My Lord and Gentlemen,—In our views on Indian matters we shall sometimes agree and sometimes differ with the Indian Government. When we agree, we shall be only too glad to express our views accordingly. When we differ, either from looking at the subject from a different point of view, or from more or less information, we shall respectfully lay before the Government our views. In doing so, it cannot be supposed that our object is to set up an opposition party. On the contrary, our object is co-operation, as the aims both of the Government and of ourselves are the same, viz. the good government and welfare of India. I believe that Government would rather be glad than otherwise to know our independent views, provided we always confine ourselves to a dispassionate and careful examination of their acts, and lay our reasons of difference before them in a becoming manner, especially making “measures, not men—arguments, not abuse,” our rule of conduct. I hope, therefore, I shall not be misunderstood for laying before you my views, and you for expressing yours on the subject of this paper.
I beg to submit for your consideration that the decision of the Cabinet not to pay the ordinary pay of the Indian troops employed in the Abyssinian expedition is an injustice to India, and an injury to the prestige of England; that the decision is not only unfair in principle, but contrary to the reasonable practice of former days. I first examine whether there are any past events or precedents which can guide us to a just decision.
When the English Government was only one of many independent Indian Powers, and when temporary assistance like the present was needed from each other, on what principles was such assistance given and taken? I find that in these cases the English had acted on the fair and equitable principle that the party receiving assistance should pay the whole charge of the troops during the period of assistance. I shall not take up your time with many extracts, I shall give only three or four short ones. In the treaty with Hyder Alli, 1769, it is provided (Article 2)—
“That in case either of the contracting parties shall be attacked, they shall, from their respective countries, mutually assist each other to drive the enemy out. The pay of such assistance of troops from one party to another to be after the following rates, viz. to every soldier and horseman fifteen rupees per month, and every sepoy seven and a half rupees per month. The pay of the sirdars and commandants to be as it shall be agreed on at the time.”*
The treaty of 1770 contains similar stipulations, which are again confirmed in the treaty of 1792.
In the treaty of alliance with Bazalut Jung, 1779, it is provided (Article 4)—
“If the Nawab Shujah-ool-Moolk’s territories be invaded by an enemy, we shall, besides the troops that are stationed with him, send such a sufficient force as we can spare to his assistance. The ordinary and extraordinary expenses of such troops, whatever they may amount to, shall be paid agreeably to the Company’s established customs by the Nawab, who will sign the accounts.”†
Again, in the treaty with the Nizam, 1790 (Article 4)—
“If the Right Honourable the Governor-General should require a body of cavalry to join the English forces, the Nawab Asuph Jah and Pundit Prudhan shall furnish to the number of 10,000, to march in one month, &c. . . . . . The pay of the said cavalry to be defrayed monthly by the Hon. Company at the rate and on conditions hereafter to be settled."*
In the "Articles explanatory of the 3rd Article of the Treaty of Mysore, concluded in 1799," Article 3 provides—
"If it should at any time be found expedient to augment the cavalry of Mysore beyond the number of (4,000) four thousand, on intimation to that effect from the British Government, His Highness the Rajah shall use his utmost endeavours for that purpose; but the whole expense of such augmentation, and of the maintenance of the additional numbers at the rate of (8) eight star pagodas for each effective man and horse while within the territory of Mysore, and of an additional sum or batta at the rate of (4) four star pagodas a month after the expiration of one month from the period of their passing the frontier of Mysore, as described in the 2nd article, shall be defrayed by the Hon. Company."†
Now, I ask why this reasonable and just practice should have been subsequently departed from. I hope the standard of fair play of the Crown is not to be inferior to that of the Company. Next, I ask a few questions. Suppose the tables were turned, and England sent some troops for India's assistance, will the English taxpayer and Parliament allow the assistance without charging India with the whole expense?—or rather, has the British Government ever given any assistance to the British Indian Government, or the British Indian Government to any native Power, of the sort without making the receiver of the assistance pay fully? Suppose some subjects of the Nizam were held in captivity by some Arab chief, and the Nizam, to liberate his subjects and to maintain his honour, deciding to send an expedition to Arabia, requested his allies, the British, to assist him temporarily with troops; would such assistance be given without charging the Nizam with the pay of the troops, as well as any extra expenses? If not, then on what grounds of equity or fair play should England now get the Indian troops without being charged for their pay? Why, instead of the British Government having ever given any assistance of the kind, it has a few accounts to settle with its conscience for having made India pay even more than what could be fairly due from it.
