I. The Cause of Famine
From the days of the Buddhist pilgrims from China to the latest Moral and Material Progress Report, famine lies broad written across the pages of Indian history. The accounts of early famines are indeed most meagre. In the chronicles of courts, which cared little for the people, social calamities found but scant record. A few lurid descriptions have come down to us—man feeding on man and even slaying him for food, the violation of all natural ties1, conspicuous acts of unavailing charity, depopulation, and the loss of revenue; but of famine history in its wider range there is no trace. We only know that famines were very frequent under Native rule, and frightful when they came2. We know also that they have been frequent since the British came to India.
This frequency of famine is easily explained. Famine is a disease of all agricultural countries. India is, and always has been, mainly agricultural, and agricultural under conditions peculiarly exposed to famine. The soil is parcelled out in minute farms. The farmers have no capital and depend on unorganized local credit, which shrinks when harvests fail. Off the land, but dependent on it, are millions of agricultural labourers, the vast majority of whom have only casual employment and are thrown out of work when harvests fail. Thus, the masses of the Indian people depend upon the harvests, and these depend upon a periodic, but by no means regular, rainfall.
The two rain-bearing currents are (1) the south-west monsoon, commonly called the monsoon or the rains, and (2) the so-called north-east monsoon, the period of which is marked in North-Western India by what are commonly called 'the winter rains.' The agricultural year commences with the former, which is the more important of the two.
For a month or two before the rains the land has rest over the greater part of India. The heat is intense, the soil is baked, ploughing is impossible, and the people sit in their villages literally gasping for rain. The monsoon bursts in June, and dies away at the end of September or beginning of October. After the first heavy shower, ploughing begins, and the autumn harvest (kharīf), which provides the year's food for the poorer classes, viz. millets and rice, is sown. It occupies the ground for from two to four months, during which period the distribution of the rainfall is even more important agriculturally than its amount. A long break in the rains and hot dry winds cause serious loss; excessive rain produces floods; and continuous rain interrupts work in the fields. On fine days the people are very busy: the autumn harvest requires two or three weedings, and the land reserved for the spring harvest is ploughed many times. Weeding, ploughing, and harvesting employ millions of labourers.
In October or November, the spring harvest (rabi) is sown. Wheat, barley, pulses, and the more valuable non-food crops1 are grown in the north; the larger millets predominate in the south of India. The so-called north-east monsoon breaks on the east coast in November or December2, while the winter rains fall in the north from Christmas on to February. The spring are less precarious than the autumn crops. But heavy or prolonged rain, accompanied by east winds, causes rust in the wheat and barley; and premature hot west winds shrivel up the swelling grain. Harvesting begins in March and April, and again employs millions of labourers. Intermediate crops, such as sugar-cane and the late cotton, also employ large numbers.
Thus, any failure of the rains involves some failure of crops, thereby reducing the supply of food and stopping the demand for labour. But not every failure of the rains causes famine. The people are not generally dependent on the out-turn of a single harvest. The railways have put the whole food-supply of the country into circulation, and what is lost in one part of the country is made good from another. The cultivators have some resources and credit. The spring harvest may be good although the autumn harvest has failed. The agricultural labourers are safe so long as there is a demand for labour, and there are various degrees of crop failure with varying effect upon the labour market. A widespread failure of either harvest will cause distress, especially to the agricultural labourers ; but it depends on several conditions, such as the character of preceding harvests, and the degree in which agricultural operations are affected, whether the distress will amount to famine.
II. The Famine Problem, and Modern Relief
Formerly war, rapine, and misrule were direct causes of famine. These have disappeared and in the process a new problem has arisen. Peace has multiplied the people. The custom of the country favours early marriage, while the general security has removed the old checks on population. And as those who have least hope in the world usually bring most children into it, the increase of population has been great among the poorer cultivators and the agricultural labourers. The modern outlets, emigration and industrial development, afford as yet little relief. Large tracts in India still await population, but the inhabitants of congested districts will not move to them, partly from habit, but largely from regard to caste and language. Industries are growing up, but as yet they draw only small numbers off the land, occupation being still prescribed by inheritance and tradition. Pressure, therefore, increases where it is already greatest. Holdings already small are subdivided, or sublet at competition rents, while the supply of agricultural labour outruns the demand for it, and so keeps agricultural wages low.
This is the great famine problem. It is not in the power of man to prevent drought in India, or, so long as the country is mainly agricultural, to prevent drought from causing famine : all he can do is to restrict and mitigate the resultant suffering. Modern famine policy is thus a struggle against nature. As such it has two objects, the one remedial, the other protective. It seeks to relieve distress when droughts come; and it seeks in many ways to fortify the people against drought1.
Under Native rule there was little thought for, and no effective means of, remedial action. Occasionally a large relief work was started and spasmodic attempts were made to send food to famine-stricken areas. But primitive transport could not enter fodderless and roadless country, and so broke down where most required. The people wandered and died in thousands, the country was desolated and the revenue was not collected. Conditions scarcely changed in the early days of the East India Company, but by degrees a scheme of systematic relief grew up. The modern view of the responsibility of the state was not reached, however, until India had passed under the Crown. In 1868 the famous order was issued2 that ‘every District officer would be held personally responsible that no deaths occurred from starvation which could have been avoided by any exertion or arrangement on his part or that of his subordinates.’ And, after some experience of the demoralizing influence of indiscriminate state charity, relief policy assumed its final shape in the declaration made by the Secretary of State in 1877:—
‘The object of saving life is undoubtedly paramount to all other considerations. But it is essential that in pursuing this end your officers should sedulously guard against the danger of inducing the population to rely upon Government aid rather than upon their own industry and thrift. In the interests of the distressed population itself, as well as of the taxpayers generally, you are bound to adopt precautions against indolence or imposition, similar, so far as the circumstances of India will permit, to those with which in this country it has always been found necessary to protect the distribution of public relief from abuse.’
This policy has been accepted by three Famine Commissions —in 1880, 1898, and 1901. It resolves relief administration into the anxious problem of how to hit a happy mean, how to steer between the rock of distress and the whirlpool of demoralization.
