millions of people in the general poverty, of course there is a small portion that has some little capital and that very little capital comes out in some way of investment. That certainly does not enable India to go in freely with all its own resources to develop its own resources for its own benefit as Sir William Wedderburn has just pointed out. It is in this way that we are not able to develop our own resources, which we would otherwise do if we were not deprived of this money every year.
What evidence have you as to the accumulation of capital in India before the time of British Rule ?—India has been well known to be a rich country before the time of British Rule, that it is its own riches that has brought all these invasions upon it, otherwise I do not think that the English would have come there had they thought that they would get no benefit out of going to India and merely to go on a quixotic expedition in order to save India from destruction or anything of that kind. And, besides that, the very fact that such an amount of wealth has been drawn from India shows that it has a capacity for producing if it is only allowed to enjoy what it produces.
One question more about this Rx. 20,000,000 ?—Yes.
I want to be perfectly fair on the subject. You speak of this Rx. 20,000,000 as if it went to England and was then returned in the shape of capital to India; but is it not the case that a very large amount of it is spent on the spot in India by the civil servant and by the soldier ?—Yes.
And therefore, are you right in putting it forward that Rx. 20,000,000 comes to England and goes back again in the shape of investment ?—No, I do not put the whole Rx. 20,000,000 as going to England. I first explained how a portion of it is spent in India; that portion is still to a certain extent to the detriment of an Indian, who would have taken his place; but that portion is spent there so far, with the loss that it is not enjoyed by an Indian but by a European.
I do not want to press this unduly, but would you not, therefore, modify your statement, “that Rx. 20,000,000 are not of “themselves the only evil; they return (that is the Rx. 20,000,000) “in the shape of capital to drain away great deal more”?— Yes I take the Rx. 20,000,000 as representing the whole evil, not simply for what passes out of the country, but what is also consumed in the country by somebody else other than the Indian, but it is the actual amount of capital; of course I mean that the actual amount of capital that goes clean out of the country is what is left after allowing for what is spent there, so far as among the Indians themselves—I do not mean to say that the whole of the Rx. 20,000,000 goes bodily out of the country entirely; I do not mean that.
Well, but that is your statement?—Oh, yes.
You would probably wish to modify that?—I think I have modified it; in fact, I have shown that this is the partial loss, and the other, which goes out of the country is the entire loss. Oh, yes, that may be clearly understood; it is clear on the face of it. Shall I go on?
Yes?—The present machinery of foreign domination of government is most destructive in every way. If England were subjected to such machinery, notwithstanding all its present great wealth, it would be, like India, impoverished before long. The one other necessity to improve the machinery is that the people themselves must have a voice in its conduct. Till the people themselves have a voice, it is simply an Oriental despotism, and India does not derive that blessing which it has a right to demand from Britain, of a constitutional government in place of a despotic government of the worst kind; “the heaviest of all yokes is the yoke of the stranger” as Macaulay has truly said. Then the present machinery requires to be improved by the employment of native labour, by a fair share in the expenditure, of all that is insisted as necessary of foreign element in the services to maintain British Rule, and to give to the Indians the true and the only important blessing of the British Rule, the Right of British Citizenship, of having a voice in its own expenditure, thereby fulfilling all the solemn pledges and Acts of Parliament which the British people by every honour are bound to fulfil, and which have been so far dishonourably ignored and not fulfilled by the Executive Governments in both countries. I feel bound to repeat, that if the machinery of a number of Native States, as suggested by Lords Salisbury and Iddesleigh, be carried out, all the requirements of Britain’s best interests and India’s best interests will be fully realised and fulfilled. I do sincerely hope that this Commission will see their way to an improvement of the present machinery, in a way beneficial both to England and India. I may add here my agreement to what I have already quoted from Sir Wm. Hunter : “ But the good work thus commenced has assumed “ such dimensions under the Queen’s Government of India that it “ can no longer be carried on or even supervised by improved “ labour from England, except at a cost which India cannot “ sustain,” . . . “ 40 years hereafter we should have had an “ Indian Ireland multiplied fifty-fold on our hands. The condition “ of things in India compels the Government to enter on these “ problems. Their solution and the constant demand for improve- “ ment in the general executive, will require an increasing amount “ of administrative labour. India cannot afford to pay for that “ labour at the English rates, which are the highest in the world “ for official service. But she can afford to pay for it at her own “ native rates, which are perhaps the lowest in the world for such “ employment.” “ You cannot work with imported labour as cheaply “ as you can with native labour, and I regard the more extended “ employment of the natives not only as an act of justice but “ as a financial necessity.” “ The appointment of a few natives “ annually to the Covenanted Clvil Service will not solve the “ problem. . . . If we are to govern the Indian people efficient- “ ly and cheaply we must govern them by means of themselves, “ and pay for administration at the market rates of native “ labour.” This, I say, is a fair statement of the principal imperfections and evils of the present machinery, which must be improved as suggested. This peculiar inherent evil, or fundamental error, in the present British Indian administration and management of expenditure, and its consequences have been foretold more than 100 years ago by Sir John Shore (1787) : “ Whatever allowance “ we make for the increased industry of the subjects of the State, “ owing to the enhanced demand for the produce of it (supposing “ the demand to be enhanced), there is reason to conclude that the “ benefits are more than counterbalanced by evils inseparable from “ the system of a remote foreign dominion”. And it is significantly remarkable that the same inherent evil in the present system of administration and management of expenditure has been, after nearly 100 years, confirmed by a Secretary of State for India. Lord Randolph Churchill has said in a letter to the Treasury, (1886): "The position of India, in relation to taxation and the "sources of the public revenues, is very peculiar, not merely "from the habits of the people and their strong aversion to "change, which is more especially exhibited to new forms of "taxation, but likewise from the character of the Government, "which is in the hands of foreigners who hold all the principal "administrative offices, and form so large a part of the Army."
Might I interrupt you, is that true that you have just read, "who hold all"?—Hold all the principal administrative offices.
All?—Yes, that at least is the assertion of the Secretary of State, but there are a few Natives now, I think, in those appointments—very few—such as a few Chief Justices.
A few Chief Justices?—I mean the judges, and there has been some little advance in the application of what was incorrectly called the Statutory Service; but they have put an end to that.
Well "all" is not correct, then?—All the highest offices is certainly correct.
That has been much qualified, has it not?—Well, it is qualified to a very small extent in regard to some of the inferior offices; still, I have quoted what the Secretary of State says.
But the judges are not administrative departments?—No, not administrative nor executive.
All the principal administrative offices?—Yes, all the principal administrative offices. "The impatience of new taxation which "would have to be borne wholly as a consequence of the foreign "rule imposed on the country, and virtually to meet additions to "charges arising outside of the country, would constitute a political "danger, the real magnitude of which it is to be feared is not all "appreciated by persons who have no knowledge of or concern in "the Government of India, but which those responsible for that "Government have long regarded as of the most serious order." Lord Salisbury, as Secretary of State for India, put the same inherent evil in this manner: "The injury is exaggerated in the "case of India, where so much of the revenue is exported without "a direct equivalent." And he indicates the character of the present system of the administration and management of expenditure as being that "India must be bled." I need not say more upon this aspect of the inherent evil of the present system and machinery of expenditure. I give these opinions in these words as I agree with them, and as very significant as coming from high authority. Almost in words of prophecy Sir David Barbour and Lord Lansdowne uttered these words only four years ago on the present machinery of Government. Sir David Barbour said "The financial position of the Government of India at the present "moment is such as to give cause for apprehension." "The "prospects of the future are disheartening." Lord Lansdowne, as "Viceroy, said: "We should be driven to lay before the Council so "discouraging an account of our finances, and to add the "admission, that, for the present, it is beyond our power to "describe the means by which we can hope to extricate ourselves "from the difficulties and embarrassments which surround us." "My honourable friend is, I am afraid, but too well justified in "regarding our position with grave apprehension." "We have "to consider not so much the years which are past and gone as "those which are immediately ahead of us, and if we look forward "to these there can be no doubt that we have cause for "serious alarm." And now within four years, India is visited by the greatest and direst calamity as was feared. When will there be an end of these calamities? Sir George Wingate says, with which I agree, with regard to the present system of expenditure: "Taxes spent in the country from which they are raised "are totally different in their effect from taxes raised in one coun- "try and spent in another. In the former case the taxes collected "from the population . . . are again returned to the "industrious classes. . . . But the case is wholly different "when the taxes are not spent in the country from which they are "raised. . . . They constitute . . . an absolute loss and "extinction of the whole amount withdrawn from the taxed "country . . . might as well be thrown into the sea. . . . "Such is the nature of the tribute we have so long exacted "from India. . . . From this explanation some faint "conception may be formed of the cruel crushing effect of "the tribute upon India." "The Indian tribute, whether weighed " in the scales of justice, or viewed in the light of our own interest " will be found to be at variance with humanity, with common " sense, and with the received maxims of economic science." This is my criticism on the most vital aspects of the present machinery of the administration of expenditure. It is destructive to India, and will be disastrous to England, and cannot promote the general prosperity of the people. My statements have been in the hands of the Commission from 9 to 15 months (the sixth being about 6 or 7 weeks), and I cannot but trust that the Commission will have fully examined them, and know my views on the most important references to them; viz., the administrative machinery of expenditure and the apportionment of charges for common purposes. Now, coming direct to some of the incidence of the machinery, I say there is one thing very unfortunate in the Government of India; in both countries there is great disinclination to give information, especially if it is likely to tell against them. Even such information as Parliament prescribes and the Government of India itself tabulates. In the Act of 1858 (Section LIII.), Parliament provided that, among other information for its guidance, the Indian authorities should lay before it every year " a statement prepared from de- " tailed reports from each Presidency and district in India, in such " form as shall best exhibit the moral and material progress and " condition of India in each such Presidency." Thereupon such reports were ordered by the Government of India to be prepared by the Government, of each Presidency. As a beginning the reports were naturally imperfect in details. In 1862, the Government of India observed: "There is a mass of statistics in the " Administration Reports of the various Local Governments . . . . " but they are not compiled on any uniform plan . . . . so as " to show the statistics of the Empire (Fin. Con., June 1862)." The Statistical Committee, which the Government of India had organised for the purpose, prepared certain forms of tables. And after receiving reports on those forms from the different Governments made a report to the Government of India, with revised forms of tables (Office Memorandum, Financial Department, No. 1,043, dated 28th February, 1866). The members of this Committee were Mr. A. Grote, President, and Messrs. G. Campbell, D. Cowie, and G. Smith. Now, if all these tables of the different departments were fully and carefully given, in the Annual Administration Reports, the non-official public and, for the matter of that, the officials themselves would be able to judge correctly the character of the efficiency or inefficiency of the departments. But the non-official public and Parliament have no means afforded them by the Government to understand and judge fairly the working of the whole machinery. The machinery of every department is a monstrosity, a huge heavy weight of lead, of high salaries to a few Europeans at the top, and the undermachinery from which all work originates is very weak, underpaid, and offering every temptation te corruption and oppression, and consequently both insufficient and inefficient, or worse than inefficient, as in the case of the police. If India were allowed the benefit of its own production, instead of being bled unceasingly, it is capable of giving as full resources to Government as this country is. But this is not allowed. Compare the expenditure incurred in this country to enjoy efficiency of administration and protection, with the wretched provision in India, because India is not allowed to enjoy its own. And consequently the whole machinery of Government is unworthy of an English administration. All this great imperfection and discredit would become clear to the public if the administration reports gave all the information which Parliament has asked, subject to such improvements as may be suggested from time to time. This is the chief reason why the non-official public in India are unable to criticise this machinery. Criticism presupposes knowledge and information of the subject, and this cannot be got. If we criticise without precise information, from general belief, we are at once come down upon as reckless, attacking Gevernment without knowledge, ill-informed agitators, and what not, when really the head and front of the offence is the Government itself. I shall read the comparison I have made between the expenditure of this country and of India to show that with India's poor expenditure on India's benefit (after the bleeding), makes inefficiency and insufficiency of Government as a matter of course. The Duke of Devonshire, Lord Salisbury, Sir William Hunter, and others are perfectly justified in their views about the inefficiency and insufficiency of Government of India. And then I have got this table of comparison between the expenditure incurred here for the sake of efficiency and the expenditure we can only provide it from very poor resources in India, which, of course, must naturally be insufficient and inefficient in Government. Am I to read all the figures or only just give the ultimate result?
Perhaps you will take the course that you think best for the Commission?—Very well. The United Kingdom, 1896—I have taken this from the Statistical Abstract Return, No. C. 8209 of 1896—United Kingdom expenditure—I exclude interest, because it does not form a part of the administration or protection—civil list, and civil administration list, 21,251,357l.; army, 18,459,800l. Navy I exclude, because we have no Navy, except a small marine expenditure, and therefore I do not think it just to put that in. Charges for the collection of revenue, 13,119,000l.; total expenditure for administration and protection, excluding the Navy and interest—52,830,157l.; or 53,000,000l. for a population of 39,465,730, say, 40,000,000. This gives 1l. 6s. 6d. per head, excluding the Navy and interest. On the side of British India: the statistical abstract of British India, Return C. 8238 of 1896; the figures are for 1894–5–I exclude interest also. Post office, telegraph, and mint. Rx. 2,466,175; salaries and expenses of civil departments, Rx. 14,835,209; miscellaneous civil charges, Rx. 6,065,705; famine relief and insurance, Rx. 610,235; buildings and roads, Rx. 5,352,801; army services, Rx. 24,096,091; special defence works, Rx. 217,867; provincial expenditure defrayed from provincial balances, Rx. 560,860; direct demands on revenue, Rx. 9,722,041; deduct refunds, Rx. 280,555; the total amounts to Rx. 63,646,429, or, say, 640 million rupees, for nearly six times the population; for a population of 230 millions; and taking the population of 1891 as 221,172,952, and adding 4 per cent. for the subsequent four years, gives a total of 230,091,870—say, 230 millions population. The expenditure, therefore, per head comes to 2 rupees 12 annas per head as compared with 1l. 6s. 6d. in the United Kingdom.
And what deduction do you draw from that? What is the impression it leaves on your mind; and what is the impression you wish to convey to the Commission?—The impression left on my mind, and what I wish to impress on the Commission, is, that resources of British India are so very poor that Government cannot get more with all the taxation than 2 rupees and 12 annas per head for administration and protective charges. Consequently, necessarily this Government should be very inefficient, while here the fact that for efficient and good government the public are willing and are able to give 1l. 6s. 6d. per head shows that the Government of British India naturally throws a great deal of discredit upon the Government of India for the poor resources that they have at their command for giving efficient and sufficient government.
I ask that question with reference to this point; you are comparing the rich country and the poor country?—Yes.
You have dwelt very much upon the wealth of England, and very much upon the poverty of India; and yet from your putting those two totals together, it looked as if you thought it an evil that the administration in India did not cost more?— What I want to conclude is that the administration of India is very imperfect and very inefficient on account of its resources being so poor, caused by the foreign domination system, and the unnatural system which is introduced, or which is worked in India.
But I want to follow you out. Would you advocate a larger expenditure on administration in India?—Yes; I advocate that India should be left to be benefited by its own resources; and India would be able to give a great deal more for governing purposes, and be more efficiently governed than what it is at present. The cause of its being in such an unfortunate plight is that the system of machinery adopted there is a very unnatural and a very unfortunate one.
Then what is your conclusion; that if India was independent, would the independent Government double, treble, quadruple, quintuple the taxation in order to bring the expenditure to something more like the expenditure in England?—If India is allowed to keep its own resources to itself I am quite confident that India would be quite able to supply all the necessary funds as they are supplied here.
That is to say, that, if India were independent she would have to raise something like Rx. 300,000,000?—Very well.
And you really think that if India was independent, she could do that without damaging her own resources?—If India is allowed to retain all its resources whilst being dependent upon British Rule, because it is a great blessing—the British Supremacy—for various reasons; but if India is allowed to retain its resources instead of being bled by this foreign domination, India would be quite able to pay, if necessary, Rx. 200,000,000.
That is to say, that you are using that expression "if India was independent" because that is the easiest way of putting it?—You may put it in that way to illustrate the case.
That the Indian Governments in that day without doing harm to India, could quintuple the present taxation?--I cannot go so far as to say that it would quadruple or sextuple it; but still, I have no doubt that it would supply all the necessary funds for efficient government.
I want to get at your standard. You are holding up to us a comparison between the expenditure in England of 1l. 6s. 6d., and the expenditure in India of 2 rupees and 12 annas?—Yes.
And your evidence would lead us, I think, to think that India, under a happier state of things, would emulate, in order to get a thoroughly good administration, the expenditure per head which obtains in this country?—Yes.
I want to give you the opportunity of qualifying the statement if you think it necessary. It leads to this, that in some shape or other you are to get out of India, which you say is a poor country, say, five times the present revenue. It is a question of the difference between the 1l. 6s. 6d. and those 2 rupees 12 annas a head, which, I think, take it up very closely to Rx. 300,000,000. That is multiplying its present revenue by six or seven. Do you think that a poor country, if it were only under an independent Government, could raise that amount of money without impairing its resources?—With this British Supremacy, what is poor now would become rich if it is allowed to keep its own benefits. The only qualification I have to make, whether she will need even so much money as England requires for efficiency, is this: that labour there and efficient labour and native labour would be so much cheaper, a good deal cheaper, than what it is here, and the result would be that perhaps if we did not require Rx. 200,000,000 or Rx. 300,000,000, or as many times as the difference now exists; but certainly India would be quite capable of supplying as much as may be necessary for its own efficient and sufficient government; that I have not the least doubt whether it would be 150,000,000 or 200,000,000, or 150,000,000, I have not the least fear that India's resources would be found quite equal to the necessities of its wants.
You see the practical remedy which you have indicated to us as a means of arriving at this result is that, whereas Rx. 20,000,000 is now spent upon European soldiers and European civilians, that amount should be spent upon Indians, that is to say that Indians should receive this Rx. 20,000,000; but, supposing that was done, that would not supply anything like the difference which would be necessary to raise the two rupees up to a level of 1l. 6s. 6d. per head, and therefore you would have to find the difference by some other method?—If what is taken out of the country is saved to the country its economical effect would be to enrich the country.