It is said that India will lose nothing. What is it that the troops are kept in India for? Whatever that is, that India loses. If it is nothing, then the army should be reduced by so much. If it is something, then India is not losing nothing. If the troops are required for security, then it is unfair that India should be deprived of that security, and yet be made to pay for it. The question resolves itself into this: Should the pay of the troops be allowed to be a saving to India or to England? For, if India is made to pay, it is so much a saving to England, and if England pays, India saves so much. Now, whether on the grounds of equity, or of need, or of ability, certainly India has the claim to be allowed to save what it can. England has always charged for everything she has given on similar occasions, so she should not now shrink from paying when it is her turn to do so. The need of India to save whatever it can, is greater than that of England. Famines, intellectual and physical, are its crying evils, and the weight of a large army keeps some of its urgent wants in abeyance. Lastly, England is the richest of the two, and well able to pay for what it receives. The very circumstance that England is able to avail herself of a readymade army, a very convenient base of operations, and the services of Indian officials and of experienced Indian officers, is in itself a great advantage to the English taxpayer.
It is urged, that because the prestige of England is important, therefore India must contribute. But what prestige is it that England has and needs to maintain? Is it that England is poor in means and unfair in dealing, or that her resources are as great as her arm is strong, and that her sense of justice is above suspicion? Here England sends her envoys to Abyssinia, and finds in its ruler a troublesome customer. Her honour is insulted, and her representative is kept in captivity. The prestige which England has to maintain under such circumstances is to show that she is herself able to hold her own, from her own resources; not that she is so poor or unfair that she is unable or unwilling to pay for the very troops which are employed in vindicating her honour, and liberating her own representative, and helps herself from the Indian purse. Can the world be blamed if they consider it strange that the England which is ready to spend some four millions or more for her honour, should shrink to pay a few hundred thousands?
However, even the question of the few hundred thousand pounds is not of so much importance. A far more important question, of the principles of the financial relations between the two countries, is involved in the present course of the Cabinet: Who is the guardian of the Indian purse? and are the British Government and Parliament absolute masters and disposers of it, or is it a trust in their hands to be discharged on some equitable principles? I should think that in the present condition of the political relations of England and India, the Indian Secretary ought to be its natural guardian; that he ought, when English and Indian relations are to be adjusted, to act as if he were an independent Power, representing Indian interests, and negotiate with the Foreign Secretary on terms fair and equitable to both parties. If this position of the Indian Secretary is faithfully acted upon, India will have the satisfaction to know that they have some one here to protect them from any unjust treatment Parliament being the ultimate Court of Appeal. The Indian Secretary, instead of offering to make a present to the English taxpayer from the Indian revenue, ought to protect it from any encroachment. India is unable to protect itself, and as the British Government and Parliament hold its purse in trust, it is the more necessary for them that they should not be generous to themselves with others' trust-money, but, on the contrary, adopt the only proper course of treating the trust with the strictest justice and care, especially in the relations with themselves.
Clause 55 of the Indian Government Act of 1858, runs thus:—
"Except for preventing or repelling actual invasion of Her Majesty's Indian possessions, or under sudden and urgent necessity, the Revenues of India shall not, without the consent of both Houses of Parliament, be applicable to defray the expenses of any military operation carried on beyond the external frontiers of such possessions by Her Majesty's forces charged upon such revenues."
The evident object of this clause, I submit, is to prevent the application of Indian revenues except for Indian purposes, or otherwise the clause means nothing. If Indian revenues can be applied for the payment of troops beyond the Indian frontiers, then the clause becomes simply useless, for England then can use Indian troops under any circumstances, as the two grounds—viz. of Indian purposes, and of loan to England for her own wars—will embrace all cases.
I have now laid before you as briefly as possible my reasons why England should pay the entire expense of the Expedition, under any consideration, whether of justice and fair play or prestige, with the hope of eliciting an impartial discussion from you. Upon the necessity of the expedition, and when and how Englishmen should vindicate their honour, it is not for me to tell them. Among the nations most able to uphold their honour, the English have never held a second place. Their whole history, and their instinctive love of liberty and honour, are enough to satisfy the most sceptical that England is well able to take care of herself, and to know what her honour is and how to uphold it.