The carrying out of this policy is beset with many and great practical difficulties. India has no poor law. In ordinary times private charity supports the poor; in times of famine this charity dries up, and the recipients of it are thrown upon the state together with large numbers of the agricultural population. In the nineteenth century the largest area simultaneously affected by drought was 475,000 square miles (in 1900), and the largest population so affected was 69,500,000 (in 1897); the largest number relieved at any one time was 6,500,000. Over such large areas, and for such large numbers, the Indian Government may in any year be called to improvise a system of relief without disturbing ordinary public business. Nor do the difficulties end with the numbers. The peoples of India are infinitely various in habits, creed, custom, caste, and language. The language of one part of a Province may not be understood in another part of it. Thousands would die sooner than resort to relief camps or touch food which they thought was unclean, either in itself or by reason of the agency employed in its preparation. One caste will not feed with another. The shy folk of the hills will not work with the people of the plains. Skilled weavers will not go to ordinary relief works for fear of losing their delicacy of touch. And for dealing with these sensitive, suspicious masses, the Government has to organize and control vast temporary establishments, which are generally untrained and have a low standard of intelligence and integrity. The difficulties would be insuperable if the people were less orderly, or less amenable to discipline. But discipline can be enforced, and corruption and demoralization can be kept down, only if relief is closely supervised by European officers, and it is very hard to find the men.
These difficulties have, however, in great measure been overcome. Under the stern but efficient teaching of experience, an elaborate system of relief has now been worked out. Philanthropists may still mourn that complete success has not been attained; those who are acquainted with Indian conditions will perhaps rather marvel at the progress already made. It may fairly be said that, in spite of inevitable defects, a modern Indian famine campaign is one of the most remarkable achievements in history of scientific administration.
Standing preparations are made on a large scale in ordinary times. The Government is kept informed daily of meteorological conditions, weekly of crops and prices, and monthly of birth and death rates. Programmes of suitable relief works are revised annually in every District. The country is mapped out into relief-circles of convenient size. Reserves of tools and plant are stocked, and lists of persons suitable on emergency for famine establishments are annually drawn up. In short, every effort is made so to arrange matters in advance that a telegram from head-quarters can mobilize relief.
When the rains fail preliminary inquiries are started; a forecast of the probable crop failure is made; and a careful look-out is kept for the regular danger signals of approaching distress. Prices begin to rise and the people become uneasy. Aimless wandering in search of work takes the place of the seasonal movement of labour which attends a normal harvest. Private charity in the villages contracts, and the habitual paupers who depend upon it drift to the towns. Petty crimes against property increase; credit becomes more difficult; and grain-dealers make large purchases. During this period of tension the local officers look to their programmes of relief and prepare for action.
As the uneasiness is intensified, the Government makes the necessary financial arrangements and declares its general policy. At this stage great importance attaches to ‘moral strategy.’ In an Eastern country hope turns quickly to despair, and despair shades off insensibly into a dull resignation. Accordingly, meetings are held; policy is explained; non-official gentlemen are encouraged to be active, especially in undertaking local improvements which will employ labour; committees are appointed to stimulate and organize private charity; village inspection begins, and preliminary lists of helpless persons who may require gratuitous relief are made. All this gives confidence to the people, who are further encouraged by liberal advances of money for wells and work in the field, and by detailed inquiries as to crop failure which are undertaken at this stage with a view to suspension of revenue. If the number of paupers in the town is great, poorhouses 1 are opened.
Test works 2 are also started. This is an anxious stage. If the tests are too lenient the state may be led on to unnecessary expenditure; if they are too strict the situation may not be grasped. The condition of those who seek employment on the test works is closely watched, and a look-out is kept by village inspection on the condition of those who stay in their villages. At this, as at every stage, the death-rates are scrutinized.
When the test works, or village inspection, disclose real distress, relief works are opened, the village inspecting staff is increased, the lists of persons entitled to gratuitous relief are revised, and the distribution of gratuitous relief begins. By the end of December in a famine year the numbers on relief are as a rule large. The gathering of an intermediate crop like sugar-cane may reduce them slightly, but generally they continue to rise till the following March. The great spring festival, the Holī, the reaping of the spring harvest (if there be one), and the ripening of the mahuā, or of the mango, crops usually draw off many relief workers for a time: these mostly return, however, by the end of April. In May distress reaches its maximum, and cholera generally breaks out.
An outbreak of cholera is the supreme test of organization. In the Pānch Mahāls District of Gujarāt, in 1900, cholera broke out suddenly with extraordinary virulence. In three days the dead numbered thousands and the people fled panic-stricken all over the country, spreading the disease. The native staff and camp attendants deserted in large numbers, and the European officers were left to collect with their own hands and burn some hundreds of corpses. Famine history is lit up by acts of self-sacrifice, and devotion even to death, but it records no nobler work than that performed by the European officers on this occasion.
The power of efficient organization was displayed in the management of a cholera outbreak in Bundelkhand in 1897. The Lieutenant-Governor was prepared, and the relieving staff and the people had been schooled by two years’ experience of famine. The country had been divided in advance into circles in which small works were mapped out. On the first outbreak of cholera the people on the large relief works were split up into parties of about 500, and marched with full staff and equipment to the circles in which their villages were. Here they found small works ready for them; the wells had been disinfected; work was commenced at once; there was no panic; and the pestilence was stayed.
Policy changes somewhat with the advent of the rains. Relief works are generally closed, and there is an extension of local gratuitous relief. In the interests of the country at large, and of the people themselves, it is important that ordinary agricultural conditions should be restored with the least delay, and that as large an area as possible should be sown. For this purpose, the people are moved from the large works to small works near their villages at the end of May, and liberal advances are made to agriculturists for the purchase of plough cattle and seed. When the rains break relief-workers return to their fields in crowds; if any stay on the works they are encouraged to return to their villages as soon as the demand for labour springs up. A few relief works are kept open, in case of need, and every one who cannot work and requires relief receives it gratuitously. The state supports, where necessary, the weakly members of a family, and the able-bodied are able to support themselves.
When the earliest of the principal autumn crops is ripe, the few remaining relief works are closed gradually, and gratuitous relief is discontinued, the recipients being given a valedictory dole, and by the middle of October famine is ordinarily at an end. Quinine is distributed in large quantities during September and October, in anticipation of fever, which generally prevails in the autumn.
The strictness of Government relief, which must inevitably be confined to the provision of necessaries, is softened and supplemented by private relief funds, to which it may be said that almost the whole world subscribes. These subscriptions are devoted to four principal objects, of which the last absorbs about two-thirds of the whole: (1) providing small comforts of food or clothing to the aged, infirm, sick, children, and others in need of them; (2) helping orphans; (3) relieving the respectable poor in ways acceptable to them; and (4) giving a fresh start in life to those who have lost everything in the struggle. Thousands of desolate homes have been restored by this splendid charity.