But you cannot enrich it more than the sum?—No. This sum remaining in the country will economically provide far better effects than it does at present. It is not the saving of the Rx. 20,000,000 only, it would be the saving of all the reproduction, fructification of the money in the ccuntry itself.
But that Rx. 20,000,000 laid out there could only produce a certain interest?—It is not all interest, it is developing the resources of the country which might quintuple and make the riches of the country far greater than what they are. It will make, in fact, the country rich if all that is drawn away from India is saved in it and becomes its own resources. It is the capital, the blood of the country.
May I interpret it in this way, that if that Rx. 20,000,000 was left in Indian pockets it would produce every year Rx. 300,000,000, and that gain, realised by laying out those Rx. 20,000,000 in India, would enable the Indian Government to raise the rate of taxation from 2 rupees 12 annas a head to something like 1l. 6s. 6d.. It is a very large deduction. I am delighted to hear that India is so rich that laying out Rx. 20,000,000 would produce in a year between Rx. 200,000,000 and Rx. 300,000,000?—Of course it will not produce it in a year, but it will first have to fill up the gap of all that has been drawn away, and it will raise it gradually to that rich condition which it is capable of. Of course to say that these Rx. 20,000,000 saved this year will enable the Government of India to have Rx. 200,000,000 for the purposes of Government cannot be thought of. Of course I never meant that, but if those Rx. 20,000,000 or Rx. 30,000,000, or whatever it is that is drawn from India, is saved to it, it will gradually work its economical effect in enriching India every year by increased foreign trade, by increased production, and in that manner will make it strong enough and rich enough to give the Government of India such resources as may be necessary to their heart's content.
I am only anxious to bring out clearly, Mr. Naoroji, what you mean by it in order to give you an opportunity of making any modification of the statements which you have just given us in evidence ?—Yes.
Because at present it certainly, I think as it stands, would sound rather drawing wide deductions from small premises. You point out to us that India is a very poor country, you go on to say that, if she was independent, you would quintuple her expenditure in order to bring her up to somewhere near the standard that you suggest it should be or to the English standard, and you produce that result by proposing that a comparatively small sum in salaries and pay, which now goes to Europeans, should go to Indians?— Yes. It is not the amount that is so much the difficulty. If the people get back what they give, as here, India can give in time all that may be necessary, Rx. 200,000,000 or Rx. 300,000,000.
And you think that that comparatively small sum kept in India would result, perhaps in a few years, in this enormous sum in order to raise the expenditure of India to something like the level of the English expenditure ?—I thank you very much for pointing out the likely misunderstanding which would arise, and therefore I have given the modifying answers, so that it may not be misunderstood. Then I have given an illustration here. I have taken just one instance of public education in which I have also worked out those figures which come to for primary education alone; here 4s. 6d. per head of the population, while in British India it comes to about one anna and-half a pie per head. I just point out my object in bringing this illustration was not to point out that the figures must be equal, but that there is a great disparity on account of certain causes which I lay stress upon.
And I think that you do not lay stress upon the word “independent” which the Chairman used?—No, I do not at all.
You mean that if a suitable system is adopted it will tend greatly to prosperity; it will allow of much heavier taxation and sufficient taxation?—Quite right; that is what I mean.
And that the present system is as though the people were to consume the seed corn which is needed for next harvest, it will produce destitution even though sowing that seed corn may not immediately produce prosperity. I think that is the drift of your evidence?—Yes.
In using the phrase “independent Government,” I was only wanting to get out your view, Mr. Naoroji, that if the English Government were removed, and, therefore, if the great evil which is pressing on India in your view were removed, India under a better system of administration would be able to work in the direction of the model which you have put before us; namely, the amount of expenditure in this country?—Of course. What I mean is that I for one, certainly do not wish to sever the connection with Britain. On the contrary it is my extreme desire that the connection with Britain may last a very long time for the benefit of both countries; it is for that reason alone that I am struggling; if it were otherwise, I think I had better remain quiet.
Then may we take that as giving your views upon the machinery of administration?—Upon the machinery of administration.
There is nothing you would like to add to that?—No. I do not think I have got anything to add here.
I mean that is a general statement of your views?—A general statement.
But I would bring it before you that it hardly touches the subjects that have been before us and upon which Indian officials have placed very full information before us; namely, the analysis of the different branches of public expenditure in India. Beyond your comment upon the small amount spent in education, do I understand that you do not wish to offer any criticisms upon the description they have given of Indian administration in all its branches?—No, I do not offer any criticism upon those details for the simple reason that I confine myself especially to the important point for which I asked the Commission and for which Sir Henry Fowler said that he wanted to prove that there was prosperity or not from the machinery of the Government as it existed. I therefore applied myself fully to prove that point that it did not promote prosperity. I therefore did not apply myself to the little details for two reasons, first that you cannot get information from the public records of any kind so as to go very minutely into precise figures, and for the present purpose for which this Commission, as far as I was concerned, was asked was the important purpose of the principles upon which the whole Government expenditure was conducted, and these principles being unnatural any discussion upon the details of the different departments will benefit nothing excepting perhaps proposing a reduction here and a reduction there which is soon forgotten and which is the fate of all the previous Commissions that have generally taken place, and as I know of the Financial Committee of 1871-4. I purposely, therefore, wanted to bring out as prominently as possible this fundamental evil difficulty, by the removal of which both England and India may benefit.
Then may we take it that you confine your recommendation for reform of Administration in India to the doing away with the European element—I do not want to put this in an antagonistic manner, but merely to get out your view?—No.
From your evidence I gather that your remedy is to do away with the European element in India and replace that element by an Indian Army and by an Indian Administration—no Europeans being employed in the Army, no Europeans being employed in the Administration—that I should gather to be your view?—No. I can explain what I mean; I do not mean that there should be no Europeans at all in the Army, nor in the Civil Administration. What I want to say is—even Lord Ripon put it as the irreducible minimum—that as far as possible every native added in the service will be a gain to the Administration of the country, and that if any portion of Europeans is considered as absolutely necessary it is on the ground of the maintenance of the British Rule; otherwise there will be no necessity as far as the British Government or the British people are concerned. In that case, I say in fairness, if they went for the common purpose, and I admit that is a benefit to India also, that in fairness the expenditure incurred upon the European portion—the irreducible minimum—should be fairly divided between the two countries instead of putting the whole burden upon India. As to the employment of every Indian, of course, India ought to pay and should be very prepared to pay.
You put your suggestion before us as a means of raising the expenditure of India to something like a level of the expenditure of England. As far as possible the Europeans in the Army and the Europeans in the Administration should be replaced by Indians. The mere fact of paying an Indian, you look upon it, instead of a European would have such a fructifying effect that in the course of a certain number of years it would enable the Indian Government to raise taxation up to almost the level of the English taxation. But you go further, and you say wherever Europeans are employed that England should repay. Therefore the position would be this, that supposing, we will say, that only one-fourth of the present force were retained of Europeans that would cost something like Rx. 5,000,000. I am now taking the figures of Rx. 20,000,000 as the total that will be paid by England to India by your view, and that would be the sole immediate cash benefit?—Immediate benefit, yes.
Beyond that the Rx. 15,000,000 would be paid to Indians, and that left in the Indian pocket would produce this enormous interest or fructifying power, which would enable the Indian Government within a few years to raise the expenditure per head from 2 rupees 12 annas to something like 1 l. 6s. 6 d. per head?—Sticking to that comparison between the two as I have brought in this table as an illustration, I do not think it is fair to me. What I mean there is that India, if left to such resources as I am mentioning, will be able to supply all its wants, and at the cheaper rate of labour every demand required of themselves; but I say if it requires Rx. 200,000,000 or if it requires Rx. 150,000,000 to be more efficient and sufficient to give that, Indian resources are quite enough to meet all its wants, provided those resources remain in its hands.
That is the object with which I asked these questions ?—Yes.
You placed this before us as a model ?--Yes, as an illustration.
And your evidence after that, I think, pointed very much to this--you were giving the cost of the English Administration at home as a type, and you considered that something of the kind should be the object of administration in India. The increase of taxation which that involves in so poor a country, is, of course, very startling. I wanted to be quite sure that there was no modification in the case that you are putting before us that you would wish to make ?—Yes.
Now, I understand that you modify it so far as this, that you do not put the 1l. 6s. 6d. as an absolute type ?—No.
But, of course, you do leave it that a very large increase of expenditure is necessary in India for Indian purposes ?—Yes.
And therefore that considerable means ought to be found for that purpose; but the one practical remedy which you suggest is, that a certain number of Europeans who are now employed in India should be replaced by Indians ?—Yes. The principle which I approve is that which was declared “by the “Duke of Devonshire, who said: “If the country is to be “better governed, that can only be done by the employment of “the best and most intelligent of the natives in the service,” and “as pointed out by Sir W. W. Hunter, if we are to govern the “people of India efficiently and cheaply, we must govern them by “means of themselves, and pay for the administration at the “market rates of native labour”. An administration conducted on these principles will stop the material, political, and intellectual drain from India.
And I think you are able to illustrate the general problem to which the Chairman has referred, the wonderful improvement in the case of Mysore, which was handed over to native rule in a condition of great financial difficulty, and which is now able to raise a large revenue and to do a great deal for the public good, and yet is in a prosperous financial condition. It is not to the mere interest profit out of sums invested, but to a more economical and suitable method of administration that you look for the prosperity which will bear the additional expenditure. Is that not so?—Yes. In the case of the Mysore State this method was adopted by Lords Salisbury and Iddesleigh ‘‘as a guarantee for the good govern- ‘‘ment of the people, and for the security of British rights and inter- ‘‘ests.’’ This experiment, though disapproved by the Anglo-Indian authorities, was loyally and effectively carried out by them, and proved a brilliant success, resulting in a contented people, a full treasury, moral and material progress, and attachment to British Supremacy. It is a brilliant episode in British Indian History. Similarly British India will be prosperous and contented if the same principles are followed, local administration being entrusted to competent native officials under European control, co-operating with representative assemblies.
I understand that it is your desire that British Rule in India should be continued and strengthened?—I gladly recognise the benefits of British Rule, especially as regards law and order, education, and freedom of the press and public meeting; but I believe that British power and influence are much weakened by the refusal to administer expenditure in a way so as to give the people justice and a voice in their own affairs, by the consequent ‘‘extreme poverty’’ of the masses, and by the non-fulfilment of the solemn pledges given by Parliament and the Crown, of equal opportunity in the public service to all subjects of Her Majesty; and I sincerely desire to see British Rule strengthened on the lines most beneficial to the people both of India and of Britain.
Then, before we pass on to apportionment, I would call your attention to one point, Mr. Naoroji. We have a proverb here, ‘‘take care of the pence and the pounds will take care of themselves’’. That argument does not apply in India, does it? Your evidence does not deal with the reform of the administration in its details?—Taking care of the pence and an examination like this which you have so very carefully and with much trouble carried out has its use. What I want to point out was that that alone by itself will not remove that general condition of the poverty of India, and all the bad effects of the present system of administration, unless we go into the question of the principle upon which the whole administration of expenditure is based.
Quite so ?--And I wanted to impress upon the Commission particularly that they must fully treat India on righteous principles, and if that is once settled a great deal of the difficulty would be removed; the whole Indian problem will be solved; and there would be time enough then to go into the details which will be a matter of necessity, as here, every year, there is an examination of the details of Government in the discussion on the Budget.
Quite so. You have put before us your general view of the manner in which the reform of the administration should be effected and its results. The Commission, I think, might regard the remedies you propose as outside their powers—but within our powers we have had a very exhaustive examination of the details of administration, and I was anxious to know whether in the course of that examination you had any views to express upon the different branches of the public service as they have been brought before us. It is only by going into those details that economy can be effected; I rather gather from you that you are not prepared to offer us any suggestions or criticisms upon this evidence which has been placed before us?—No; I do not enter into the criticism of the details, as I have already explained that, with the best results that may be obtained, there is very much of this criticism that would not touch the chief evil and the real evil of the whole matter; and so far as the Government of India is concerned, taking the things as they are, they are doing what they can to a very great extent, and I do not find much fault with them as far as the machinery is adopted by them subject to all human imperfections as they have. An examination like this of details at regular intervals something like what it was every 20 years in the case of the East India Company might be very important to check any unnecessary expense, or any extravagance in expenditure, and that also has been discussed during the last Financial Committee. On the present occasion my chief contention, and I wanted particularly to keep aloof from the details for the very reason that I may direct the Commission as pointedly as possible to going to the root of the whole evil, so that there may be some permanent benefit, and therefore I am not prepared to go into the criticism of the details. I did that deliberately and I may say generally, as I said just now that the Government of India avoiding the question of the evil of this principle of administration they are doing as well as they can, with all human imperfections and requiring criticism from time to time. They are doing their work with a sufficient desire to administer in the best way possible. I am quite willing to give them that credit, that the officials are doing what they can, even under very disadvantageous and evil circumstances.
And does not that somewhat justify my quoting the proverb about the pence? Is it not worth taking care of the pennies ?—Only that these points will all again come back when the Government of India falls into its own regime, and there will be no good done. And that was my own personal course that I have taken. I do not know; my other friends may be able to go into some criticism of details here.
You have been critical upon the Indian administration and you have stated that the information, I think, was not forthcoming which would enable you more effectually to criticise Indian administration ?—Yes, that is true; that is the great want.
But has not this Commission given you a very fair opportunity for obtaining that information. We have had the responsible Indian officials before us ?—Yes.
And was not that a far better opportunity to cross-examine them and elicit from them this information which is wanting, rather than after the time to say that examination is difficult because the information is not forthcoming ?—Yes; but the information that has come before the Commission is of that kind, especially from the official point of view, is a one-sided information to a large extent necessarily to justify their own way of procedure. We have not that information which would enable us to know behind the scenes what is wanting in it. Only we should have in order to criticise, and that is a great disadvantage for every non-official witness that he cannot criticise, because he has not a full knowledge and a complete knowledge, and he does not know what to ask. It is for the Government of India to give this information as is asked by the Committee of the Government of India and by Parliament, and we would then be able to criticise more effectually and more precisely what decrease, or what extravagance, or what waste has taken place in any particular department, or in any particular way.
I think, Mr. Naoroji, a man who has given so much attention to these subjects as you have evidently done from the papers which you have laid before us, is in a position, when he is put face to face with the official witnesses, to elicit from them those weak points upon which they have not given us, in his opinion, full information ?—We have not got such information as would enable us to know what the weak points are. The official witnesses really do not point out what their weak points are, and we are not able to point out those weak points for the simple reason that we have no information, or very imperfect information which would not help.
If you have no information, is it quite fair to make a general attack on Indian administration ?—The general attack is perfectly justified from the results. The results show that the very nature of the administration with the poor resources at the command of the Government, that the Government must be inefficient and insufficient, and the general attack I made is not so much upon the Government as officials, but upon the system upon which they are working, that system being an evil system. They cannot help but do what of course would produce unsatisfactory results. I have not the least wish to attack the Government of India or the officials, because I do not believe they themselves would do any evil. It is the cause of the evil system upon which they are working, and which requires to be considered and modified so that they themselves may be able to do their work with greater satisfaction to themselves as well as with greater satisfaction to the people. That is the principle which I wanted specially and principally to bring forward.
Of course, the point to which I am directing your attention is this. We have had a large amount of evidence before us of an official character ; and we have done our best on the Commission not only to get the best official evidence, but also the evidence of high officers who have held posts in India, and who are above the ordinary official witnesses. In addition we have been anxious to learn native opinion upon the subject; and here a very large field of examination has been opened, upon which, I think, every opportunity has been given in bringing over witnesses from India to undergo examination; every fair demand for information has been fairly met, and at the end of it I am anxious to learn from you whether, from a native point of view and as representing native opinion, you have any criticism to offer upon the subject more immediately interesting to us, namely, administrative management of expenditure in its details?—If this question of the greatest importance upon which I insist is put aside, and if simply the machinery as it is taken, supposing it to be, as it were, machinery in which that evil did not exist, I have not much criticism to offer myself. I do not think it so much necessary that I need go into very great detail in order to point out any defects in any particular department.
With regard to what you say of not being able to get the information of certain definite facts, can you give the Commission a note of the points on which you had asked for information, and you have not got it, and points on which you desire information from the India Office or the Indian Government, can you give a statement to that effect?—I can give it at once just now; to say that if all the tables which are proposed by the Government of India were fully filled up for any particular year, we shall be able to offer a good deal of criticism.
Yes; but will you just give a form that you wish filled up, and then I have no doubt the Chairman will consider whether they can be obtained?—Yes, I can do that if the India Office would be good enough to give us the Report of that Committee which settled the tables, and from those tables—those tables are the very tables that they have not placed before the Commission.
What tables are those?—The tables that were fixed by this Committee of Sir George Campbell and others, and what the different administrative officials give in their Administrative Reports, and if those tables were supplied with the information I think it would be good for the Government itself as well as for the public to understand each other, and a good deal of misunderstanding and misapprehension will then be removed, and then the statement I can lay partly as I pointed out in one instance already in my Report with regard to the agricultural tables a factor of depreciation. I have got those tables at page 4 of my statement of the 9th January, 1896, and as they were prescribed by this Committee, and if this information is fully given, we should be able very well to ascertain what the capacity, and what the condition of the people is. This is only one set of tables, and there are tables with regard to the Judicial Department, and with regard to the Police Department, with all the departments, and if those tables were correctly and fully given of course, we have all the information. It is not that the information does not exist; this Commission would have been very much helped and we would have been very much helped, to help the Commission in the most effective manner possible.
Do you wish to ask Mr. Naoroji to put in such a paper?
I should like a note of that to be put in, and to state distinctly what is the information that you consider necessary?—
Very good. I shall require, Sir James Peile, if I can be given a copy of the Report of this Committee, with all the tables connected with it. I was obliged to go — even those few tables that I have made—I was kindly allowed to go to the India Office by Sir Charles Bernard, and to copy out some of those which I immediately required.
Has a copy been refused to you?—Yes, a copy has been refused, for this reason, that they have got it all bound up in one volume, and no spare copy.
