The Muhammadan invaders of India had entered across the north-west mountains. Her Christian conquerors approached by sea from the western coast. From the time of Alexander the Great (327 b.c.) to that of Vasco da Gama (a.d. 1498), Europe had held little direct intercourse with the East. An occasional traveller brought back stories of powerful kingdoms and of untold wealth ; but the passage by sea was scarcely dreamed of, and, by land, wide deserts and warlike tribes lay between. Commerce, indeed, struggled overland and by way of the Red Sea. It was carried on chiefly through Egypt, although partly also across Syria, under the Roman Empire ; and in later mediaeval times by the Italian cities on the Mediterranean, which traded to the ports of the Levant. But to the Europeans of the fifteenth century India was an unknown land, which powerfully attracted the imagination of spirits stimulated by the Renaissance and ardent for discovery.
In 1492 Christopher Columbus sailed westward under the Spanish flag to seek India beyond the Atlantic, bearing with him a letter to the great Khān of Tartary. He found America instead. An expedition consisting of three ships, under Vasco da Gama, started from Lisbon five years later, in the southern direction. It doubled the Cape of Good Hope, and cast anchor off the coast of Malabar near Calicut on May 20, 1498, after a protracted voyage of nearly eleven months. An earlier Portuguese emissary, Covilham, had reached Calicut overland about 1487. From the first, Da Gama encountered hostility from the Moors, or rather Arabs, who monopolized the sea-borne trade ; but he seems to have found favour with the Zamorin, or Hindu Rājā, of Calicut. After staying three months on the Malabar coast, Da Gama returned to Europe, bearing with him a letter from the Zamorin to the King of Portugal : ‘ Vasco da Gama, a nobleman of your household, has visited my kingdom and has given me great pleasure. In my kingdom there is abundance of cinnamon, cloves, ginger, pepper, and precious stones. What I seek from thy country is gold, silver, coral, and scarlet.' The safe arrival of Da Gama at Lisbon was celebrated with national rejoicings as enthusiastic as those which had greeted the return of Columbus. If the West Indies belonged to Spain by priority of discovery, Portugal might claim the East Indies by the same right. The Portuguese mind became intoxicated with dreams of a mighty Oriental empire.
The early Portuguese navigators were not traders or private adventurers, but admirals with a royal commission to open up a direct commerce with Asia, and to purchase Eastern commodities on behalf of the King of Portugal. A second expedition, consisting of thirteen ships and twelve hundred soldiers, under the command of Pedro Alvares Cabral, was dispatched in 1500. On his outward voyage, Cabral was driven westward by stress of weather, and discovered Brazil ; but ultimately he reached Calicut. He seriously embroiled himself with the Zamorin, and the factors there were murdered by the Muhammadan merchants. In spite of this disaster, he left a factor behind him at Cochin when he returned to Portugal.
In 1502 the King of Portugal obtained from Pope Alexander VI a Bull constituting him ‘Lord of the Navigation, Conquest, and Trade of Ethiopia, Arabia, Persia, and India.’ In that year Vasco da Gama sailed again to the East, with a fleet numbering twenty vessels. He formed alliances with the Rājās of Cochin and Cannanore, and bombarded the Zamorin of Calicut in his palace. In 1503 the great Affonso de Albuquerque sailed to the East in command of one of three expeditions from Portugal. The Portuguese arrived only just in time to succour the Rājā of Cochin, who was being besieged by the Zamorin of Calicut. They built a fort at Cochin, and, to guard against any future disaster, left ninety Portuguese soldiers under Duarte Pacheco to defend their ally. When they departed, the Zamorin of Calicut again attacked Cochin ; but he was defeated by Pacheco on both land and sea, and the prestige of the Portuguese was by these victories raised to its height.
In 1505 a large fleet of twenty sail and fifteen hundred men was sent under Francisco de Almeida, the first Portuguese Viceroy of India. Almeida was also the first Portuguese statesman to develop a distinct policy in India. He saw that, in the face of the opposition of the Muhammadan merchants, whose monopoly was infringed, it was necessary to fortify factories on land, in which to carry on trade. But he wished these forts to be as few as possible, and that the chief power of Portugal should be on the sea. Almeida had also a new danger to meet. The Sultān of Egypt perceived that the discovery of the sea-route from Europe to India round the Cape of Good Hope was ruining the transit trade through his country. He therefore dispatched a fleet to exterminate the Portuguese forces in Asia. The Sultān’s admiral won a victory off Chaul, in 1508, in which Almeida’s son was killed ; but on February 2, 1509, the Egyptians were utterly defeated off the island of Diu. The danger of a general union of the Musalmāns against the Portuguese was thus averted for the moment, and the quarrels between the Turks and Egyptians that ensued gave time for the Christians to consolidate their power firmly in India.
In 1509 Albuquerque succeeded as Viceroy, and widely extended the area of Portuguese influence. He abandoned the system of Almeida, and resolved to establish a Portuguese empire in India, based on the possession of important points along the coast, and on playing off the native princes against one another. Having failed in an attack upon Calicut, he in 1510 seized Goa, which, from 1530, became the capital of Portuguese India. Then, sailing round Ceylon, he captured Malacca, the key to the navigation of the Indian Archipelago, and opened a trade with Siam and the Spice Islands. Lastly, he sailed back westward, and, after penetrating into the Red Sea and building a fortress at Ormuz in the Persian Gulf, returned to Goa only to die in 1515. In 1524 Vasco da Gama came out to the East for the third time, and he too died at Cochin, after a rule of only three months.
For exactly a century, from 1500 to 1600, the Portuguese enjoyed a monopoly of Oriental trade. But they had neither the political strength nor the personal character necessary to maintain such an empire. Their national temper had been formed in their contest with the Moors at home. They were not traders, but knights-errant and crusaders, who looked on every pagan as an enemy of Portugal and of Christ. Only those who have read the contemporary narratives of their conquests can realize the superstition and the cruelty with which their history in the Indies is stained.
Albuquerque alone endeavoured to conciliate the goodwill of the natives, and to live in friendship with the Hindu princes, who were better pleased to have the Portuguese, as firmly governed by him, for their neighbours and allies, than the Muhammadans whom he had expelled or subdued. The justice and magnanimity of his rule did as much to extend and confirm the power of the Portuguese in the East, as his courage and the success of his military achievements. In such veneration was his memory held, that the Hindus of Goa, and even the Muhammadans, were wont to repair to his tomb, and there utter their complaints, as if in the presence of his shade, and call upon God to deliver them from the tyranny of his successors.