In 1900 the Mahārājā of Jaipur presented 16 lakhs of Government securities to be held in trust for the relief of the needy in times of famine. This trust has now (1905) 30 lakhs in Government securities, the greater part of which has been contributed by the founder and his family. It is vested in a body of trustees selected from all parts of India, and the income will be devoted, in times of famine, to objects similar to those of the charitable relief fund.
The greatest administrative achievement of the last twenty years has been the extension of communications. Railways have revolutionized relief. The final horror of famine, an absolute dearth of food, is now unknown. Private trade pours in food wherever it is required1. The telegraph has made control efficient; and as the administration has been freed from the primary necessity of finding food, it has been able to grapple successfully with other difficulties, supported, as it now is, by a system of agricultural intelligence, and increased knowledge of the social conditions of India1.
Under these influences the relief system has become increasingly elastic. Relief works are organized with due regard to the feelings of the people. Those who cannot work are relieved, as a rule, in their villages, and special consideration is shown to the respectable poor. The habitual beggars, the waifs and strays of society, are sheltered, clothed, and fed in poorhouses. Children are protected from the rapacity of their parents by being fed in kitchens, a precaution proved by sad experience to be necessary, and milk is given to infants whose mothers cannot nurse them. Weakly persons are specially treated. Deserted children are separately cared for, and returned to their relatives or co-religionists, if they will take them, at the close of the famine. An elaborate scheme for making relief acceptable to forest and hill tribes has been worked out; and weavers and artisans, who formerly suffered on ordinary relief works, are now, as far as possible, relieved in their own trades. Non-official aid and advice are enlisted on the side of Government. In a word, no effort is spared to prevent the loosening of social and moral ties, which is the melancholy accompaniment of an economic cataclysm like famine.
In the following section a sketch will be given of the efforts and experience, the failures and the successes, which have gradually evolved this result.
III. History of Chief Famines, and of Famine Relief
Sleeman in his Rambles and Recollections complains of the ignorance which prevailed in India in regard to the economic aspects of famine; and the fact that Turgot anticipated, in the Limousin famine of 1770, the general principles finally asserted by the Indian Famine Commission of 1880 lends colour to his complaint. But the East India Company really developed a famine policy, although their means of giving effect to it were small. In the Bengal famine of 1770 relief was administered, mainly in the old native way1. In the Agra famine of 1838 the beginnings of modern famine policy appear. The period from 1770 to 1838 was generally one of increasing knowledge, experiment, and expenditure, but progress was interrupted by wars which were themselves one of the causes of famine. All accounts of these early famines are vitiated by guesses which are still a fruitful source of controversy2; and there is practically no information for native territory, where famines were most frequent. Only a few general facts stand out of the mass of speculation.
Owing to the want of communications, prices in famine areas ran up to a level rarely reached in modern times, when normal prices are probably three times as high as they were a century ago3. Government prohibited the export of grain, and tried to import it and fix its price. The attempt was always costly and generally vain. From 1812 onwards the principle of non-interference with trade was adopted, but for many years bounties were given on importation.
Relief works were first opened in Madras in 1792. The obligation to provide work for all who sought it was fully recognized for the first time in the Agra famine of 18384. The relief of the helpless, who crowded into the big towns, was left to the charitable public. The largest direct expenditure on relief was about 23 lakhs in 1838. Remissions of revenue were generally made in the old native way—Government collecting what it could and leaving the rest—and were thus the measure of desolation rather than of relief.
The depopulation of the country is sufficient proof of terrible mortality, although any estimates of it are practically worthless. A third of the population, or 10,000,000, are said to have perished in the Bengal famine of 1770; and Colonel Baird-Smith put the death-roll of the Agra famine of 1838 at 800,000 on an estimated population of 15,500,000. Both estimates have been disputed, the former as excessive, the latter as inadequate.
A new spirit entered into famine policy when the Government of India passed to the Crown. The famine of 1861 witnessed the first practical demonstration of sympathy by the British public, and was followed by the first famine inquiry. The mortality in Orissa in 1866 deeply stirred the public conscience, and Sir George Campbell's Commission, which followed, effectually called attention to the responsibilities of Government in times of famine. This was the beginning of a more humane policy; but it was not till 1874 that the responsibility of the state for gratuitous relief was fully recognized.
The famine of 1861 struck parts of the Province of Agra and the Punjab, and touched Rājputāna and Cutch. The total area affected was 53,500 square miles, with an estimated population of 20,000,000; but famine is said to have been intense only between Agra and Delhi, a tract weakened by two years of irregular harvests and the military operations of the Mutiny. The autumn harvest was lost and very little of the spring harvest was sown. In 1838 remissions of revenue had been liberal, and relief had been given to the able-bodied on ordinary works managed by civil officers. In this famine remissions of revenue were small, but ten large relief works were opened under professional control; moreover the Government doubled the subscriptions of the public for the relief of the helpless. Poorhouses were opened, and respectable ladies were relieved in their own homes, for the first time, in this famine. Altogether some 33,000,000 units1 were relieved in British territory, at a cost of about 27 lakhs, of which 9 lakhs was subscribed by the public. The mortality was estimated at 8½ per cent. of the population in the worst districts.
An inquiry into this famine was conducted by Colonel Baird-Smith. His report is still of interest, as showing the advance made in general administration, small though it may appear to modern eyes. Stability of tenure and canal irrigation had already increased the staying power of the people. Many modern principles were anticipated, particularly in regard to selection for gratuitous relief. But practice was still crude: the temporary migration of 250,000 people from the Doāb was viewed with satisfaction by this able officer.
