Chapter VI

The Revenue System in the Punjab Before and Since Annexation Contrasted.

Musalmans and Money-Lenders in the Punjab, Septimus Smet Thorburn, 1886 · from page 42 · about 16 minutes

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From the death of the Emperor Aurangzeb (1707) until Maharaja Runjeet Singh had completed the conquest of the Western Punjab (1823), that country was without a central Government. Throughout each domain, the strongest tribe, acting collectively, or moved by some master-spirit of the day, ruled all weaker tribes and castes. The state of society was then what it is now in the independent hills beyond our N.-W. Frontier. Loosely-defined tribal, and even sectional village boundaries were recognised, jealously guarded, and frequently fought over. Within them, according to the ebb and flow of public opinion and private feud, the little entities composing the tribe or community, shifted about, now in friendly union, now in hostile severance. Party strife, however, except amongst Pathans, was never allowed to weaken the tribe collectively, and was always in abeyance against danger from without. The shop-keeping and trading classes pursued their respective avocations, as humble dependents and servants of the strong men of the day. There was little intercourse between tribe and tribe. Such a state of things conduced rather to strengthen than to subvert local self-Government throughout tribal domains. Population was thin, hence there was plenty of land for all. The fights and squabbles of rude agricultural tribes never caused much bloodshed. At most the want of a strong central control rather checked increase than diminished numbers. What decimated the population from time to time and wiped out villages— the remnants being dispersed and absorbed by those which had suffered less—were famine, and pestilence which sometimes follows in the wake of famine. In 1783 the Punjab was visited by a famine, which must have killed a quarter of its population and half the cattle in it. Half the deserted village sites in the country are traceable to it. Again, in 1812 and in 1833, the Punjab suffered terribly from famine. There were no roads and few canals in those days, and the cultivated area was small : hence the failure of the spring crop in any tract caused food-grains to rise to famine prices. But when the drought was so prolonged that the cattle died from starvation, the inhabitants either died too or dispersed, and their old village site fell into ruins and knew them no more.

Families had to huddle together for the sake of mutual protection, hence villages were all strong and defensible. For the same reason cultivation could only be carried on in their neighbourhood. Villages were therefore few in number, and much of the best arable land in the country—particularly in the broad valleys of the Punjab river beds—was jungle. The consequence was, that the agricultural tribes of to-day were then largely pastoral, and that the wealth of the country was rather live-stock than corn. As the Sikhs consolidated, first into a military commonwealth, and then into the obedient soldiery of Maharaja Runjeet Singh, the development of tribal government was, except on the frontier, arrested.

What may be called the Sikh revenue system, obtained from early in the present century until a few years before the first Sikh War with ourselves (1846-47). Under that system, as was incidentally mentioned in the first chapter, the country was divided into governments, each of which was sub-divided into a large number of circles. These latter were administered, either singly or in groups, by revenue farmers or jagirdars, whose tenure of office depended on their influence with those in power at Lahore. Making allowance for individual idiosyncrasies, the general rule was for appraisers at harvest time to roughly estimate the yield per acre, and the approximate acreage under each crop, and take one-half of the yield so obtained as the Government share. This share was in some localities paid in kind and in others in cash. When cash was taken, the assessment was advanced by the village money-lender, or by some local contractor who squared his accounts with the cultivators after harvest. Wherever the community was very powerful or well organised, it contracted through a local chief, or its own headmen, with the Government representative, whether farmer, jagirdar, or governor, and paid whatever was agreed upon from harvest to harvest. In most cases the limit of the demand was the ability to pay on the part of the cultivator, and to coerce on that of the farmer or collector, without raising an insurrection, which would either cause him to forfeit his life or his post.

No rights between those of the collector and the cultivator were recognised except in cases where policy made it expedient to use middlemen—generally influential locals—as sub-collectors. In such cases a remission of from 1/4th to 1/10th was made to them in order to repay the cost of collection. In the case of rich lands growing superior crops in the immediate vicinity of large villages and towns, fixed cash rates were sometimes taken. Wise administrators whose incumbency was pretty secure—such as the famous Diwan Sawan Mull of Mooltan—encouraged cultivators and capitalists to sink wells, but the number so excavated was insignificant. Practically, whether corn or cash reached the local treasury, the actual cultivator always paid in kind as much as could be squeezed out of him.

