I begin with Mr. Maclean. His remarks consist of violent declamation and criticism proper. With the former I have nothing to do.
He has very much misunderstood my papers. As a first instance :—when he asks me to deduct the exports of India (less the exports from Native States) from my estimate of the production of India, he does not see that my estimate is for the total production in India, and that what is exported is not to be deducted therefrom. Besides, my estimate is for British India, and is not affected in any way by the exports from the Native States.
As a second instance—he asks me to add £15,000,000 for Cotton manufactures. My estimate of production includes all raw Cotton of British India. The only thing to be added (which is already included in my estimate) is the additional value the raw Cotton acquires by the application of industry in its conversion into cloth. Coal and foreign stores that are used in the mills are paid for from and are therefore included in the production I have estimated. The only additional value is that of the labour employed. But even if we allowed the whole additional value acquired by raw cotton in its conversion into cloth, what will it be ? Mr. Maclean's Guide to Bombay (1875) gives the number of the then working spindles (which is much later than the time of my notes) as about six lacs in the whole of the Bombay Presidency. Taking 5 ozs. per day per spindle, and 340 working days in the year, the total quantity of raw cotton consumed will be about 81,300 Candies, which, at Rs. 150 per Candy amounts to about £1,220,000. The price of cloth is generally about double the price of raw cotton, as I have ascertained from the details of two or three mills of Bombay, so that the whole addition caused by the mills to the value of raw cotton is only nearly 1¼ millions, say 1½ millions sterling to leave a wide margin. Then, again, there are about the time of my notes, yarn imports into India worth about £2,500,000 per annum. This, of course, is paid for from the production of the country. The value added to it is its conversion into cloth. Now the cost of weaving is about 25 per cent. of the value of yarn, so that the value thus added is about £600,000, say a million to include any contingency, making the total value to be added to the raw production of about £2,500,000. If deduction is made for coal and foreign stores, this amount will be much lessened. Again we know that hand spinning is much broken down, and there can be but a little quantity of cloth woven out of hand-spun yarn in India. Giving even £500,000 more for that industry, the outside total of addition to the raw produce would come to, as a high estimate, £3,000,000 instead of the £15,000,000 which Mr. Maclean asks me to add without giving a single figure for his data. Let him give any reasonable data, and I shall gladly modify my figures so far. As a third instance of his misunderstanding my paper—when he asks me to take £5,000,000 for gold and silver ornaments made in this country, he forgets that gold and silver are not produced in this country. All bullion is imported and is paid for from the produce of India. It, therefore, can add nothing to my estimate of production. The only addition is the industry employed on it to convert it into ornaments. This industry for the ordinary Native ornaments will be amply covered by taking on an average an eighth of the value of the metal, which will give about £625,000, or, say, three quarters of a million sterling, or even a million, while Mr. Maclean wants me to take £5,000,000.
As a fourth instance:—while Mr. Maclean tells me erroneously to add £15,000,000 and £5,000,000 when there should be hardly one fifth of these amounts, he does not see that I have actually allowed in my paper for all manufacturing industrial value to be added to that of raw produce as £17,000,000. And further for any omissions £30,000,000 more (Supra pp. 24-5).
These four instances, I think, would be enough to show the character of Mr. Maclean’s criticism, and I pass over several other similar and other mistakes and mis-statements. I come to what is considered as his most pointed and most powerful argument, but which, in reality, is all moonshine. After contradicting flatly in my paper his assertion that the exports of the United States were in excess of imports, I had said that I had no reliable figures for the years after 1869. To this he replies: " Here they are," and he gives them as follows. I quote his own words.
