§ 1. Chronic antagonism of the Indian peasant to the revenue collector.
A careful student of Indian history is very much struck by the chronic antagonism between the rent-payer and the rentreceiver from very ancient times. European travellers in India have noticed how the ryot was averse to pay even his legitimate rent and that force had to be employed to get from him the dues of the State [Storia do Mogor, ii. 450.] On the other hand, in Sanskrit literature as well as Persian Court-annals we read how the “king’s man”—i.e., revenue officials and underlings,—preyed on the peasantry, and in both ages the sovereign is called upon to save the ryots from such blood-suckers.
The Indian peasants’ habitual reluctance to pay revenue was partly due to the fact that he derived little benefit from the Government in return for the revenue ; but it was mainly because of the uncertainty of that Government. I have explained already how the State in Mughal India performed no socialistic duties, but simply undertook to defend the country from invaders and rebels. Even this work of national defence was badly done at times, while the policing of the villages against thieves and robbers was done by a village agency which was not remunerated out of the revenue. Thus, the ryot received nothing visible in return for which Government might fairly demand from him a share of the fruits of his labour.
Secondly, changes of dynasty were so frequent, wars of succession within the same dynasty so much the rule rather than the exception, and the invasion of neighbouring countries (in Sanskrit digvijay, in Persian mulk-giri,) was so universally regarded as a duty by Hindu Rajahs and Muslim Sultans alike, that the peasant in India seldom knew for certain to whom to pay the revenue, even when he was willing to pay it. He naturally wanted to avoid having to pay the same money twice over. It was (he felt) wiser to wait for some months or years, even at the risk of some beating in the meantime, and see which side became firmly planted on the throne and then pay the revenue to it. But the arrears of revenue which thus accumulated could never be paid in full after such long delays, because much of the peasant’s stock was eaten up by him and much of it plundered during the unsettled state of the country.
Many centuries of political insecurity and revoluton have left in the mind of the Indian peasant even of the 20th century, a subconscious but ingrained belief that wars of succession are quite in the nature of things and that whenever the Government is engaged in a war anywhere, a wise peasant ought to think twice before paying the revenue due.
During the late war with Germany, several khasmahal ryots in Chittagong hesitated to pay their land-tax and told the Deputy Collector, “If the Kohisur (i.e, Kaiser) comes will he not ask for our revenue over again? Save us, Sir, from the double payment.”
I was in a North Bengal village at the time of the death of King Edward VII. The first question which the local ryots asked me on hearing of His present Majesty’s succession was, “Are not his kinsmen disputing his accession to the throne?’ We can easily imagine the long ages of disorder and oppression that lie behind this traditional belief among our villagers.
§ 2. The peasant ever in arrears of payment.
Hence, the collection of the revenue was always the result of a struggle between the ryot and the sarkar, and the arrears were seldom, if ever, cleared. The next logical step in this vicious circle was for the Government collectors to exact from the ryot, under the name of the never-to-be-extinguished arrears everything except his bare subsistence. In most parts of Mughal India the ryot was therefore, like the French peasantry in the reign of Louis XV, trying to escape the unjust taille or the cottier peasantry of Ireland who were ever in debt to their landlords.
There was this difference, however, that in pre-British times there was no eviction for default, no starvation of the peasantry (except when there was a local famine, with no communication with the more fruitful parts of the country.) In the early and mediæval times, the peasant was left in his holding and left with enough to feed him (except when the entire harvest failed). The old custom of payment by the division of the crop (the batai system) was an advantage to him, as the payment depended on the actual harvest of the year, unlike the modern money rent which is an amount fixed irrespective of the yield of different years. In those days of constant war and disorder, the peasant was also cherished and valued because his landlord had need for him as an armed retainer. Indeed, competition for tenants among the zamindars was the rule and the poorer peasants sometimes escaped from one zamindari to another in the hope of getting rid of their arrears with the former and of faring better under a new landlord. Cases of such fugitive ryots were very frequent in North Bengal only forty years ago.
§ 3. Illegal imposts on peasants condemned by the Government Head.