The next famine fell on the whole eastern coast from Madras upwards, reaching far inland. The total area affected was estimated at 180,000 square miles, with a population of 47,500,000; but distress was greatest in Orissa, which was at that time practically isolated from the rest of India. The people depended for food on the winter rice, and the rainfall of 1865 was scanty and ceased prematurely. Food-stocks had been depleted and soon ran short; but the gravity of the situation was not realized, the Bengal Board of Revenue being misled by defective estimates of the population requiring food and by fictitious price lists. The position was not grasped till the end of May, and then the monsoon had set in. Carriage by sea was extremely difficult, and even when grain reached the coast it could not be conveyed inland. At great cost some 10,000 tons of rice were imported, but this did not reach the people till September. Meanwhile the mortality had been very great. It was estimated that at least a million people, or one-third of the population, died in Orissa alone. The troubles of Orissa did not cease in 1866. The heavy rains of that year caused floods which destroyed the rice in low-lying lands, and in the following year relief measures were again undertaken. ‘Then, as an apparent result of the reaction following the want of foresight and activity in the preceding year, the relief operations were marked by a profusion and absence of check hitherto unexampled. Altogether about 40,000 tons of rice were imported, of which the most lavish use could not dispose of half; and while it cost four times the usual price to procure, the residue had to be sold for almost nothing when the monsoon of 1867, followed by an unusually fine harvest, altogether put an end to the famine in 18681.’ In the two years about 35,000,000 units were relieved at a cost of 95 lakhs, two-thirds of which was debitable to the expense of importing grain. Adding loss of revenue in all departments, the famine in Orissa is said to have cost the state about 1½ crores.
In Madras, in 1866, about 21,000,000 units were relieved at a cost of 12 lakhs, and revenue was remitted to the amount of 15 lakhs. Rather more than a lakh was also spent on relief works in Bombay.
The relief arrangements of the first year in Orissa were much criticized by Sir George Campbell's Commission of inquiry, particularly in regard to the poorhouses ; but failure was mainly due to the actual dearth of food, which the then imperfect means of information failed to detect until too late, and the then means of communication failed to relieve when detected.
This great famine in the east was shortly followed (1868–70) by a great famine in the west of India, which affected an area of 296,000 square miles, with an estimated population of 44,500,0001. The famine centred on the Native States of Rājputāna and the British territory of Ajmer. The rains came late, fell lightly, and practically stopped in August. There was an utter dearth of fodder, and in parts of water ; and grain could only be imported on camels. Thus Rājputāna was landlocked in the same way as Orissa. The people emigrated in enormous numbers with their flocks and herds2, but were reluctant to go on relief works in British territory, and many wandered till they died. Cholera broke out over the whole country, and there was practically no spring harvest. Large numbers returned to their villages in May, 1869, in the belief that the rains would be early ; but the rains held off till the middle of July, and in the interval thousands died. The autumn harvest of 1869 promised well, but swarms of locusts destroyed it. The rains in September and October were heavy, and were followed by a virulent outbreak of fever. A good spring harvest was, however, secured, and the famine ended in March, 1870, after dreadful mortality. In British territory 49 lakhs was spent in direct relief ; and in this famine the state spent over 7 lakhs in gratuitous relief3. Remissions of revenue amounted to little more than 5 lakhs ; but a new departure was taken in making advances to cultivators to the amount of about 21 lakhs. In the Province of Agra 29,000,000 units were relieved at a cost of nearly 30 lakhs ; but in spite of the Lieutenant-Governor's declaration (referred to on p. 478) as to the responsibility of District officers for saving life, the mortality was great. Immigration from Native States broke down the relief system.
The lessons of Orissa and Rājputāna were still fresh, when there followed a partial failure of the rains in Bihār and in the adjacent parts of Bengal and the United Provinces. The total area affected was only 54,000 square miles, with a dense population of 21,500,000, and the failure of the rainfall was not very serious ; but an immense organization was set on foot, and it was decided to save life at any cost. From first to last about 300,000,000 units were relieved (including 20,000,000 in the United Provinces) at a cost of 6¼ crores, of which nearly 4 crores were spent on the importation of grain. Altogether this famine cost the state about 6¾ crores. Financial considerations were thrown to the winds ; but life was saved, and a great advance was made in administration. For the first time village inspection, the basis of modern organization, was carried out, and gratuitous relief on a large scale was given by the state. The enormous expenditure on ‘a famine of unusual brevity and of no exceptional severity1’ would probably never have been incurred had any system of agricultural information existed. The want of such a system was shown again in the following year, when, on the premature cessation of the rainfall, the Local Government proposed to renew large relief measures in Bihār. The Government of India, however, resisted the alarm ; and in the result, so far from there being a famine, grain was cheaper than usual in the area of anticipated distress.
The famine which commenced in 1876 afflicted Southern India (Madras, Mysore, Hyderābād, Bombay) for two years, and in the second year extended to parts of the Central and United Provinces and to a small tract in the Punjab. The total area affected was 257,000 square miles, with a population of 58,500,000. Embarrassed by the large expenditure on the Bihār famine, the Government of India insisted on the imposition of proper tests in the interests of both the people themselves and the general taxpayer. In Bombay these tests drove large numbers of relief-workers to strike, and the question arose whether relief should be given to men who could, but would not, work. This was decided by the Government of India as follows : ‘We say that human life shall be saved at any cost and effort’; and if it is asked what ‘the general principles are by which the District officers should be guided in refusing the aid needed to preserve life, the reply must be that there are no such principles, and that there are no circumstances in which such aid can be refused.’ In Madras and Bombay the reduced, or Temple1, wage was adopted, but eventually abandoned as insufficient except under favourable circumstances. In the United Provinces little relief was given, and the mortality was very great. Throughout India fever raged in the autumn and winter of 1878. The excess mortality in this famine is said to have been 5,250,000 in British territory alone.
Speaking generally, the administration of relief was as strict on this occasion as it had been lax in Bihār. Prices ranged very high, and owing to the absence of railways private trade was scarcely equal to the demands made on it. Throughout British India about 700,000,000 units were relieved at a cost of 8⅓ crores2; and charitable contributions from Great Britain and the Colonies amounted to 84 lakhs.