"Mr. Dadabhai says he cannot get 'authentic figures' of American trade for a later year than 1869—Here they are for him :—
| Imports. | Merchandise and bullion. £ | Exports. | Merchandise and bullion. £ |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1869 | 87,627,917 | 1869 | 99,330,735 |
| 1870 | 97,779,351 | 1870 | 117,534,993 |
| 1871 | 112,552,770 | 1871 | 138,084,908 |
| 1872 | 117,250,899 | 1872 | 128,337,183 |
| 1873 | 132,709,295 | 1873 | 142,240,730 |
| 1874 | 119,172,249 | 1874 | 130,582,689 |
| £667,085,481 | £756,111,238 |
"The excess of exports over imports for the six years is, therefore, 89 millions sterling, giving a yearly average of nearly 15 millions against only 11½ for India. The explanation of the deficit in imports in the case of the United States is, of course, similar to that which accounts for so much of the Indian deficit. The United States form a favourite field for investment of English Capital, the interest of which is paid by America in the form of exports of produce. Yet we never heard an American citizen complain that his country was being drained of its wealth for the benefit of foreigners. He is only anxious to borrow as much English Capital as he can, knowing that invested in reproductive works, it will repay him a hundred-fold the paltry rate of interest he has to send abroad."
To these remarks of Mr. Maclean I reply that he is as utterly wrong now as he was before. When he first made the mistake which I have pointed out in my paper there was some excuse for him—that he was misled by what was supposed to be a book made up from authoritative statements— but after I flatly contradicted him once, it was his duty to ascertain whether my contradiction was correct, and if so not to follow the same blind guide again. He did nothing of the kind, and his conduct now was quite inexcusable in dealing recklessly with such important matters. He has taken his figures from the "Statesman's Year Book." This book has made curious mistakes. It has included bullion in the figures for exports of “Merchandise,” and again given bullion separately; and it has not converted the “currency” value of exports of “domestic produce” from the Atlantic ports, into gold. These two and some such other mistakes render this book’s figures for the years taken by Mr. Maclean utterly wrong. I give the following illustration of these mistakes in the figures for the year ending 30th June, 1871.
The correct official1 figures are:—
| Merchandise. | (gold value.) Gold and Silver. | Total. |
|---|---|---|
| $14,421,270 | $14,038,629 | $28,459,899 |
| Merchandise. | Specie and bullion. Gold Value. | Total. | ||
|---|---|---|---|---|
| from Atlantic ports. | from Pacific Ports. | from Atlantic Ports. | from Pacific Ports. | Mixed Value. |
| Currency Value. $ | Gold Value. $ | $ | $ | $ |
| 464,300,771 | 13,712,624 | 76,187,027 | 8,318,229 | 562,518,651 |
| equal to gold Value. $ 414,826,393 | 13,712,624 | Total 84,505,256 | equal to Gold Value. $ 513,044,273 | |
| Domestic exports. (Gold Value.) $ | Re-exports. (Gold Value.) $ | Total. (Gold Value.) $ |
|---|---|---|
| 513,044,273 | 28,459,899 | 541,504,172 |
Now instead of the above correct official figure of $541,504,172 as the total exports from the United States (including bullion), the Statesman’s book makes “Merchandise” $590,978,550 and bullion $98,441,989, which I find to be made up as follows:—It takes from the official returns total mixed value of domestic Exports, $562,518,651 and then adds to it the total re-exports $28,459,899, and makes the addition of the two figures as the total for “Merchandise” —viz., $590,978,550. It will now be seen by a comparison of these figures with the official ones, that the “Currency” value of the domestic Exports from the Atlantic ports is not converted into gold, and that though in the two official totals of $562,518,651 and $28,459,899, bullion is already included, the total of these in the Statesman’s book is given for “Merchandise” alone and a further statement is given for bullion as $98,441,989, made up nearly of $84,505,256 of domestic exports, and $14,038,629 of re-exports.
Mr. Maclean takes the total $590,978,550 of “Merchandise” (which already includes bullion) and bullion over again, $98,543,885, and makes the exports $689,420,539 or £138,084,908. It will thus be seen that Mr. Maclean’s figure for 1871 contains bullion to the extent of $98,543,885, or £19,889,198 taken twice, and the “currency” value of domestic produce exported from the Atlantic ports, is not converted into gold value, making a further error of $49,474,378; or the total error in Mr. Maclean’s figure for exports for 1871 alone is $98,543,885 + $49,474,378 = $148,018,263, or nearly £31,000,000 sterling @ 50d. per $.
