Appendix E

Extracts From Mr. A. P. Howell’s Paper “Legislation in India,” in the “Calcutta Review” of April, 1886.

Musalmans and Money-Lenders in the Punjab, Septimus Smet Thorburn, 1886 · from page 184 · about 14 minutes

Read by machine, not yet checked by a person. It may hold small errors.

In the reported proceedings of the Supreme Council in December, 1866, an instructive speech of Sir H. S. Maine will be found, defending the Council from the charge of excessive legislation, but admitting that “there could hardly be any censure too heavy for the Council if it really did legislate with incaution and precipitancy;” and as regards the introduction of English Law—“one of the most difficult and cumbrous systems in the world”—that it would be a “most intolerable hardship” if 250 millions of people should have their civil rights defined in a system which they cannot understand, and which is contained in records not accessible to them. The point for consideration is, whether instances of incautious and precipitate legislation in India can be pointed to, and whether the people are, indeed, subjected to the hardship which Sir H. S. Maine denounced. It would be a mockery to ask those who are familiar with the real story of the Ilbert Bill, whether it was not both incautious and precipitate.

I am content to leave the Ilbert Bill, and to rest the argument on the more solid ground of other instances of the same system. The only difficulty in the selection of instances is the embarras du choix. I will, however, take the Specific Relief Act of 1877 and the Easements Act of 1882.

It would be hardly an exaggeration to say that until 1877, no one in India, barring barristers trained in England, had ever heard of the legal term specific relief. When Sir Arthur (now Lord) Hobhouse introduced the Bill to the best informed audience in the country, so ignorant was the Council of the meaning of even the title of the Bill that he was forced to explain—and the explanation is extant—that the measure had no concern with the relief of the scarcity then prevalent in Madras. Of course, therefore, there could be no discussion, for it was a case of ubi tu pulsas Ego Vapulo tantum, and equally of course the Bill passed, and was declared applicable to all British India. Will any one maintain that a measure so passed by a Council which knew nothing about the Bill, and by an introducer who knew nothing about the people, could be justified by any theory of legislation? I can say from experience in a court of appeal, that after eight years of its operation, many of those who have to administer it are still quite ignorant of its provisions, and that to the great mass of the people it is a dead letter, or, being understood only by the pleaders, opens opportunities of sometimes vexatious litigation. Would not the measure have been far more warrantable had it had any real connection with the relief which its mover disclaimed ; and as it had no such connection, was there not a strange but true analogy between the Council so engaged and the Council of Laputa which busied itself in scientific frivolities, while the people around were dying for food and clothes ?

Take the other more recent instance. How many civilians prior to 1882 could have explained the nature of an easement or any vernacular term for it ? To this day, such an inquiry, especially among the older civilians, whom the examiner has long ceased from troubling, would elicit curiously discrepant answers. In fact, neither the title of the Act nor its chief provisions can be translated into any vernacular, without an adaptation of English terms analogous to the pigeon English of the Chinese sea-board. No executive officer ever dreamt of proposing such a measure. On the contrary, one Lieutenant-Governor seriously replied, when asked what number of troops were required for the protection of his dominions, that if the Legislative Department continued to harass the people with such Acts, he must reconsider his requirements. Objections of this type, of course, failed to stop the torrent of legislation at the fountain-head, but the local Governments, grown wary by experience, still managed at the last moment to divert its course. One after another of them declared that however excellent the Act might be in the abstract, they individually did not want it, and so the operation of the Act was accepted only by the more courtly representatives of Madras and the Central Provinces—notoriously the most backward parts of the Empire—and for the tiny community of Coorg, which by a curious anomaly is still directly subordinate to the Government at Calcutta. The restriction is a significant comment of the necessity of the Act at all. It is not required by the European community at Bombay or Calcutta, or by the highly intelligent natives there resident—the Parsis or Bengalis—but it is enforced among the rude Gonds and Bhils of Central India, and among a fraction of the wild mountaineers of the Southern Peninsula. Will it be maintained that the Indian Councils Act contemplated measures being passed in advance of requirements, and then being rejected like misfits at a ready-made store ? What would be thought of an English Act passed for Great Britain and Ireland, and then limited to the crofters of Skye ? The analogy fails to show the anomaly of what has been done in India, because in no part of Great Britain can any community be found so low in the scale of civilization as in the Central Provinces of India. I know of whole villages where the current vernacular has no written character; where there is no currency, and all the resources of the village cannot raise change for a rupee; where men and women, on their rare appearance in court, are addressed even by natives through an interpreter, and are sworn by "the black dog ;" where, on the occasion of an epidemic, the collective wisdom of the community will seize on an old woman supposed to be connected with the visitation, and will pound her to death in a tank. Such are some of the Gonds who are counted by hundreds of thousands. They are mostly agriculturists of the roughest type ; and if one of them now finds closed the familiar pathway to his immemorial field, he must be told in English, which he cannot of course understand—and yet he can be told in no other tongue— that he must sue the dominant owner for a release of the servient heritage under Chapters IV and V of the Easements Act. The simple savage will reply that he is a poor man, and knows nothing of easements, and cannot afford a pleader. He must then be informed that such is the law, and that it is one of the merits of our system that the law is the same for rich and poor alike. Can it be maintained that the Easements Act, any more than the Specific Relief Act, finds any warrant in the constitutional scheme of Indian legislation, or that the passing of them is not clearly amenable to Sir H. S. Maine's censure ?

