No review of the measures which have been adopted to mitigate the effects of drought would be complete without taking into consideration those wider economic problems, upon the correct solution of which the ultimate prosperity of India depends. The famine codes which the Government of India has drawn up for the various Presidencies presuppose a definite economic structure, and have varied as that structure has itself undergone alterations. If then the efficacy of the system of relief in the past is to be estimated, it is necessary to bear in mind the fact that the energies of the Government have not been restricted to a mere opportunist struggle with the horrors of famine when drought has already produced distress. Railways have been laid down to render relief possible ; irrigation works have been constructed to render it unnecessary. Districts which were deserts have been converted into cornfields ; districts which were inaccessible islands have been connected with grain markets. On what principles the one or the other of these two alternatives of protection of the people against famine or prevention of the possibility of drought has been adopted, and what have been the effects of those measures on the general economic position of India, it is in part the purpose of this chapter to discuss.
But before entering further upon this inquiry, it is necessary to consider the truth of the theory that famines are, in fact, not only inevitable, but beneficial. For there are certain thinkers who look upon famine as a natural check against over-population and deplore the expense which efficient relief works entail as waste of wealth upon those surplus numbers the destruction of which is demanded by ultimate expediency. The question is important, for, in a country where two-thirds of the population are engaged upon agriculture, over-population is an obvious theoretical possibility, and it might be to this, rather than to any other cause, that the weakness of the people's resisting power has been due. In Western Europe, where production is mainly industrial, the economically advantageous density is rarely exceeded, and the restrictions imposed by civilisation on the growth of population have proved sufficient in the past, and appear likely to prove more than sufficient in the future. But in India it is. no mere matter of animal instinct, but of prehistoric custom. The Government can scarcely hope to check early marriage ; and it has abolished the counteracting forces of widow burning and female infanticide. Moreover, the fact cannot be controverted that the pressure on the land steadily increased during the latter half of the nineteenth century. (a) Indigenous industries have been destroyed, and the growth of the importation of foreign manufactured commodities has been accompanied by an equivalent ruralisation of the Indian population. If that increased ruralisation is not met by an equivalent increase in the productivity of the land, then, since the point after which the investment of further quantities of labour and capital will render a smaller proportional return is more rapidly reached in agriculture than in other industries, there is an a priori probability of misery from want ensuing.
But it is difficult to find evidence to prove that over-population in India is a reality; it is still more difficult to substantiate the argument that, were that the case, drought would constitute a desirable check. As Chailley-Bert says, "La densité de la population ne dépend guère—sauf exceptions—que de la température et de la pluie, et varie avec elles." (a) Although there is evidence to show that in various places and at various dates the population has increased more rapidly than the means of subsistence, still the exceptions referred to are purely local.1 The fact that the ratio between rainfall and climate and population is as unvarying as it is, is indeed not difficult to explain, for climate and rainfall have the same influence on the fertility of man as on that of vegetation. Were this not the case, the greatest degradation would be found in those districts which had for the longest time been free from drought. But inasmuch as over-population is confined to restricted localities, and is dependent on special causes such as a sudden social and political tranquillity, or the decay in some prosperous district of the industry which produced that prosperity, drought is the clumsiest of all counteracting forces. There is no guarantee that drought will affect the desired areas; and since the introduction of railways, and the disappearance of private stores of grain, there is no guarantee that the power of resistance will be greater in uncrowded districts than among those people who burden the soil upon which they live. So far is this true indeed that it was in Gujarat, "the garden of India," where a land revenue of 20 per cent. was paid, that the greatest mortality occurred during the famine of 1900. (a) Female infanticide was a far more logical and far more desirable check in the past, and if the danger is to be obviated in the future it must be through the growth of industry and an increased demand for labour. It is impossible to utilise a means which makes prosperity the sport of the clouds; it is absurd to uphold as beneficial calamities which cause the destruction of all wealth.