I take 50d. per $ as the Parliamentary Returns for foreign States No. XII. has taken this rate of Exchange.
Mr. Maclean has given the figures for six years. I am not able to verify the figures for 1874, so I give a comparison of the official correct figures and Mr. Maclean’s figures for the years ending June, 1869 to 1873.
| Years ending June. | Imports. | Exports. | ||
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Merchandise. $ | Bullion. $ | Merchandise. $ | Bullion. $ | |
| 1869 | 417,506,379 | 19,807,876 | 439,134,529 | 57,138,380 |
| 1870 | 462,377,587 | 26,419,179 | 529,519,302 | 58,155,666 |
| 1871 | 541,493,774 | 21,270,024 | 590,978,550 | 98,441,989 |
| 1872 | 572,510,304 | 13,743,689 | 561,808,381 | 79,877,534 |
| 1873 | 642,030,539 | 21,480,937 | 626,595,077 | 84,608,574 |
| 2,635,918,583 | 102,721,705 | 2,748,035,839 | 378,222,143 | |
| Add | 102,721,705 | 378,222,143 | ||
| Total. | 2,738,640,288 | Imports. | 3,126,257,982 | Total Exports. |
| 2,738,640,288 | Deduct Imports. | |||
| 387,617,694 | Excess of Exports. | |||
| Years ending June. | Imports. Including bullion, gold value. | Exports. Including bullion, gold value. | Total. | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| $ | Domestic. $ | Foreign. $ | $ | |
| 1869 | 437,314,255 | 318,082,663 | 25,173,414 | |
| 1870 | 462,377,587 | 420,500,275 | 30,427,159 | |
| 1871 | 541,493,708 | 512,802,267 | 28,459,899 | |
| 1872 | 640,338,706 | 501,285,371 | 22,769,749 | |
| 1873 | 663,617,147 | 578,938,985 | 28,149,511 | |
| Total Imports | 2,745,141,403 | 2,331,609,561 | 134,979,732 | 2,466,589,293 |
| Deduct Exports | 2,466,589,293 | |||
| Excess of Imports | 278,552,110 | |||
Mr. Maclean's total error for the five years 1869 to 1873 is therefore $278,552,110 + 387,617,694 = $666,169,804 = £138,785,000 @ 50d. per $; or $133,233,961 = £27,757,000 per annum.
In making, however, a comparison between the trade returns of India and the United States, there is one important matter to be considered, and which, when taken into account, as it ought to be, the Imports of the United States will be some 16 per cent. more than they are above shown to be. In India the exports are declared at the value at the ports of export. It is the same with the United States. The imports in India are declared at the "wholesale cash price less trade discount"2 at the Port of Import, which means the value at the foreign port of export, plus freight, insurance, and other charges to the Indian port of import, and also plus 10 per cent. for profits. This is the principle on which the imports are declared in the Custom Houses in India, when the tariff value is not already fixed, or the market price not agreed upon by the importer and the Custom House. But in the case of the United States the declared value3 of imports is only the value declared at the foreign port from which the Merchandise was exported, which means, without adding the cost of freight, insurance, and other charges and 10% profits. Now Mr. Edward Young, the “Chief of the Bureau of Statistics, Treasury Department” of the United States calculates 6%1 as representing the freight from foreign ports to America.
This 6% for freight (without taking the further additional charges for insurance, commission, &c., into account) together with the 10% as calculated in India for declaration for Imports, makes it necessary to add 16% to the Imports of the United States before the actual excess of imports of the United States on the principle adopted in India can be ascertained and compared with that of India. In that case the actual excess of imports over exports in the United States will be $717,774,734 = £149,536,4032 for the five years 1869 to 1873, or $143,554,947 = £29,907,280 per annum. Thus the correct result about the United States (on the principle of the Indian Custom House) is that, instead of there being an excess of exports of 15 millions sterling per annum, there is actually an excess of imports of double that amount, or nearly 30 millions sterling, thus making a difference between Mr. Maclean’s and the correct figures of nearly 45 millions sterling per annum.