In 1878 the whole question of relief and protection was referred to the first great Famine Commission under the presidency of Sir Richard Strachey. Starting from the principle, laid down in 1877, that the Government should spare no efforts to prevent starvation or an extremity of suffering dangerous to life, but could not attempt to prevent all suffering or to give general relief to the poorer classes of the community, the Famine Commissioners insisted that relief should be so administered as not to check the growth of thrift and self-reliance among the people, or to impair the structure of society which, resting in India upon the moral obligation of mutual assistance, is admirably adapted for common effort against a common misfortune. ‘The great object,’ they said, ‘of saving life and giving protection from extreme suffering may not only be as well secured, but in fact will be far better secured, if proper care be taken to prevent the abuse and demoralization which all experience shows to be the consequence of ill-directed and excessive distribution of charitable relief.’ They quoted Turgot to the effect that ‘the best and most useful kind of alms consists in providing means of earning them,’ and laid down the principles (1) that employment should be given on relief works to the able-bodied, at a wage sufficient for support, on the condition of performing a suitable task; and (2) that gratuitous relief should be given, in their villages or in poorhouses, to those who, after inquiry into their circumstances, were found to be unable to work. In order to regulate relief, they prescribed constant inspection of the people in their villages. As regards food-supply, they recommended non-interference with trade except in the very rare cases when it might be unequal to the demands on it. Finally, they advised that the landowning classes should be assisted by loans and by general suspensions of revenue in proportion to the general crop failure, it being a condition that proportionate relief should be given by the landowners to tenants and holders of subordinate rights in the land.
These recommendations were embodied in a Provisional Famine Code. In circulating this in 1883, the Government of India laid down the fundamental principle of the famine wage. That wage is ‘the lowest amount sufficient to maintain health under given circumstances. While the duty of Government is to save life, it is not bound to maintain the labouring population at its normal level of comfort. To do so would be unjust to other sections of the community, besides prolonging the period for which the labouring population would cling to the relief works.’
Provincial Codes were then drawn up, and were acted upon in the several scarcities which followed in different parts of India. These codes were first severely tested by the famine of 1896–7.
The monsoon of 1895 was weak in the Bundelkhand Districts of the Province of Agra, and the winter rains also failed. Famine was declared, and relief was commenced, early in 1896. The monsoon of 1896 was generally deficient; and the United Provinces, the Central Provinces, Berār, parts of Madras, Bombay, Bengal, the Punjab, and Upper Burma, together with portions of Rājputāna, Central India, and Hyderābād, were plunged in famine. Altogether 307,000 square miles were affected, with a population of 69,500,000, and the numbers relieved exceeded 4,000,000 at the time of greatest distress.
In British territory the area and population affected were 225,000 square miles, and 62,500,000, respectively1. Famine was intense in the United Provinces, the Central Provinces, Bihār, and the Hissār District of the Punjab. From first to last, 821,000,000 units were relieved at a cost of 7¼ crores. In addition, revenue was remitted and loans were given to the extent of about 1¼ and 1¾ crores. The charitable relief fund amounted to nearly 1¾ crores, of which about 1¼ crores were subscribed in the United Kingdom. The famine ended, generally, when the autumn harvest of 1897 was ripe; but it was followed by heavy mortality from fever in the autumn, and by a plague of rats. The actual famine mortality in British Districts may be roughly estimated at about 750,000. This famine will be remembered for the vigorous, efficient, and economical administration in the United Provinces, and for the comparative failure of relief in the Central Provinces. The difficulties in this latter Province were, however, extraordinarily great, owing to the reluctance of the wild tribes to accept relief on ordinary terms.
The incidents of this famine were exhaustively analysed by a Commission, presided over by Sir James Lyall, which passed the following judgement on the administration as a whole: ‘We consider that, while the areas over which intense and severe distress prevailed in the famine of 1896–7 were greater than in any previous famines, the success actually attained in the relief of distress and the saving of human life was, if not complete, far greater than any that has yet been recorded in famines that are at all comparable with it in point of extent, severity, or duration; and that this result has been achieved at a cost which, when compared with the expenditure in previous famines, and with other standards which we have had before us, cannot but be regarded as very moderate.’
This Commission also made important recommendations for the future treatment of famines. In regard to the broad principles of relief administration they adhered to the recommendations of the Commission of 1880. But in details they suggested some changes, including a more liberal wage and an extension of gratuitous relief, particularly during the rains. They broke new ground in formulating rules for the relief of weavers in their own trade, for the relief of aboriginal and hill tribes, and for the management of the charitable relief fund; and they laid great stress upon the necessity for liberal remissions of land revenue. The Commissioners seem to have been impressed by events in the Central Provinces, and the general effect of their recommendations was to avoid all risks and to make relief more attractive.
Before these recommendations had been fully considered, another great famine occurred. Distress began in Ajmer in 1898 and some relief was given. The monsoon of 1899 failed generally over the west and centre of India. In the Central Provinces, Berār, Bombay, Ajmer, and the Hissār District of the Punjab, famine was acute1; it was intense in Rājputāna, Baroda, Central India, Hyderābād, and Kāthiāwār. The total area affected was 475,000 square miles, with a population of 59,500,000. The Meteorological Department declared the drought to be unique. 'The mean average rainfall of India is 45 inches. In no previous famine year has it been in greater defect than 5 inches. But in 1899 the defect exceeded 11 inches.' This was for India as a whole; in particular localities there was practically no rainfall. The autumn harvest was a failure, and hardly any spring crops were sown. At the end of July, 1900, no fewer than 6,500,000 persons were receiving daily relief. The distress was aggravated, and the difficulties of administration were enormously increased, by the failure of the water-supply and fodder.
In British territory1 180,000 square miles with a population of 26,000,000 were affected, a smaller area and a much smaller population than in 1897; but the people in most parts had not recovered fully from the famine of two years before. The numbers relieved were far greater than in 1897. At the time of greatest relief—in this famine at the end of July—4,500,000 persons were supported by the state. Altogether about 1,140,000,000 units were relieved at a cost of 10 crores. Cattle died in millions, and the Government helped agriculturists by very large remissions of revenue and by loans which have since been mostly written off. The total cost to the state has been put at about 15 crores. The charitable relief fund reached 1½ crores, of which nearly a crore was subscribed in the United Kingdom. In addition, loans were made to Native States to the extent of 3½ crores. Although the relief was thus extraordinarily liberal, the mortality was great. The Famine Commission of 1901 thought that about one million deaths might be attributed to famine in British Districts, and that of this total at least one-fifth were caused by cholera. This was largely due to the special conditions of the famine: namely, the extreme rigour of the winter of 1899–1900, the failure and consequent pollution of the water-supply, which led to virulent outbreaks of cholera in the summer of 1900, and the extremely unhealthy autumn in 1900, uring which malarial fever attacked the rich as well as the poor. The famine ended, generally, when the autumn harvest of 1900 was ripe ; but distress continued in parts of Western India for two years more.