Throughout India the theory that the State is the ultimate landlord, and, as such, entitled, as a first charge, to a half or larger share of the profits of cultivation, has been indisputable for more than 2000 years in every part of the Peninsula, and every Government which has ever ruled over any part of it has invariably acted upon this theory. Taxation in the form of land revenue has fewer objections in the East than any other kind of known impost. What the Sikh system did, was to extend the theory on which the land revenue rests, and enforce the State's right to the whole profits of cultivation. In other words, the State was held to be the sole—not the ultimate—landlord.

With the death of Runjeet Singh, the first and last King of the Sikhs, in 1844, the machinery by which he had maintained his revenue system for upwards of a quarter of a century, was dislocated, and for a few brief years anarchy prevailed throughout the Punjab. In the Musalman tracts, the respite, such as it was, gave the dominant clans and families the opportunity to revive and partially recover rights which had been in abeyance for the previous generation or more.

When, in 1849, the Punjab became an integral part of British India, the first duties of our earliest administrators were to pacify the country and secure the payment of the land revenue. There was no leisure for an inquiry into tenures, nor was the time yet come when such inquiry could have had any beneficial result. Land was plentiful, cultivators were scarce: “individual rights” was a term hardly yet comprehended: what rights were understood were those of the tribe or village collectively. Thus, for some years after annexation, dominant tribes and families obtained a further respite wherein to consolidate and legalise their levy of proprietary dues of sorts. As the Sikhs, though good soldiers, were also good farmers, they at once settled down, under our strong rule, into peaceful tillers of the soil, and our civil officers obtained leisure to make a land revenue settlement of the country. They found that the Sikhs, besides taking the landlord’s share of the produce, had also levied cesses from cultivators,—the whole of the date and mango crops, where such trees grew, a poll-tax on artisans, camels, buffaloes, sheep and goats, and heavy transit and town duties. No tax seems to have been paid by the shop-keeping Bunniah class at all, because they were, except in towns, merely poor dependents of the cultivating classes. I draw particular attention to this fact.

We retained the cattle tax, abolished all other cesses and dues, substituted individual for collective ownership of land, and converted the share of each harvest paid by the cultivators, which he had generally paid in kind, into a fixed cash assessment. As the assessments had to be very rapidly conducted—each English officer having to make a settlement with the headmen of from 1,000 to 3,000 different villages in the course of one cold weather’s tour—a great many errors were made. No reliable data for assessment existed. The Sikh records, such as were found, only showed the gross demand. Remissions, deductions, and, above all, unrealised balances, were unascertainable. Then most of the early district officers were young, untrained, military men. The assessment imposed was in each case the assumed average collections of the three preceding years, converted into cash at the market rates of the day, less a deduction, for the sake of safety, of from 15 to 20 per cent. In most cases a committee of village elders accepted the demand, and contracted to pay it for a short term of years.

In many cases middlemen—former sub-collectors or local revenue farmers—agreed to pay the assessment, the cultivators refusing to engage. The dearness of coined money and the smallness of the cultivated area, had hitherto kept up prices, and had they continued high, the assessments made immediately after annexation would have been—making a fair allowance for unavoidable inequalities—fairly equitable. Peace and security, however, expanded the cultivated area enormously; and the presence of a large military force in the Punjab, together with the undertaking of great public works, such as the Grand Trunk Road and barracks, doubled the money circulation. Those causes reduced the money-value of agricultural produce from 50 to 100 per cent. The result was ruin for thousands of cultivators, indebtedness for tens of thousands, and the beginnings of a hold on the land for astute and wealthy middlemen. As soon as possible, the assessments were everywhere revised.

What is called summary settlements were made and village boundaries demarcated. The object of such settlements being fiscal, no authoritative investigation into tenures took place. As a rule, the person found in cultivating possession was treated as the proprietor and settled with. The general result of summary settlements effected in 1852 and the following years, was an all-round reduction of assessment of from 10 to 20 per cent. When the enormous extension of the cultivated area is considered, the fact that three or four years after annexation such reductions were found necessary, shows how severe the earliest assessments were, and speaks volumes for the patience of the people.