Yet these successors were not all tyrants. Some of them were great statesmen; many were gallant soldiers. The names of four of them stand out brightly in the history of the Portuguese in India. Nuno da Cunha, Viceroy from 1529 to 1538, first opened up direct and regular trade with Bengal. After 1518 one ship had annually visited Chittagong to purchase merchandise for Portugal; but Da Cunha, hearing of the wealth of the province, and the peaceful, industrious character of its inhabitants, resolved to make a settlement there. He sent 400 Portuguese soldiers to assist the Muhammadan king of Bengal against Sher Shāh in 1534, and was intending to follow in person, when important events on the other side of India detained him. His intervention had the effect of causing many Portuguese to settle in Bengal. They were never formed into a regular governorship, but remained in loose dependence on the Captain of Ceylon. Yet they became very prosperous, and their head-quarters, Hooghly, grew into a wealthy city. After the capture of Hooghly by Shāh Jahān in 1632, the bravest of the Portuguese in Bengal became outlaws and pirates, and in conjunction with the Arakanese and the Maghs preyed upon the sea-borne commerce of the Bengal coast. The event which prevented Nuno da Cunha from establishing the Portuguese power in Bengal was the approach of a great Turkish and Egyptian fleet. Sulaimān the Magnificent, having consolidated the Turkish power by his conquest of Egypt, prepared to accomplish the task which the Sultān of Egypt had attempted thirty years before. But the Portuguese were now in a better position to resist than they had been in the days of Almeida. Nuno da Cunha had obtained possession of the island of Diu, a place much coveted by Albuquerque from the Sultān of Gujarāt in 1535, and it was there that the storm broke. Encompassed by the armies of Gujarāt on land and by the vast Turkish and Egyptian fleet, Diu stood a terrible siege in 1538; and the defenders at last beat off the assailants. Nuno da Cunha did not live to see this glorious result, for he was maligned by enemies and sent home in custody, and it was reserved for his successor to relieve Diu.
João de Castro, who ruled from 1545 to 1548, was no unworthy countryman of Albuquerque and Da Cunha. He relieved Diu, which again had to stand a siege by the Sultān of Gujarāt, whom he defeated in one of the greatest victories ever won by the Portuguese in India. But it was not only as a warrior, but also as a statesman, that João de Castro won his fame. In the three short years of his government he tried to reform the errors of the Portuguese colonial system. The trade with India was a royal monopoly, and crowds of officials resorted to peculation and corruption in order to enhance their salaries from the Crown. João de Castro endeavoured to cleanse the Augean stable, and by his own upright character set an example to his compatriots. It was during his rule that the Portuguese, in addition to being a trading and a governing power, became a proselytizing power. Hitherto Catholic priests had come to India to tend the souls of the Portuguese. But now began the era of missions to the heathen. This development of missionary effort was largely due to the inspiring exertions of St. Francis Xavier, who was Castro’s intimate friend. The Jesuits followed the missionary pioneer of their Order, and the whole authority of the Portuguese Government was practically placed at the disposal of the Christian missionaries after this epoch.
Constantino de Braganza, a prince of the royal house of Portugal, attempted, and not without success, to take up the task which had proved too hard for De Castro, during his rule from 1558 to 1561. But he is better remembered as the conqueror of Damān, one of the places still belonging to Portugal. Luis de Athaide, Viceroy from 1568 to 1571, and again from 1578 to 1581, had during his first term to meet a formidable league of opponents. The defeat of the Hindu Rājā of Vijayanagar at Tālikotā in 1565 left the Muhammadan Sultāns of the Deccan at liberty to act against the Portuguese. A great league was formed by them, which included even the half-savage king of Achīn. All the Portuguese settlements on the Malabar coast, as well as Malacca, were besieged by overwhelming forces. But the Portuguese commanders rose to the occasion. Everywhere they were triumphant. The Viceroy, in 1570, defended Goa for ten months against the Sultān of Bijāpur, and eventually repulsed him. The undisciplined native troops were unable to stand against the veteran soldiers of Portugal, 200 of whom, at Malacca, routed 15,000 men with artillery. When, in 1578, Malacca was again besieged by the king of Achīn, the small Portuguese garrison destroyed 10,000 of his men, and all his cannon and junks. Twice again, in 1615 and for the last time in 1628, Malacca was besieged, and on each occasion the Achīnese were repulsed with equal bravery. But the increased military forces sent out to resist these attacks proved an insupportable drain on the revenues and population of Portugal.
In 1580 the Portuguese Crown was united with that of Spain, under Philip II. This hastened the ruin of the maritime and commercial supremacy of Portugal in the East. The interests of Portugal in Asia were henceforth subordinated to the European interests of Spain; and the enemies of Spain, the Dutch and the English, preyed on the Portuguese as well as on the Spanish commerce. In 1640 Portugal again became a separate kingdom. But in the meanwhile the Dutch and English had appeared in the Eastern Seas; and before their indomitable competition the Portuguese empire of the Indies withered away as rapidly as it had sprung up. Between 1641 and 1664 the Dutch captured almost all their stations in Ceylon and on the coast of Malabar. In 1683 the Marāthās plundered to the gates of Goa, and in 1739 they captured Bassein, the northern capital. The further history of the Portuguese in India is a distressing chronicle of pride, poverty, and misfortune. The native princes pressed upon them from the land. On the sea they gave way to more vigorous European nations.
The Dutch were the first European nation who broke through the Portuguese monopoly. During the sixteenth century Bruges, Antwerp, and Amsterdam became the great emporia whence Eastern produce, imported by the Portuguese, was distributed to Germany, and even to England. At first the Dutch, following in the track of the English, attempted to find their way to India by sailing round the northern coast of Europe and Asia. William Barents is honourably known as the leader of three of these Arctic expeditions, in the last of which he perished.