The fallacy of the general over-population of India has at least never influenced the policy of the British Government. That Government has realised that the economic stability of India depends on the extent to which insurance, or protection, or prevention could lessen the recurrent danger of droughts, and into the dispute which took place between the advocates of irrigation extension and the supporters of railway construction the question of the ultimate ideal never entered. It would be superfluous to relate here the story of that dispute; but if the policy actually adopted be open to subsequent criticism, it should at least be borne in mind that that policy was not hurried or thoughtless, but was the result of almost half a century of discussion and deliberation.
Irrigation works may actually restrict the area and intensity of droughts within certain limits; but not the keenest advocate of the greater utilisation of her water supply has ever dared to dream of an India wholly immune from drought; and at the point where irrigation against drought fails protection against famine must begin.
There was no little truth in the fancy of General F. C. Cotton when he spoke of India as an “earth spot.” (a) But just as that land has enough corn to feed itself in the driest of years with an improved distribution, so, too, its waters are sufficient were their perfect distribution possible. Possible, however, it can never be, for not only are some districts, such as the stony uplands of the Deccan trap, outside the range of engineering aspirations, but the question is ultimately financial, and a crop, like all produce, must bear its due interest on capital outlay. Moreover, in times of protracted drought both wells and tanks may dry up. A tank is a mere store of water, and when one year of drought follows on another, that store is depleted, and it is not possible to restrict consumption in the first year on the expectation of deficiency in the second. Owing to financial considerations also the construction of railways must modify the construction of irrigation works. For when the law of substitution comes into play between the two alternatives, it may often prove more remunerative to import than to produce. Moreover, the utility of irrigation is often too far restricted to justify the initial cost, unless railways can also be constructed to market the grain, or to feed less fortunate districts with the surplus of the protected zone. Nor is it completely true that railways can supply none of the direct benefits of irrigation, for the prosperity of the cultivator is increased by extension of his range of markets, and he is given a new incentive to greater production when the sale of his surplus is ensured.
But the utility of irrigation can never be denied, and has indeed been recognised by all ages.
The relative advantages of canals, and of tanks and of wells, must depend on the nature of the soil and the lie of the land ; but in respect to the North-West Provinces at least there is little exaggeration in Sir J. Strachey's dictum that “ the number of wells is generally a good index of the condition of the agricultural population.” (a) For wells are the property of the cultivators themselves, and their construction and maintenance is the expression of their prosperity and energy. It is by such small, and often unnoticed, signs as the introduction of, and growing demand for, steam pumps in the Madras Presidency that the real progress of the landed population should be measured.
Mention has already been made of the antiquity of irrigation in India, of the canals of the Muhammadan Emperors, of the advances made by Tughlak for the construction of wells, and of the tanks which were built up in the narrow valleys of the hills. The industry which had flourished in the fourteenth century was revived again by Akbar and Shah Jehan in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, and the Jumna canals of the present day are extensions of the works of the great Moghul Emperors. But in all parts of India, and in all centuries, the cultivation of the land has been promoted by artificial means. The origin of the inundation canals of the Punjab and Sind is beyond the ken of history ; to the Hindu monarchs of the sixteenth century are due the weirs on the Tungabhadra, and Paes relates how there were employed on the construction of a single tank fifteen to twenty thousand men, "looking like ants so that you could not see the land." (a) So great was the skill displayed by the native engineers in the economy of water that often the whole stream was exhausted and dried up.2
To the engineers indeed and emperors must be attributed the successful construction of the greater works ; but their maintenance was the duty of the villagers. (b) When, therefore, with the long wars, which succeeded the break-up of Aurangzib's Empire, and the subsequent establishment of a foreign dominion, the village system degenerated, much of the work of the past fell into disrepair, and the British Government was forced to begin anew. Nor, save in the opium districts, has there been under this Government the same incentive towards assisting the cultivator in the construction of wells, which the system of collecting the revenue in kind gave to the tax farmers of earlier times.