When I wrote this paper I could not know the reasons of the Government; therefore I must crave your indulgence while, in continuation of the paper, I make a few remarks on the debate of last night. But, in making those remarks, it is far from my intention to make any personal reflections on any speaker: Parliament has accepted the reasons, and decided upon the resolution; consequently any remarks I may make apply as much to Parliament itself as to any of the individual speakers. To make my remarks as few as possible, I shall just read a few extracts from some of the speeches of last night, which give nearly the pith of the whole argument, and give my views upon them. Sir S. Northcote said—"From the first moment that this expedition was thought about, early in the month of April last year, in reply to communications addressed to the Secretary of State in Council, we stated that we were willing to place the resources of India at the disposal of the Home Government, but must stipulate that, as the matter was one in which Indian interests were not concerned, India should not bear any portion of the charge. At that time it was clearly understood, though we did not put that into the despatch to the Treasury, that, though we were determined to resist any attempt to charge the revenues of India with any new burthen, we did not, to use a homely expression, want to make money by the transaction." This amounts to saying that India must pay under all circumstances. If Indian interests were concerned, then, of course, India must pay also; and if Indian interests were not concerned, then also India must pay for the troops in order "not to make money." Can this be considered right? Sir Stafford Northcote says— "It is said, and we have said it ourselves, that India has no interest in this matter. That is perfectly true if by 'interest' you mean material interest. But there are principles which should be upheld in the interest of both countries, even at the cost of blood and treasure, and one of them is this—that envoys of the Sovereign of this country should be protected by us. That is a leading principle of international law, and we should be untrue, not only to ourselves, but to the civilized world, if we fail to uphold it." If that principle is to be admitted, if the envoys of England are to be protected everywhere at the expense of India, then India could be made to share in the expenses of a European or American war. Also, in other words, if the United States dismissed an English ambassador, and insulted the dignity of the Crown, and if the Crown went to war with America, India must contribute for it; or if the Crown embarked in a European war, India must contribute. This, I trust, would not be allowed by Englishmen as just. Again, the interests of the Colonies are as much, or perhaps more, involved in this principle. What are they contributing to the present expedition? And would they be always ready to act according to the principle laid down in the extract I have read? Sir Stafford Northcote has been at great pains to show that the news about the Abyssinian captives, and the efforts made to release them, is carried to the natives of India, and that in undertaking this expedition the opinion of the people of India about the power and resources of England is most important to be taken into consideration. If it be considered so important that the prestige of England should not suffer in the slightest degree in the estimation of the natives of India, then that is just the reason why Parliament should not have passed the resolution. For, it will be naturally thought that though the English Government admit that the war is for their own purposes, that it is for liberating their own captives, that it is for vindicating England's honour; yet they, while ready to spend five millions, or ten millions if necessary, to protect their country's honour, and to punish its insulters, take from India a little because India cannot help herself. That cannot increase the prestige of England in India; it is likely to have just the contrary effect, not only among the natives of India, but perhaps among all Asiatics.
Let us now consider the precedents brought forward by Government for what they propose to do now. We have the Persian war and the Chinese war referred to. There is one important difference between the precedents I have brought before you and those of the Government. In the precedents I have referred to there were two parties, both able to take care of themselves, who negotiated with each other, and who were able to strike the right balance between them; whereas in the case of Government precedents the holder of the purse was also its disposer, without any voice from the owner, and therefore the transactions themselves required examination. Even granting, for argument's sake, that former transactions were in just proportions, they are not at all applicable to the present expedition. The Persian war and the Chinese war do not bear analogy to this. In the Chinese and Persian wars we can, at least, trace some Indian concern—with the former commercial, with the latter political, the alleged necessity of arresting Russian progress; but Government itself acknowledges that, in the present expedition, Indian interests are not concerned. All these present complications have arisen without the India Office or the natives of India having anything to do with the matter. It is entirely the Foreign Office affair. Even at present it is the Foreign Secretary who takes the whole brunt of the battle in Parliament, and the only way in which India is brought forward is that it is the best agency through which the Foreign Secretary can accomplish his object of carrying on the war in the cheapest and most expeditious way possible. Sir Stafford Northcote says—"All that India undertakes to do is to lend her troops, without charge, as long as she can spare them. That is the principle upon which we have proceeded, and which, I contend, is a just and liberal one. I say it is just, because India really loses nothing whatever in point of money; she only continues to pay that which, if the expedition