The first Dutchman to double the Cape of Good Hope was Cornelius Houtman, who reached Sumatra and Bantam in 1596. Within the next five years no less than sixty-five vessels sailed to the Indies. Private companies for trade with the East were formed in many parts of Holland; but in 1602 they were all amalgamated by the States-General into ‘The United East India Company of the Netherlands,’ which was granted a monopoly of the trade for twenty-one years and possessed a capital of £540,000. This great corporation had especially close relations with the Government, for in Holland ‘merchandise was accounted a matter of state.’ The Dutch soon came to blows with the Portuguese in the Moluccas, and captured Amboyna in 1605. Their conflicts with the English will be described later. In 1619 their great Governor-General Coen laid the foundation of the city of Batavia as the seat of the Supreme Government. In 1641 they took Malacca, a blow from which the Portuguese never recovered. In 1652 they founded a colony at the Cape of Good Hope, as a half-way station to the East ; and six years later they captured Jaffnapatam, the last stronghold of the Portuguese in Ceylon.
In India itself they obtained a factory at Pulicat in 1609, and from 1616 were established at Surat. Between 1661 and 1664 they wrested from the Portuguese all their settlements on the pepper-bearing coast of Malabar. By 1664 they possessed factories at Masulipatam and other places on the Coromandel coast ; at Hooghly, Cossimbazar, Patna, and Dacca in Bengal ; at Surat, Ahmadābād, and Agra in Northern India, besides seven stations in Malabar. But while they retained and consolidated their power in the East Indian Archipelago, they were gradually forced to relax their hold upon the coast of India. Three fiercely contested naval wars with England, 1652–4, 1665–7, and 1672–4, and the almost continuous fighting with France from 1672 till 1713, put a heavy strain upon their resources and impaired the strength of their marine. During this period they dealt some severe blows at the early French settlements in India, and thus unwittingly smoothed the path of the English. After 1674 they were usually allied with the latter in Europe, and were forced to moderate their old ruthless attitude. Further, their somewhat short-sighted commercial policy, which was based upon a monopoly of the trade in spices, though effective in the Malayan Archipelago, hardly fitted them to play a great part on the continent of India.
Like the Phoenicians of old, the Dutch stopped short of no acts of cruelty towards their rivals in commerce ; but, unlike the Phoenicians, they failed to introduce their civilization among the natives with whom they came in contact. The knell of Dutch supremacy was sounded by Clive, when in 1759 he attacked the Dutch at Chinsura by both land and water, and forced them to an ignominious capitulation. During the great French Wars between 1795 and 1811, England wrested from Holland every one of her colonies, although Java was restored in 1816, and Sumatra exchanged for Malacca in 1824. At present, the Dutch flag flies nowhere on the mainland of India. But quaint houses, Dutch tiles and carvings, at Chinsura, Negapatam, Jaffnapatam, and at petty ports on the Coromandel and Malabar coasts, with the formal canals in some of these old settlements, remind the traveller of scenes in the Netherlands.
The earliest English attempts to reach India were made by the North-west passage. In 1496 Henry VII granted letters patent to John Cabot and his three sons (one of whom was the famous Sebastian) to fit out two ships for the exploration of this route. They failed, but discovered the island of Newfoundland, and sailed along the coast of America from Labrador to Virginia. In 1553 the ill-fated Sir Hugh Willoughby attempted to force a passage along the north of Europe and Asia, the successful accomplishment of which has been reserved for a Swedish explorer of our own day. Sir Hugh perished miserably; but his second in command, Chancelor, reached a harbour on the White Sea, now Archangel. Thence he penetrated by land to the court of the Grand Duke of Moscow, and laid the foundation of the Russia Company for carrying on the overland trade with India through Persia, Bokhāra, and Moscow.
Many English attempts were made to find a North-west passage to the East Indies, from 1576 to 1616. They have left on our modern maps the imperishable names of Frobisher, Davis, Hudson, and Baffin. Meanwhile, in 1577, Sir Francis Drake had circumnavigated the globe, and on his way home had touched at Ternate, one of the Moluccas, the king of which island agreed to supply the English nation with all the cloves which it produced.
The first modern Englishman known to have reached the Indian peninsula was Thomas Stephens, in 1579. He had been educated at Winchester, and became Rector of the Jesuit College in Goa. His letters to his father are said to have roused great enthusiasm in England to trade directly with India. In 1583 four English merchants—Ralph Fitch, John Newbery, William Leedes, and James Story—went out to India overland as mercantile adventurers. The jealous Portuguese threw them into prison at Ormuz, and again at Goa. At length Story settled down as a shopkeeper at Goa; Leedes entered the service of the Mughal emperor; Newbery died on his way home overland; and Fitch, after a lengthened peregrination in Bengal, Pegu, Siam, and other parts of the East Indies, returned to England.
The defeat of the ‘Invincible Armada’ in 1588, at which time the Crowns of Spain and Portugal were united, gave a fresh stimulus to maritime enterprise in England. In the following year a number of merchants presented a memorial to Elizabeth, praying for permission to send a squadron direct to the East. The Queen granted their petition, and in 1591 three vessels made the first English voyage round the Cape of Good Hope to the Indian Ocean. The commander, George Raymond, went down with his ship in a storm, but James Lancaster in the Edward Bonaventure penetrated to Cape Comorin and the Malay Peninsula, returning to England in 1594. Another expedition of three ships was sent out two years later under Benjamin Wood at the cost of Sir Robert Dudley, but not one of them was ever seen again. The first Englishman to reach northern India in the seventeenth century was a London merchant, John Midnall or Mildenhall. Armed with a passport from Queen Elizabeth he travelled overland, and spent seven years in the East (1599–1606). He visited the emperor Akbar at Agra, and obtained from him some farmāns of doubtful value which he afterwards vainly endeavoured to sell to the East India Company.
By the time Midnall returned that Company was already in being, for it had long been inevitable that England, refusing to hold herself bound by the Papal Bull, should make a serious attempt to win a share in the trade with India. On September 24, 1599, some merchants of London held a meeting, and having subscribed capital to the amount of £30,133 resolved to seek incorporation from the Crown. The movement owed much to certain members of the Levant Company, and Thomas Smythe, one of the leaders of that body, was eventually the first Governor of the East India Company. The original proposals of the adventurers were not accepted by the Privy Council, but they reassembled in Founders’ Hall exactly a year after their first meeting, and having now the Queen’s approval purchased ships and raised their capital to £68,373. On the last day of the year 1600 Elizabeth incorporated the subscribers, 217 in number, by Royal Charter, under the title of ‘The Governor and Company of Merchants of London trading into the East Indies.’