Shortly afterwards what is called regular settlements were undertaken in many districts. The object of such settlements was partly fiscal, but chiefly the preparation of what is called the record of rights,—i. e., tenures of every sort were investigated, determined, and recorded. The result is a sort of elaborate Doomsday Book, which permanently fixes individual rights in land and water.

For the 14 Musalman districts of the Punjab, the first regular settlement of a district was completed nearly a quarter of a century ago, and the last—that of Kohat—only the other day.

The slow deliberation with which such work was undertaken in the western districts of the Punjab, greatly assisted dominant tribes and families, and sagacious individuals, in perfecting titles to proprietary dues, which, if investigated immediately after annexation, would have been found to have been either non-existent, of uncertain continuity, or simply State remissions made for revenue purposes. As a regular settlement fixed the Government demand for 20 or 30 years, and, above all, defined individual rights, and so gave each person, with any recorded interest in land, a clear title, the effect of such settlements was everywhere both to largely appreciate the market-value of land and the credit of those whose titles to marketable interests had been established. Without doubt a grave error was made upon annexation, in suddenly substituting for an elastic kind of assessment a fixed cash assessment—to say nothing of its severity. Although this mistake originated a good deal of the existing peasant indebtedness, no disastrous consequences would have ensued had we not also at the same time converted collective into individual ownership of land, plus the right to alienate it at pleasure. By so doing we made an unconditional gift of a valuable estate to every peasant proprietor in the Punjab, and raised his credit from the former limit of the surplus of an occasional good crop, to the market-value of the proprietary right conferred. It is difficult for us now to realise the revolution effected in the status and relations of peasants and shop-keepers by the innovations introduced in 1849-50. Until then the proprietary unit had been the tribe or community collectively, individual rights in land being restricted to the plot each member actually cultivated. Alienations of a cultivating right, unless approved by the whole body of shareholders, were impossible; his borrowing power was limited to a few rupees, recoverable only at harvest time; his Bunniah was merely his humble servant and accountant; he himself in worldly wisdom was as ignorant as a wild beast. For a hundred generations he had pastured his cattle, sown and reaped his scanty crop, and paid as little of it as he could to the Government of the day, and that little either through his aforesaid servant and accountant, or some intelligent chief or headman. Such terms as "individual rights," "property," "the purchasing power of money," "credit," "attachment and sale," were incomprehensibly meaningless to him. In one day the old order passed away, and gave place to a new one, which imposed upon this unsophisticated Punjabi a responsibility to which he was unequal, in that he who had never handled coin in his life before, was required to pay to his Government twice a year a fixed sum of money—crop or no crop. To his surprise and delight he found that his formerly petty borrowing powers were now practically unlimited, his Bunniah being ready to accommodate him to any extent. If, in his newly-discovered freedom, he was reckless and improvident, the blame was not his, but that of his rulers. Were the children in all the Board schools in Great Britain suddenly let loose in London, each with fifty golden sovereigns in his pocket, would it be right to blame them or the donors who had given them their holiday, if, instead of putting their money in the Savings Bank, they spent it foolishly? Again, if Parliament were suddenly to abolish guardians and put all monied wards in the untrammelled possession of their estates, most minors would run through their properties before attaining majority, and the world at large, as well as the pauperised minors, when arrived at years of discretion, would condemn the act of emancipation as one of folly. Yet that is exactly what was done upon the annexation of the Punjab, throughout its Musalman tracts at least.

To the Bunniah class the change to fixed cash assessments, the creation of individual rights in lands, and the introduction of civil courts administering laws and procedure code framed on European models, were as welcome as would be the succession to a great estate of an impecunious Anglo-Indian, or the discovery of a gold mine on his land to an Australian settler. With their inherited business habits, their want of sympathy for Musalmans, their unscrupulous greed for gain, their established position as accountants and factors for the agricultural population, their monopoly of education, of general intelligence, and of trade—most particularly of money-lending (the taking of interest being unlawful for a Musalman*)—prospects of wealth and position, never before attained in their history, were opened for the Bunniah class.