The natural tendency of the ryot to withhold or refuse the payment of revenue and the failure of the State to give him a clean slate every three or five years by writing off his arrears, were the chief causes of of trouble in the Mughal revenue department. The evil was aggravated by the greed of the revenne underlings and of some of the Emperors even. When I discuss the list of abwabs or unauthorized exactions from the people in Mughal times you will perceive the wonderful fertility of the human invention in devising means for squeezing money out of the people,—at birth, throughout life, and even after death. All these abwabs were not directly paid by the peasant; several of them affected the smaller dealers aud towns people too. But as our population is predominantly agricultural and most of tbe articles for sale came from the land, the weight of the abwabs pressed most heavily on the ryots.
It is only fair to add that in respect of the abwabs, there was a clear conflict of policy betwen the better sort of Emperors on the one hand and the revene eollectors on the other. These Emperors are for ever issuing orders to their officers to show leniency and consideration to the peasants in collecting the revenue, to give up all abwabs, and to relieve local distress; and the revenue officers are as often squeezing everything out of the peasants except the barest subsistence. A solemn proclamation is issued by one Emperor abolishing all abwabs and urging all his officials, ‘‘at present and in future’’ to obey these instructions. But these very abwabs crop up again and have to be abolished by his successor with another proclamation, which has exactly the same efficacy as the first. English readers will fined painful illustrations of it in Thomas’ Revenue Resources of the Mughal Empire published in 1871, which may be supplemented by my translation of Aurangzib’s Revenue Regulations published in the J. A. S B. in 1906,* and the list of abwabs abolished by Aurangzib in 1673, as given in this lecture.
The policy of the supreme head of the Mughal Government not to commit any exaction on the ryot is manifest from the contemporary histories and letters, and can be proved to have been a reality and not merely a pious wish. Several instances are recorded in the reigns of Shah Jahan and Aurangzib in which harsh and exacting revenue collectors and even provincial viceroys were dismissed on the complaints of their subjects reaching the Emperor’s ears. A characteristic anecdote to the same effect is told in India Office Libary Persian Manuscript No. 370, interleaf facing folio 68. It clearly illustrates Shah Jahan's eagerness to do justice and even liberality to the peasantry, and I shall narrate it here.
“One day,” so runs the story, “ Shah Jahan was looking through the revenue returns of his empire and discovered that in a certain village the revenue for the present year was entered as higher by a few thousands [dám ?] than that of past years. Immediately he ordered the High Diwan Sadullah Khan to be brought to the Presence for explaining the difference. Sadullah Khan was then sitting in his treasury with an open bundle of revenue papers before him and his eyes dozing in consequence of his daily and nightly attention to the business of his department. The royal messengers brought him to the Emperor in exactly the same condition [and dress.] Shah Jahan asked him for the cause of the increase in the assessment. After a local inquiry it was found out that the river had receded a little and a new tract of land had risen above water-level, causing an addition to the area of the village and the income of the State. On the Emperor asking whether the land in question was khalsa or aima, a further inquiry was made and it was found to adjoin a piece of rent-free grant of land (aima.) Then Shah Jahan cried out in wrath, ‘The water over that tract of land has dried in response to the lamentations of the orphans, widows and poor [of the place] ; it is a divine gift to them, and you have dared to appropriate it to the State ! If a desire to spare God's creation had not restrained me, I should have ordered the execution of that second Satan, the oppressive faujdar [who has collected revenue from this new land.] It will be enough punishment to dismiss him as a warning to others to refrain from such wicked acts of injustice. Order the excess collection to be immediately refunded to the peasants entitled to it.’”
This anecdote may or may not have been true in every letter but it shows the atmosphere and the public belief in Shah Jahan's kindness to his subjects.
§ 4. Lower revenue officials were harsh and extortionate.
The lower officials of Mughal India were incurably corrupt, while the highest were, on the whole, just and statesman like except an occasional diwan who inflated the revenue demand on paper and farmed the collection to the highest bidder with ruinous consequences, as can be illustrated from the revenue history of Orissa in the 17th century.
The subahdar of Orissa wrote in 1662 : “The mahals of Crownland have been reduced to desolation and their affairs have fallen into confusion in consequence of the harsh assessment of an unreasonable amount of revenue and the neglect of details by the [new] diwan, Muhammad Hashim. He transacts business in this way : when a candidate for krori-ship accepts the post, Hashim imposes on him the paper assessment of the parganah and sends him there, before he can learn about the [actual] yield of the place. After a short time, another man is secured for the post, and Hashim Khan taking money for himself from this man, dismisses the former krori, appoints the second man and makes him promise a larger revenue than the first collector had engaged for. After a little time, a third man appears, offering a still higher sum to the State, and he is sent as collector to the parganah ! ...The Khan has thus increased the revenue [on paper] twofold in some places and threefold in others, while the ryots, unable to pay, have fled away and the villages have turned into a wilderness.” [Studies in Mughal India, 223—224.]