The first epoch in the Company’s history is that of the ‘Separate Voyages,’ from 1601 to 1612, each of which was organized by a particular body of subscribers and was wound up on the return of the ships by a realization of the profits. The early expeditions were directed to the islands of the Spice Archipelago rather than to the mainland of India. Captain James Lancaster of the First Voyage (1601) entered into commercial relations with the king of Achīn and visited Bantam, where he established a factory. The fleet of the Second Voyage sailed to Bantam, Ternate, Tidore, and Amboyna. It was not till the Third Voyage that a landing was made on the coast of India (1608), and for the next few years most of the trade was done with Bantam, Achīn, Aden, Mocha, and Socotra.
As soon as the trade to the Indies was definitely established, the Company proceeded to get from the Crown a renewal of their charter. This was the more necessary as King James had shown a disquieting tendency to infringe their monopoly. In 1604 he granted a licence to Sir Edward Michelborne, to trade ‘to Cathay, China, Japan, Corea, and Cambaya.’ But Michelborne, on arriving in the East, instead of exploring new sources of revenue like the East India Company, followed the pernicious example of the Portuguese and plundered the native traders among the islands of the Indian Archipelago. In this way he secured a considerable booty, but brought disgrace upon the English name, and seriously hindered the Company’s business at Bantam. The second charter, granted in 1609, extended the period of the Company’s privileges from fifteen years to perpetuity, unless they proved unprofitable to the realm, when they might be terminated on three years’ notice. After 1612 a change was made in the financial organization of the Company, and the period of ‘Separate Voyages’ was followed by that of ‘Joint Stocks.’ These, however, must be distinguished from the great permanent Joint Stock of 1657. The change simply meant that groups of adventurers for single voyages were replaced by somewhat less ephemeral groups for three or four voyages.
Early English efforts to found factories in the East were made in the teeth of determined opposition from Portugal and Holland. The Portuguese turned back the fleet of Sir Henry Middleton from landing at Surat in 1611, but in 1612 Thomas Best defeated them in several stubborn naval engagements off Swally (Suvāli). In 1615 Nicholas Downton in the same waters won a still more decisive victory; while in 1622, in concert with a Persian land force, the English captured Ormuz in the Persian Gulf. Henceforward the Company had little to fear from the Portuguese. The Treaty of Madrid in 1630 proclaimed peace in the Indies, though that desirable consummation was not reached till Methwold, the English President of Surat, and the Viceroy of Goa signed in 1635 a convention of their own—a convention which was afterwards ratified in the international treaty of 1642. Cromwell, by his treaty of 1654, finally wrested from Portugal a formal acknowledgement of England’s right to trade in the East.
The conflict with the Dutch was of deadlier intensity and more profoundly affected the Company’s history. The twelve years’ truce in 1609 between Spain and the United Netherlands allowed Holland to concentrate her energies against the English. The interests of the two Protestant powers had already clashed in the East, and continuous conferences in London or at the Hague had proved unavailing to bring about a settlement. On the Indian seas neither side was in the mood to pay a punctilious respect to the decencies of European diplomacy. The sea-captains of two nations that were nominally at peace fought openly and savagely whenever opportunity arose. The Dutch pressed hard upon our factories in the Spice Archipelago, and Courthope’s gallant defence of Pulo Run for four years (1616–20) was an episode that remained long in the memory of his countrymen. In 1619 a Treaty of Defence was signed in Europe which aimed at a partial union of the two national Companies. An amnesty for all past hostile acts was proclaimed, the trade of the Eastern islands was to be shared in common, and both nations were to contribute in a certain fixed proportion to the expenses of the fleet and garrisons and the duty of patrolling the seas. When the terms were proclaimed in the East (1620) the Dutch and English fleets, dressed out in all their flags, and with yards manned, saluted each other. But the treaty ended in the smoke of that stately salutation, and the perpetual strife between the Dutch and English Companies went on as bitterly as ever. The English were expelled from Lantor and Pulo Run in 1621 and 1622.
The massacre of Amboyna, which made so deep an impression on the English mind, marked the climax of the Dutch hatred to us in the Eastern seas. After long and bitter recriminations, the Dutch seized Captain Towerson at Amboyna, with nine Englishmen, nine Japanese, and one Portuguese sailor, in February, 1623. They tortured the prisoners at their trial, and found them guilty of a conspiracy to surprise the garrison. The victims were executed in the heat of passion, and their torture and judicial murder led to an outburst of indignation in England; but James could not afford to quarrel with Holland, and though he used brave words nothing effective was ever done. Under the reign of his successor wearisome negotiations ended in a paralysis of all action ; and it was not till the Treaty of Breda in 1654 closed Cromwell’s victorious war with Holland, that a belated indemnity of £85,000 was paid to the Company, with £3,615 to the heirs of the sufferers. Though the English did not formally renounce their shadowy claim to Pulo Run till the second Treaty of Breda in 1667, the Dutch were supreme in the Malayan Archipelago after 1624, and the fall of the English factory at Bantam in 1682 left their position unchallenged.
East of the Bay of Bengal the struggle had gone against the English, but in the meantime the factors of the Company had been slowly and painfully establishing themselves on the mainland of India. In 1608 Captain Hawkins of the Third Separate Voyage landed at Surat and proceeded to the court of Jahāngīr at Agra. He was graciously received and obtained permission to settle at Surat ; but the grant was afterwards revoked through the influence of the Portuguese, and after two and a half years of fruitless waiting at Agra Hawkins left in disgust. Although the English had obtained a precarious foothold in Surat in 1608, the credit of establishing a permanent factory there belongs to Thomas Aldworthe, who cleverly used the prestige won by Best’s victory over the Portuguese to procure an imperial grant. Subordinate agencies were set up at Ahmadābād, Burhānpur, Ajmer, and Agra. In 1615 Sir Thomas Roe was sent as ambassador from the court of St. James to Jahāngīr. A man of great ability and tact, he held his anomalous position with credit to himself and advantage to the Company for more than three years ; and, though he never succeeded in getting his famous treaty ratified, he did much to place the English trade in the Mughal dominions on a more favourable footing. Surat became the most important English factory in the East, and in 1630 even Bantam was made subordinate to it. Meanwhile the English had also made their presence felt on the coast of Coromandel. After many abortive attempts, factories were established at Masulipatam and Pettapoli about 1616. In 1628 the former settlement was abandoned for Armagon, but two years later a return was made to Masulipatam. In 1639 Francis Day procured a grant of land from a Hindu Rājā at Chennapatam or Madras, and built there (1640) Fort St. George, with the exception of Armagon the first fortified position held by the East India Company. In 1653 Fort St. George was raised to the rank of a Presidency and made independent of Bantam, to which it had hitherto been subordinate. In 1633 Ralph Cartwright founded our first factories in Bengal at Hariharpur and Balasore; and in 1651 the English established themselves at the more important position of Hooghly, largely through the good offices of Gabriel Boughton, who was surgeon in the household of the Mughal viceroy of Bengal. In 1658 the factories in Bengal were made subordinate to Madras, which was itself dependent on the chief Presidency of Surat.