Now after all Mr. Maclean’s recklessness what does he come to? He clearly admits my most important statements. He says :—
“It has been estimated that the amount of the annual earnings of Englishmen connected with India, which are thus transmitted home, cannot be less than £20,000,000, and we should be inclined to place it at a very much higher figure.1
Again :—“ To decrease these (home remittances) by clipping establishments or, rather, reframing on an economical basis by never employing other than Natives of this country,1 except when good policy and public convenience demand it, and if possible by establishing some check on the extravagant follies of the Secretary of State, should be the task of the Indian Government.”
This is just what I say, that there is an enormous transfer of the wealth of this country to England, and the remedy is the employment of Natives only, beyond the exigencies of the British rule. But for this single circumstance, his remarks about the United States would apply to India perfectly well, viz :—“ He (the American) is only anxious to borrow as much English capital as he can, knowing that invested in reproductive works it will repay him a hundred-fold the paltry rate of interest he has to send abroad.”
The Indian will do just the same, but Mr. Maclean, blinded by his blind patriotism, does not see that this is just the difficulty ; that while the American derives the full benefit of what he borrows, the Indian borrowing with one hand, has to give the money away to England with the other hand in these “home remittances” of Englishmen and “home charges,” getting for himself the burden only of the debt. The very idea of comparing the circumstances and condition of the United States and India as being similar is simply absurd, for which another reason will be given further on. When Mr. Maclean has digested the figures I have given above there will be time enough to discuss whether even if the United States exported more than it imported for any particular period or periods, there will be anything at all similar to India’s case. The fact is there is no such similarity except the interest paid on loans for reproductive works.
Next Mr. Shapoorjee says I have discarded official figures and substituted my own. I have done nothing of the kind. I have requested him to point out, but he has not done so. Mr. Shapoorjee says India is in the same boat with the United States. From the remarks I have already made, it may be seen that no weight can be given to this statement. In support of his assertion he says the United States have foreign debts of about £1,625 millions. I requested him to show m any official or sufficiently reliable authority for these figures, and he shows me none.
From what I have already shown about the imperfections of even such a book as the “Statesman's Year Book,” and the reckless reliance of Mr. Maclean upon it, I cannot but be careful in accepting such off-hand assertions of Mr. Shapoorjee. He is kind enough to advise me to adhere to official figures, and I need simply request him to do the same himself. Like Mr. Maclean, Mr. Shapoorjee also does not read my paper carefully ; or he would not have said a word about America’s public debt. He would have seen that I have excluded from my total of imports and exports those very years in which the United States contracted nearly the whole of its public debt (1863 to 1866). Again, Mr. Shapoorjee tells us that the Railways of the United States “could not have cost less than £20,000 a mile,” while the Railway Manual for 1873-4, which Mr. Shapoorjee has kindly lent me, gives the average cost at $55,116, and Mr. Maclean’s guide, the Statesman’s Book, gives $50,000 a mile. This is about £10,000 to £11,000, or nearly half of Mr. Shapoorjee’s figure ; and thus nearly half of his “£850 millions if not more” of foreign Capital for Railways disappears. Now I give one more reason why Mr. Shapoorjee’s figure of 1,625 millions sterling as the present foreign debts of the United States cannot be accepted. Mr. Edward Young, whom I have already mentioned, the highest official and authority on the treasury statistics of the United States, calculates and gives (in his official “Monthly Reports on the Commerce and Navigation of the United States for the year ending June 30th, 1874, page 352) his own personal and unofficial estimate of the “Aggregate foreign debts” of the United States. He says : “Although there were no national securities held abroad at the commencement of our late war, yet some of the bonds of the commonwealth of Pennsylvania, and, probably, of Massachusetts and other States, as well as railroad shares and securities, were owned in Europe. In the absence of accurate data on the subject, it is believed that fifty millions is an ample estimate for these ante bellum securities. With this addition, our aggregate foreign debt amounts to nearly TWELVE HUNDRED MILLION DOLLARS.” Such is Mr. Young’s estimate of the aggregate debts, “national, State, Municipal and Corporation—held in foreign countries”—i.e., $1,200,000,000, when Mr. Shapoorjee asks us to take the figure nearly seven times larger—£1,625,000,000 equal to $7,800,000,000. Mr. Shapoorjee will, I trust, therefore excuse me for not accepting his figures and his conclusions based thereon. Again, Mr. Shapoorjee has been good enough to give me an extract from the Westminster Review of January, 1876. This extract gives (in 1875) the national production of the United Kingdom as £28 per head of population ; of the United States as £25 per head, and of Russia as £7-10 per head, France £22, Austria £18, and Italy £15 ; while India hardly produces £2 a head. The simple fact, then, that the United States is the second richest country in the world, and its people have all their revenues and resources at their own command and for their own benefit only, is enough to shew that it is simply absurd and idle to compare it, in its circumstances and condition, as being in the same boat with the half-starving and ever-draining India. Mr. Shapoorjee’s and Mr. Maclean’s wonder that the Americans are not lachrymal is a great wonder in itself. When the Americans are subjected to a “home remittance” to a foreign country of some “very much higher figure” than twenty millions sterling a year, and “Home charges,” and when a large number of foreigners engross all official and important positions to their own exclusion, causing thereby such heavy drain, then will be the proper time to make a comparison between America and India.