But you can come and consult it here?—So I went and copied what was required for this purpose. If a copy could be made by a clerk, or by the India Office, it would save me a great deal of trouble; if not, I will come and copy it all myself, in order to place it here.
You drew attention to the difference between the salaries payable to Europeans and to Natives, and seem to think that India would gain very much if the salaries were reduced to the native scale. Can you give any instance of the high salaries which you think would be saved if a system of native employees was introduced?—All the high positions are of such salaries that the Government of India does say that if any Indian is employed in any of those places two-thirds the salary would be quite enough for him, as a very liberal salary. The Government of India and the Secretary of State, has himself laid down this condition, that wherever an Indian is employed in place of a European, that two-thirds of the salary ought to be enough for him. That in itself at once saves one-third. But then I go further than that, even those two-thirds in its economical effect will be still of far greater benefit, as well as the one-third saved.
And is it the rule at present when a native is appointed to any one of those high positions that he receives two-thirds of the salary? ---Yes, I think that is the rule now.
May I correct you?---Is it not?
No; that rule is now abolished. Under the Provincial Service there are special rates of salary lower than the European rates fixed for the natives, except in the highest appointments, such as the High Court, where a Native Judge gets the same salary as a European Judge?---Yes. What I say is that even in the highest positions a lower salary will be accepted by quite equally efficient men, even on the scale which the Government of India itself has laid down; but at present, of course, it produces to a certain extent dissatisfaction, for one official is paid at a very high salary for services of the same character done by a native. If the European officials were also brought down to the same salary as the Indian there would be some fairness; that the salary is paid not according to the individual, but according to the services done; and if it is paid according to the services done, there will be a great deal of saving, not only two-thirds, but, I think less---at least this is my opinion---that these high salaries can be reduced with satisfaction both to the Government, as a relief to them, and to the Indians, that they have employment in their own country.
Does that apply to any very large number of appointments?---There are very few appointments yet given in that way.
But is there a very large number of these high appointments?---Yes.
To which high salaries are attached?---Yes.
Which could be reduced, do you think, if a Native Indian was employed?---Here we have got a Return which gives us the figures. I got them out. From what salary do you think I should begin in. Here is a Return from Rs. 1,000 per annum up to—well, take the salary of the Viceroy, 25,000l. Then, as you go through, we go to the highest, the number, of course, is smaller, but the amount is very large. If you look at this, this will give you the exact figures, and we can work them out if you like.
But you think that below the very highest appointments there are salaries which are too high for the scale of work, either for the European or for the Native?—Yes, there are to a very great extent—all those salaries. The very fact that the Government has determined, in regard to the Covenanted Civil Service especially, that any appointment now, except those that pass here with the other competitors, that they are kept, I think, on the same level, but when the Statutory Service was passed, that is to say, the Service under the Act of 1870, the Government passed a rule that any appointments given to them should have two-thirds of the salaries paid to Europeans, and that regulates appointments, under the Statutory Service; though the Act exists, its action is repealed by the Secretary of State himself, though Parliament required that a certain number of Indians should be every year appointed in India itself, and that Act of 1870 is now a dead letter.
Did you say a dead letter?—It is a dead letter is the Act of 1870. The Provincial Service is now introduced, which really does not supply what this Act of 1870 meant.
Why?—Why, because it does not come to the same level. In the Act of 1870, it was intended that the Indians appointed in India itself, without being required to come to this country, were to be put exactly on the same footing as those who went from this country, in fact, they were to form an integral part of the Civil Service. Well, this went on for 10 years, and then the Secretary of State decided that no further appointments should be made in that way. In 1878, the Government of India urged very strongly not to act upon that Act, and to introduce what I may call the Provincial Service. The Secretary of State refused to do that; the Secretary of State wished that the Act should be carried out in its integrity, and then only after the Secretary of State's resistance the rules were made. For six years no notice whatever was taken of this Act, either here or in India.
For what six years?—From 1870 to 1876. The Secretary of State, from here, several times reminded the Government of India to make rules, but they did not do it until they were pressed afterwards, and in 1878 they wrote a long despatch, trying to persuade the Secretary of State for India not to compel them to make these rules, and not to carry out the Act of 1870.
The Statute was passed in 1870, was it not?—The Statute was passed in 1870.
Are you aware that rules were prepared and sent here for approval in 1873?—Yes, that I became aware of when the Blue Book was published, but the rules that were sent were not received, as far as I can understand, were not adopted by the Secretary of State, and it was in 1876 or 1877.
Do you know why they were not adopted?—That I cannot say, because the information is not given in the Blue Book.
Well, I will give you the information. You could have had it at any time in the Report of the Public Service Commission?— Yes.
The difficulty was that the Law Officers of the Crown raised an objection to the rules proposed by the Government of India. Do you know when the next set of rules were proposed; you said nothing was done for six or eight years?—The next set of rules was proposed by Lord Cranbrook, who pressed those rules again.
What year?—That was again in 1877 or 1876.
No, in 1875, on the contrary?—I know; I have not even the despatch, I think.
Revised rules were drawn up by Lord Northbrook's Government in 1875?—Very well. I am very glad to have all that information.
Rules were proposed in 1873 and 1875; and then what next? —They were only settled in what year?
The rules were sanctioned in that year?—When was the Act brought into regular operation?
It was brought into regular operation in 1875?—Were there any elections or nominations made in 1875?
One or two, I believe?—No.
Yes?—I do not think—at least that is my knowledge—that no nominations were made.
Well, we differ ?—I know I had none from the India Office. Every Member of the Council, when I complained to him that no notice was taken of the Act of 1870—that the rules were made and finally settled—I do not know whether it was in 1877 or 1878, and the very first uominations were made much later; that is my information; that is just our difficulty.
The rules were not finallly settled, but a new set of rules was prepared in 1878, to give more thorough effect to the Statute ?—Very well, if the rules were made in 1878 to give thorough effect to the Statute.
More thorough ?—Very well, more thorough ; I am very glad. Then it is very strange that those rules were abolished, and the nomination entirely put an end to altogether; why were they not carried out while the Statute was still standing?
When were they abolished ?—The nomination continued, as far as I can remember, about 10 years.
And why were they abolished ?—That I do not know. The Government of India was determined, even in their despatch, that long despatch, I do not know whether it was in 1877 or 1878; they recommended very strongly that those rules should not be made, and that Provincial Service should be adopted.
That does not really concern the question ?—Yes; it concerns this question.
I asked you why were they abolished ?—Why they were abolished is the thing.
Was it not that after the experience of a good many years it was found that the system introduced in 1879 did not work satisfactorily ?—Yes; very well there is nothing strange in that; it was actually foretold by people that it would not work, because the rules were not satisfactory.
Then in 1886 a Commission was appointed to consider the whole subject ?—Yes.
On which native members sat ?—Yes.
And they reported. And the consequence of their report was that a new system was adopted, which is now in force ?— Yes. I know that the Commission was appointed and that the Commission came to that conclusion. The fact of the matter is, and of course, I do not want to attribute any motives, but the effort of the Government of India was to have the rules that they themselves had suggested to the Secretary of State in that long despatch, to be somehow or other got into operation, and this Act of 1870 should not be carried out in its full extent. The result of that was that first the rules were made very unsatisfactorily. Instead of making rules by which the nominations in India should be of the same standing, the same competence, and under the same tests of examinations; instead of that the rules made were to leave the Governments—the different Governments —to make their choice; and, in my opinion, without any satisfactory test of competence. Well, the result was that the rules were made which were very unsatisfactory, which were not as they ought to have been, and the result was naturally that discredit should be brought upon them. The rules themselves showed in their very face; whether there was the intention or not; but that that should be the result, where the nominations were made merely according to the ideas of the Government of the day, instead of having any public good test, just as it was, adopted here for the competitive examination.
The Government of India themselves tried in various ways to give effect to the Statute?—Yes.
And they have now introduced a new system which is on its trial, and which appears to have a satisfactory working?—Yes. Well, this new system they were determined to have.
That is all I wish to ask you?—That is quite right. I wish to say this, that this new system which is now introduced was the Government of India's desire many years before, publicly expressed in their public despatch, and they did try at least to carry that system of their own into effect and nullify the Act, as it was originally, no doubt. That is what I have to say.
Was not the object of the Act of 1870, to give promotion to higher offices to men of experience and qualifications already in the service who had shown their competency. Was not that the object of the Act?—That was a part of the object.
That was one of the objects of the Act?—Yes; that was one of them.
And the objection to the rules was that they allowed the Government of India to appoint young men of good family or otherwise without any qualifications at all?—Without any qualifications at all.
And that was the objection to the rules, and it was owing to that that public opinion in India considered that the Statutory Service was not successful?—No.
But it would have been successful if it had been carried out, thoroughly in the spirit of the Act of 1870?—That is what I say.
But, however, you are willing to accept the proposal or the idea that if the natives were employed in any of those places the salaries could be very largely reduced?—Yes; certainly salaries could be reduced by one-third as it is already settled; and I think that if a fair trial is given many thoroughly efficient persons would be able to accept these higher offices at less than two-thirds because the original standard is very high.
Mr. Dadabhai Naoroji, I suppose you stand by all that you have said in the pamphlets which you have printed for the instruction of the Commission?—Yes.
I understand that your views may be summarised in this way, first, that India is so crushed with taxation and impoverished by the withdrawal of her wealth abroad, that the Indian people are ground to the dust and reduced to starvation?—These are the words of authorities.
Secondly, that the European services, and the present forced inordinate and arbitrary employment of Europeans are India’s greatest evil, and the cause of all its economic miseries and destruction?—Yes.
And, thirdly, that the Government of India is an unrighteous system of selfishness and despotism? Yes; I have said that.
Carried on by the Anglo-Indian authorities in defiance of the desires and biddings of the British people and Parliament?—Yes. Well, the desire of the British people in Parliament is distinctly pointed out by the Act of 1833, by the Proclamation of the Queen which is again repeated at the last Jubilee. There you have the whole policy of the British people in Parliament set forth, and if that had been carried out, and even if it were now carried out, the whole difficulty would disappear, and the British Government would indeed be a great blessing to India, and India will not be a less blessing to England. That is what I say.
With regard to the taxation; you are at considerable pains to prove that the taxation of India is exceptionally low, as compared with that of European nations, and of the Indian Native States?— I want to show there is a little misunderstanding; it is exceptionally low in amount, and far heavier in incidence and pressure than even British taxation, because of the incidence of taxation, as I have explained over and over again.
That would depend, of course, on the comparative poverty of the people?—Upon the comparative capacity and poverty of the people.
Yes?—That when you take the whole production over India and you take the whole production of this country, and compare the taxation in this country with the whole wealth, and compare the taxation of India with their capacity you will find that the percentage of the incidence of that taxation in India is higher than the percentage of taxation as compared with the wealth of this country, with such information as we have got.
Well, it amounts to this, that the people being poor, the Government has kept the taxation of India extraordinarily low; but when you come to the incidence of taxation on wealth, and you allege increasing poverty, and crushing taxation, I want to know what proof you have of the capacity and wealth of the Indian people?—I first worked out the poverty of India, the total production of India mostly on official authority; this calculation has been before the public and I should have been very glad if any mistake had been pointed out. When Lord Cromer—Sir Evelyn Baring—gave his opinion as that the production of the country was 27 rupees per head per annum—while I have made it 20 rupees per head per annum which, however, will not make a very great differnce,—however, I asked Sir Evelyn Baring, the present Lord Cromer, to give me that calculation so that I might see whether I had made a mistake, or who has made the mistake. Unfortunately that calculation was not given to me, and therefore I adhere to my resolution that the total production of India— British India—is on the average only 20 rupees per head per annum.
That is the total income of the people?—No; there is a little confusion, only the total production, actually the quantity of material wealth produced in the year by cultivation, by manufacturers, from the mines and so on, all these accumulated as the total wealth of the country produced during the year and calculated at the prices which are always published regularly. We will make out—and the whole process of calculation is given in my books—we make out that the average cost of about 20 rupees per head per annum.
Then, with a family of seven or eight, the production, not the income, would be Rs. 140, Rs. 160, and so on ?—Yes, and it is not enough to keep them.
That is at best an assumption ?—And it is by comparing the consumption I have given, not only the production ; the production may be very small in amount, and yet if the requirements of consumption may also be comparatively small in amount there would be nothing to complain of; but they are not able to produce as much as would even satisfy their ordinary want of common labour. These figures also I have given there, and I have not up to this time had pointed out to me that they are wrong. I have had correspondence direct with the India Office—I laid down all this— and I have not had any reply to refute those figures from the India Office.
Do you think that calculations of that kind in a country like India are of any value whatever ?—Even Lord Cromer himself has said that, for all practical purposes they are sufficiently approximate, we cannot expect them to the farthing ; but at the same time in India we have this advantage, that Government has almost all the information it can require to calculate such a result as that. What the result really is of the annual wealth produced in the country which is not very easy here in this country, but there they being principal proprietors, as you may say, why they have all the details of land cultivation in every way. Then the Administration Reports also give, what manufactures are done, what mines exist, and so on we have very substantial material to go upon in order to calculate from year to year what the real production is or the amount of wealth that is produced every year, and from which the State expenditure and taxation has to be paid, and were that taxation to return to the people as it returns here, notwithstanding such a large debt the interest comes back to the taxpayers,, the whole tax that is raised comes back to the taxpayers, there is nothing to complain of, that is the difference.
Now as regards crushing taxation, I see here you take the taxation of 1886 of India and from that you deduce that the taxation comes to about 5s. 6d. a head. Well, in looking into the details of that year——?—Will you kindly tell me what page it is, and which report it is of mine?
It is page 27 ?—What date is it No. III.?
I am not going into the pamphlet; the 9th of January is the date, but I am merely referring to it ?—9th of January. Yes and what is the page?
The 27th page ?—27, thank you. Yes, this pamphlet was written, it is a copy of the pamphlet that was written, in reply to Sir Grant Duff in those years.
On looking to the items that make up the taxation which you give there as about Rx. 57,000,000, the first item I remark on is Land Revenue, about Rx. 23,500,000 ?—What are my figures to which you refer ?
I am not referring to any of your figures; I am referring to the details, the items, which make up your Rx. 57,000,000?— Rx. 57,116,000; I have got it only from public records, I have not created it myself.
No, I am not disputing it ?—No.
The first item which makes up your total is the Land Revenue ?—Yes.
Rx. 23,500,000 ?—Yes.
You consider that to be taxation ?—It is taken from the wealth of the country whether you call it taxation of rent, or anything; it does not matter at all as far as the economic condition is concerned. I think Lord Salisbury himself has discussed that point in one of his minutes, if I remember right, in which he says that you may call it taxation or you may call it rent, but he is more inclined to call it taxation, as so much taken off from the country for revenue purposes.
I do not wish to enter into any controversy as to the nature of the Land Revenue ?—No; very well.
But I will just ask you one question, when a man is taxed is he taxed on his own property or income, or on the property of some other person ?—On his own property.
On his own property ?—Yes.
Now is it not the fact that throughout all history a portion of the produce of the land in India has belonged to the Ruler or Crown ?—Yes.
In that case it does not belong to the producer ?—You take the principles of the despotic Government. I grant that as a fact. Go on ; yes, I will answer that question if you like.
I am quite satisfied with your answer. Does not the British Land Revenue as it is now constituted represent the share which the former Native Governments used to own of the produce of the land ?—Yes; in its economic effect you may call it the property of the Government or the property of the people, it is not of the slightest consequence, because in those days though Government took this half it used it on the government of the country, and every farthing of that half remained in the country. It is there that the difficulty lies ; I do not care at all whether it is.
We are not on that point, at all events at present ?—That is the real purpose which we have to discuss.
The next item is opium ?—Well.
In that year it came to about Rx. 9,000,000. Now that is paid by China ?—That is paid by China ; very well.
It is not a tax on India ?—No; it is so much, that is to say, that it is actually, properly speaking, the property of the Indian people, which Government—
Certainly ?—Because it is their produce which brings this profit. Whether it is morally good or not is not the question ; but it is the produce of the country which otherwise would have gone to the people. It is the profit of the people of India ; the Government find it very convenient to have this for their government purposes.
It is a tax on that produce which is paid by China ?—Yes, that is true ; that is the case with all trade, every trade. When you send goods to another country you get a certain profit out of it, and that becomes the profit of the country.
Well, let us proceed. I think the home charges that year were about 14,000,000l.; that at 1s 7d. to the rupee is about Rx. 18,000,000, so that you see China paid half of those home charges?—Yes, that is so; India’s profit; that is so much gain in that direction.
And the public share, the national share of the land produce would more than cover the whole of the home charges?—Yes; but then why should India be deprived of that benefit? That is no justification that somebody else should take it away if it is the produce of India—India must enjoy it.
We are not on that point now. If you would kindly just answer the question?—Yes; I am answering the question.
Now, from that Indian taxation fund which you have admitted to be exceptionally low, far lower than that of any other country? —In amount, not in incidence.
Whether it is 6s. a head, as you say, or 2s. 6d. a head as Sir Henry Fowler makes it?—Sir Henry Fowler makes it so; that is the authority.
If you take away land revenue and opium, the remaining taxation comes to a very small amount?—I do not think land revenue ought to be taken into account.
Is it not the fact that from that very low taxation fund the Government pays all the charges which devolve upon Government, namely, all the charges for the Army, both in India and in England, the contribution to the Navy, the whole cost of civil administration both in India and in England; the interest on railway capital?— Yes.
And the deficiency on the revenue account of railways, the interest of debt, all charges for pensions and leave allowances; and also the cost of all stores, and all railway materials?—Yes.
In fact every charge?—Yes.
Is paid out of the very low rate of taxation which is levied by the Government?—Yes.
And your grievance appears to be that out of that low rate of taxation about one-fourth in this year, 1886, was applied to the payment of home charges?—Yes; well.
These home charges are what you call tribute?—Yes.