But while Englishmen in the East tenaciously maintained their hold upon the Indian sea-board, the East India Company at home had fallen upon evil days. Since 1628, in which year the Commons disregarded their Petition and Remonstrance, opposition to their claims had been growing up, based partly on jealousy of the monopoly, partly on a mediaeval theory of foreign trade. In 1635 Charles I granted to Sir William Courten or Courteen and others a licence for trade in the East. Courten died the next year, but his son and his associates continued the trade, and became known as the Assada Merchants from their plantation in the island of Madagascar. Their captains committed depredations in the East, for which the servants of the London Company were called to account by Indian rulers. The Company’s petitions to the king passed unheeded in the constitutional struggle with the Parliament and in the turmoil of the Civil War. It became increasingly difficult to raise the Joint Stocks necessary for the continuation of the trade, and the commercial operations of the Company were practically suspended. In 1649 they were driven to some form of union with Courten’s Association. But both bodies had been nearly ruined in the long duel; other forces of opposition had come to a head, and the popular cry was raised that the trade should be thrown open to the nation. The Company, driven to despair, threatened in 1657 to withdraw their factories from India, till the Protector, who had long hesitated as to his course, granted them a new charter. Under its provisions the first permanent Joint Stock of £739,782 was raised, and the settlements in India were restaffed with factors. At the Restoration Cromwell’s charter was conveniently ignored, but the Company obtained a similar one from Charles II, which granted them the right to coin money and exercise jurisdiction over English subjects in the East. Under the Restoration Government the Company enjoyed a period of great prosperity, and the value of their stock rose steadily till in 1683 it stood at £360 per cent. In India, despite some checks, such as Sir Edward Winter’s royalist rebellion at Madras (1665–8), their star was in the ascendant. In 1661 Bombay was ceded to the British Crown as part of the dower of Catharine of Braganza, but was not delivered up until 1665. The King transferred it to the Company for an annual payment of ten pounds in 1668. The seat of the Western Presidency was removed to it from Surat in 1687. The direct effect of the Restoration Wars with Holland (1665–7 and 1672–4) upon our position in India was curiously small. In the former a Dutch fleet threatened Surat, but dared not land troops for fear of violating the neutrality of the Mughal empire. By the treaty which ended it England finally renounced her claim to Pulo Run. In the second War the fighting fell mainly to the lot of France, who was England’s ally. The Dutch did indeed capture St. Helena, which the English had occupied since 1658, but it was speedily retaken (1673) and henceforward remained an English possession. Under the rule of able men, such as Sir George Oxenden (1662–69), Gerald Aungier (1669–77), and Sir John Child (1682–90), all Presidents of Surat and also Governors of Bombay, the trade and influence of the Company was prosperously maintained.
Towards the end of the reign of Charles II, the position of affairs in India became much less favourable. Keigwin’s rebellion at Bombay (1683–4), and a mutiny at St. Helena during the same time, injured the reputation of the Company both at home and in India. More serious were the premonitory signs that heralded the break-up of the Mughal empire. In 1664 and 1670 Sivājī was repulsed with difficulty from the factory at Surat, and he threatened Madras in 1677. From 1683 to 1687 Aurangzeb was waging in the Deccan a desultory but destructive war with the Sultāns of Bijāpur and Golconda. All over India the forces of rebellion and disruption were manifest. The trade of Surat and Madras suffered, while in Bengal the viceroy Shaistā Khān actively oppressed the English factories. In 1686 the Court of Committees, dominated by Sir Josia Child, brother of the President of Surat, deliberately abandoned their traditional policy of a peaceful commerce, which dated from Roe’s time, for one of active reprisals. In the following year they proclaimed in memorable and prophetic words that they intended to ‘establish such a polity of civil and military power, and create and secure such a large revenue . . . as may be the foundation of a large, well-grounded, sure English dominion in India for all time to come.’ The Company began to covet revenues, rents, and fortified positions, and determined to consolidate their position in India on the basis of territorial sovereignty, to enable them to resist the oppression of the Mughals and Marāthās. With that view they laid down the policy which was destined to turn their clerks and factors throughout India into conquerors and proconsuls :—
‘The increase of our revenue is the subject of our care, . . . as much as our trade ; ’tis that must maintain our force when twenty accidents may interrupt our trade ; ’tis that must make us a nation in India. Without that we are but as a great number of interlopers, united by His Majesty’s Royal Charter, fit only to trade where nobody of power thinks it their interest to prevent us. And upon this account it is that the wise Dutch, in all their general advices which we have seen, write ten paragraphs concerning their government, their civil and military policy, warfare, and the increase of their revenue, for one paragraph they write concerning trade.’
The actual results in India were in grotesque contrast to these brave words. A fleet of ten ships with a considerable military force was dispatched from England under Captain Nicholson. When it arrived in India, fighting had already begun in Bengal between the Nawāb and the English. Job Charnock, the chief of the Hooghly factory, had twice been driven from Calcutta, whither he had first gone in 1686. All the warlike operations of the Company were attended by failure ; an attack on Chittagong hopelessly miscarried. The English in Bengal were compelled to take refuge on their ships ; they fled to Madras and remained there for fifteen months. In 1690 the representatives of the Company were forced to accept from Aurangzeb a humiliating peace, by which, on making submission and paying a considerable fine, they were allowed to return to Bengal. In August, 1690, Job Charnock once more moored his ships in the long pool of Calcutta and definitely founded the capital of British India.