Mr. Shapoorjee’s comparison with Russia and other European States is equally unreasonable. In spite of the inferior administration of Russia and the great Military expenditure, its national income is nearly four times as much as that of India, and that of the other European States is much larger still ; and they have no “home remittances and charges” to remit, which India has to do from its wretched income of hardly £2 per head per annum.
Mr. Schrottky misunderstands me when he thinks that in the present discussion about the Material Condition of India I mention the necessity of the employment of Natives as anything more than the only remedy by which the capital of the country can be saved to itself to enable the agricultural as well as all other industries to get the necessary life-blood for their maintenance and progress. If it be possible that every European coming to India would make it his home, so that the item of the “ home remittance and charges ” is nearly eliminated, it would not matter at all, so far as the present question of the material prosperity of the country is concerned, whether the European or the Native is in office. The only remedy is that either the European must, like the Mahomadan conquerors, become Natives and remain in the country, or remain out of office beyond the exigency of the British rule, and for which British interests Britain must pay its share. If not, then it is idle to hope that India can rise in material prosperity, or be anything else but a wretched drudge for England's benefit. On the other hand a natural and just policy will make India with its teeming population one of the, if not the best customer for England and the best field for England's enterprise, and its agriculture will derive all the aid which Mr. Schrottky could desire in the goodness of his heart. Under the present unnatural policy England takes from India's scanty; under a natural and just policy, it will gain from India's plenty, and Manchester may have its free trade to its heart's utmost content.
To Mr. Trant I have to say only this, that mere assertions are not worth much and that all his political economy may be all right, in a Native-governed country, but when he takes the element of the “ home remittances and charges ” into account, he will not differ much from me.
In reply to Mr. Collet's remarks, I have to request him to take several elements into account which he appears to have forgotten.
- 1. To add 15 per cent.1 profits to exports (during the American War the percentage of profits on the exported produce was very much larger).
2. To deduct from imports nearly £140,000,000 of foreign debt (public and railway) incurred during the eighteen years he has taken.
3. To remember that the profits of opium as well as of all India's commerce are as much India's property and resources as the profits in coal, iron, and all other exported produce and manufactures of England are England's property and resources, though all such profits are derived from foreign nations, and that all the profits of opium and general commerce of India are included in my total production of India.
4. To remember that notwithstanding that opium and the profits of commerce are legitimate property and resources of India, that even after deducting these amounts, or that in addition to these amounts being sent away to England, there is the further amount of about £200,000,000 in principal alone gone to England during the thirty-eight years I have taken; and that Mr. Collet has not pointed out any mistake in my calculations.