Nor is this all. The large importation of technical law necessarily displaces a more than proportionate amount of native custom. If the excellence of a legal system can be gauged by the absence of lawyers, as the healthiness of a locaity by the absence of doctors, native custom in respect of leases, mortgages, and common agreements had at least the merit of serving its own purpose. Until recently the agricultural communities of India, that is, the great bulk of the population, have been in the habit of managing their own affairs in their own way. The barrister and the pleader are of our recent creation; while, except in the Presidency towns, there are even yet no solicitors or conveyancers, barristers and pleaders, dealing with litigants direct. In England no sane man thinks of touching a mortgage or even a lease or . common agreement without a lawyer at his elbow, and the unwisdom of being one's own lawyer has passed into a proverb. In India the money-lenders, that is most well-to-do agriculturists, have been in the habit of drawing up all their own legal documents, rudely no doubt, but still so as to be a fair guide to the mutual intentions of the parties. If disputes arose, native custom all over India would settle them cheaply and expeditiously by a system of arbitration (punchayet) so excellent as to be recognised in those Acts whose tendency it is to abolish arbitration. But now, as our laws are rapidly becoming unintelligible to all but professional lawyers, and as the professional lawyer class is largely on the increase in wealth and numbers, a standard of legal skill and knowledge is being introduced, which bears very hardly upon those who do not come up to it themselves, and cannot afford to hire it. The ordinary native can no longer manage his own affairs. It must be borne in mind, too, that the very large majority of Indian Judges are not trained lawyers, are not lawyers in any sense, and that many of them are besides over-burdened with executive duty. The result is, that the executive work, in which the great body of the people is most interested, is hurried over in order that the amateur Judge may find time to elaborate something in faint resemblance to a professional judgment, as this part of his work may come before his superiors in appeal, and stand on record against him. The professional Bar which makes a business of the study of the law, is stronger than the amateur Bench, and this is the secret of the enormous fees which litigants in a very poor country still find it worth their while to pay for legal assistance. Over and over again I have heard natives say that a man has been convicted or lost his case, not because he was guilty or had the worse case, but because he had no barrister to appear for him. I am far from under-valuing the immense advantage which a Judge derives from a well-informed Bar, but I still hold that the causes which have suddenly placed so high a premium on the legal profession in India, are a great hardship to the masses, and especially to the poor, and that the multiplication of the pleader class and the ousting of the old land-holder class, are great political evils. The growth of the Bar and the increase of litigation are constantly held up in annual reports as gratifying evidence of an advance in legal efficiency and increased confidence in our courts. As well, I venture to think, might we look upon the multiplication of doctors and undertakers, and the increase of pawn-brokers' tickets as satisfactory proofs of increased professional or commercial activity.

The multiplication of English barristers and English-speaking pleaders, and still more the predominance of the barrister-element in the highest courts of appeal, naturally tends to leaven the whole Bench with English law. Our Judges, even in the lower grades, are beginning to plume themselves on citing English case law and text books—often to the neglect of that accuracy in the statement of facts on which most decisions really turn. Where a Judge would have been content, a few years ago, to satisfy his own sense of the merits of a case, he must now satisfy his ambition to show that he also can cite English ruling and precedent. In a recent case of some importance, I was encountered by a ruling taken from a decision of Sir G. Jessel, uttered without any reference to India, and yet made the basis of a decision in an Indian appeal. As our courts of first instance have no access to such decisions, it seems to me to be productive of hardship and uncertainty, that a suitor at the last stage of his case may find himself worsted by a ruling taken from a source which he could not foresee.