The man was shortly afterwards removed from office.
The Emperor, the High Diwan, and even the subahdar may have been just and kind in their treatment of the peasantry. But the lower official or revenue underling was the man on the spot, the person in direct relation with the ryots and therefore his harshness and greed affected the ryots far more effectively than the far-off Emperor’s or Chancellor’s kind intentions and benevolent proclamations. This fact was well-known in the 17th century.
The great and good Diwan-i-ala, Sadullah Khan, used to remark that a diwan who did not do justice to the ryots was a demon sitting with a pen and inkpot before him. The propriety of this epigram will become clear when I tell you that in the Persian alphabet a is a long vertical line with a sharp downward point like an Indian reed-pen, while the letter n is formed by a circle open at the top, just like an indigenous inkpot. The word diw means ‘an evil spirit ;’ and hence diwan can be analysed into diw followed by a or a pen and n or an inkpot ! (Ruqaat-i- Alamgiri, letter No. 154.)
In fact, the cunning of the local officials and the subordinates of the revenue department was too much even for the lord of the Peacock Throne, and we find more than 50 abwabs flourishing immediately after the death of this very Shah Jahan.
§ 5. Why revenue officials exacted perquisites.
The exaction of perquisites and presents by the officials from the subahdar downwards was one of the greatest evils of mediæval administrations, in the East and the West alike. In the Mughal Empire the evil was aggravated by three other causes, viz., (1) the custom of offering presents to the Emperor and the princes by the higher officers and to the higher officers by the lower, (2) the nominal salaries paid to the lower officers, and (3) the submissive, indifferent spirit of the people.
Immemorial custom and the prevalent notions of social etiquette, as well as the more worldly motive of keeping one's superiors in good humour, made it imperative for the subahdars to offer rare or valuable presents to the Emperor on his birthday, and also at their visits to the Court. The High Chancellor also had to be propitiated by similar means.
This pressure passed from the top to the bottom, though it was unintentional and its real effects were not fully realized by the head of the State. The Emperors, without meaning it, squeezed the subahdars and the subahdars did so to the zamindars; the provincial diwan had to gratify the High Diwan and therefore he had to squeeze the subordinate collectors of the revenue; and these men at the bottom of the official ladder squeezed the ryots.
This was quite distinct from giving bribes to cause a failure of justice or to win a favour that was undeserved by the man or injurious to the real interests of the State. Taking bribes was recognized as a wicked and disgraceful thing even in Mughal times, though it was extensively practised under the veil of secrecy.
The low salaries paid by the Government had necessarily to be supplemented by the clerks and other subordinates exacting unauthorized fees from the men who had to do business with them. It was called “the writer's fee” haqq-ul-taharir (or tahariri as used in the law courts and some other offices here even now.) In the Manual (page 72) the auditor (mushrif) is advised, “Take the writer's fee that the people pay you willingly, for how else can a man deserving Rs. 50, but paid a salary of Rs. 20 a month contrive to live ?”
§ 6. The krori or collector of revenue of a district.
The actual revenue collector was the krori, so styled because he was placed in charge of a tract theoretically expected to yield a revenue of one kror of dam, i.e., 2½ lakhs of rupees. The arrangement was Akbar’s (Ain, i. 13.). But the title of krori was continued in later times irrespective of the amount of revenue to be collected by this officer. It latterly meant simply ‘a collector of State dues’ and we have a class of kroris of ganj, i.e., collectors of markets.
“The krori ought to entertain a body of militia (sehbandi) proportionate to his jurisdiction and collect the reveuue without negligence and at the right time. He should not demand mahsul (the State due in cash or kind) from places not yet capable of paying, lest their ryots should run away. He should urge his subordinates not to realize anything in excess of the regulations, lest he should, in the end, be subjected to wásilát (examination of accounts with a view to detect peculation.) He should be honest’’ (Manual, page 64.)
The duties and necessary virtues of an ideal “collector of the revenue” under Akbar are described in the Ain, ii. 43—47 ; but he seems to have been a higher officer than a krori of the 17th century.