Now, is it the case that one single rupee from the Indian revenues goes into the British treasury as tribute; that is to say, is applied otherwise than as a payment for something which is given in return?—What is given in return. First of all my grievance has been again misunderstood. The grievance lies in this, that what is taken from the people as so much taxation in any shape whatsoever does not return to the people, but a portion of it goes away out of the country and impoverishes the country—that is the grievance. It is not of the slightest consequence, that the very fact that from a very small taxation the Government of India is obliged to carry on all these departments shows that these departments therefore naturally become very insufficient and inefficient; and the Secretaries of State, two Secretaries of State were perfectly justified in saying that this was an awful condition of things. That is the grievance.
What you have said is that this tribute, as you call it, is a portion of the produce exported out of British India, for which nothing whatever has returned to her in any shape?—Yes.
Now, I ask you whether there is any part of it that is not spent upon services or materials supplied to India?—Very good; it is only for necessary services. The services itself are our grievance, we are not only deprived of our money, but we are deprived also of our employment. We do not want those services.
Excuse me, that is not our point?—That is the main point.
The point is whether, rightly or wrongly, the money has not been paid for services or materials supplied to India?—The services are a portion of the tribute which we are compelled to pay. The services, and the money which is given for the services, both are our great grievances, that we are doubly injured both in the point of money and in the employment which belongs to us by right in our country should be taken away from us; and with it, therefore, the wisdom which is derived from that service, so that it is a grievance.
So that the irreducible minimum of Europeans is not to be paid for, is it?—First of all, there ought not to be so great a minimum as now exists. I explained that very clearly that the irreducible minimum, if considered by the British as absolutely necessary, it is for the sake of maintaining their rule in India and their position in the East, as well as their position in Europe. Well, therefore, all I say is, that we grant, though if I were to take it in its logical sequence I do not grant that it is absolutely necessary to have this irreducible minimum, with the exception of the few highest offices, in order to keep the control over India; but I grant for the sake of present purposes, and for practical purposes, that a certain number of Europeans may be considered absolutely necessary. Then I say—
We will come to that presently?—If you will kindly allow me to finish. Then I say, if it is true that Europeans for certain purposes are required simply on account of the British Rule, then the British people ought to pay a fair share for that interest which they themselves have.
Now, next you contrast the British system of government with the system in the Native States?—Yes.
Very much to the disadvantage of the British system?—Yes, the system of course. There is nothing to be said but against the bad system.
You say the Native States which adopt good management go on increasing in prosperity, in strong contrast with the system of the British management of expenditure?—Yes.
And you give instances of the taxation in certain States which come to about 12 rupees, 18 rupees, and so on, per head, so that the taxation of the Native States is at least two or three times what it is in British India, or even more?—It is more.
Twice or three times that of the native of British India?—And yet he is better off.
That is what you say?—And yet he is better off.
That has to be proved, I think, has it not?—The proof lies on the very surface. First of all——
We shall come to that?—I have given testimony; one testimony, I think, in regard to this in Bhownuggar.
I have seen what you refer to, and I do not think it proves it in the slightest degree?—I have your own words that Bhownuggar had a full treasury, and so on.
I said it had a full treasury. Still, if you take three times the taxation from the people you can easily have a full treasury?— Yes, but the whole people are much better off.
I did not say that, you assume it?—What was the use of praising that State if this was not the meaning of it. You praised it because it was a good government.
Under a long British management it had a full treasury?— True, but British management was Indian management.
Shall we go on?—Yes; I have to explain a little.
I have not asked you any question?—No; but it is in answer to that question we had just now.
What?—In regard to the comparison with Native States exacting greater taxation, and yet you say: How is it that they are prosperous?
I did not ask you that?—Oh, very well then.
You say the capacity for taxation in the Native States is not the result of any oppressive taxation, but the natural developments under improved government of the increasing prosperity of the people. Well, the first point is that the taxation is at least two or three times as high as that of British India?—Yes, and taxation here is I suppose, 20 times higher than in British India.
Now how is this taxation in Native States spent; have you ever heard of its being wasted upon unworthy favourites and in debauchery?—That may be, if the political agents do not do their duty; but that is no argument against the development of the prosperity of the people under this taxation.
Have you ever heard of the Native State revenues being hoarded?—Hoarded, yes; and they can afford to hoard.
You give the case of Scindia, for instance, who lent 3½ millions sterling to the British Government?—Yes, that is the British Government.
Where was that money produced from; was it not hoarded in vaults?—It was hoarded in vaults.
For many years?—Yes; and it was the fault of the Native State that it did so; but we are discussing the ordinary good management.
When the money was hoarded in vaults in that way, was it doing any good to the subjects of Scindia?—No, it was not doing any good; that was the fault of the Native State, and notwithstanding that the people were in better condition.
Now let me ask another question. Does any of the Native State revenue go outside the Native State, is it spent outside the State; for instance, there is a considerable item of tribute that goes out?—Yes, that is the only thing, and it is a very small item, it does not affect them very much; the whole thing is so very small.
The Mysore State pay 25 lakhs a year?—25 lakhs, and yet they flourish.
You keep on assuming that as a fact?—Yes, we have that point.
Mysore pays 25 lakhs?—Yes.
That is as a subsidy for military aid?—Yes.
For military protection. Therefore you see that the Mysore subject contributes a considerable sum towards the cost of the English Army?—Yes, that might very well be considered, what might be a reasonable contribution to a portion of the Army.
That is not the point. He is, therefore, very much in the same position as the British Indian subject as regards contributing to the Army?—Yes, but not exactly the same position.
Now do you not find in Native States European servants?— Yes; that is of their own choice.
We will take the Bhownuggar State?—Yes.
I daresay you are aware that for the last 20 years the Head of the Public Works there has been a European with a family at home?—Yes.
And that some of his sons are also employed?—Yes.
Again, take the Native State Railways?—Yes.
The Managers of the Native State Railways are Europeans living in Native States?—Yes.
And the railway materials and the rolling stock have all been bought in England?—I never made a complaint of that.
The Native Chiefs are in the habit of coming to Europe?—Yes.
And spending large sums of money in England?—Yes.
In all those ways a portion of the taxation of the Native States goes out and is spent abroad?—Yes.
So that their position in that respect also is like that of British India?—That is so very small compared with the system in British India, there is no comparison between the two.
There is no comparison between a Native State like Bhownuggar and the British Empire ?—Yes.
In size; therefore neither should there be in the amount of revenue spent abroad ?—Then I am again misunderstood. What I say is this, that in the Native States you have the whole of the service from top to bottom, the natives themselves.
I have just shown you that you do not ?—The whole of them are natives with the exception of such Europeans as a sort of investment they employ for benefit; and so for instance for the mills in Bombay. Actually I myself have sent from here managers.
We are discussing the Native States I think, if you do not mind ?—It is the similarity of the incident that induced me to mention it; I will keep to the Native States. Therefore every farthing that is raised by the State is returned to the people, it remains in the country, it fructifies among the people naturally. I have been, of course, in Baroda, and I know a Native State.
But if Europeans are employed there that does not take place ? —The Europeans are employed for special purpose of their own choice; here they are compelled to put upon us where it is unnecessary, where you can have Indians of the same efficiency to do that work.
But Europeans in Native States send their savings home just the same as Europeans in British India ?—Yes, that is true, but the Native States do that of their own choice for their benefit; in the other case it is compulsory to an extent that the people cannot afford.
Now we come to a point in which you see a great advantage in the Native States, that is to say that they build and extend their own railways from revenue ?—They have their revenue.
British India is not able to do that because they have no revenue ?—They cannot, yes.
Do you think you are correct in that statement ? Baroda has built its own railway.
That, while the Native States build their railways from revenue ——?—Baroda has built it from revenue.
British India is not able to do so ?—No, it cannot.
You think that is correct ?—Yes. I think so.
Do you happen to remember a question in our evidence some time back in which it was shown that the British Government has spent Rx. 22,000,000 on railway and irrigation works out of revenue?—What is that compared with the whole debt.
I did not ask what it was compared—is that the evidence or not? —If you want to modify it in this way, that British India has from revenue spent some money on railways, of course I did not deny altogether.
Do you think that the Native States have spent anything like Rx. 22,000,000 on railways?—But Native States are not so big as British India.
Then, in proportion?—In proportion they have spent a good deal, and they are spending more every day.
How much, do you know?—One Native State has lent to another Native State for railway extension.
Can you tell us what amount Native States have spent on railways?—I would work it out if you want it.
You do not know?—I could not tell you off-hand.
But that is not all, besides the expenditure on railways and irrigation, the British Government has spent—I have taken it out for 10 years, 1885-6 to 1894-5—has spent immense amounts on roads and rest-houses, and all sorts of communications?—Yes.
And on other public improvements, water supply, and so on. Will you allow me to ask my question?—Yes, I am not interfering.
The total of expenditure from revenue on these for the 10 years, 1885-6 to 1894-5, amount to Rx. 43,000,000?—Yes. All that from that wretched taxation; all that from a small amount. You ought to have been able to do 10 times as much.
Will you allow me, that is spent by the British Government from revenue?—-Yes.
So you are wrong in saying that the British Government is unable to find revenue for public works?—Yes; that is to the extent they ought to do.
That was not your remark?—I have said that in my evidence to-day; I have referred to that point. All this is from a poor revenue, therefore they ought to be able to if they were in the same condition as the Native States, then their expenditure would have been in such a large proportion.
I think it is plain, then, that the Native State subject is really in precisely the same position as the British Indian subject as regards the appropriation of his taxation to the interest on loans which they have in Mysore and the Nizam's dominions, too; to the payment of Europeans employed by the States, and to payments made towards the cost of the British Army, as in the case of Mysore?—Yes.
I think all you have shown me is that a large revenue is raised, and not why the people are more prosperous?—Yes.
Do you recollect also that the Native States contribute largely to the British salt revenue?—Yes. Well, that shows, you see, that there is something drawn from other people which the people themselves are not able to supply.
The point I am making is that the Native State subject pays money to the salt revenue?—So much the worse.
Which money goes abroad?—So much the worse for the British Administration.
Again, they pay a portion of the duty on piece-goods?—Yes.
In all these ways they pay taxation?—Yes.
Which goes out of the Native State?—No. Still, as much as goes out of the State, they are still able to do that and be prosperous.
Well, I will take the point of prosperity. Will you allow me to ask you a question as to the testimony of your own eyes. You are a native of Western India?— Yes.
You know the districts of Kaira and Neriad?—Yes.
You know the magnificent cultivation of Neriad?—Yes.
Do you know also the Plains of Kathiawar?—Yes.
Contrasting those two, do you think the conditions of prosperity in Neriad are smaller than those in the Native States of Kathiawar?—Well, is it fair to compare a very fertile portion of the country with a portion of the country which is not so fertile? Leaving that alone; I have been in Baroda; I know symething of the condition of Baroda, of the condition of the people of Baroda, its revenue, having administered that for a year; and I know that the Baroda people are much better off than the people of the neighbouring territory.
Baroda, again, is a particularly rich territory?—Very well then, if you compare it.
That is exactly my point. Do you not think the comparative prosperity of the people depends as much on the fertility of the lands they have to cultivate as on the form of government?—If it is a fertile region and the political condition is good it will be still happier, still better.
The advantage of the political condition is that they pay three times as much taxation?—Yes, it all comes back to them, while in our case one-third does not.
I have shown that it does not all come back to them?—The very fact that so much is raised from them, and all that comes back to them.
You forget you have admitted Europeans?—Very few Europeans, that are not worth considering.
Loans are raised; tribute is paid?—The tribute is very small compared with the resources.
Now, as to the capacity for taxation not being the result of any oppressive taxation?—It is oppressive taxation, because they are unable to pay it.
Will you kindly wait until you are asked a question?—Yes.
I wish to contrast the British system as regards the land revenue with the Native State system. Are you aware that the Famine Commission, after very carefully examining the question, and with every advantage in access to statistics, brought out that the incidence of the British land revenue was about 7 per cent. of the gross produce; are you aware of that?—I am not aware of it, but I would take it from you. I believe you; yes.
Are you also aware that the ordinary system in the Native States is that the State—the Native Ruler takes one-half of the gross produce. You see, then, there is a considerable advantage there on the side of the British subject?—Yes, and yet all that advantage is lost on account of the system of the Government.
That is your assumption?—I simply mention the fact that the half—I take that for granted—though I know that in the British assessment it is a great deal more than 7 per cent.; but I do not question that point. I take the fact as you have placed it, but the chief point is, that though they may take half of the produce, or more or less, the produce remains in the country. It is enjoyed by the country, every part of it.
I have ventured to show you that it does not?—Very well, you may say so, and the difficulty is that the exception of just this little portion of tribute that they pay; it is not large at all or weighing upon them, and they are increasing in prosperity, so that this tribute is almost not worth thinking of; but the prosperity consists in this, the difference in the two rules consist in this, that in one case every farthing, as in this country, although it pays nearly 100,000,000l., but all that 100,000,000l., come to the people; in the other case one-fourth or so goes to other people and not to the Indians. There is the point. Of other comparisons I have no complaint to make.
Do you consider the British land revenue to be oppressive to the people?—Their taxation, I consider, is oppressive, simply from this point of view, that it becomes oppressive. The people's capacity for payment becomes less and less every year.
And that it reduces the people to a state of starvation?—Just so; it does.
Would you allow me to read a part of a speech made in India by Sir Syed Ahmed, Khan of Aligarh?—He has his own views, and I have my own views.
In the course of the last month?—Yes.
He says, “Two very large classes of the population consist of zemindars and peasants. The amount of attention that is now given to the welfare of the peasantry is unparalleled in any former Indian kingdom. In those provinces in which the East India Company made a permanent settlement of the land the enormous increase of the wealth of the zemindars has been such that it is unnecessary for me to enlarge on it, but I wish to say something about the land revenue system in the provinces in which there is no permanent settlement. If you will study old histories you will find that the mode of assessment adopted by this great empire is far lighter and milder than that adopted by former rulers. The most famous of former land settlements was instituted by Shere Shah, and perfected by Akbar, and I wish, in a few words, to explain the difference between that system and the present one, so that everyone may understand it. It is this, that in the former system Government took a share of the whole produce of a village, and under the present Government a share of the whole produce is not taken, but a share only of the surplus after the peasants have received their dues. Hence, everyone can see how light and easy is the land settlement even in these provinces in which there is no permanent settlement. No one can deny that under this good administration every species of property, and especially landed properties, has immensely increased in value. These landed properties, which were formerly a burden on their owners, are now a source of profit and wealth, of honour and social distinction. The income from property has increased tenfold, so that he who formerly got Rs. 10 now gets Rs. 100, and the owner of an estate worth Rs. 10,000 has property now worth a lakh"? — Yes; so I answer, first of all, the proportion of people to whom he refers is but infinitesimally small. The large mass of the people suffer. This is what we complain of, both from starvation and famine; but with regard to the system of assessment, I would take for granted that it is a good system, that the system adopted by the British is a better system than the old rulers had; but the whole mischief comes in this, that whether it was a bad system or a good system in their old Government, and under their own kings, every farthing produced was taken by the State and returned to them, it remained in the country. The evil of this foreign domination is that it drains the country of a portion every year unceasingly, and there the whole difficulty lies. If some proper suitable remedy were applied to reduce that to its minimum extent — a fair tribute — we do not then object to pay the tribute, as it were, just as the Native States pay; but that could be brought within such dimensions as would enable India to make capital, so as to be able to stand on the same footing as any other country; it would be all right. As I said in answer to former questions, I do not want to object to the system of rules that are adopted for the sake of good government. I accept them. The difficulty lies in the economical condition of the foreign domination, and that must be reduced to its lowest possible mischief, which cannot but be incidental to a foreign domination.
I have pointed out to you that what you call the drain amounts to about one-fourth of a very low rate of taxation? — Very well. And that about one-half of that in the year we took was paid by China. Now I want to ask you with regard to another point; there seems to be some misunderstanding as to the return of the price and profits of exports? Yes.
You seem to be under the impression that the British Indian subject does not get back his full price and profits of his export; that some part is retained somewhere?—That is this what is taken away from the country.
Will you let me now just put a case. Suppose that a British Indian subject in Ahmedabad, and a Native State subject in Kathiawar adjoining, each sent home cotton worth ten sovereigns? --Yes.
Each of those men gets the full value of his ten sovereigns in rupees paid to him, does he not?—Yes.
Then the British Indian subject is not deprived of any part of his ten sovereigns?—Yes; I will explain that. The British Indian subject, in sending his ten sovereigns worth of produce; that produce is here intercepted by the India Office in sending him a bill.
Not the produce, I think?—That produce is sold, and the agent for the sale of that produce pays the British Indian subject by an India Office bill, and sends it out there to be paid not from the price that is got here from that produce, but from the revenues of India that are drawn upon to meet that bill which is kept here. That is to say it is paid from the revenue. It requires to be understood clearly.
We are all perfectly aware of that, Mr. Naoroji. It is a convenient fiscal expedient?—No.
Yes?—I would not interrupt you.
It is a convenient fiscal expedient?—Yes.
That is to say, the Secretary of State, wanting the gold here for the Home charges, takes from the merchant the gold price of the Indian produce and he gives the merchant an order on the Indian Treasury for an equivalent amount of rupees?—Yes.
Does that in any way affect the profit of the native producer and exporter in India?—Of course its effect is this, that as much as is intercepted here by the India Office in sending their bills off that price of the produce, does not itself return to India, but in its place that price of the produce is paid out of British revenue which, in the case of the Native States, is quite different, he gets back actually the return.
It really amounts to this, dees it not, that that small portion of the low taxation fund is paid at home for material and service supplied to India from England?—Very well, we come back to that again.
I do not wish to go into that. That is the fact, whether you think the services are worth it or not is another question. I say it is paid for in material or service supplied to India?—That is the whole of my complaint.
That is the whole transaction?—That is the whole of my complaint.
The money might be sent home to India, but the money, the gold, is kept here and the silver is obtained for it in India?— Which must be paid in some shape or other.
Does that affect the native exporter of the produce itself?— No, the native exporter is not affected.
That is all I wish to know?—But then, at the same time, it is misleading if you stop there.