This famine is remarkable for profuse relief in the Central Provinces, great mortality in Gujarāt, and general emigration from the Native States. In the Central Provinces the reaction from 1896 was complete : the people were all too ready to take relief (even the aboriginal tribes overcame their shyness), and the officers were anxious not to be behindhand in dealing with distress. For some months, over 20 per cent. of the total population were relieved ; and the total cost of direct relief was nearly 4½ crores. In Gujarāt the people and the Government were alike unprepared ; the former had been softened by a long period of prosperity, and were stunned by the blow. Their wealth was sunk largely in their cattle, and in the vain hope of saving these, they clung to their homes until it was too late. Relief of the aboriginal tribes was as difficult in Gujarāt and Khāndesh as it had been in the Central Provinces in 1897, and the result was much the same. In all Provinces the administration was hampered by crowds of immigrants from Native States, so exhausted by privation in many cases that their lives could not be saved even by the best medical care.
A Commission, presided over by Sir Antony MacDonnell, whose own famine relief measures in the United Provinces had been so successful in 1896–7, was appointed to gather up the lessons of this famine. Their judgement on the administration as a whole was as follows : ‘In certain districts . . . people in sore need of relief were denied it in the early stages of the famine, owing to defective administration ; but in the main, and taking the famine period as a whole, the relief distributed was excessive. We have no doubt that the excess is to be accounted for by an imperfect enforcement of tests on relief works, by a too ready admission to gratuitous relief, and by a greater readiness on the people’s part to accept relief owing to the demoralizing influences of the preceding famine.’
Impressed apparently by this demoralization, the Commission clearly restated ‘the principles by which alone famine relief on a great scale can be successfully administered.’ They recommended a policy of ‘prudent boldness,’ starting from a large and expansive plan of relief, and secured by liberal preparations, constant vigilance, and a full enlistment of non-official help. The wage-scale was revised ; the minimum wage was abolished in the case of the able-bodied, payments being made proportionate to the task performed; and provision was made for the exclusion from relief works of those who were in a position to maintain themselves. The relief system was enlarged by proposals for dealing with a fodder famine. Where differing from the Commission of 1898, this Commission reverted as a rule to the recommendations of the Commission of 1880.
It will thus be seen that, in the quest of the happy mean, the pendulum has been constantly on the swing; but the arc has become steadily smaller, and the relief system is gradually settling down. The main principles of relief are no longer questioned, and diversity in practice becomes less in each successive famine. The essential difficulty of state relief is deep-rooted. The reluctance of those unaccustomed to famine to accept relief, and the eagerness of those accustomed to famine to seek relief, are likely to perplex the relieving officer in the future as they have done in the past. But as establishments improve, the system will become more elastic and adaptable.
Although much ground has been gained in the long struggle with nature, and drought has been stripped of its worst horrors, the tale of suffering is still long, and the heart of the civilized world is touched by the mortality of an Indian famine. The Famine Commissions of 1880, 1898, and 1901 agree that ‘no imaginable system of relief will completely meet all the various degrees of privation and suffering which a famine produces.’ Pestilence is the twin-sister of famine, for the abnormal conditions of drought have from the earliest times lent themselves to disease1. Cholera invariably breaks out in the hot weather, and fever almost invariably succeeds in the autumn. Moreover, in every famine many persons refuse relief until it is too late to save them. Nevertheless, the total famine mortality since 1880 has been small compared with what it was before relief was then reduced to system. Moreover, the great majority of deaths in the two recent famines occurred generally among the very old and the very young. There has been since 1880 comparatively little of that mortality among healthy adults which was so deplorable a feature of earlier famines, a fact of which the comparatively rapid recovery in the birth rate is at once the result and the proof.
IV. Protection against Famine
The famine problem is not, however, limited to relief. ‘It is of still more essential importance,’ said the Secretary of State in 1878, ‘to ascertain how far it is possible for Government by its action to diminish the severity of famines, or to place the people in a better condition for enduring them.’ The Famine Commission of 1880 concluded that much could be done in this direction, particularly by the accumulation of accurate knowledge of the country and its economic conditions, with the ultimate object of stimulating the material prosperity of the people; and much has been done.
Reference has already been made to the elaborate system of agricultural intelligence, but this represents but a part of progressive knowledge. Geological, mineralogical, ethnological, and linguistic surveys have been set on foot, while valuable statistics of trade are annually published and reviewed in the Department of Commerce. Vital statistics are still defective, but each successive Census marks improvement in their registration. The functions of Government have been differentiated, the branches of the administration have been specialized, and action has been taken simultaneously on many lines.
Railway and irrigation works—‘the best, and often the only, means of securing protection from the extreme effects of famine and drought1’—have always been the mainstay in building up material prosperity. From the financial point of view, these works are of two kinds, according as they are, or are not, commercially profitable, the former being called productive, the latter protective. The cost of the former is met by loans; the latter are debitable to the Famine Insurance Grant.
This grant dates from the famine of 1876. A succession of famines, and a recognition of the duty of the state in regard to them, induced the Government of India to provide a reserve in ordinary years to meet the obligatory and recurrent, but extraordinary, demands of famine relief. This reserve was fixed, on the basis of past expenditure, at 1½ crores annually, and was secured by fresh taxation and economy. Doubts as to the precise objects to which the grant should be devoted arose almost immediately, but were settled in 1881 by a scheme, which, in its general bearings, still obtains. The first charge on the grant is famine relief, the second protective works, and any balance is devoted to the reduction, or rather the avoidance, of debt.
Experience in 1866, 1868, and 1878 had shown the imperative need for extending communications, and precedence in the policy of insurance was consequently given to the construction of protective railways, or the guarantee of interest on money borrowed for the purpose. The system of protective railways has been practically completed so far as main lines are concerned, and the Famine Commissions of 1898 and 1901 urged the now greater claims of protective irrigation works.