It will, perhaps, be objected that the Acts to which exception has been taken are a portion of the work of the Indian Law Commission, which, as a body appointed in England and working in England, is not amenable to an order of the Indian Government. I would ask the objector whether that Commission has any, and what, authority to override the Indian Councils Act, and whether the orders of 1873 did not express the spirit and letter of that Act? How and when the Indian Law Commission was appointed, with what objects, for what period, and at what cost, are some of the many things not generally known, and might in these days of extreme financial pressure well come under reconsideration; for, if there is one luxury of administration with which, more than another, the whole Indian public would most readily dispense, it is the costly superfluity of technical law. Ruffles for the shirtless are in no sense more anomalous than easements for Bhils and Gonds and savages of the same calibre. A more valid objection might be raised on the ground that the legislative needs of a great Empire are not to be measured by the capacity of its administrators of the day; that the object of the Government has been to bring the law up to the level of the English standard of completeness; that a system of scientific law is one of the best and most rapid educators of the people; and that if portions of the Empire are backward, that is no reason why all, including the more advanced, should not share in the great boon of a scientific legal system, adapted from the best sources to the circumstances of India. This objection, besides assuming a great deal, raises the question of the theory of legislation as to which I can only hope here to invite discussion. Is it the case, I would ask, that the theory propounded by Bentham is obsolete—that all legislation is an evil, only warrantable when the legislator is assured of the existence of an evil capable of correction, and that his legislation will correct it ? Tried by this standard, full warrant may be found for our Penal and Procedure Codes, the Evidence and Stamp Acts, and for other general Acts of the same class, as also for special enactments designed for local or temporary objects. But surely measures of this character differ from those which define or create altogether new rights and new penalties. In the large majority of Acts of the latter class there is no mention of the existence of an evil to be remedied, and no pretence that the measure in hand will remedy it. The usual Statement of Objects and Reasons which accompanies an Act, is restricted to the enumeration of the sources from which the Act is taken, and of the legislator's personal acquaintance with those sources. Legislation so originating fails altogether to be the prescription and the remedy which Bentham contemplated. The legislator of the present Indian type inflicts his prescription upon millions of the human race, not because they want it, or will be the better for it, but because he has, or thinks he has, a vast knowledge of prescriptions. Would any one, who could help it, consent to be so doctored in the gross, without regard to his symptoms, and can any theory of legislation justify the imposition of Procrustean Acts not originating in the circumstances of the people, but requiring those circumstances to conform, as best they can, to some arbitrary standard ? I offer no opinion on the abstract merits of any of the Acts cited or referred to. They are the work of extremely able men in their own speciality, and their drafting is no doubt faultless from their own point of view. But legislation in the abstract does not seem within the scope of practical politics. It is certain that there are millions who do not want such Acts at all, and whose lives would be easier without them. It is too often forgotten that the Indian Empire is a bundle of nationalities, differing as the Esquimaux from the Neapolitan. Hence, in reply to the common inquiry what " the natives " think of this or that measure, or of this or that man, the only safe answer is, that millions never heard of the one or the other, and that of the rest some think one thing and some another. If English statesmen find it no easy task to contrive an Act for Ireland, or any single section of Great Britain, what would be the difficulty of a measure intended for application to all Europe? And yet Indian legislation jauntily applies Act after Act "to all British India." As the limit of necessary general Acts has long since been reached in India, it would seem that henceforth the Legislature should be content with the humbler task of watching the laws actually in force, simplifying their operation, remedying real evils discovered in practice, eliminating some uniformity from the decisions of the Privy Council and the concurrent High Courts, and still more— with the best of all legislation—the repeal of previous legislation. It must be remembered that the oriental mind is strictly conservative, and does not share in that admiration for reform which characterizes the West. A recent Governor, on the occasion of the opening of an Industrial Exhibition—then a novelty—asked a native of the old school whether he was not pleased at the probable development of local resources. "My Lord," said the old man, with uplifted hands, "first the cyclone came and then the Exhibition, we poor people are being ruined." In the early days of the Empire the people suffered from the rapacity of new arrivals, each requiring to be satisfied. The rapacity has long since ceased, but the suffering remains, and will remain, if each new arrival to power is permitted to let loose his own packet of specialities, scientific or benevolent. Sir A. Hobhouse threw in Specific Relief, Mr. Stokes Easements, and there are ominous rumours that Mr. Ilbert will consider his term of office unworthy of his distinguished predecessors if he does not bequeath us an imperial system of "Torts." I have no hesitation in saying that the people at large do not require any information about torts.