I beg your pardon, I do not think it is at all misleading?—I must give my full answer, that the native exporter receives his money from the Indian Exchequer and not the money which is actually got by the sale of the goods. The sale of the goods, which means, therefore, that so much of the produce of the country entirely went out of the country without that material return in the shape of produce or bullion or in any shape.
But in the shape of service or materials?—Then that service comes in. The service does not give us a grain of rice more, but then the service in itself again is a further complaint, a further grievance of ours.
The question I was asking you was as to the profits of the native exporter, you will admit that he gets back the whole of these profits?—He must get his value; but at the same time, he does not get it from his own proceeds, he gets it from Indian revenues.
Never mind?—That makes all the difference.
Not the slightest?—That is what I complain of; else, I have no complaint whatever. The native gets this, but then what he has sent here is never returned except in the shape of services.
It is simply a convenient arrangement ?—It is not a convenient arrangement, it is an economic drain.
You have admitted that the Native State subject and the Indian subject each get their full equivalent of the 10l. ?—The native must get his 10l., but in the one case——
And out of the 10l. the Native State subject pays 12 or 18 rupees of taxes, and the British Indian subject pays half a crown? —Yes, because the Native Indian subject does get back his full price of the produce that he has sent, all the 10l. ; and the British Indian subject, that is to say British India as a body economically does not get his own 10l. That makes all the difference.
I want to ask you a few questions as to the agency employed in exporting ; that is to say, the foreign merchant. You are particularly hard on him are you not ?—In what way ?
You grudge him what he eats ?—I do not grudge him anything.
You said of him " he eats what the Indian would eat if he id not eat it "?—That is the Indian not employed.
Oh no, the merchant ?—The merchant or the non-official ?
What is the merchant in India ? What is his business. Does he not export raw produce ?—Yes.
And import English goods in return ?—Quite right.
His gains are what—the interest on the capital he employs in that business ?—Yes.
Do you not think that that is a benefit to India ?---Under a self-governing country, if we were a self-governing country, or at least governed in the way I am describing, we would welcome the merchant, because we would have our own resources daily employed, and the merchant would have so much more, and he is quite welcome to come in there and use his capital, and get any profit himself in the perfect free trade, but our position is that we are helpless, our capital is taken away from us, we cannot make any capital, and the foreign merchant or the foreign capitalist comes in. He has a full monopoly, as it were, of the resources of the country, he benefits by it, and we are simply the hewers of wood and the drawers of water to them. That makes an entirely different position in the economical condition of India.
Does the foreign merchant pay taxes in the country?—He may pay taxes. It is nothing, the small amount he pays. It is all very good.
Does he spend largely on living and employ labour, and so on ?—Yes, to his profit.
Has he any privileged position at all ?—No, the economic condition is the thing in all these things.
I find, however, in one of your remarks you suppose that he has a certain privilege ?—Oh, yes, he has. I can understand what you mean.
I should like to ask you about that ?—Yes.
You say here : “ The position of the exploitation by the foreign capitalists is still worse than I have already represented. Not only do they exploit and make profits with their own capital but they draw even their capital from the taxation of the poor people themselves. So that the European merchants, bankers, &c., may have Indian taxes at their disposal, the profits of which, they may take away to their own country ”?—Yes.
What does that mean ?—I have explained it thereto.
Oh, I see ?—If you read further on in explanation I have quoted Sir James Westland himself.
Allow me to read Sir James Westland ?—Yes, if you please.
You say “ The following words of Sir James Westland in “ the telegram of ‘ The Times ’ of the 18th December last, will “ explain what I mean. Sir James Westland then explained how “ closely connected the money market of India is with the Govern- “ ment balances, almost the whole of the available capital em- “ployed in commerce practically being in those balances. . . . “ A crore and-a-half, which under normal conditions would have “been at headquarters in Calcutta and Bombay, had been placed “ at the disposal of the mercantile community for trading “ purposes,” and so on. Is it possible that you have confused these two different things, that is, the loan of money out of taxes to foreign merchants for trading purposes, and the supply of the currency by the Government for the trade generally ?— No, this is quite a different thing. This simply means this : that a portion of the taxation or the money raised by taxation is or would have been available, as he says, at the disposal of commerce, and that means, therefore, that a portion of the taxation goes into the Banks; from these Banks European merchants mainly draw their credit, and use that money for their own business, which in reality is supplied to them as a capital from the taxation of the people.
Do you mean to say that the Government lends the taxes to the foreign merchants?—No, the Government does not lend. The Government gives it to the Banks, there is a certain amount of balance kept into the Banks. The merchants get the benefit of it because the Banks do not put it in a stocking, and put it away saying, “there is Government money, it must remain there.” They use it, they lend it: they make a profit out of it, and that means that it goes mostly to those who are in the commercial world.
Do you really suppose that that amounts to lending the taxes to the merchants?—It is so really.
Lending the taxes?—Because it is from the taxes that that money is deposited in the Banks; where does that money come from?
Well, we will leave it there. Now I should like to say a few words about the civil administration. You are even harder upon the civil administration than you are upon the foreign merchant? —How; in what way, let me see?
Well, I will quote a few of your phrases. “The European civil and military services are a burthen and a destruction to India”?—Yes.
“The European services are India’s greatest evil.” “The present forced, inordinate, and arbitrary employment of Europeans.” “A charge forced upon India by sheer tyranny”?— Yes.
“It is the British Indian authorities who have made India what she is, bleeding at every pore, and a helotry for England.” “The sovereign, the British people and Parliament have done their duty by laying down the true and righteous principles of dealing with India, but their desires and biddings are made futile by their servants, the Indian authorities”?—Yes.
Now do you mean to say that you really believe that the English authorities in India are at liberty to disobey and set at defiance the orders of the English Government?—Why, your own Viceroy has acknowledged it in so many terms. Lord Lytton in his private minute says distinctly that of the two ways of saying straightforward to the Indian people that we shall not do this, or that. Instead of that we have deceived the people; we have adopted (I think the words are) transparent, deliberate subterfuge in all these matters.
Have you got that paper?—It is in the statements. I will read the part itself.
Have you got the paper you are quoting—Lord Lytton's?— I will read it.
Have you got the whole of his confidential minute?—No such confidential minute.
Has it ever been published?—I do not know. I will tell you. The extract was brought forward publicly, by a Speaker in the first—I think it was the first—Meeting of the Congress. It is in the very first Congress. It has been in the public prints all this time—-12 years—and it has never been contradicted.
It was a confidential paper pilfered from the Viceroy?—That I do not know. I have nothing to do with that.
Will you answer this question? Was the purport of that paper in favour of a larger employment of Indians in offices in India?—It would have been very good if it had been published. I do not know.
Was it so or not?—I do not know. This is the only extract out of the Despatch which has become public some way or other.
Now let us return to the question before us?—Yes.
Will you give an instance of a great public measure, in which the Viceroy and the Government officials in India have thwarted and defied the wishes and the orders of the English Government? —Yes.
Give it then?—This very Act of 1833 has been left a dead letter up to the present moment.
That is not at all to the point?—Yes, but I want to show that.
I want you to show me some great measure?—This is the great measure.
In which the Anglo-Indian authorities, the English authorities in India have defied, and resisted, and obstructed a great measure which the English Government wished to give effect to in India?—That is just what I am answering, that the greatest of all measures, our very emancipation as you may say, our great charter, the Act of 1833 has been kept a dead letter up to the present time.
But is it not the case that whatever has been done in that matter has been done under the orders of the Secretary of State and the English Government?—Very well. It is no consolation to me whether it is the Secretary of State or the Government of India. When I am talking of the authorities I talk of both.
No; I beg your pardon, I quoted this to show that you were speaking of the English in India of whom you complained?—I speak of the English altogether.
I beg your pardon, it is not so?—Whatever the——
They are the public servants, the Indian authorities?—Yes, the Indian authorities; but I mean, of course, the Indian authorities in both countries.
You say, "British Indian authorities and Anglo-Indians "generally obstructing at every point any step desired by the British "people for the welfare of the Indians?—Yes. There it is. This illustration. This is confirmed by Lord Lytton himself. Then there is the admission by the Duke of Argyll, showing that we have not fulfilled our promises, and I could make out a statement if you like.
And you condemn both the Anglo-Indians and also the Government at home?—Oh yes, both.
But the Government at home is responsible to Parliament?— Very well.
And Parliament represents the English people?—Yes; and Parliament has passed the Acts.
And do you mean to say that the Indian Government can refuse to obey or ever have refused to obey any order sent out to them from the Cabinet and the Secretary of State at home?—But there are the facts.
Where?—This Act of 1833 has been disobeyed entirely. The Act of 1870 was disobeyed for six years and every effort was made not to carry it out.
I have shown already that it was not disobeyed for six years and you admitted it?—Very well. Then, again, I give the authority also.
Will you kindly answer the question about that Statute of 1870?—Yes.
Is it not the fact that nothing could be done under that Act without the sanction of the Secretary of State?—My complaint is about the Secretary of State as much as about the Government of India.
You say it is the English authorities in India?—No, Indian authorities. I mean, if I have not expressed it properly, my complaint is more against the India Office than against the Government of India. To take for instance this Resolution that was passed for simultaneous examination, why the Secretary of State and the Government of India resisted to the tooth, and they would not have it, though the Resolution was passed by the House of Commons.
But they may be quite right in the opinion of the British Government?—That is another affair. As to the disobedience of the Government of India or the Secretary of State to a Resolution passed, this is the instance; really the reasons are there before you. Whether they are good reasons or bad reasons is not the question now.
You have shifted your ground. Your statements were made about the British Indian authorities, and I wish to know whether it is true that they can act in defiance of the home authorities?— No, I never meant such a thing. I mean both British and Indian authorities. I mean both authorities over India; I have repeatedly stated that, as well as in this country.
Let that rest there?—Very well then.
You have condemned these European services in these strong terms, I want to call your attention to the sort of work that they have done in India?—Yes.
India is a great exporter of raw produce, is it not?—Yes.
And what a country of that nature requiries is to be opened up by railways?—Yes.
Up to last December the Government had opened 20,000 miles of railway?—Quite.
Did the natives of India take any great part in promoting those railways?—Simply because they have not got the means, their means are taken away.
That is what you say?—Yes, that is what I say. If the people were able to invest their money in those railways they would be only too glad to do it.
We have had that a great many times. Now, with regard to commerce, I will just read, and it is as good as anything for the purpose, the remarks of Mr. Playfair in the Chamber of Commerce in Calcutta this month. He says, speaking of Her Majesty's reign and the increase of Indian trade during Her Majesty's reign: "The combined value of exports and imports, including treasure, in 1837 amounted to about 19 crores; it now exceeds 200 crores. The capital invested in cotton mills exceeds 13 crores, and in jute mills 4 crores. The cornfields yield 3,000,000 tons annually, while the tea crop is valued at 24 crores. The progress which the country has made in the 60 years, during which its resources have been developed, communication improved, law and order maintained, and the protection of life and property assured, was described as lending lustre to the Queen's reign." Then I will quote a few figures relating to the last seven or eight years. In four provinces, being the Punjab, Madras, the Central Provinces and Lower Burma, for which exact figures happen to be available— the average cultivation—cultivated acres, in 1886-9 was 72,215,000, in 1893-5 the average acreage was 80,915,000. The value of some of the principal exports, cotton, rice, wheat, oil, jute, tea and indigo, in 1881-5 the average was Rx. 54,000,000; in 1891-5 it was Rx. 73,000,000?—Yes.
You see the increase which has taken place in the figures which I have quoted?—Yes. But all this I have fully explained in my statements.
Now you will naturally say that the taxation also has greatly increased?—Well, we are going into a subject which requires very careful examination, both with regard to the taxation, and we are not going into taxation; I am not allowed to go into that by our reference, or I would have gone into it.
I am merely wishing to give you a few figures as to the great increase of taxation, which is probably a question in which you take an interest?—Yes.
I was taking the Queen's reign as before. I find that between 1839 and 1840 the average yearly taxation, was 18 crores; in 1896-97 it is 65 crores?—That does not show that there is a natural increase of prosperity, it has been new taxation.
No, on the contrary, I suppose it would prima facie show that there had been a heavy increase of taxation?—Yes, heavy and crushing.
I wish you to look at one or two items. The land revenue has increased from Rx. 12,000,000 to Rx. 26,000,000, that is an increase right off of Rx. 14,000,000?—Well, it is not a great matter, after so many years of increasing assessment.
Of course there are new provinces which have been added?— Yes.
And, as I have just shown, an enormous additional acreage has come under assessment?—Yes.
For instance, it amounts, as I have shown you, to 8,000,000 acres in 7 years in four provinces only?—Yes. There is an increase of population also.
Then in opium there is an increase of from Rs. 784,000 to Rx. 7,123,000?—Yes.
That 6,000,000 is got from China, as we have already agreed. In customs there is an increase of Rx. 4,000,000 and in excise an increase of Rx. 6,000,000?—Yes.
That is upon strong liquor generally?—Yes.
In stamps there is an increase of 4,000,000?—Yes.
I suppose in none of those things would you find a specimen of "crushing taxation grinding India to the dust"?—How has that taxation increased? The nature of the taxation, the principles upon which it has enhanced, that has to be considered and examined before you give any judgment upon these.
I have just been accounting for the increase of land revenue? —Yes.
The increase of Chinese tribute?—Yes.
And so on?—Well, what I say is that the increase in the land revenue is an increased oppression; well, without going into the character and the examination of the increase of this land revenue, unless we go into a thorough examination of the way in which it has increased and the other increases, we cannot form a judgment generally that it is all favourable, because a more high figure is not necessarily good. We are precluded by our reference from going into taxation.
I have shown you that in 10 years there was an increase of over 8,000,000 acres in four provinces ?—Yes, and there is an increase of population also.
Which came under assessment ?—Yes.
So that it is the growth of cultivation which largely accounts for the increase of the land revenue and also the increase of territory ?—All this require examination, which the Commission cannot go into.
But I think you know that as a fact ?—If it is a fact we must go into it, and we cannot go into it here.
There is one item which I have not noticed, and which you have not noticed also—salt. The increase during the Queen's reign has been from Rx. 2,696,745 to Rx. 8,861,845 ?—Yes, by what increase of rate.
An increase of 6 millions of Rx. ?—Yes, and there is an increase in the rate of taxation.
That, I suppose, you would consider as an instance of heavy additional taxation ?--Yes, it is additional taxation, and it is more crushing to the poor people that it should ever be taxed at all.
It is a poor man's tax ?--It is the poor man's tax ; he is not able to pay any tax. He is starving, he is dying off at the slightest touch, living on insufficient food.
The incidence of the salt tax has been lightened and not made more heavy during the last 30 or 40 years. Do you know that fact ?—There is no need of doubting anything ; if the fact is a fact you can put it here before the Commission. There is no need of doubting it. All I know is that there are 6,000,000 or 7,000,000 raised from salt, which is one of the most objectionable taxes that can be put upon these poor, wretched people.
The question is whether there is a crushing and increasing burden of taxation, crushing the life out of the people ?—That is what I consider.
I wish to show that this salt tax, which is the most open to objection, is actually lighter than it was 30 or 40 years ago ?—If it is actually lighter than it was 30 or 40 years ago, that is no consolation. It was very heavy.
Do you know what the price of a pound of salt is in India? I know in my own time what the price of salt was. I, myself, as a little boy, used to go to the salt store and used to buy it far cheaper than it is now.
Do you know what the price of salt is—a pound of salt?— Yes.
Well, what is it?—It is a tax added to its cost of production.
What is the price of a pound of salt in India?—I do not know the exact figure; I can find it out very easily.
I only wanted to know whether you knew?—I do not know just now; I cannot tax my memory immediately.
The price of a pound of salt in India is something over ½d.; it is ·68 of penny. The price of salt in London is ·75 of a penny; so that it is dearer in London than it is in India?—Yes, it is much worse for the Indians than in London, because the people have not the means of paying. Lord Cromer said, when talking of this: You say that one anna—it only costs one anna, or the addition is one anna; do you mean to say that one anna is not a matter of concern to people who are so extremely poor?
I quite agree with you that that is perfectly evident?—It is perfectly evident.
This is really the only tax the poor man pays?—They are not capable of paying it. They are starving, as you know.
I wish to point out the nature of the salt tax in India. It is generally looked upon as a rather arbitrary tax. The real fact in India is, is it not, that the Government sells the salt to the people? —Yes.
And charges a certain duty—at present 2 rupees 8 annas a maund, in addition to the cost price of production?—Yes.
With the result that, while the salt supplied is of very excellent quality—far better than it used to be—the price at which the salt is sold is less than it was 40 years ago; that is all I wish to bring out?—Yes, but all I wish to say is that, notwithstanding that, these people are so wretched that they cannot get enough of salt for themselves and for their cattle.
That is what you say?—Well, those are the facts.
Now, with regard to what you call the minimum which you want to sweep away—the minimum civil administration—you call it inordinate ; “forced inordinate and arbitrary employment of Europeans”?—It is arbitrary because we have no voice in it.
Of course not ?—Yes.
Are you aware that the higher administrative body, the Indian Civil Service, consists of less than 1,000 persons, of whom about 60 are natives ?—Yes.
You grant that ?—I know that.
Do you think that a large proportion for managing 300,000,000 of people ?—It is the amount of money which is paid to them, and the economic effect of the large amount of money which is paid to them. It is not simply the men.
You think that too many ?—Yes, certainly. It is the very cause of the whole grievance.
You would sweep them all away ?—No, I would not sweep them all away. You may have your Viceroys and Governors, and a few Heads of Departments to have your whole control. There is no necessity for having this 1,000 Europeans.
Let us go on to the next official rank; the middle rank—Sub-Judges and Magistrates, and that class. I take the figure of the Public Service Commission Report, that is sufficiently near; the number of persons is 2,558 ?—Yes.
Of these 35 were Europeans ?—Very well.
Thirty-five were domiciled Europeans, 104 were Europeans permanently resident in India and Eurasians ?—Yes.
When you get to the next rank below that the whole are natives ?—Of course all the lower places are given to Indians, because they cannot help it. It is at these low salaries Europeans could not be employed.
It is not necessary to attribute motives. I suppose it is a fact, is it not ?—It is a fact. I do not say it is not, but it is the higher salaries that it takes away.