The distinction between productive and protective works is purely financial. It remains to consider the effect of railways and irrigation on material prosperity. The benefits of irrigation have never been disputed; but of late there has been a tendency in some quarters to detract from the advantages of railways. It is contended that, by equalizing prices all over India, railways extend the area of distress beyond the limits of crop failure, and that they have destroyed the habit of storing grain, which formerly served as an insurance against famine. This may be admitted, without really qualifying the overwhelming benefits of improved communications. If railways have somewhat extended the area, they have enormously reduced the intensity, of distress; and if they have discouraged the storage of grain, they have substituted ‘the great reserves of the country at large for the petty reserves of individuals1.’ They have substituted famines which are of money only, for famines in which both food and money were lacking; and by giving access to large markets they have undoubtedly increased the incomes of landowners and cultivators, and enabled them to reap the benefits of high prices2. ‘It is true,’ say the Famine Commissioners of 1901, ‘that to a certain extent cultivators, who formerly stored grain, because it could be neither sold nor removed, have ceased to do so because they can sell to advantage; and that, owing to their improvidence, the money slips through their fingers. But this change in the habits of the people is a regular attendant of progress: it is merely a transient phase of a great economic movement, which makes for national prosperity.’ It has become a proverb in India, as elsewhere, that ‘railways make trade.’
Much has been done in other departments to promote general prosperity. The land revenue has become progressively moderate in assessment, and increasingly elastic in collection. The rent law of nearly every Province in India has been revised since 1880 in favour of the cultivating classes. Loans are given by the state, at low interest and on easy terms of repayment, for land improvement and for the purchase of seed and bullocks; and attempts are being made, with the active help of the state, to start co-operative credit associations. Experiments in agricultural improvements are continuously carried on. It cannot be said that the agricultural classes have responded very largely to the efforts made to help them or to teach them to help themselves, or that those efforts have always been well devised; but experience is being steadily gained, and the cumulative effect of the action already taken is considerable.
The Famine Commissions of 1880 and 1898 both bore witness to the recuperative power of the country1, but the best evidence of the fact is the rapid recovery of cultivation after a famine. The following figures give the cropped area in British Provinces1 for the years preceding, coincident with, and following the recent famines:—
| Year and Area of Famine. | Total Cropped Area in Millions of Acres. | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| Year before famine. | Year of famine. | Year after famine. | |
| 1897 (Bengal, United and Central Provinces, Berār, Madras, Bombay) | 180 | 167 | 183 |
| 1900 (Central Provinces, Berār, Bombay, Ajmer) | 49 | 40 | 45 |
As the mortality of cattle was enormous in 1900, and distress continued in Bombay and Ajmer until 1902, these figures show a power of recuperation in the landowning and cultivating classes which would have been thought impossible fifty years ago.
Nor are the evidences of material progress confined to the landowning and cultivating classes. The great increase during the last twenty years in trade and commerce, in the use of the post and the telegraph, in remittances by money orders, and in savings banks deposits; the rise in urban wages, and the expanding revenue under excise, stamps, and income tax, all testify, in different ways and in various degree, to the steady
and this he attributed to the increased power of resistance and self-support among the landowners following the introduction of long-term settlements, which dated from about 1840. Still more remarkable are the facts recorded in the agricultural statistics of Bombay and Madras for the year 1877–8. In Madras the area occupied exceeded by 50,000 acres that of 1874–5. . . . In Bombay there was an actual increase of 70,000 acres of revenue-paying occupied land in excess of the previous year.’—Report of the Commission of 1880, paragraph 84.
‘It may be said of India as a whole that of late years, owing to high prices, there has been a considerable increase in the incomes of the landholding and cultivating classes, and that their standard of comfort and expenditure has also risen. With a rise in the transfer value of their tenures, their credit has also expanded. During the recent famine these classes, as a rule, have therefore shown greater power of resisting famine, either by drawing on savings, or by borrowing, or by reduction of expenditure, than in any previous period of scarcity of like severity.’—Report of the Commission of 1898, paragraph 592.
The subject was not referred to, or discussed by, the Famine Commission of 1901. growth of general prosperity. Twenty years is a very short time in an old and conservative country like India.
One class alone is being left behind in the general progress, and that a large one. Agricultural labourers, as already stated, are multiplying rapidly on the margin of subsistence and beyond the requirements of agriculture, and by so doing are keeping their own wages low, while cash payments for work actually done are superseding, over large parts of India, the old customary payments of grain at each harvest. Agricultural progress will do little to improve their position. Emigration when feasible, will only temporarily postpone the pressure on the soil, unless the growth of population is checked. ‘No remedy for present evils,’ say the Famine Commissioners of 1880, ‘can be complete which does not include the introduction of a diversity of occupations through which the surplus population may be drawn from agricultural pursuits and led to find the means of subsistence in manufactures or some such employments.’ In this direction a fair start has been made. The construction of railways and irrigation works employs large numbers; and there is a growing labour market in docks and arsenals, and in the factories and commercial undertakings that are now springing up. But the numbers released from dependence on the land are as yet few in proportion to the normal increase of the rural population. Industrial development is slow, and the growth of population is quick. The country is crying for capital, and native capital is, so far, not forthcoming. ‘The natural resources of India are beyond question, as is also the need for their development. In order to develop and reap the benefit of her resources, India requires, and must long continue to require, foreign capital1.’ The steady application of capital to the organization and development of industry is, indeed, the one thing needful for the gradual solution of the famine problem.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
W. W. Hunter.—Annals of Rural Bengal (1868). Report on the Famine of 1860–1, by Colonel R. Baird-Smith. Report of the Bengal and Orissa Famine Commission, 1866. Narratives of the Drought in Bengal and Bihār in 1873–4, with Minutes by Sir Richard Temple (1874). Report of the Indian Famine Commission, 1880; ditto, 1898; ditto 1901. Report of the Indian Irrigation Commission, 1901–3.
Notes
- 1. ‘The flesh of a son was preferred to his love,’ says one chronicler.
- 2. ‘In 1630,’ says Sir W. W. Hunter, ‘a calamity fell upon Gujarāt which enables us to realize the terrible meaning of the word famine in India under Native rule. Whole cities and districts were left bare of inhabitants. In 1631 a Dutch merchant reported that only eleven of the 260 families at Swally survived. He found the road thence to Surat covered with bodies decaying “on the highway where they died, there being no one to bury them.” In Surat, that great and crowded city, he “could hardly see any living persons”; but the corpses “at the corner of the streets lie twenty together, nobody burying them.” Thirty thousand had perished in the town alone. Pestilence followed famine. . . . “This, that was in a manner the garden of the world, is turned into a wilderness.” The Dutchman estimated that it would take three years before the trade could revive at Surat. Indeed one striking contrast between Native and British rule was the slowness of recovery from famine in the Mughal Empire.’—History of British India, vol. ii, p. 59.
- 1. Opium, tobacco, oilseeds, &c.