Meanwhile at home the Company had again to confront a determined and organized opposition. For many years individual interlopers had defied the Company’s claim to the sole market of the Eastern trade, one of the most famous being Thomas Pitt, the grandfather of Lord Chatham, who thus founded the fortunes of his family. In 1691 the enemies of the Company formed themselves into an association and allied themselves closely with the Whig party in Parliament. The struggle was a long one, and can only be very briefly outlined here. The Old Company obstinately refused all concessions in the way of widening their basis, and in 1693 Sir Josia Child, by bribery on the most lavish scale, actually succeeded in procuring from the Crown a new charter. But in this he overreached himself, and the following year the Commons in anger passed a resolution that ‘all the subjects of England have a right to trade to the East Indies unless prohibited by Act of Parliament.’ In 1695 an inquiry was held into the bribery and corruption employed in procuring the charter; and among those who were politically ruined by the revelations that followed were the Speaker, Sir John Trevor, and the Duke of Leeds, the Lord President of the Council. A still heavier blow soon fell upon the Old Company. In 1698, on providing Charles Montagu, Chancellor of the Exchequer, with a loan of £2,000,000, the new association was constituted by Act of Parliament a General Society, to which was granted the exclusive trade to India, saving the rights of the Old Company until they expired in three years’ time. The great majority of the subscribers to the General Society, which was on a ‘regulated’ basis, at once formed themselves into a Joint Stock Company and were incorporated by the Crown as the ‘English Company trading to the East Indies,’ to distinguish it from the Old or London Company. The latter, to safeguard themselves, by an adroit move, subscribed £315,000 to the funds of the General Society in the name of their treasurer, John Du Bois. Thus the position after 1698 was curiously complicated. Four classes of merchants had the right to trade to the Indies: (1) the New Company; (2) the Old Company trading on their original capital until 1701, and after that on the limited subscription of £315,000; (3) those subscribers to the General Society who had held aloof from the Joint Stock of the New Company, their capital amounting to about £22,000; (4) a few separate traders who, relying on the Commons’ resolution of 1694, had sent out ships prior to 1698 and had been permitted to complete their voyages. The two latter are comparatively unimportant and may be left out of account. Between the Companies there followed a desperate struggle, waged at home with all the rancour and bitterness of the party spirit of the day, and in the East with a strange disregard of national interests.
To the chief settlements in India the New Company sent out Presidents of their own, all of whom had been formerly dismissed from the service of the Old Company. Lively passages of arms ensued at Bombay between Sir John Gayer and Sir Nicholas Waite; at Calcutta between John Beard and Sir Edward Littleton; and at Madras between Thomas Pitt, the ex-interloper, now the zealous servant of the Old Company, and his cousin John Pitt. The embassy of Sir William Norris to the court of Aurangzeb, on which the New Company had built many hopes, proved a failure. In England the settlement of the East India trade became a burning political question; but finally in 1702, on pressure from the Crown and Parliament, the two Companies were forced into a preliminary union. The Old Company was called upon to buy £673,000 additional stock in the General Society to make their share equal to that of their rivals. The dead stock, i.e. houses, factories, and forts of the Old Company, were valued at £330,000 and of the New at £70,000; and the latter had to pay £130,000 to make up for the discrepancy. There followed six years of negotiation and compromise at home, and of ‘rotation governments’ and squabbling abroad. In 1708 the union was made absolute by Parliament, all points in dispute being settled by the arbitration of the Earl of Godolphin; a further loan of £1,200,000 was made to the state, and the amalgamation of the ‘London’ and the ‘English’ Companies was finally carried out under the style of the ‘United Company of Merchants of England trading to the East Indies.’
The settlement of 1708 gave the Company an assured position at home, and henceforward the centre of interest shifts mainly to the Eastern arena. The years that followed were comparatively uneventful, for the Company gladly returned to their traditional policy of a peaceful commerce. Surman’s embassy to Delhi in 1715–7 procured certain territorial concessions as well as trade rights from the Mughal emperor, and indirectly enabled the Company’s servants to see with their own eyes the internal rottenness of the empire. The three Presidencies quietly grew in population and importance amidst momentous political changes, the disintegration of Mughal power, the growth of the Marāthā confederacy, and the establishment of practically independent kingdoms. The evil results of the political anarchy were felt mainly in Bombay, which in the period 1708–50 passed through a severe trial. On the sea-board it was harassed by the famous corsair chief Angriā (died 1730) and his sons, while on land it was constantly threatened by the steady advance of the Marāthā armies. In Bengal the semi-independent Nawābs lived at peace with their European neighbours; while in Madras the English could feel that the issue must be fought out between the Nizām and the Peshwā before it could come home to them. But it is noticeable that about 1740 the outposts of the Marāthā power are approaching the boundaries of all three Presidencies. In 1739 the Bombay Council, through Captain Inchbird, concluded a commercial treaty with the Peshwā; in 1740 the Marāthās invaded the Carnatic; while two years later the Marāthā Ditch was hastily constructed at Calcutta.
Before passing on to the political history of British India, which properly speaking begins with the Anglo-French Wars in the Carnatic, it is necessary to give a short account of the progress of England’s chief rival, and to deal with other European attempts to acquire the Indian trade.