For his eighteen years also, if he will take the items he has forgotten, his result will not differ from mine.
| For 1858 to 1875 his figures for exports are | £910,995,000 | |
| Add 15 per cent. profits | 136,649,250 | |
| Total proceeds of exports | 1,047,644,250 | |
| His imports are | £764,310,000 | |
| Deduct loans imported, about | 140,000,000 | |
| Actual commercial imports (including Government stores) | 624,310,000 | |
| Excess of proceeds of exports | 423,334,250 | |
| Deduct railway interest | 51,133,987 | |
| Transfer to England from India's resources (excluding interest in railway loans) | 372,200,263 | |
| This transfer is equal to the whole of the opium revenue | £108,156,107 | |
| The whole of profits on exports | 136,649,250 | |
| And furthermore from India's resources | 127,394,906 |
Or nearly £130,000,000 in addition to the railway interest. The actual transfer is even larger than this, as will be seen further on.
Mark, then, during Mr. Collet's eighteen years all opium revenue, all profits of commerce and guaranteed interest on railways are transferred to England, and £130,000,000 besides, making a total in principal alone of £424,000,000, or £372,000,000 excluding railway interest. Moreover it must be remembered that during the American War great profits were made, and this having to be added to the exports is so much more transferred to England.
Thus as Mr. Collet’s figures are imperfect I need not trouble the meeting with any comments on the confusion into which he has fallen on account thereof. I have taken his own figures and shown what they lead to as the best way of pointing out his mistake. He seems to have also a somewhat confused notion of a balance sheet. But this is not the time or place for me to go into that matter.
Thanks to my critics, they have led me into a closer examination of some points, and I find the case of India worse than what I have already made out. I have to modify some of my figures1 which I now do.
I have shown that the imports into India (including bullion) from 1835 to 1872 are £943,000,000. Now in making out a nation’s balance sheet with foreign countries, the balance of profit should be taken between the price of exports at the port of export, and the price of imports, as laid down or costing at the port of import, and not the market price at the place of import, which includes the profit on the import obtained in the importing country itself.
I may illustrate thus. I laid out Rs. 1,000 in cotton and sent it to England. There it realised proceeds, say, Rs. 1,150. This may be remitted to me in silver, so that when the transaction is completed, I receive in my hands Rs. 1,150 in the place of Rs. 1,000 which I had first laid out, so that the country has added Rs. 150 thereby to its capital. But suppose instead of getting silver I imported, say, 10 bales of piece goods which laid down in Bombay for Rs. 1,150. The gain to the country so far, is the same in both cases—an addition of Rs. 150. But any gain to me after that, in the sale of these piece goods in India itself, is no gain to India. Suppose I sold these goods for Rs. 1,300. That simply means that I had these goods and another person had Rs. 1,300, and we simply exchanged. The country has no addition made to its already existing property. It is the same, viz., the 10 bales of piece goods and Rs. 1,300; only they have changed hands. Bearing this in mind, and also that the declared value of imports into India is not the laying down price but the market1 price, which means the laying down price plus 10 per cent. profit, it is necessary for ascertaining the real profits from the foreign commerce of India to deduct 10 per cent. from the declared value of imports (merchandise). Doing this, the total imports from 1835 to 1872 should be taken £943,000,000 minus £62,000,000,2 which will be equal to £881,000,000. In that case the real deficit of imports under what the imports ought to have been (£1,438,000,000) will be £557,000,000 in place of the nearly £500,000,000 I have given in my paper.
The figure of the amount, after deducting opium and profits of commerce, will be £248,000,000, instead of nearly £200,000,000; or the total transfer of wealth to England in addition to the railway interest (£40,000,000) will be £517,000,000 instead of £453,000,000 given in my paper, and the yearly average of every five years of this amount of £517,000,000 will be proportionately larger, about 13 per cent. :—
| 1835—1839 | £6,000,000 | 1855—1859 | £8,700,000 |
| 1840—1844 | 6,600,000 | 31860—1864 | 19,000,000 |
| 1845—1849 | 8,700,000 | 1865—1869 | 27,500,000 |
| 1850—1854 | 8,400,000 | 1870—1872 | 31,000,000 |
This average during the American War would be much increased if the whole profits on the exported produce of the time could be ascertained.
In preparing this reply I have had to work out all the figures hurriedly, but I hope they will be found correct.