Are there Native Judges on the Benches of the High Court?— There are some few.
Are there Native Judges on the Benches in each High Court ? —Yes.
Are there native gentlemen in the Legislative Councils?—Yes, that has nothing to do with the economical condition, and they do not get anything.
Are there Native Judges on the District Benches?—Yes, on the District Benches. Do you mean what are called District Judges, and who can be only employed from the Civil Service?
Yes?—Well, there are a few that, being entered into the Civil Service, are necessarily District Judges.
The Provincial Service comprises a considerable number of the district judgeships, which have been handed over to them in order that natives may be employed?—It is yet to be seen whether this Provincial Service which has destroyed the Statutory Service will fill up its place. We have been deprived of something like 200 situations given to us in the Civil Service by the introduction of this, what is called the Provincial Service; we lost instead of gained by it.
Would you take it from me, that in the North-West Provinces now, or very recently, two district judgeships having been placed in the provincial list, there are four native gentlemen filling the appointment of District Judge?—I am very glad, so far we have made very little progress but the progress would have been far greater had the Act of 1870 been kept intact, and the number of additions which was a partial instalment, what was given to us on my petition through the East India Association by Sir Stafford Northcote. If that had been loyally and faithfully carried out by this time we should have had a much larger number.
Will you answer me this question? Has the general tendency of the British Government been to increase or decrease the employment of natives in public offices?—Well, there are two opinions upon it, and, of course, we are obliged to remain on general belief. There is an opinion prevalent in India among the Indians that whereever they can introduce an European they try to do it, notwithstanding the Despatch of Sir Stafford Northcote referred to, with regard to 200 rupees of salary, namely, that any appointment of 200 rupees of salary, or above that salary, should not be given as far as possible to an European, but to an Indian, except with the consent of the Secretary of State. But the actual practice, so far as I have heard, has been that situations are given to Europeans. The Secretary of State's consent is taken, and that really and properly speaking the Despatch is a dead letter, in which Sir Stafford Northcote had put very strong grounds. I have not got that Despatch, or I should have been glad to read it.
Do you know that in 1880 the recruitment for the Civil Service was decreased by one-sixth, in order to make room for natives ?— For the Act of 1870.
Quite so ?—But unfortunately then for 10 years there was such a deal of opposition to it, some way or other, that it was cut away.
What was cut away ?—This one-sixth, had you gone on adding this one-sixth we should have been very glad.
I beg your pardon, the decrease of the Civil Servants has not been abolished ?—The Statutory Service does not exist.
But the Provincial Service has taken its place ?—The substitution of the Provincial Service was actually a loss to us from what was the Statutory Service.
I do not admit that at all. You have got the whole of the statutories so far ?—That is so. Those that had been passed ; but none after that—after that year.
Of course not ?—The year 1888 or 1889.
The provincial service has been substituted ?—The provincial service has been substituted on a different scale altogether.
The provincial service has been substituted ?—There was no reason why it should be substituted. The statutory service was a great gain to us, as an instalment, and as a part of the Civil Service. Had you gone on adding that one-sixth to the service every year in 30 years, 210 situations in the service would have been held by Indians in what is the Indian Civil Service.
A statutory civilian does not hold a position in the service, he is simply put into some appointment. He is not a member of the Indian Civil Service ?—That was the interpretation put upon it. The Act was passed in reference to our petition, and it was simply and solely an integral part of the Civil Service. The only difference was that—
Where is that, is it in the Act ?—Oh yes, the 6th Clause says that distinctly.
What does it say?—That instead of Indians being required to come and pass their examination here, to get into the Civil Service——
That is not in the Statute of 1870 ?—Yes, the service, the statutory service is a wrong name given to it. Why the Civil Service itself is the statutory service, the whole of it.
There is not a word of that in the Statute; the Statute simply says that in order to increase the promotion of natives of approved merit and ability, a native may be appointed to any post without restriction ?—Yes, and then a certain portion is fixed, is it not.
No?—A certain portion—one-sixth—or something of that sort is fixed.
No?—And then the speeches will illustrate very largely what the Act says.
No; you are quite mistaken ?—One-sixth was prescribed in order that so many appointments should be made every year for the Civil Service.
Was that in the Act?——Whether it is in the Act, or whether it is in the despatch, I am not able to say just now.
It is not in the Act; I have sent for the Act ?—We shall see the Act. If it is not, some way or other the rule was adopted, in fact, by the Government from 1880, I think as you said.
It was in 1880?—And they fixed a proportion of six and seven, say six and seven every year. Well, there, they at least made it as the proportion in which they should be nominated every year. What it ought to have been would have been that by a good strong test of competition they should have been selected. Instead of that they were nominated by the Government, and the whole of the statutory service was discredited in that manner. It does not exist now, and the provincial service was substituted for it which the Government of India was determined to have as early as 1877 or 1878. They did not then get it, and they at last got it by their own way.
You are aware that the statutory civilians are young gentlemen of good birth and station?——Yes, but they were not competent.
And that was found on the whole not to answer ?—Yes.
And therefore the statutory service was abolished ?—Yes.
And what promised to be a better system was substituted for it ?—No, but there is an injustice done to the statutory service.
We need not go into that; that is another question ?—Then what is the good of putting your question to me; I must answer that question.
The injustice done to the statutory service has nothing to do with the question ?—Yes, because you referred to the statutory service just now, and said it was found unsatisfactory; but the reason was, that the statutory service was introduced in a way which was sure to fail; instead of simply going to have boys belonging to good families, one essential and most important necessity was that they should have been first found and tested as competent to hold such places. Well, that was not done.
Quite so. It was right to do away with such a system, was it not ?—Yes; but then that system should not have been introduced. Well, at least, this was the suspicion in the mind of the Indians, that these rules were adopted without the test of competence, and that it was the object of the Government to throw discredit upon it and to try to get rid of it.
Do you attribute such a motive as that ?—I do not attribute it myself; but that is the general feeling, and also this is a fact, that this is a general feeling among the Indians, that the rules were made, whether intentionally or unintentionally—the rules were not such as they ought to have been made.
I will read part of the Statute of 1870, Section 6. “Whereas it is expedient that additional facilities should be given for the employment of natives of India, of proved merit and ability, in the Civil Service of Her Majesty in India: Be it enacted that nothing in the ‘ Act for the Government of India,’ 21 & 22 Vict. c. 106, or in the ‘Act to confirm certain Appointments in India and to amend the Law concerning the Civil Service ‘there,’ 24 & 25 Vict. c. 54, or in any other Act of Parliament or other law now in force in India, shall restrain the authorities in India by whom the appointments are or may be made to offices, places, and employments in the Civil Service of Her Majesty in India from appointing any native of India to any such office, place, or employment, although such native shall not have been admitted to the said Civil Service of India in manner in Section 32 of the first-mentioned Act provided, but subject to such rules as may be from time to time prescribed by the Governor-General in Council, and sanctioned by the Secretary of State in Council, with the concurrence of a majority of members present; and that for the purposes of this Act the words 'natives of India' shall include any person born and domiciled within the dominion of Her Majesty in India, of parents habitually resident in India, and not established there for temporary purposes only; and that it shall be lawful for the Governor-General in Council to define and limit from time to time the qualifications of natives thus expressed; provided that every Resolution made by him for such purpose shall be subject to the sanction of the Secretary of State in Council, and shall not have force until it has been laid for 30 days before both Houses of Parliament?"—Those rules were made, which were unsatisfactory altogether. Unfortunately the Secretary of State, when the rules were made, did not pay attention to those rules, and they were unsatisfactory to us.
What you said about one-sixth and all that is not in the Statute?—I will find out.
You did not find it in the Statute?— I cannot lay my hand upon it at once, but the best proof of that is that the Government of India actually adopted a certain proportion, whether it was by a despatch from the Secretary of State for India or whether it was the Government of India's own decision I am not prepared to say, but there was the fact.
Are you aware of what were called the rules of 1879?—What are they, and what about them?
The rule of 1879 was that in this intermediate or middle body of officials, subordinate magistrates and judges and so on, no European should be appointed to a place of 200 rupees and upwards if a native could be found fit to hold it?—Yes.
Now was that provision in favour of the appointment of natives to that class?—Yes, it was, for the lower class.
At the same time that one-sixth was deducted from the recruitment of the Civil Service?—Yes, that was an independent provision.
Was not that in the direction of giving larger employment to natives?—Then I have to ask that question, if you would kindly supply it to us—how many appointments have been made since that time?
Since what time?—Since the time that that despatch was written, that no appointment at 200 rupees salary should be given as far as possible, to Europeans, but to Indians, except with the consent of the Secretary of State; I never have been able to get the information.
I can personally testify that the rule has been most rigidly observed?—Very well, I am very glad to hear that, but I can tell you that the general impression among us is that it has not been strictly carried out.
That may be?—And the Secretary of State has sanctioned, of course, whatever the Government of India said, and all such situations have not been given; there was one complaint from Madras, if I remember rightly, of such an appointment which was irregular, and the Secretary of State actually put it back.
I have no doubt; that confirms what I say?—But I should be very glad indeed to be satisfied that that is done.
Might I put another point to you?—Yes.
The admission of natives to high offices has always been conditional, in a certain sense, from the first. For instance, in the Act of 1833 it is said that no native shall be excluded from office on account of his religion or his place of birth?—Yes.
It does not say that he is to be admitted to office on account of his religion?—He is not to be excluded; therefore he ought to have been given equal facilities.
Allow me to go on. In the Queen’s Proclamation we find “that, so far as may be, Our subjects, of whatever race or creed, be freely and impartially admitted to offices in Our service, the duties of which they may be qualified, by their education, ability and integrity, duly to discharge?—Yes, quite right; that is all we ask.
Then when you get to the Statute of 1870, it provides for the promotion of natives of approved merit and ability?—True.
So you see the Government always has the same difficult task of deciding, in any case, whether a native candidate is qualified by education, ability, and experience for any particular office? Yes.
And that makes a considerable difficulty in carrying out the Statute of 1870 ?—There can be no difficulty whatever if the Government is determined to do it, for they have only to lay down the standard.
But they are determined to do it, and they have done so ?— They have not done so. That is my complaint.
They have tried various expedients, and are now trying one which they hope will succeed ?—They have not tried the right expedient.
That is your opinion ?—That is what I point out to you. The expedient is just as they have done here; they ought to have laid down rules according to which the Indian candidates are examined, and whether physical, mental, or moral, there is the standard laid down there. Well, according to that standard, those Englishmen who come to that standard are elected in the same manner. Have the regular standard as high as you like, either mentally, morally, or physically; put it forward, and then let them come forward without any disabilities of being compelled to come to this distant country. Let them have equal facilities. We do not want anything more; we do not want any favouritism or any concession, but let us all be treated exactly on the same footing, and on the same standard, and then if we fail the fault will be ours. Let us have simultaneous examination upon the very same standard.
That is your view of the matter ?—I can only give my view.
I want to ask you, generally, what it is that you want; do you wish to sweep away the whole Euglish Civil Service?
I think when Mr. Naoroji says again and again that he does not wish to do it that he should not be asked this question.
I want to know what he says.
Mr. Chairman, I do not think, when Mr. Naoroji has only made a statement of that sort, it is a fair question.
I asked him whether he wishes to sweep away the whole Civil Service in India, which he describes as the destruction of India and its greatest evil ?---Yes, as it is.
I want to know whether he wishes to get rid of it bodily ?— There you misunderstand me. What I lay down in my fifth pamphlet, what I considered as the best means of governing India, is suggested by Lord Salisbury and Lord Iddesleigh themselves.
What proportion would you keep ?—There is no proportion there ; there you have first of all Native States, and that supreme power should be maintained there a certain contribution from all the States, just to keep a certain reasonable amount of the European Army ; and in each Native State, as we will call it, you will have a political agent who will have a complete control over the work—call him a Governor, call him a subordinate, call him anything you like ; this will supply the double purpose both of maintaining the supremacy in a very remarkable and in a very efficient manner, and at the same time the people will feel that they are governed by themselves.
I merely wish to ask whether you propose to retain any part of the Civil Service ?—The European service ? Only the highest portion, such as the Viceroy, the Governors, the Commander-in-Chief, leaving the Military alone if we are talking of the Civil Service, and the Lieutenant-Governors, or you may go one grade below as a beginning. Now I do not mean to say that all the Europeans are to be turned out ; let there be, as in Mysore, gradually every European place being supplied by the Indian, till at last you come to these highest places which are really not the places of the Civil Service ; let us have the whole Civil Service, leaving alone all the high level to Europeans as the controlling power. That I have always said.
Then you would have the Viceroys, the Governors, and the Lieutenant-Governors ?—Lieutenant-Governors ; these certainly.
No Englishmen beneath them ?—-I do not see any necessity for others ; but even if you go one grade lower for the sake of regularity in a practical way, you may begin with, say, one-half the Civil Service should be given to the Indians, and let the number be reduced from 1,000, as you said, to 500 or 400 ; that by itself would be a great relief.
And by degrees you would evict them all ?—Then we may go on gradually higher up.
Then tell me about the Army ; what would you do about that —the British Troops ?—I am quite willing to say that Lord Roberts put it very properly : He says we have an Army, and he praised that Army. I have not the least objection to that praise, but he said that after all the real strength of the British rule depends upon the contentment of the people. If the people were contented, and if they are at your back, no matter when Russia or five Russias come to invade India; if the people are at your back you can raise an Army sufficient even to drive away Russia to St. Petersburg. But I am just going further—I am quite willing to allow that a certain portion of the British Army is absolutely necessary for the purpose of benefiting both England and India. Let there be a fair proportion of expenses divided between the two countries, because the European soldier or the European Army is wanted, especially for the sake of the British rule. We grant that the continuance of the British rule is also a benefit to us, and therefore we do not want to object to the European Army to a reasonable extent, and I will show that afterwards. Let the British people pay a share of it. Now, with regard to the whole Army, I do not see it is necessary. The number that was at the time of the transference to the Queen, say about 30,000 or say 40,000, may very well be kept, say, up to 40,000, and the half the share must be paid by the British on account of the mutual benefit for common purposes, and if the other plan is adopted of Native States being formed out of them, they contribute what share would be considered as reasonable as for common purposes, and then the whole thing will be as natural and as worthy of the English name and the English fame as can possibly be.
Yes. You heard Lord Ripon say that his Government had considered the question most carefully?—Yes. Very well.
And had arrived at the conclusion that the proportion necessary to maintain is one English soldier to two natives?—Yes, because it is on account of the fear that is entertained that the soldiers cannot be depended upon; it is the fear of the people.
Of the soldiers?—I mean of the Indian soldier; it is the fear of the Indian soldier. We propose then—it is a question merely whether you are to act upon fear or upon confidence. If you act upon fear then there is no help; then, at least, you must pay a proper proportion for keeping such an European Army as you think necessary on account of that fear.
If you had a very small European Army do you think that you would have the means of preventing two sections of the Indian Army fighting one another, Mohammedans and Hindus for instance?—Again we are going back to the first proposition.
I said with a very small European Army?—Have that confidence in the people and the people will side with you and will regard it as your and their own interest.
I am not speaking of the people siding with you, but of the people fighting among themselves?—The people fighting among themselves is quite a different thing altogether from the Imperial purpose of keeping up the supremacy of the British rule which, first of all, necessitates this employment of Europeans to an inordinate extent. If you say that a certain amount of European Troops are necessary it is always from fear that the Indian Army will not behave properly. I am willing to grant the fear, and whatever they consider as the necessity either of the protection or the fear of the Indian soldier going wrong at any time, very well, all this arises from the necessity of maintaining British rule in India and British Empire in the East. Well, therefore, I say that granting that an irreducible minimum, as Lord Ripon called it, granting that that is absolutely necessary, without controverting that point, I say that it is for the benefit of both, and therefore a share must be paid by the British Treasury. That is granting all the necessity that the British rulers may consider necessary to have Europeans there.
What I wanted to bring before you was this; suppose the English Civil Administration is reduced to half a dozen men, and the English Army is reduced to——?—Say 40,000.
Would England be able to keep the warlike races of India from invading the peaceful ones?—The warlike races of India have been there for thousands of years, the peaceful ones have been there for thousands of years, and the people themselves and they have not disappeared. They are now even perishing by millions. Take for instance, Europe, civilised and highly advanced countries, they are armed to the teeth, one spark will throw them we do not know where.
But the history of India is that the people have been continually slaughtering each other?—What have you done here; what is the history of Europe? We do not want to go back, because we have learnt as you have learnt.
Is your receipt for reviving the prosperity of India to let loose the Pindaris?—Not necessarily; those days are gone; you have now introduced, and perhaps that is one reason that I say that your supremacy must remain there in a way in which the interest of every Native State will be to take care of itself and will therefore depend more upon you, and you will be more secure, you see. I have proposed my plan, and I do not want to go beyond my plan.
Do you remember what Sir Madava Rao, Prime Minister of Baroda, said to Lord Roberts on the subject of India for the Indians?—What did he say? I do not know.
He said it would be like loosing the bars of the cages of the Zoological Gardens and letting out the animals, that very soon they would all be dead except the tiger—the tiger was, I believe, the warlike people of Northern India?—Is this the result of 150 years of British rule that we are not so civilised enough to observe law and order?
It would be the result of the suspension of British rule?— The result of British rule that we are yet unfit for law-abiding people?
Now, Mr. Dadabhai Naoroji, we have kept the Commission a long time. You and I are agreed on certain propositions—that it is a disadvantage—however inevitable it may be—that, people, or a continent of people, should be under the supreme control of foreigners who cannot, from the nature of the Indian climate, be permanently amalgamated with the Indian people, and that in those circumstances it is the duty of the Supreme Power to be careful that the cost of Government should not be unduly heavy on a poor population, and that natives of India should be admitted freely to all public offices for which they are fit?—Yes.