The sanad appointing a new krori runs thus : “Collect the revenue season by season as assessed by the amin and pay it to the fotahdar. With the advice of the faujdar and amin, carefully deposit the [accumulated] money in the imperial treasury, giving a receipt for it to the fotahdar. Send to the Government Record Office your abstract accounts and statements of income and disbursement and other papers, as laid down in the regulations. Do not collect any abwab, such as nahib (?), the collector’s perquisite (tahsildari), etc., lest the money should be taken back from the offender and he be dismissed.’’
§ 7. The amin and the qanungo.
Amin literally means an umpire or arbitrator, a trustee for others. The essence of his office was to be an impartial umpire between the State demanding revenue and the individual ryots paying it.
The Manual of the Duties of Officers (61—63) gives us the following information about the amin and his work :—
“The amin should know the regulations (zábita) well, and be an honest and expert man, well-versed in the quality (good or bad) of every affair. He should make the assesement (musha- khas) according to the rules and let none steal Government money.
“The amin’s work is to cause the kingdom to be cultivated, before the commencement of the season of cultivation, he should take from the qanungoes the preceding ten years’ papers of the revenue assessment and area of the villages, ride to the villages in company with the kroris, chaudhuris, qanungoes and zamindars, inquire into the condition of the villages, as regards their [culturable] area and the actual number of ploughs, compare the area given in the papers of the qanungo with the real area, and if the two do not agree call upon the qanungo to explain the excess (in the case of excess), and censure the headmen (in the case of shortage), saying ‘Why did the qanungo give a false return and why did the headman tell lies?’
“Then inquire whether the existing ploughs are sufficient for the cultivators of the village. If not, then grant taqavi (agricultural loans), proportioned to the area of the culturable soil of the village, for the purchase of oxen and seeds, taking bonds* from the headmen for the recovery of the loan with the first instalment of the [next] year, and indemnity-bonds (muchilka) from the kroris that they would realize the loan with the first instalment of the [next] year.”
The sanad appointing an amin runs thus: “Do your work with honesty and truthfulness. Exert yourself to prepetuate the cultivation and increase the habitation. You will be held responsible for the portion of the collected revenue deposited with the fotahdar which he keeps in his hands in arrear (i.e., without paying it into the treasury.) Urge the krori to collect the revenue according to his own assessment and deposit it with the fotahdar. Give temporary receipts (chitha) for the money that the ryots pay to the fotahdar, under your seal and the fotahdar’s signature, and at the time of payment of revenue in full (bebáqi) make up the account according to this chitha. Do not collect any abwab like bálá dasti and tahsildari, as all these have been forbidden by the Emperor. Warn the chaudhuris and qanungoes not to exact any such cess.”
The papers which the amin and the krori had to submit to the Diwan’s office are enumerated in Z. 34a and D. 89a, those that they had to keep, in Z. 6a and b.
The QANUNGO, as the name implies, was a walking dictionary of the prevailing rules and practices (qánun), and a store-house of information as to procedure, precedents, land history of the past, etc. The Ain (ii. 66) styles him “the refuge of the husbandman.” [See also Ain, ii. 47 n.] They were “ village revenue-officers who recorded all circumstances within their sphere which concerned landed property and the realisation of the revenue, keeping registers of the value, tenure, extent, and transfers of lands, assisting in the measurement and survey of the lands, reporting deaths and successions of revenue-payers, and explaining, when required, local practices and public regulations; they were paid by rent-free lands and various allowances and perquisites.” (Wilson, 260.)
The Manual (34—35) instructs a new qanungo thus : “ The Emperor’s business goes on in reliance on your papers. To your office belong the papers of division (taqsim), comparison (muázana) etc..........Keep two copies of the records,—one in your house and the other in your office (in charge of your gumashta) so that one at least may be saved in case of fire or flood.”
§ 8. Abwabs or illegal cesses.
I shall now discuss in detail the abwabs or exactions made on various pretexts in addition to the regular land-revenue or custom duty. These imposts were again and again declared by the Muhammadan sovereigns to be illegal and forbidden within their realms, but they soon reappeared with some changes in their items. Thomas in his Revenue Resources of the Mughal Empire has given from Persian lists of the abwabs abolished by Firuz Shah Tughlaq (1375, A.D.) and Akbar (about 1590.) Those prohibited by Aurangzib in a farman dated 29th April 1673, are enumerated in Mirat-i-Ahmadi, pages 303—304, Z. f. 135, and D. f. 102. But these three sources do not agree in all points ; Mirat names forty-one, Z. seventy-four, and D. seventy-eight abwabs as abolished at this time. In Bengal nineteen such imposts continued to be levied, but from the tenants only, till the 19th century, when the British law-courts finally put an end to them as illegal. (Rampini’s Bengal Tenncy Act, 4th ed., pages 255—256.) We are thus in a position to make a comparative study of the growth of abwabs through several centuries of our history.