I have not seen the late Administration Reports, but I trust they give fuller details than the previous ones with which I had to deal, and, if so, more precise results could be attained as to the actual annual production of the country, which is the most important point to be settled to give us an accurate knowledge of the actual poverty or otherwise of this country.
Since I wrote the above I purchased a copy of the latest Administration Report of Bengal (1874-5) to see if I can at present give some more definite statistics about production than I have already done in my paper. Fancy my disappointment when I read Sir R. Temple saying :—
“ Again the survey embraced only the exterior boundaries of each village or parish, and afforded no details of cultivation and waste, culturable or unculturable.”
To the latter part of Mr. Collet’s paper I have simply to reply—any amount of mere assertion or assumption can do no good. The question is a simple matter of facts and science. Is there so much cultivated land or not; is there so much produce or not; and are such and such the prices or not ? And then common arithmetic gives you certain results. No amount of indirect reasoning or assumption can falsify facts and arithmetic and make 2 and 2 equal 5. So far as the official statistics are imperfect, it is the duty of the Government to give to the public full details. We know the national production of other countries, and there is no reason why the Indian Government should not be able to give us such most important similar information. That will be the best and surest guide and test of the actual condition of the people of India, and our rulers will see their way clearly to the most proper and effectual remedies. I have not the least doubt in my mind about the conscience of England and Englishmen, that if they once clearly see the evil, they will not shrink to apply the proper remedies. My estimate of 40s. a head has been accepted and argued upon by an Under-Secretary of State (Mr. G. Duff), and a Viceroy (Lord Mayo), and another Viceroy (Lord Lawrence) has told us that the mass of the people are half fed. It is not the question of the ordinary proportion of the poor in every country. Mr. Grant Duff in his reply to Mr. Lawson asked whether the “ already poor population of India ” was to be ground down “ to the very dust ” by the removal of the opium duty. So the margin between the present condition of India and of being ground down “ to the very dust ” is only the opium revenue. This is prosperity with a vengeance. I would not take up more of your time. Mr. Collet’s remarks about the United States are already disposed of in the reply to Mr. Maclean. I have been lately reading the expression “balance in favour of India.” The writers evidently suppose that what they call the balance of trade in favour of India was something that India had to receive sometime or other. They do not seem to understand that of all the deficit of import under the proceeds of export, not a single pie in cash or goods is to be received by India. That similarly, that of all the excess of imports in all the other parts of the British Empire to the extent of 15 to 25 per cent. over exports, or 18 per cent. in the United States, not a single farthing has to be paid to any country. It is in fact the profit of their exports, and the deficit of India, is so much transfer of its wealth to England. If I sent £100 worth of goods and get back only £80 worth, with no chance of getting the remaining £20, as well as the profits of my venture, in cash or goods, and then to call this “balance in my favour” is ndeed a very unenviable condition. On this subject I can only request attention to my papers instead of detaining you any longer.
Mr. Dadabhai concluded by saying that he was very much obliged to the meeting extending so much indulgence to him, and at the same time to many gentlemen who had come forward for discussion. When they first met in that hall, their fear was that they would have none to oppose as there would be none to criticise the paper. But he was much and very agreeably surprised that he had been criticised by many, and he was sure that this would bring out the real truth, and he hoped that from this day hence Mr. Maclean and his party would leave the United States alone and exert their influence to make India something like the United States. (Hear, hear, and cheers.)
The Remedy.
When I wrote these notes in 1873, or read them in 1876, I little dreamt that they would so soon obtain such terrible confirmation as the present deplorable famines have given them.
The chief cause of India’s poverty, misery, and all material evils, is the exhaustion of its previous wealth, the continuously increasing exhausting and weakening drain from its annual production by the very excessive expenditure on the European portion of all its services, and the burden of a large amount a year to be paid to foreign countries for interest on the public debt, which is chiefly caused by the British rule.
The obvious remedy is to allow India to keep what it produces, and to help it as much as it lies in the power of the British nation to reduce her burden of the interest on the public debt ; with a reasonable provision for the means absolutely necessary for the maintenance of the British rule. And for such means Britain must pay its proper share for its own interests.