The French were comparatively late in making their appearance in India, though there were several early voyages undertaken by Frenchmen to the East by the Cape route. The most famous was that of Jean and Raoul Parmentier, who reached Tiku in Sumatra in 1529. Successive companies for the Eastern trade were chartered by Henry IV in 1601, 1604 (privileges renewed in 1611), and 1615; but they all failed, from want of capital and popular support. In 1642 Richelieu founded his Compagnie d’Orient, which concerned itself mainly with the colonization of Madagascar. Its privileges were extended in 1652 for fifteen years, but it soon became impotent, and communications with the island were maintained only through the ships of the Duc de la Meilleraye. In 1664 the famous Compagnie des Indes was founded at the direct instance of Colbert and Louis XIV, who took an intense personal interest in its development. The new company bought out the claims of Richelieu’s company for 20,000 livres, and its first expeditions were wasted in vain attempts to revive the colonies in Madagascar. The first French factory in India was founded by Caron, a renegade Dutchman, at Surat in 1668; in the following year a post was established at Masulipatam. Louis XIV’s wars with Holland seriously affected the French in India. In 1672 their fleet was driven from Ceylon, but captured St. Thomé from the Dutch. Two years later the place was retaken, and the French force was obliged to surrender. In 1674, however, François Martin founded Pondicherry, and about the same time the first factory was acquired in Bengal at Chandernagore. The Dutch captured Pondicherry in 1693; but by the terms of the Peace of Ryswick they were compelled to restore it to the French, with its fortifications greatly strengthened, in 1697. Under the care of its founder, who lived till 1706, it grew into a flourishing settlement. In the meantime want of support in France had brought the company to a very low ebb, and after 1708 it was obliged to yield its active trading rights to some enterprising merchants of St. Malo. The brilliant schemes of Law drew fresh attention to the Indian trade, and the powers, possessions, and assets of Colbert's company were taken over by his great Company of the West. On the downfall of Law, this was reconstituted as the ‘Perpetual Company of the Indies’ in 1719, and within a few years the prospects of the French were much improved. Lenoir was Governor of Pondicherry in 1721–3, and again in 1726–35; during the interval Beauvallier de Courchant held office. In 1735 Benoît Dumas succeeded to the chief position, which he occupied till the appointment of Dupleix in 1741. The subsequent history of the French Company is closely bound up with that of the English and will be related in the next chapter.
Two attempts were made to establish a Scottish Company. In 1617 James I granted a patent to Sir James Cuningham to trade to Greenland, Muscovy, and the East Indies, but in the following year the charter was recalled on representations from the English Company. In 1695 the Parliament in Edinburgh incorporated the Company of Scotland trading to Africa and the Indies, but the capital was squandered on the ill-fated Darien scheme, which failed partly through English opposition. The disaster engendered such international bitterness that in the Act of Union compensation was guaranteed to the Scots by the English Government.
The first Danish East India Company was chartered by Christian IV in 1616. The settlement of Tranquebar was founded in 1620, and that of Serampore probably in 1676, though the Danes seem to have appeared in Bengal before that date. The second company was founded in 1670, and new charters were granted in 1698, 1732, and 1772. In 1807, when England went to war with Denmark, Tranquebar was seized by British troops, but was restored on the conclusion of peace. All the Danish settlements in India were acquired by purchase for the British Government in 1845.
The Ostend Company was incorporated by the Holy Roman Emperor in 1722, though commissions for single voyages had been granted as early as 1714. Its factors and agents were chiefly persons who had served in the Dutch and English companies. This enterprise forms the subject of Carlyle's ‘Third Shadow Hunt’ of the Emperor Charles VI :— ‘The Kaiser’s Imperial Ostend East India Company, which convulsed the diplomatic mind for seven years to come, and made Europe lurch from side to side in a terrific manner, proved a mere paper company ; never sent ships, only produced diplomacies and “ had the honour to be.” ’
Carlyle’s picturesque paragraphs do not disclose the facts. The Ostend Company formed the one great attempt of the German Empire, then with Austria at its head, to secure a share of the Indian trade. The capital of the company was 6,000,000 florins ; and so great were the profits during its early years that in 1726 a dividend of 33½ per cent. was paid. The company not only sent ships but founded two settlements in India which threatened the commerce of the older European Companies. One of its settlements was at Coblom or Covelong, between the English Madras and the Dutch Sadras, on the Coromandel coast. The other was at Bānkībāzār, on the Hooghly river, between the English Calcutta and the Dutch Chinsura.
The object which the Emperor Charles VI had in view was political not less than commercial. Prince Eugene had urged that an India Company might be made to form the nucleus of a German fleet, with a first-class naval station at Ostend on the North Sea, and another at Fiume or Trieste on the Adriatic. Such a fleet would complete the greatness of Germany by sea as by land, and would render her independent of the maritime powers, especially of England and Holland. The Empire would at length put its seaports to a proper use, and would thenceforth exert a commanding maritime influence in Europe.
The existing maritime powers objected to this ; and the Ostend Company became the shuttlecock of European diplomacy for the next five years. The Dutch and English felt themselves particularly aggrieved. They pleaded the Treaties of Westphalia and Utrecht. After long and loud altercations, the Emperor sacrificed the Ostend Company to gain the acceptance of a project nearer his heart—the Pragmatic Sanction for the devolution of his hereditary dominions. To save his honour, the sacrifice at first took the form of a suspension in 1727 of the company’s charter for seven years. But the company was doomed by the maritime powers, and the Emperor bound himself to suppress it in the treaty with England (1731). On the suspension of the company in Europe, its enemies made short work of the settlements in India. They stirred up the Muhammadan governor to attack Bānkībāzār. The small garrison there, after a despairing resistance against overwhelming odds, abandoned the place and set sail for Europe. Henceforward the Ostend Company became merely a name in Bengal, though isolated factors are mentioned as being still at Bānkībāzār as late as 1744.
Attempts were made by the company to transfer its seat to other ports within the Empire, namely Fiume and Trieste on the Adriatic; but the scheme fell through. Failing this, recourse was had to other European powers. In 1728 King Frederick IV of Denmark granted a special charter enabling members of the suppressed company to join his subjects in the Indian trade, and establishing an India House at Altona (near Hamburg). Other members joined a new Swedish Company founded by Henry Köning in 1731. The latter were left more or less undisturbed, for the trade of the Swedes was all along rather with the Farther East, China and Japan, than with India. But in the case of the Danes the British and Dutch united in strong diplomatic protests against what they considered a revival under another name of the Ostend Company, and after some demur the India House at Altona was abolished. The aims of the Ostend Company were revived in 1781, when, largely through the exertions of William Bolts, a renegade servant of the English Company, the Imperial Company of Trieste was chartered by the Emperor Joseph II. This company became bankrupt in 1784.
What the Emperor of Austria had failed to effect, Frederick the Great, King of Prussia, resolved to accomplish. Having got possession of East Friesland in 1744, he tried to convert its capital, Embden, into a great northern port. Among other measures, he gave his royal patronage to the Asiatic Trading Company, started September 1, 1750, and he founded the Bengalische Handelsgesellschaft on January 24, 1753. The first of these companies had a capital of £170,625; but six ships sent successively to China only defrayed their own expenses, and yielded a profit of 10 per cent. in seven years. The Bengal Company of Embden proved still more unfortunate; its existence is summed up in two expeditions which did not pay, and a long and costly lawsuit.