had not been ordered, she would still pay; and it is liberal, because India places at the disposal of Her Majesty forces which the Imperial Government could not obtain without paying for them." If to be prevented from saving when saving can be made, is not losing, then I do not know what losing means. Again, if India loses nothing, then how can there be any liberality? I have no doubt if England ever needed aid or liberality, India, from very gratitude to England for the position in which it now stands, ought, and would, strain every nerve to give it. But is the present such a case? The world naturally does not like trustees to be liberal to themselves. It is a matter of regret more on account of England herself, that she should present the spectacle of, on the one hand, being able and ready to spend any number of millions for her honour, and on the other of taking a few hundred thousand pounds from India for the pay of the very troops to be employed in vindicating that honour. However, had Government stopped at the argument of liberality, or sense of gratitude, or friendly feeling towards England, there would not have been much to complain of, and the natives, perhaps, would have been glad to have been looked upon as friendly; but by citing precedents for justification, and arguing for rights, the question assumes a different aspect, and occasions the present discussion. Then the Government has taken very great pains to prove that after all what India has to pay is very little, and that if all the former precedents were followed, it would have had to pay more. But suppose it is a small affair, then it is a greater pity that they should have made so much fuss about it, and not paid this little themselves, and should not have taken this opportunity to show that they are as just as they are strong and rich. Sir Henry Rawlinson says—"Our system of Government in India was essentially for the maintenance of our power, and when we spoke of Indian interests we meant our own interest as the ruling power of India." If that is the case, and that is the guiding principle of the Government, then against such argument of the rights of might there can be no discussion. But I believe the English Government to be guided by the principles of justice and truth and not of the rights of might. Sir Henry Rawlinson says—"The Royal Navy now fulfilled gratuitously all the duties connected with the defence of India, that were formerly discharged by the Indian navy—a service which drew heavily upon the Imperial Exchequer; and in many instances the Home Government had sent out, at its own expense, expeditions of which the objects more nearly related to India than to the rest of the British Empire." I have no right to question the truth of that statement. I only say if it be true, and as it is also intimated by Mr. Gladstone, that India is better off in its financial relations with England, it is indeed a great pity that the natives of India should be allowed to remain under a false impression. If it be true that England has, on occasions, performed services for India to which India has not contributed, it is in the first place necessary, for the sake of justice to both parties, that the financial relations between the two countries in respect of those services should be fairly examined and adjusted; and next, if India has been so benefited as alleged by England, it is proper and just that India should know and feel that benefit, and knowing it be grateful for it. At present India is under the impression that England, having the purse, appropriates it at its own pleasure, and that unjust burthens have been placed upon her. As Sir Henry Rawlinson has not given us any instance of what he refers to, we are left in the dark; but against his statement there is one of another authority, equally, if not more important. Lord Cranbourne says—"At all events the special injustice of the course now about to be pursued consists in this—that when we employ English troops in India they are paid for out of the Indian revenues from the moment they land in that country; but when we employ Indian troops on English duty, we say that India must pay for them." I do not, of course, impute to Sir Henry Rawlinson, who has only lately given a signal instance of his sense of justice to India, that he would state anything that he did not thoroughly believe. I wish he had given the cases, for it is very desirable, for the sake of both countries, that the real state of the case, in regard to this matter, should be known. It is also necessary to know how far the Colonies, which also benefit by the Royal Navy, contribute to it. Then there is some stress laid upon this, that India benefits by this expedition; that by the expedition going from India, stores are brought there, and money is poured into the country; but nobody can seriously urge that, therefore, India must contribute to the expedition. I do not suppose that cotton merchants, or ship-owners, paid anything towards the American war because they benefited largely by its occurrence. The fact is, that India is resorted to on this occasion in order that the interests of the English taxpayer may be served in the best possible manner. Lord Stanley distinctly stated that he referred to the Indian Secretary, and to the Indian authorities, in order to carry out the expedition in the most successful way. He found in India a ready machinery for carrying out the expedition. That induced the English Government to make India the basis of operations. In concluding my remarks I once more suggest that the discussion should be confined to the one point which I have brought before you, and I hope that we shall follow the advice of our noble Chairman, and not be guilty of any personalities, but shall confine ourselves entirely to the arguments of the case. It is my sincere conviction that Lord Stanley or Sir Stafford Northcote would never allow any injustice intentionally. All their acts would at once refute any contrary assumption. I take this opportunity of thanking Mr. Fawcett and the other twenty-two members, and the English press, for their advocacy of justice to India.