The abwabs naturally fall into six broad classes :—
- (a) Duties on the local sale of produce, like the municipal octroi duty of certain towns in modern India, but taken by the State.
- (b) Fee on the sale of immovable property.
- (c) Perquisites exacted by the officials for their own benefit, and fees or commissions levied on behalf of the State, on almost every conceivable occasion.
- (d) License-tax for plying certain trades.
- (e) Forced subscriptions.
- (f) Special imposts on the Hindus:
Aurangzib's abolitions are given below :—
A. Duties on the sale of produce :—
- 1. Fish.
- 2. Oil or ghee. [Both Z. and D. read án karuah, which I read as raughan-i-karuah, or mustard seed oil.]
- 3. Chungi on opium. [Reading doubtful.]
- 4. Cowdung cakes.
- 5. Milk and curds.
- 6. Dhák leaves and bark of the babul (gum) from the jungles. [All three sources differ in reading. Babul in Mirat only.]
- 7. Kitchen vegetables.
- 8. Grass, fuel wood and brambles from the jungles.
- 9. Ground-rent for stalls in bazar. [All three read hasil-i- tah (or batta)-i-bazari. The ground-rent for stalls in bazars called the pandari tax, was abolished by Aurangzib in certain towns in 1659. See History of Aurangzib, iii. 89—90.]
- 10. Tobacco tax. [Abolished in 1666, under circumstances described by Manucci, ii. 175. See History of Aurangzib, iii. 91.]
- 11. Roses for rose-water. [Doubtful reading.]
- 12. Earthen pots and dishes made in the villages and towns.
B. Fee on the sale of property :—
- 13. On the sale or mortgage of land.
- 14. On the sale of houses (haveli).
- 15. On the sale of captives (barda faroshi).
C. Perquisites of officials and fees or commissions of the State :—
- 16. Rahdari or remuneration of road patrols. [Abolished by Aurangzib in 1659. The hardships and abuses connected with this tax are fully described in my History of Aurangzib, iii. 88—89 and Studies in Mughal India, pages 162—163. In the Crownlands alone this tax used to yield 25 lakhs of rupees a year at the time of its abolition.]
- 17. Tax (hasil) on the hire of carts, camels and messengers.
- 18. Tax on stone weights, [“at the time of stamping with the official stamp the stone weights, iron weights, etc.,”—added by Mirat.]
- 19. Fee for census of head-dresses, heads and houses (dastárshumári, sar-shumári, khánah-shumári.) We know that houses were counted to complete village records in Akbar’s reign, but we have no mention in the Persian histories or the accounts of the European travellers of any census of the population being taken in Mughal India.
- 20. One-fourth of the amount in dispute in money-suits belonged to the State (like the court-fee of our times.) Aurangzib abolished this exaction as well as the payment of the fines and thank-offerings which had the sanction of ancient usage and even of Muslim judicial practice.
- 21. Shash dámi [a fee of three-twentieth of a rupee. Not clear.]
- 22. The customary perquisite (muqarrari) taken from men in receipt of rent-free grants of land (madad-i-má‘sh.)
- 23. The exaction of presents in kind from such men at the time of marking out their plots of land (chak bandi).
- 24. Fee for the appraising (muqimi) of land. [Mirat reads “muqimi for the sale of houses acquired by Government.”]
- 25. Tax on the grass of pastures.
- 26. Tax on the birth of male children.
- 27. Fee for the dárogha and the kotwáli [Mirat adds “for setting up the weighing balance,” dandi.]
- 28. Fee of watching over pack-oxen, camel-litters, dolis (litters carried on men’s shoulders), chests and packages [ ? in market places. Evidently collected for the benefit of the police.]
- 29. Ancient perquisites on special occasions and with special names,—sáliáná (once in a year), fasalána (once in a season), máhiána (once in a month), rozána (daily), on the ‘Ids., dastárbarái (?), etc.
- 30. Ferry tax collected on rivers that have dried up [and can be crossed on foot] !