The failure of Frederick the Great’s efforts to secure for Prussia a share in the Indian trade resulted to some extent from the jealousy of the rival European Companies in India. The Dutch, French, and English pilots refused to show the way up the dangerous Hooghly river to the Embden ships, ‘or any other not belonging to powers already established in India.’
It is due to the European Companies to state that, in thus refusing pilots to the new-comers, they were carrying out the orders of the Native government of Bengal to which they were then strictly subject. ‘If the Germans come here,’ the Nawāb had written to the English merchants on a rumour of the first Embden expedition reaching India, ‘it will be very bad for all the Europeans, but for you worst of all, and you will afterwards repent it; and I shall be obliged to stop all your trade and business. . . . Therefore take care that these German ships do not come.’ ‘God forbid that they should come,’ was the pious response of the President of the English Council; ‘but should this be the case, I am in hopes they will be either sunk, broke, or destroyed.’
They came, nevertheless, and some years later the English Court of Directors complained that their Bengal servants were anxious to trade privately with the Embden Company. ‘If any of the Prussian ships,’ wrote the Court, ‘want the usual assistance of water, provisions, or real necessaries, they are to be supplied according to the customs of nations in amity one with the other. But you are on no pretence whatsoever to have any dealings with them, or give the least assistance in their mercantile affairs.’ The truth is that the German Company had effected an entrance into Bengal, and found the French, English, and Dutch merchants quite willing to trade with it on their private account. But the German investments were made without experience, and the Embden Company was before long sacrificed by the Prussian king to the exigencies of his European diplomacy.
Such is a summary of the efforts by European nations to obtain a share in the India trade. The Portuguese failed, because they attempted a task altogether beyond their strength: the conquest and the conversion of India. Their memorials are the epic of the Lusiads, the death-roll of the Inquisition, an indigent half-caste population, and three decayed patches of territory on the Bombay coast. The Dutch failed on the Indian continent, because their trade was based on a monopoly which it was impossible to maintain, except by great and costly armaments. Their monopoly, however, still flourishes in their island dominion of Java. The French failed, in spite of the brilliancy of their arms and the genius of individuals, from want of steady support at home. Their ablest Indian servants fell victims to a corrupt court and a careless people. Their surviving Settlements disclose that talent for careful administration which, but for French monarchs and their ministers and their mistresses, might have been displayed throughout a wide Indian empire. The German Companies, whether Austrian or Prussian, were sacrificed to the diplomatic necessities of their royal patrons in Europe, and to the dependence of the German States in the wars of the last century upon the maritime powers.
England emerged the prize-winner from the long contest of the European nations for India. Her success was partly the gift of fortune, but mainly the result of four elements in the national character. There was—first, a marvellous patience and self-restraint in refusing to enter on territorial conquests or projects of Indian aggrandizement, until she had gathered strength enough to succeed. Second, an indomitable persistence in those projects once they were entered on ; and a total incapacity, on the part of her servants in India, of being stopped by defeat. Third, an admirable mutual confidence of the Company’s servants in one another in times of trouble. Fourth, and chief of all, the resolute support of the English nation at home. England has never doubted that she must retrieve, at whatever strain to herself, every disaster which may befall Englishmen in India ; and she has never sacrificed the work of her Indian servants to the exigencies of her diplomacy in Europe. She was the only European power which unconsciously but absolutely carried out these two principles of policy. The result of that policy, pursued during two and a half centuries, is the British India of to-day.
Bibliography
For the Portuguese in India :—
Lord Stanley of Alderley.—The Three Voyages of Vasco da Gama (Hakluyt Society, vol. xlii, 1869).
Walter de Gray Birch.—The Commentaries of the Great Afonso Dalboquerque (Hakluyt Society, vols. liii, lv, lxii, lxix, 1875–83).
M. Faria y Sousa.—Asia Portugueza, 3 vols. (Lisbon, 1666–75).
R. S. Whiteway.—The Rise of Portuguese Power in India (1899).
H. Morse Stephens.—Albuquerque (Oxford, 1892).
For the Dutch in India :—
J. K. J. de Jonge.—De Opkomst van het Nederlandsch Gezag in Oost Indie, 13 vols. (The Hague, 1862–89).
J. P. Du Bois.—Vies des Gouverneurs Généraux (The Hague, 1763).
David Macpherson.—The History of the European Commerce with India (1812).
For the English in India :—
W. N. Sainsbury.—Calendars of State Papers,Colonial Series, 1513–1634 (1862–92).
Sir George Birdwood.—Report on the Old Records of the India Office (1891).
Sir George Birdwood and W. Foster.—First Letter-Book of the East India Company (1893).
W. Foster (first volume in conjunction with F. C. Danvers).—Letters Received by the East India Company from its Servants in the East, 6 vols. (1896, &c.).
W. Foster.—The English Factories in India, 1618–21 (Oxford, 1906).
Sir Henry Yule.—The Diary of William Hedges, 3 vols. (Hakluyt Society, vols. lxxiv, lxxv, lxxviii, 1886–8).
John Bruce.—Annals of the Honourable East India Company (1810).
Sir William W. Hunter.—A History of British India, 2 vols. (1899– 1900).
J. Talboys Wheeler.—Madras in the Olden Time, 1639–1748 (Madras, 1861–2).
J. Talboys Wheeler.—Early Records of British India (Calcutta, 1878).
See also the various Record publications edited by A. T. Pringle, G. W. Forrest, and C. R. Wilson.
For the French in India :—
François Charpentier.—Relation de l' Établissement de la Compagnie Française pour le Commerce des Indes Orientales (Amsterdam, 1666).
L. Pauliat.—Louis XIV et la Compagnie des Indes Orientales (Paris, 1886).
Souchu de Rennefort.—Histoire des Indes Orientales (Paris, 1659).
Henry Weber.—La Compagnie Française des Indes (Paris, 1905).
For the Ostend Company :—
M. Huisman.—La Belgique Commerciale : La Compagnie d'Ostende (Brussels, 1902).
Gerald B. Hertz.—‘ England and the Ostend Company.’ The English Historical Review, April, 1907.