But we differ in that I have some regard to facts and possibilities, while you, as I think, indulge in visions and certainly in a great deal of strong condemnatory language. Do you not think that, considering the facts to which I have called your attention, and the evidence before the Commission, when you describe the Government of India as a selfish and despotic tyranny, crushing India to the dust by cruel and reckless taxation administered by the Civil and Military Services, which are the destruction of India and its greatest evil, when you describe Lord Elgin, Lord Lansdowne, Lord Dufferin, Lord Ripon, Lord Lytton, Lord Mayo, and Lord Canning as the agents of this selfish and despotic tyranny, defying and thwarting the desires and biddings of the British people and Parliament, so that India is bleeding at every pore and a helotry for England, do you not think you are, shall we say, somewhat overstating your case ?—First of all, the words “ poor people ” is assumed there, or at least you understand it as if it is an actual natural necessary incident of the people ; they are poor because of the system. When you make me say that Lord Mayo and Lord So-and-So and all the Viceroys and the Secretary of State are the agents of this tyranny—there, I say, I am misunderstood. They are merely working in a system which is evil and bad ; they are working in a system; how far it is their fault, or their agent, it is quite a different thing. It is the system that is bad, and that makes very good men work on wrong lines, and therefore the result is that, on account of this foreign system, without giving the people of India such a position in its own Government as would make them prosperous, and, at the same time, benefit Britain, in that my complaint lies. The way in which you have put it just now is certainly unjust and unfair to me.
Well, I quoted your own words, and I will leave it there.
We will now pass on to the question of the apportionment of the charge ?—Yes.
Will you tell us what your suggestions or propositions will be upon that head ?—Yes, my propositions are—(1) That it is the desire of the British people that British rule should be one of justice and righteousness, for the benefit of both India and Britain, and not for the benefit of Britain only to the detriment of India, and that the financial relations in apportionment of charge should be as those between two partners, and not as those between master and slave. (2) That upon this equitable basis the apportionment of expenditure in which Britain and India are jointly interested should be according to extent of the interest, and according to capacity to pay. (3) That the creation and maintenance of British Imperial supremacy in India is a British interest of the first magnitude ; yet, with a few exceptions, India has been unjustly charged with the whole cost of creating and maintaining the British Imperial supremacy, without Britain paying any portion, and without India being allowed to share in the advantages connected with that supremacy. (4) That law and order are beneficial to India, but they are also British interest, as a condition essential to the very existence and prosperity of British rule. (5) That, assuming, as it is said, that India should bear all those charges for internal and external protection, which she would have to bear if British rule did not exist, she should not bear the special cost of European agency so far as used solely to maintain British supremacy. And, moreover, that if British rule did not exist, everyone employed will be an Indian and not an European. (6) That, as a practical arrangement, Britain should pay for all British employed in Britain, that India should pay for all Indians employed in India, and that as regards British employed in India and Indians employed in Britain, there should be an equitable apportionment, according to respective benefit, and capacity to pay. To put it still more moderately, the payments to Europeans in both countries may be divided half-and-half between Britain and India. (7) That in the Army, Navy, and Civil Service, public employment, with its advantages and emoluments, should be proportioned to the charge; and in considering this point it should be borne in mind that in India Government employment monopolises in great part the sphere of private enterprise and the open professions as practised in Britain. (8) That the wars carried on beyond the Indian frontier of 1858 are, as stated by Lord Salisbury, " An indivisible part of a great Imperial question ," and that therefore the cost should primarily be borne by the Imperial Exchequer, India contributing a fair share on account of, and in proportion to, indirect and incidental benefits accruing to her, and direct share in the services. (9) That from Aprll 1882 to March 1891, nearly Rx. 129,000,000 were spent from Indian revenues beyond the western and north-western frontiers of India, for avowedly Imperial purposes, and that a fair share of this amount should be refunded from the Imperial Exchequer, and similarly for the cost of Burmese war.
Where do you get that 129 millions ?—There is a return made. What is the reference?—Return East India Military Expenditure beyond the frontier, No. 91 of 1895.
Perhaps you would just hand it to me. (Return handed in.)
Quite so. Would you go on?—Colonel H. B. Hanna in his book No. 3 “Backwards or forwards” gives at page 40 a table, and makes the total about Rs. 714,500,000, out of which the British Exchequer paid 5,000,000l., towards the expenses of the Afghan war. Besides this amount he points out several omissions. I may put in this table with his remarks thereon in Chap. III.
Are there any further papers you would like to put in?—I desire to put in my correspondence with the War Office, the Admiralty, and the Civil Service Commissioners. In this I claim that neither the War Office nor the Admiralty had any authority or power to exclude Indians from the commissioned ranks.
What was the origin of this correspondence of yours with these three departments?—Questions were put in the Commission whether Indians were admissible in the Civil Service in this country, and, then I put a question or two, I think to Admiral Kennedy with regard to the admission of Indians in the Naval service. The answers were not quite positive and I thought proper to communicate with these three departments and find out exactly what the real condition is, and that made me carry on this correspondence which I am now putting before you.
It is quite irrelevant to our subject, your correspondence?— The employment of the service?
I am anxious to know what the object was, because the Commission must hereafter consider whether the correspondence is a correspondence which they would care to publish; therefore I will ask you what was the outcome of the correspondence—let me take first of all the Civil Service Commissioners?—The Commissioners have replied positively that the Civil Service is open to all the Indians in this country, excepting, of course, that they must come over here to be examined.
Yes?—Upon which I have put a short note saying that while for the Civil Service here every facility is given to the candidate, by examinations in Edinburgh and Dublin, that Indians should be compelled to come here for their examinations for service in their own country was not fair or just. That is a note that I have attached to it.
Your point there is that in order to qualify or to obtain admittance to the Civil Service in India, Indian gentlemen have to come over here to be examined?—Yes.
Did I not gather from some questions and answers that passed between Sir James Peile and yourself that there has been a Statute passed to enable Indian gentlemen to be admitted on certain conditions to the Civil Service in India without coming over here?—Yes, a portion of them.
I thought I also understood from Sir James Peile that the principle involved in that arrangement has been consistently carried out.
With regard to the appointment of natives in India, yes? —What I meant to say is, that there is a Statute prescribing these appointments of a portion of the Civil Service, and rules were made and appointments were made; but after some nine or ten years that is abolished, so that the Statute is a dead letter now.
Then, in fact, the point at issue between you and the Civil Service Commissioners was that you object to the Indian candidates for appointments to the Indian Civil Service being brought over here?—Yes; that was not the correspondence; it is my note upon the reply that for the English Civil Service they are eligible.
They are eligible?—They are eligible; that is distinctly pointed out, which was doubtful.
May I also ask the upshot of the correspondence with the Admiralty?—The Admiralty—I was obliged to put the last interpretation myself, that in the commissioned offices Indians will not be admitted, and so is the reply also of the War Office. I discussed that the authority by which they had any power to make appointments did not authorise them to exclude the Indians positively and distinctly from these services.
But you say that the Regulations of the War Office and the Admiralty do exclude Indians?—They do exclude Indians—the War Office—which I demur to. They do not specifically do it, but they say that it rests with the authorities here to say who is to be admitted.
They are not barred by Statute, but by Regulation?—No; the War Office regulations distinctly exclude them.
They do not mention natives?—Oh yes, distinctly.
You think so?—Oh yes; the correspondence states it.
My recollection was that they reserved the power to say who was eligible?—That is what I wanted to know from them; the Admiralty fenced with me in that respect and would not give me a decided answer, but the War Office regulations are clear; they are given to me there distinctly they must be Europeans or Europeans naturalised; any others are entirely excluded, and then the Admiralty replied that their rules were something like or approximately.
Would you read the passage in the War Office letter on which you build that conclusion?—Oh yes, I will read it: “ I am to acquaint you, in reply, that candidates for admission in the British Army must be of pure European descent, and are also required to be British-born or naturalized British subjects; that is the Regulation.”
I thought that had been altered?—This is the latest I have got.
That is about a year ago, is it not? What is the date of that letter?—The date of this is the 10th June, 1896; they have not given us any further information. The correspondence is carried on up to the present day; there is a reply still standing which they have not yet given. Since that a good deal of correspondence has taken place, but they have never modified that.
You have referred to Mysore State. Are you able to develop and illustrate the views which are put forward as to government by the Native States?—Yes. With regard to the Native States I agree with Lord Salisbury when he says: “The general concurrence of opinion of those who know India best is that a number of well-governed small Native States are in the highest degree advantageous to the development of the political and moral condition of the people of India.” And Lord Iddesleigh similarly said: “ Our Indian policy should be founded on a broad basis. There might be difficulties; but what we had to aim at was to establish a system of Native States which might maintain themselves in a satisfactory relation." Again, we should endeavour, as far as possible, to develop the system of native government to bring our native talent and statesmanship, and to enlist in the cause of Government all that was great and good in them." Entertaining these ideas, Lord Iddesleigh practically carried them out in restoring Mysore, on the distinct basis that "at once offered a guarantee for the good government of the people and for the security of British rights and interests," as I have already stated.
What advantages do you think would accrue from this arrangement?—The advantages from this arrangement will be these: The obvious conclusion is that the only natural and satisfactory relations between an alien supremacy and the people of India can be established on this basis alone. There are these obvious advantages in these relations. The British Supremacy becomes perfectly secure and founded upon the gratitude and affection of the people, who, though under such Supremacy would feel as being under their own rulers, and as being guided and protected by a mighty supreme power. Every State thus formed, from the very nature of its desire for self preservation, will cling to the supreme power as its best security against disturbance by any other State. The division in a number of States becomes a natural and potent power for good in favour of the stability of the British Supremacy. There will be no temptation to any one State to discard that supremacy, while, on the other hand, the Supreme Government, having complete control and power over the whole Government, of each State, will leave no chance for any to go astray. Every instinct of self-interest and self-preservation of gratitude, of high aspirations, and of all the best parts of human nature, will naturally be on the side and in favour of British Supremacy which gave birth to these States. There will be an emulation among them to vie with each other in governing in the best way possible, under the eye and control of the Supreme Government on their actions, leaving no chance for mis-government. Each will desire to produce the best Administration Report every year. In short, this natural system has all the elements of consolidation of British power, of loyalty, and stability, and of prosperity of both countries. The result of this arrangement, in the case of Mysore, has been most satisfactory from all sides. For the result in Mysore, I give a short statement from the Mysore Report of 1st October, 1895. Of the work of the late Maharaja from 1881 till his death at the end of 1894, it would be enough for me to give a very brief statement from the late address of the Dewan, to the representative assembly held at Mysore on 1st October, 1895, on the results of the late Maharaja's administration during nearly 14 years of his reign, as nearly as possible in the Dewan's words. The Maharaja was invested with power on 25th March, 1881. Just previous to it, the State had encountered a most disastrous famine, by which a fifth of the population had been swept away, and the State had run into a debt of 80 lakhs of rupees to the British Government. The cash balance had become reduced to a figure insufficient for the ordinary requirements of the administration. Every source of revenue was at its lowest, and the severe retrenchments which followed had left every Department of State in an enfeebled condition. Such was the beginning. It began with liabilities exceeding the assets by Rx. 307,500, and with an annual income less than the annual expenditure by Rx. 12,500. Comparing 1880-1 with 1894-5, the annual revenue rose from Rx. 1,030,000 to Rx. 1,805,000, or 75·24 per cent., and after spending on a large and liberal scale on all works and purposes of public utility, the net assets amounted to over Rx. 1,760,000 in 1894-5, in lieu of the net liability of Rx. 307,500 with which His Highness's reign began in 1881.
| Rx. | |
|---|---|
| In 1881, the balance of State Funds was | 240,743 |
| Capital outlay on State Railways | 251,919 |
| Against a liability to the British Government of | 800,000 |
Leaving a balance of liability of Rx. 307,500.
On 30th June, 1895:—
| Assets: | ||
|---|---|---|
| (1) Balance of State Funds | 1,272,361 | |
| (2) Investment on account of Railway Loan Repayment Fund | 278,150 | |
| (3) Capital outlay on Mysore-Harihar Railways | 1,480,330 | |
| (4) Capital outlay on other Railway | 413,339 | |
| (5) Unexpended portion of capital borrowed for Mysore-Harihar Railway (with British Government) | ... | 157,949 |
| 3,602,129 | ||
| Liabilities : | Rx. | |
| (1) Local Railway loan | 200,000 | |
| (2) English railway loan | 1,638,280 | |
| 1,838,280 | ||
| Net assets | ... | 1,763,849 |
| And other assets : | ||
| Capital outlay on original irrigation works | Rx. 990,893 |
Besides the above expenditure from current revenue, there is the subsidy to the British Government of about Rx. 250,000 a year, or a total of about Rx. 3,700,000 in the 15 years from 1880-1 to 1894-5, and the Maharaja's civil list of about Rx. 180,000 during the 15 years also, paid from the current revenue. And all this together with increase of expenditure in every department. Under the circumstances above described, the administration at the start of His Highness's reign was necessarily very highly centralised. The Dewan, or the Executive Administrative Head, had the direct control, without the intervention of departmental heads of all the principal departments, such as the Land Revenue, Forests, Excise, Mining, Police, Education, Mujroyi, Legislative. As the finances improved, and as department after department was put into good working order and showed signs of expansion, separate heads of departments were appointed for Forests and Police in 1885, for Excise in 1889, for Mujroyi in 1891, and for Mining in 1894. His Highness was able to resolve upon the appointment of a separate Land Revenue Commissioner only in the latter part of 1894. Improvements were made in other departments, local and municipal funds legislation, education, &c. There are no wails which, unfortunately, the Finance Ministers of British India are obliged to raise, year after year, of fall in Exchange, overburdening taxation, &c. And all the above good results are side by side with an increase of population of 18·34 per cent. in the 10 years from 1881 to 1891, and there is reason to believe that during the last four years the ratio of increase was even higher. During the 14 years the rate of mortality is estimated to have declined 6·7 per mille. But there is still the most important and satisfactory feature to come, viz., that all this financial prosperity was secured not by resort to new taxation in any form or shape. In the very nature of things the present system of administration and management of Indian expenditure in British India cannot ever produce such results, even though a Gladstone undertook the work. Such is the result of good administration in a Native State at the very beginning. What splendid prospect is in store for the future if, as heretofore, it is allowed to develop itself to the level of the British system with its own native services, and not bled as poor British India is.
You had some personal knowledge of Mysore, had you not?— No, of Baroda I have personal knowledge.
Have you any later information about Mysore?—I have the latest report of Mysore, which is summarised in the “Times” of the 8th December 1896. The “Times,” in its article on Indian affairs, confirms by actual facts and events the wisdom and statesmanship of Lords Salisbury and Iddesleigh in their one great work of righteous and wise policy. Fortunately, it is the very Mysore State to which this righteous and wise act was done; therefore, I desire to quote a few words. The “Times” says: “The account which Sir Sheshadri Iyer rendered to it of his last year’s stewardship is one of increasing revenue, reduced taxation, expenditure firmly kept in hand, reproductive public works, and a large expansion of cultivation of mining, and of industrial undertakings. The result is a surplus which goes to swell the previous accumulations from the same source.” The “Times” article concludes with the words: “A narrative such as Sir Sheshadri Iyer was able to give to the Representative Assembly of Mysore makes us realise the growth of capital in the Native States, and opens up new prospects of industrial undertakings and railway construction in India on a silver basis.” Then he has said about some other Native States, but I have not introduced that here. I have got this latest report, if the Commission would allow me to put in a statement out of it, like the one I have already given. I have cited other illustrations of Native States in my statements.
I think it probably would be best if you were to modify by those latest figures the figures which you have already given in your evidence?--I could give the latest figures in continuation of those.
You are giving us the examples of Mysore ?—Yes.
It is no good giving us two sets of tables in regard to it. Can you nct, with this latest report, correct the table you have already given us in evidence?—I could do, but there is this difference, that in the report which I have quoted here he went into the comments on the administration of the 15 years and gave the result up to 1894-5; in this last report, of course, he only goes, in the usual way, into the figures of receipts and expenditure of the year; he does not go again into a report of the administration of the 15 years.
Do the latter figures very much vary from the former?—They are not on those lines; the other figures are simply the results and expenditure in the usual way, a sort of budget.
We must bear in mind the danger of drowning the Commission in figures. You were giving us an instance of the workiug of a Native State; it is no use giving us two sets of tables in illustration of that. If you are satisfied with the figures you have given us for 1894-5—they appear to me to give the illustration which you desire to give—then I do not think it would be necessary to supplement them with other figures?—All right.
Would you take Mysore as a type of Native States generally ? —Yes.
If I had, for instance, a list of the Native States before me here, and I were to put them to you one by one, would you quote each of them as a model State of the kind like Mysore?—Not every one of them—those that have introduced improvements in the way in which they have been introduced in Mysore—Earoda will be a very good illustration, as far as that goes.
One used to hear that Oudh was not a model kingdom? Oudh was not a model kingdom.
I have heard so. What security is there that such a state of things as occurred in Oudh, or something like it, may not occur in these Native States?—No, for the times are entirely changed, and the control which the British Government has even on the existing Native States is now of a different character altogether, and the management or the system of Government is more or less assimilated and brought to the system which exists in British India.
Then your contention is that repitition of such evils as those which led to the annexation of Oudh must be prevented by the precautions to be taken by the Supreme Government; that is, by the Indian Government?—In fact, the later improvements and the way in which the administration is introduced in all Native States.
Would you quote Hyderabad as a case of model government? —Well, I am not acquainted with the details of the Hyderabad Government, and therefore it would not be right for me to give any opinion upon it. My general impression is—and I may be wrong—that the State is not conducted in the way which would produce such results as Mysore has produced. It is more the defect of the administration than the possibility of results as good as the Mysore; but still I qualify it that I may be wrong, because I am speaking only from general impressions about that State.
In that case, if Hyderabad does not come up to the level of Mysore the supremacy of the British Government is not sufficient to secure in a Native State such good results?—If I am right in the impression, I think then it is evident that in that case the supremacy has not been exercised to the best advantage.