- 31. Price of paper [used in the official records and receipts to the peasants.]
- 32. A tax on every iron cauldron in which molasses are boiled. [Mirat adds, “ But the duty on the liquid sugar is to be levied as laid down in the regulations.”]
- 33. Presents (peshkash) taken by newly arrived officials from grain-dealers and others, and in some places from the banjára.
- 34. Governors must not billet themselves in private houses, mosques or shops without the consent of their owners.
- 35. Reward (rukhsatána) taken for carrying letters from the [imperial] camp, etc.
- 36. The guards at the gates of forts must not take anything from the people passing through them.
- 37. Mahsul-i-sar-wa-basti. [ ? Sar-basti means ‘exemption from payment, not entitled to taxation’.]
D. License-tax on trades :—
- 38. From butchers.
- 39. From footmen (piádas).
- 40 & 41. From cotton-dressers and sugarcane-pressers, going to a new place to start business there.
- 42. From thatchers (of roofs) and watchmen (pásbán.)
- 43. From printers of (cotton) cloth, at the time of stamping them.
- 44. Headman’s dues (muqaddami) on the hire of camels.
- 45. From brick-makers.
- 46. From mummers, who used to put on disguises and go to houses where marriages were being celebrated, to entertain the people. [A letter of Aurangzib suggests that such mummings were altogether put down in Kashmir late in his reign.]
- 47. From brokers (dalál.) [Text obscure.]
- 48. Tax on matchlocks [ ? or from gunsmiths. D. only source.]
As Shihabuddin Talish complained (in 1666), “ From the first occupation of India and its ports by the Muslims to the end of Shah Jahan’s reign, it was a rule and practice to exact hasil from every trader,—from the rose-vendor to the clay-vendor, from the weaver of fine linen to that of coarse cloth.’’
E. Forced subscriptions and gifts :—
- 49. Forced labour and [compulsory lighting of] lamps on the ‘ Id festival.
- 50. The [compulsory] lighting of lamps in the nights of hab-i-barát, diwali, the first ten days of the month of Shawwal, etc.
- 51. Bhet and begára. [Reading doubtful. D. and Z. give bhet banjara and bhet kara respectively. Mirat reads bhet banjaraha rasum i dandihá áz chungi wa ghaiara and gives immediately afterwards No. 27 above. One of the abwabs abolished in Bengal was called ‘ bhet and begar’ or presents and gratuitous labour. See Rampini, loc. cit.]
- 52. Order for fruits, etc., [for the Emperor’s table, issued on the provinces, and supplied gratis.] [This is the reading of Z. and D. Mirat, however, reads “ (compensation) for injury to fruits, etc., ordered ” and a few lines later adds “ The fruits of (i.e., intended to be sent to the Emperor by) relays of horsemen, are misappropriated or damaged by the traffic of the men of the villages on the roads near them, and [the State carriers] therefore trouble the wayfarers.” We know that mangoes used to be sent to the Emperor regularly from Allahabad, Malwa and Khandesh, pomegranates from Jodhpur and Tatta, and several other fruits from Gujrat.]
F. Imposts on the Hindus :—
- 53. Tax on bathing in the Ganges and other (holy) rivers.
- 54. Tax on the carrying of the bones of dead Hindus for being thrown into the Ganges.
Several other prohibitions of Aurangzib given by our authorities in this connection, do not refer to illegal cesses remitted, but to practices contrary to the Quran which he prohibited. These have nothing to do with taxation, and therefore cannot be dealt with here.
Several of the items above are given with great diffidence as the Persian texts are very obscure and corrupt. I shall, therefore, enumerate here the cesses which were forbidden by the Calcutta High Court as their special names are correctly known : (a) Zabita batta or customary levy, (b) mihmani or guest money, and nazrana or presents, (c) bardana, batta, and kotwali tobacco, (d) chanda or subscription (e) qazi’s fees, (f) najai or tax assessed upon the cultivators present to make up for any deficiency arising from the death or disappearance of their neighbours, (g) a cess of so much gur or molasses on every maund manufactured, (h) a cess for grazing cattle on a jotedar’s own jote but within the zamindar’s estate, (i) rakumat or miscellaneous items, (j) parabi or festival cess, (k) patwari’s fee, (l) patwari’s wages, sidha or daily rations, (m) pásbáni or watchman’s wages, (n) bhet and begar, etc.