The ultimate diversion of a large part of the profits of cultivation into their pockets, their elevation to the position of landlords, and the degradation of the peasantry to that of tenants, were secured to them. The process was slow at first owing to the operation of two causes.

Titles were everywhere insecure until determined and recorded at a regular settlement, in which the investigations and recording of tenures was made, and that, as we have seen, was not effected in some districts until many years after annexation. Then for many years civil courts were few, and guided by reason and conscience. The introduction of the elaborate substantive law now administered in our civil courts, of a strict code of Civil Procedure, of legal practitioners, and of all those complicated devices of civilised Europe, which benefit the rich and terrorize the poor, was a matter of slow evolution in the Punjab. For many years, too, the peasant's margin of credit was so great that he succeeded in scraping along by renewing his bonds at long intervals, † and by making over to his creditor the surplus produce of the annually extended area under the plough.

That the Musalman peasant is a short-sighted and long-suffering animal, is demonstrated from his history during the last twenty years. So long as the paternal acres remain in his possession, and the pinch of actual poverty is not felt, he is content to rub along from day to day, deliberately oblivious of accumulating debts until Fate's decree removes him to paradise. From the causes already mentioned, though a good deal of indebtedness was incurred within the first decade of our rule, the area of land alienated to non-agriculturists in that period was small. Except in localities in which summary settlements had broken down in consequence of over-assessment, no popular discontent at the insidious transfer of the rights of the people of the soil to nerveless aliens anywhere manifested itself before 1860. It cannot be doubted that the loyalty of the Punjab peasantry during the Sepoy Mutiny was largely due to the absence, in 1857-58, of good cause for agrarian discontent. In the older Gangetic districts of the N.-W. Provinces, that Mutiny was largely taken advantage of by the agriculturists to wreak their vengeance on the money-lenders and auction-purchasers who had dispossessed them. For the Western Punjab the alienations of land to outsiders may be said to have seriously begun between 1860 and 1870. As the regular settlements of the frontier districts were the last effected in the province, in those districts the change was forced on the notice of Government a few years later than in the older-settled districts Cis-Indus. Between 1860 and 1870, by means of judicial decisions and revision of settlements—both summary and regular—titles had been everywhere, except on the frontier, ascertained and recorded, a system for the collection of annual agricultural statistics had been elaborated, and the value of land had become understood even by the peasantry themselves.

Energetic District and Settlement Officers had from time to time drawn the attention of the Punjab Government to the subject of agricultural indebtedness and its consequences, but without result. The standard of comfort of all classes had risen : the people generally were manifestly more prosperous than they had been 10 or 20 years before : agriculturists were better housed and clothed, spent more on betrothals, marriages, and deaths, than ever before : their land revenue assessments were, when viewed absolutely, light, not amounting to more than one-sixth of an average yield : if the inelasticity of a fixed land revenue assessment compelled them to borrow in bad years, still their assessments were, in theory, very light, falling at less than a quarter of an average yield : the surplus of good harvests must recoup the losses of poor or of no harvests : the principle of fixity of demand must not be impugned : elasticity would demoralise the people : a year or two of misfortune would inculcate prudence. As for the alienation of land to money-lenders, the investment of capital in land was a sign of prosperity and of confidence in the stability of the British rule : the village money-lender was a necessary factor in the agricultural economy of India, was coeval with agriculture, and could not be dispensed with. By such paradoxes and truisms the revenue authorities of the day satisfied themselves that the insidious change in the relationship between cultivator and Bunniah, which District Officers sometimes ventured to think dangerous, was a concomitant of progress and prosperity.

Notes

  1. *. A few Musalmans here and there Cis-Indus openly lend money on interest, braving the scorn of their co-religionists. On the frontier, in fact wherever Mahomedanism is dominant, he who hoards money, or is suspected of secretly lending it out on interest, is reviled and despised as a sordid renegade. With Musalmans liberality is the greatest of all virtues ; parsimony the meanest of all vices.
  2. †. See page 74, on gradual reduction of period of limitation from twelve years to what it is now.