Now, leaving this point, you have put before us the practical remedy which you would recommend; that is to say, you have called our attention to the cost to India of Europeans. Have you any facts or practical figures on that subject which you would like to put before the Commission?—Yes, I leave the important suggestions I have made; I leave that consideration alone, and I come now to matters exactly as they are. First of all, Europeans. Here is Return 192 of 1892 of East India salaries. In the Civil Department the amount of annual salaries, Rs. 1,000 and upwards, is :—
| Rx. | |
|---|---|
| 3,874,929 | |
| Public Works Department (Civil) ... ... ... | 909,814 |
| Absentee Allowances Civil Department ... ... | 175,677 |
| Public Works Department, (Civil) ... ... ... | 44,734 |
| Pensions paid in India, Civil:— Europeans (Eurasians) ... ... ... | 97,323 |
| Public Works Department, Civil:— Europeans (Eurasians) ... ... ... | 23,871 |
| Total in India ... ... ... | 5,126,348 |
in England. The amount for civil and military are not separate, which I may request to be supplied.
Are you suggesting that those figures should be supplied to enable you to give a complete statement of the sum which represents the cost of Europeans in India?—Yes; the two are mixed up, Civil and Military, only that the amounts might be separated, but I have just the total further on; it does not matter much even if the information is not given, because my illustration stands just the same. Now what I urge is that the European Civil Service is distinctly alleged to be employed mainly for the maintenance of the British rule. For a practical purpose at present I grant that the service is for the benefit of India also— as for the maintenance of the British rule—and further, I do not press for the very weak capacity of India. I say the least that Britain can do in justice to India is to pay half of the salaries of the Europeans in the Civil Departments. The next figure I want to put is the expenditure on the European Army in India, and pensions and other disbursements in England.
Army Europeans.
| Rx. | |
|---|---|
| For the Military Department, Annual Salaries | 3,781,844 |
| Public Works (Military) ... ... ... ... | 171,075 |
| Absentee Allowances, Military ... ... ... | 234,900 |
| Public Works Military ... ... ... ... | 7,089 |
| Pensions paid in India: Pensions under Civil Regulations: Europeans (Eurasians) ... ... ... | 8,839 |
| Pensions under Army and Marine Regulations: Europeans (Eurasians) ... ... ... | 101,697 |
| Total—India ... | 4,305,444 |
Paid in England—
The amounts, Civil and Army together, are 3,710,678l. (including contributed) say at Rs. 15 per £, Rx. 5,566,01, grand total about 15 millions of Rx., to which is to be added the payments to European soldiers. What I urge is that the British Army is mainly for the maintenance of British rule against internal or external troubles. But for present practical purposes I accept that the Army is for the benefit of India also, as for that of Britain; and I urge, therefore, that, leaving alone even the poverty in India, Britain in fairness to India should share the expenditure, say half and half, for what is a common purpose of equally vital importance to both. The Government of India correctly puts the position: “Millions of money have been spent on increasing the Army in India, on armaments and fortifications to provide for the security of India, not against domestic enemies, or to prevent the incursions of the warlike peoples of the adjoining countries, but to maintain the supremacy of British power in the East.”
You have heard a good deal of evidence taken on the subject, of existing Army charges. Would you not think it desirable to criticise what you have heard put before us with regard to the different branches of Army expenditure or have you any remarks or suggestions to make upon the question of appointment as it has been before us?—Apart from the important considerations to which I have already referred, and taking the question as it exists now, I consider, as far as I can judge at present, that the Government of India has made out a fair case. I have heard the other side of the War Office and the Admiralty, and this I shall fairly consider and give my opinion on in the preparation of the Report.
Therefore, so far, in offering your evidence you do not wish to make any remarks upon those important questions?—No; I do not see the necessity of it, because the question has been very fairly and largely discussed, and the Government of India has put the case very fairly, as far as I could see it.
On that point you associate yourself with the Government of India?—Yes; I am quite satisfied with the fairness with which they have urged the question.
And you do not wish to go beyond them?—No, I do not wish to go beyond them.
Then do you wish to offer any remarks in connexion with the Navy?—Yes, with regard to the Navy, it is of absolute necessity to England whether there was rule in India or not. With regard to the absolute necessity to the United Kingdom itself for its own safety, of the whole Navy as it exists and is intended to be increased, there is but general opinion, without any distinction of parties. It will be easy to quote expressions from many prominent politicians. It is, in fact, the great subject of the day for which there is almost unanimity. I would content myself, however, with a few words of the highest authority in the realm under the Sovereign, the Prime Minister, and also of the Chancellor of the Exchequer. Lord Salisbury said in his Brighton speech, I have not quoted the whole words, but just such words as apply here :
“ But dealing with such money as you possess . . . that the first claim is the naval defence of England. I am glad that you welcome that sentiment. . . . . It is our business to be quite sure of the safety of this island home of ours whose inaccessibility is the source of our greatness, that no improvement of foreign fleets, and no combination of foreign alliances, should be able for a moment to threaten our safety at home. . . . . We must make ourselves safe at sea whatever happens. . . . . But after all, safety, safety from a foreign foe, comes first before every other earthly blessing, and we must take care in our responsibility to the many interests that depend upon us in our responsibility to the generations that are to succeed us, we must take care that no neglect of ours shall suffer that safety to be compromised.”
Sir M. Hicks-Beach, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, so late as 28th January last (the “ Times ” 29th January, 1896), said emphatically, and in a fightihg mood : “ We must be prepared. We must never lose the supremacy of the sea. Other nations had not got it and could afford to do without it, but supremacy of the sea was vital to our very existence.”
The Irish Financial Relations Report at page 23, says :
“Sir Edward Hamilton has stated in his evidence that he did not believe that if Ireland ceased to exist, Great Britain's expenditure on the Army and Navy could be reduced (Ans. 8741- 2). The enormous outlay on the Navy has become necessary in consequence of Great Britain's position as the first commercial power in the world, on account of her enormous trade with every part of the globe, and on account of the dependence of her inhabitants for subsistence on supplies from abroad, and on having a safe ocean communication.”
Notwithstanding that such is the absolute necessity of England to have even more than its present Navy as a world-wide power, I am willing to allow that a fair share should be paid by India, for the vessels that are kept in the Indian waters, and which have been under consideration by the Commission. Well, that I have said in the question of partnership, and therefore I will not add here, that whatever is asked from us to contribute, to that extent we should have a share in the benefits of that service. It comes, in fact, next immediately—about partnership.
Considering the partnership between England and India, should not India take some share in all such charges as are required for Imperial common interests?—Yes. About the partnership between England and India, as it becomes an element in all questions of the relations between the two countries. The Indians are repeatedly told, and in this Commission several times, that Indians are partners in the British Empire and must share the burdens of the Empire. Then I propose a simple test. For instance, supposing that the expenditure of the total Navy of the Empire is, say, 20,000,000l., and as partners in the Empire you ask British India to pay 10,000,000l., more or less, British India, as partner, would be ready te pay, and, therefore, as partner, must have her share in the employment of British Indians, and in every other benefit of the service to the extent of her contribution. Take the Army. Suppose the expenditure of the total Army of the Empire is, say, 40,000,000l. Now, you may ask 20,000,000l. or more or less to be contributed by British India. Then, as partners, India must claim, and must have, every employment and benefit of that service to the extent of her contribution If, on the other hand, you force the helpless and voiceless-British India to pay, but not to receive a return to the extent of the payment, then your treatment is the unrighteous treatment of the slave-master over British India as a slave. In short, if British India is to be treated as a partner in the Empire it must follow that to whatever extent (be it a farthing or a hundred millions) British India contributes to the expense of any department, to that extent of the British Indians must have a share in the services and benefits of that department, whether civil, military, naval, or any other; then only will British India be the "intergral part" of, or partner in, the Empire.
Have you any considerations to lay before the Commission on the subject of frontier expenditure?—Yes; according to the table of, and comment on, the expenditure on the frontier wars from Colonel Hanna's book. This expenditure, which is entirely Imperial—for the maintenance of British rule against Russian invasion—is, say, roundly, about Rx. 80,000,000 or more, out of which 5,000,000l. have been paid by England. I am not at all discussing the policy of these wars. All I simply say is that these frontier wars are avowedly for Imperial purposes, that both England and India must be considered as benefited by it, and the least that should be done in justice in India is to halve the expenditure, if not in the proportion of the capacity of India as compared with that of England.
I have here the highest declarations of the Imperial character of these wars. If the Commission would allow, I shall read them.
On 11th February 1880, Mr. Fawcett moved the following amendment to the Address in reply to the Queen's Speech (Hansard, Vol. 250, p. 453).
“But humbly desire to express our regret that in view of the declarations that have been made by your Majesty's ministers that the war in Afghanistan was undertaken for Imperial purposes, no assurance has been given that the cost incurred in consequence of the renewal of hostilities in that country will not be wholly defrayed out of the revenues of India.”
Mr. Fawcett then said (Hansard, Vol. 250, p. 454):
“And, fourthly, the most important question, as far as he was able to judge, of who was to pay the expenses of the war. . . . It seemed to be quite clear that the expenses of the war should not be borne by India, and he wished to explain that so far as India was concerned this was not to be regarded as a matter of generosity, but of justice and legality. . . . . The matter must be decided on grounds of strict justice and legality . . . . . (p. 457): It was a remarkable thing that every speech made in that House, or out of it, by ministers or their supporters on the subject, showed that the war was a great Imperial enterprise, those who opposed the war having always been taunted as being "parochial" politicians who could not appreciate the magnitude and importance of great Imperial enterprise. . . . , . . (p. 458): He would refer to the speeches of the Viceroy of India, the Prime Minister, and the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs upon the subject. . . . . In December, 1878, the noble earl* warned the peers that they must extend their range of vision, and told them that they were not to suppose that this was a war which simply concerned some small cantonments at Dakka and Jellalabad, but one undertaken to maintain the influence and character not of India, but of England in Europe. Now were they going to make India pay the entire bill for maintaining the influence and character of England in Europe. . . . His lordship† treated the war as indissolubly connected with the Eastern question. . . . . Therefore, it seemed to him (Mr. Fawcett), that it was absolutely impossible for the Government, unless they were prepared to cast to the winds their declarations, to come down to the House and regard the war as an Indian one. . . . . All he desired was a declaration of principle, and he would be perfectly satisfied if someone representing the Governmeut would get up and say that they had always considered this war as an Imperial one, for the expenses of which England and India were jointly liable."
Afterwards Mr. Fawcett said (p. 477):
"He was entirely satisfied with the assurance which had been given on the part of the Government that the House should have an opportunity of discussing the question before the Budget was introduced; and would, therefore, beg leave to withdraw his amendment."
In the House of Lords, Lord Beaconsfield emphasised the objects to be for British Imperial purposes (25th February 1880, Hansard, Vol. 250, p. 1,094):
"That the real question at issue was whether England should possess the gates of her own great Empire in India. . . . . We resolved that the time had come when this country should acquire the complete command and possession of the gates of the Indian Empire. Let me at least believe that the peers of England are still determined to uphold not only the Empire, but the honour of this country."
So it is clear that the object of all the frontier wars, large or small, was that "England should possess the gates "of her own, great Empire," that "this country should "acquire the complete command and possession of the gates of the Indian Empire," and uphold not only the Empire, bnt also "the honour of this country." Can anything be more clear than the Imperial character of the frontier wars?
Mr. Fawcett, again, on 12th March, 1880, moved (Hansard Vol. 251, p. 922):
"That in view of the declarations which have been officially made that the Afghan war was undertaken in the joint interests of England and India, this house is of opinion that it is unjust to defray out of the revenues of India the whole of the expenditure incurred in the renewal of hostilites with Afghanistan."
Speaking to this motion, Mr. Fawcett, after referring to the past declarations of the Prime Minister, the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, quoted from the speech of the Viceroy soon after his arrival (p. 923):
"I came to India, and just before leaving England for India I had frequent interviews with Lord Salisbury, the then Indian Secretary, and I came out specially instructed to treat the Indian frontier question as an indivisible part of a great Imperial question mainly depending for its solution upon the general policy of Her Majesty's Government. . . . ."
And further on Mr. Fawcett said (p. 926):
"What was our policy towards self-governed colonies, and towards India, not self-governed? In the self-governed colony of the Cape we had a war, for which we were not responsible. Who was to pay for it? It would cost the English people something like 5,000,000l. In India there was a war, for which the Indian people were not responsible—a war which grew out of our own policy and actions in Europe—and we are going to make the Indian people, who were not self-governed and were not represented, pay every sixpence of the cost."
And so, Lord Salisbury, as Secretary of State for India, and the Viceroy, had cleared up the whole position: "To treat the Indian frontier question as an indivisible part of a great Imperial question, mainly depending for its solution upon the general policy of Her Majesty's Government," and the Indian people having no voice or choice in it.
Mr. Gladstone, following Mr. Fawcett, said (p. 930) :—
"It appears to me that, to make such a statement as that, the judgment of the Viceroy is a sufficient expression of that of the people of India, is an expression of paradox really surprising, and such as is rarely heard among us . . (p. 932) : In my opinion my hon. friend the member for Hackney has made good his case . . Still, I think it fair and right to say that, in my opinion, my hon. friend the member for Hackney has completely made good his case. His case, as I understand it, has not received one shred of answer
. . . . (p. 933) : In the speech of the Prime Minister, the speech of Lord Salisbury, and the speech of the Viceroy of India, and, I think my hon. friend said, in a speech by the Chancellor of the Exchequer, this Afghan war has been distinctively recognised as partaking of the character of an Imperial war.
. . . . But I think not merely a small sum like that, but what my right hon. friend the Chancellor of the Exchequer would call a solid and substantial sum, ought to be borne by this country, at the very least . . . . (p. 935) : As regards the substance of the motion, I cordially embrace the doctrine of my hon. friend the member for Hackney. There is not a constituency in the country before which I would not be prepared to stand, if it were the poorest and most distressed in the land, if it were composed of a body of men to all of whom every addition of a farthing for taxes was a sensible burden, and before them I would be glad to stand and plead that, when we have made in India a war which our own Government have described as in part an Imperial war, we ought not for a moment to shrink from the responsibility of assuming at least a portion of the cost of that war, in correspondence with that declaration, instead of making use of the law and argument of force, which is the only law and the only argument which we possess or apply to place the whole of this burden on the shoulders of the people of India."
The upshot of the whole was that England contributed 5,000,- 000l. out of 21,000,000l. spent on this war, when one would have naturally expected a "far more solid and substantial" sum from rich England, whose interest was double, both Imperial and European. But the extent of that contribution is not the present question with me. It is the principle that "the Indian frontier question is one "indivisible part of a great Imperial question, mainly "depending for its solution upon the general policy of "Her Majesty's Government," and that, therefore, a fair apportionment must be made of all the charge or cost of all frontier wars, according to the extent of the interest and of the means of each country.
Coming down to later times, the action of Mr. Gladstone on 27th April, 1885, to come to the House of Commons to ask for 11,000,000l .and the House accepting his proposal, and on the occasion of the Penjdeh incident, is again a most significant proof of the Imperial character of these frontier wars. He said (Hansard, Vol. 297, p. 859) :—
"I have heard with great satisfaction the assurance of hon. gentlemen opposite that they are disposed to forward in every way the grant of funds to us to be used as we best think for the maintenance of what I have upon former occasions described as a National and Imperial policy. Certainly, an adequate sense of our obligations to our Indian Empire has never yet been claimed by any party in this country as its exclusive inheritance. In my opinion he will be guilty of a moral offence and gross political folly who should endeavour to claim on behalf of his own party any superiority in that respect over those to whom he is habitually opposed. It is an Imperial policy in which we are engaged."-
You lay great stress on the high authorities you quote, do you not, throughout your evidence?—Yes.
May I ask you, would you lay equal stress if I placed before you the same high authorities speaking in the other direction?—I lay stress upon high authorities in all matters wnich I have so thoroughly studied, and in which I agree with them. Of course, each authority has different opinions upon different subjects.
But if the same high authorities on another occasion spoke in a different sense would you lay equal stress upon them?—On the same subject.
On the same subject?—Well, I should be glad to see them.
You quote these high authorities, in support of your own position?—In suport of my own views.
And strengthen your own views based on personal experience?—What I consider to be the right thing, of course.
There is this to be said, where great reliance is placed on the expression of opinion of a high authority, in all probability an equally high authority can be produced on the other side?—As Mr. Caine said, I produced authoritities which are in support of my opinion.
I am only pointing out that high authorities may be found on both sides; we should bear that in mind before we place absolute reliance upon what is said in political discussion?—Yes.
You are aware that there has been much discussion about the employment of the Indian Army outside of India; have you any remarks to make upon what has occurred before the Commission upon that head?—Yes. This can be answered in two ways. If the test I have just proposed of dividing the whole Imperial expenditure, and each deriving the benefit of the services in proportion to the contribution, then the whole Army and Navy becomes altogether Imperial, and may be used in any part of the world at common additional expenditure. Secondly, apart from such Imperial partnership, whenever Indian forces are taken outside Indian limits, the expenses must be paid in full by the British Exchequer except when the interests are distinctly common, like that of the frontier wars as a protection for both against Russian invasion. In such case as I have already stated, expenses may be divided in some fair way, giving some consideration to the capacity of both. On the other hand, such wars as that of Abyssinia, and for the benefit of Egypt or the Cape Colony, no expenditure should be placed, ordinary or extraordinary, upon the Indian revenues. The only case which can come at all, outside of India, within the purview of common purposes like the North-Western Frontier wars, is when the Suez Canal is actually threatened and has to be defended. Then, like common purpose, both India and Britain can make a fair share with some consideration for the poorer party. Aden should be considered as for Imperial purposes, and be divided in a similar way. With all other diplomatic or other expenses of Britain, India has no connexion or interest, and should not be made to contribute. Now, sometimes this question of interest may not be so very obvious, and, in any such difference, some fair tribunal should be resorted to decide the difference. This question of tribunal has been already discussed in evidence, and I trust the Commission may be able to see their way to recommend some.
That, I think, completes your evidence, thank you, Mr. Naoroji.
Just one question on what you have said. You say that India and Britain should take a fair share when the Suez Canal is actually threatened and has to be defended. Do you not think that Australia and New Zealand, the Straits Colonies, and Hong Kong and Ceylon, ought also to take a fair share?—Surely they ought to.
You do not discriminite between India and the other dependencies interested in the Suez Canal?—They are as much interested in the Suez Canal as India is.