For this purpose it is necessary on the one hand to limit, within a certain amount, the total of every kind of expenditure (pay, pensions, and every possible kind of allowance) for the European portion of all the services both in England and India, directly or indirectly connected with or under the control of Government (including, therefore, guaranteed railways or other works, manufactures, local funds, &c.), and to guarantee the public debt ; and, on the other hand, for the important political object of maintaining the British rule, to reserve by law, for Europeans alone, such places of power of control only as may be absolutely necessary for the purpose, with a fair proportion of the Army, within the limited amount of expenditure for the European portion of all the services. These European services being as much for the benefit and interests of Britain as for those of India, Britain must pay her proper share for their expenditure.
Under some judicious arrangement of the kind I propose, the people of India, being allowed to keep most of what they produce, will rise in material prosperity under what is, upon the whole, a good system of administration, blessing the hand that gave such prosperity, and increasing the benefit to the English people also manifold, by the extensive commercial relations that must necessarily be then developed between England and India ; and all fears of any danger to the British rule will be dispelled, both from the gratitude, loyalty, and self-interest of the people of India, and from the possession of important posts of power and a fair portion of commissions in the Army. Then will Macaulay’s words be verified to the glory of England, as also to her benefit :—
“ We shall never consent to administer the pousta to a whole community, to stupefy and paralyse a great people whom God has committed to our charge,” and we shall not “ keep a hundred millions (now two hundred and fifty millions) of men from being our customers, in order that they might continue to be our slaves.”
THE CONDITION OF INDIA.
CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA AND DADABHAI NAOROJI.
Journal of the East India Association, January, 1883.
Notes
- 1. Monthly Reports on the Commerce and Navigation of the United States. By the Chief of the Bureau of Statistics for the year ending 30th June, 1871, page 386.
- 1. Monthly Reports on Commerce and Navigation of the United States. By Edward Young, Ph.D., Chief of the Bureau of Statistics for the year ending 30th June, 1874, page 177.
- 2. Customs Act (6) of 1863, Section 180; also enquiry at the Customs House gave 10 per cent. to be added on the Importer's Invoice, or 20 per cent. on the Manufacturer's Invoice.
- 3. Annual Report of Commerce and Navigation, 1873, says, page 3, "Import entries: sworn specie values at foreign places of export."
- 1. Monthly reports for the year ending 30th June, 1874, page 352 : “The value of the imports of merchandise as presented in the first table being those at the ports of shipment, it will be proper to add thereto the amount of freights to the several ports of the United States. . . . . It is believed that 6 per cent. on the total value of imports is an estimate of approximate accuracy.”
- 2. Total imports.. $2,745,141,403 Add 16 p.c..... 439,222,624 3,184,364,027 Deduct exports.. 2,466,589,293 Excess of imports $717,774,734 at 50d. for 5 years = £149,536,403 Average per annum, $143,554,947 at 50d. = £29,907,280.
- 1. Italics are mine.
- 1. For the following countries the profits, or excess of imports over exports, are as under, subject to modification for foreign debts or loans. The United Kingdom . . . 25 per cent. (1858 to 1870) Australia . . . 15 „ (1858 to 1868) British North America . . . 29 „ ( „ „ ) [Supra, pp. 32-33.] United States . . . . 18 per cent. (1869 to 1873) as under :— Imports . . . . . . $2,745,141,403 Add 6 per cent. freight (leaving other charges—commission insurance, etc., alone) . . . . } 164,708,484 $2,909,849,887 Deduct exports . . . . . . 2,466,589,293 Excess of imports, or profits—say 18 per cent. above exports . $443,260,594
- 1. (Supra, p. 33.)
- 1. See the second note at page 131.
- 2. Imports-merchandise, 1834-5 to 1872, £618,000,000, 10 per cent. of which is nearly £62,000,000.
- 3. I could not find the amount of enfaced paper given for every year before 1860. I have therefore taken the whole amount in 1860, which increases the average for 1860-64 and correspondingly diminishes the average of the previous years, but not to a large extent.