- 2. As will be seen from the Meteorology chapter (Vol. I, chap. iii), the rainfall which is so important in Eastern Madras in November and December is really due to the retreat of the south-west monsoon current. The north-east monsoon proper is not established till the end of December.
- 1. The protective aspect of the problem is discussed in the fourth section of this chapter.
- 2. By Sir William Muir, the Lieutenant-Governor of what is now the Province of Agra.
- 1. A poorhouse is a temporary structure, run up in a few days, where paupers are sheltered and given cooked food under conditions of decency and discipline.
- 2. A test work is an ordinary work employing unskilled labour, usually earth-work. The conditions are strict but not unduly repellent, the object being to ascertain whether the people really need relief.
- 1. This result seems all the more remarkable when one considers the state of Europe fifty years ago. In the great famine of 1848 in rural Germany ‘which decimated the people,’ we read that ‘usury was frightful and [p. 483] bread and potatoes—the ordinary food of the peasantry—were not to be had.’ On this occasion Raffeissen organized his first co-operative society, which brought down local prices 50 per cent. India has already advanced, in this respect, farther than Europe had gone less than two generations ago.
- 1. In the Orissa famine, for instance, the Santāls starved in large numbers, because it was not known that they were peculiar in refusing to touch food cooked by Brāhmans; and a new caste, the Chattar-khai or ‘kitchen-eaters,’ dates from that famine.
- 1. In reality this famine was administered by the Native Government. The East India Company did not assume direct management of Bengal until a few years later.
- 2. The danger of building conclusions on them is illustrated by the fact that, in spite of the great mortality in the Orissa famine of 1865, the population of the affected districts, as ascertained by the 1871–2 Census, was considerably larger than the estimate made of it by the best authorities prior to the famine.
- 3. Thus, in 1813, when prices in Rājputāna were 5 seers, in the Agra and Farrukhābād Districts they were never below 21 and 39 seers per rupee, respectively. In 1838, prices in the Province of Agra ranged from 16 to 10 and even 8 seers, while in Mālwa they were 50 to 60 seers per rupee. A seer is about 2 lb.
- 4. This was the first occasion when a fixed famine wage was given. Relief was given on ordinary works without any special arrangements. Relief works under professional control were largely used for the first time in 1854.
- 1. In famine phraseology a ‘unit’ means one person relieved for one day; e.g. if 100 persons are relieved daily for a month of thirty-one days, 3,100 units will have been relieved.
- 1. Report of the Famine Commission of 1880, Part I, paragraph 51.
- 1. Gujarāt, the North Deccan Districts, the Jubbulpore Division of the Central Provinces, the Agra and Bundelkhand Divisions of the United Provinces, and the Hissār Division of the Punjab were all affected. These two famines, coming so close together, find their counterpart in the famines of 1897 and 1900 almost exactly a generation later : in each case the centre of distress shifted to the west, and the rains were unusually late in the second famine year.
- 2. Of 1,500,000 inhabitants of Mārwār, 1,000,000 are said to have emigrated with their cattle.
- 3. In Native States relief was given on a very small scale, except in Udaipur, where 5 lakhs was spent.
- 1. Report of the Famine Commission, 1880, paragraph 94.
- 1. So called after Sir Richard Temple, the Famine Commissioner for the Government of India. The wage was 1 lb. of grain plus 1 anna for a man, with small reductions for a woman or child.
- 2. In Hyderābād and Mysore about 72,000,000 units were relieved at a cost of 72 lakhs, and revenue was remitted to the amount of 60 lakhs.
- 1. No complete account of relief in Native States is available.
- 1. There was also distress in small areas in Bengal, Madras, and Agra.
- 1. The Native States conducted their own relief under the general advice of the Government of India, which lent them the services of British officers and assisted them with loans. It is impossible to give details. In some States very inadequate relief was given, and in most the mortality was great. But the Commission of 1901 was struck with the advance made by most of the Darbārs towards bringing their relief into line with the humane policy of the British Government.
- 1. It seems worth while to quote an authoritative opinion on famine mortality. ‘Dysentery and diarrhoea are peculiarly famine diseases, directly caused by insufficient and unwholesome food, or by reduced powers of digestion and assimilation as the result of continued privation. Again, it is practically impossible to prevent the outbreak of cholera when large masses of men are collected together in the hot weather under famine conditions; but efficient organization and careful sanitary arrangements can stay the spread of the epidemic, and when these precautions are not taken, a considerable share, at any rate, of the resultant mortality must be deemed to have been preventible. Of fevers it can only be said that they often are in origin climatic, but that their fatality is, owing to the reduced power of the people to resist them, largely due to famine.’—Report of the Famine Commission of 1901.
- 1. Report of the Famine Commission of 1880.
- 1. Report of the Famine Commission of 1901, paragraph 223.
- 2. It may be noted that, among the reasons adduced by the Board of Revenue in 1812 against a Permanent Settlement in the Upper Provinces, was the fact that ‘an exuberant harvest is, in the existing state of society here, almost as detrimental to the landholders as a scanty produce.’
- 1. ‘It is, we believe, demonstrable that the effects produced by the famine of 1876–8 on the general prosperity of the country have been less disastrous than those of former calamities. . . . The famine of 1770 resulted in widespread desolation of the most affected districts, so that we read of depopulation and ruin, the thinness of the inhabitants, many hundreds of villages entirely depopulated, half the ryots credibly reported to have perished, and a complete disorganization among the landed classes which lasted for many years. The famine of 1803 struck such a blow at the prosperity of Khāndesh and Ahmadnagar that even in 1867 the traces of its ravages were still visible in the ruins of deserted villages which had not been repopulated. In the famine of 1833 so much land went out of cultivation in the Guntūr District that even in 1850 the land revenue was only three-fourths of what it had been in 1832. In 1837, in the North-Western Provinces, the pressure was so great that the ordinary bonds of society seemed to be broken by it. In 1841 the still-deserted lands and abandoned houses in the Etāwah District bore evidence to the devastation and waste of life, and during the next five years the land revenue continued to be less by 12 per cent. than in the period preceding the famine. Colonel Baird-Smith, from whom the above quotation is made, testified that similar effects were hardly noticeable in 1860–1,
- 1. Except in the Punjab, the recorded figures for which are excluded as doubtful.
- 1. Report of Sir Henry Fowler’s Currency Committee, 1898, paragraph 36.