So much controversy has centred round the question as to the adequacy of the irrigation works undertaken by the British Government that experience and time alone can pass ultimate judgment. The works undertaken under the control of the East India Company were comparatively few in number, and were not remarkable for their financial success. But by 1877 nearly nine and a half million acres were artificially protected, (a) and from that date until the present day the work has steadily progressed. The real economic nature of these works and the wisdom of the Government’s policy towards them are beyond the scope of purely theoretical estimation. But certain facts are indisputable. On the one hand, the extent and value of those works, viewed merely relatively, are unprecedented and unparalleled. On the other, despite the recommendations of every Famine Commission, it is only since 1904 that there has been any marked increase in the rapidity of extension, or any considerable change in the relative amount of the annual revenue appropriated for irrigation and railway enterprise respectively.
There has indeed been a prima facie advantage in the latter, on account of the greater security of the investments and the greater rapidity of return on the capital expended. But the question of their real value in the past is difficult and intricate.
In a country so vast as India, with very limited natural facilities for navigation, and an almost total absence of roads, the primary necessity of railways as a protective measure against famine was indeed imperative. By railways alone can the necessary rapidity of transportation be achieved; to them alone has the economy resulting from non-interference with trade in time of drought been due. It was largely owing to the lessons taught by the famines in Orissa and the North-West Provinces, and in Bengal and Madras, before 1880, that the subsequent development of railways took place.
But famines by the ensuing financial strain limit the possibility of supplying that which they themselves demand. It was on that account, and also owing to the lack of capital in India, that the system of guaranteed companies was initiated and so long continued. The value of railways as means of protection must be in part gauged by their primary cost; and this was often excessive when the interest was guaranteed. But the balance to their credit is great. Over two and a half million tons of corn were imported in the last great famine of the nineteenth century to affected districts in a single year, and after the drought of 1907 still more protective lines were demanded. (a) When the increase in mileage from 4255 miles in 1870 to 32,839 in 1911 is taken into consideration, and the horrors of such tragedies are recalled as that of Rajputana in 1868, where no means of transport existed, the value of the service that railways have rendered in the past, and the hope of security which they afford for the future, seem indeed inestimable. But still, in spite of growing financial prosperity, the projection of new lines is a strain almost too great for the Government, and no system of guarantee is wholly satisfactory. If waste in construction is to be prevented, and such loss of revenue as has occurred in some instances in the past, owing to the Government's purchasing a commodity at a price which is artificially enhanced by its own guarantee, is to be avoided, the inducements to private adventure must be curtailed. But as the guarantee system of 1896 showed, when those inducements are diminished they do not always prove sufficient to call capital into the market. Whether this restraint upon the investment of foreign capital in Indian transport is wholly undesirable, whether indeed the investment in the past has not been excessive, is a problem which can only be solved by a closer investigation of the moral and economic effects of railways upon the population as a whole.
Viewing the question more especially in its bearing upon that of famine relief, regard must be paid to the ultimate, as well as to the immediate, effects of railways, and to the fact that thus viewed they are nothing more than an insurance against risk. The success of that insurance must be estimated, not merely by the amount of corn imported into famine-stricken areas, nor merely by the annual revenue accruing from railways to the Government, but also by the extent to which it has affected more ancient methods of self-protection. It involves no criticism of the ultimate benefit accruing from the Government's policy to consider the possible damage which that policy has caused in the past. The extraordinary rapidity with which the construction of railways in India was achieved produced an economic revolution in that country, which, like all revolutions, was not unaccompanied by suffering. The obligation to save life in times of drought and the necessity of lines of strategic utility (for it was the Mutiny which gave the first real incentive to construction) have been the cause of that rapidity; and it has had for effect the destruction of the native industries, and the concentration of labour on that very employment to which droughts are the most dangerous. Had strategic, or economic, considerations allowed the change to be more gradual, it is conceivable that greater powers of resistance might have been shown by the native industries, that the lessons of the West might have been taught before destruction was inevitable, so that labour might have drifted to other occupations as well as to agriculture. The revolution produced was too sudden, the historic methods of protection against famine were abandoned, and although indeed security of life was increased, although grain was imported when required and paid for by doubtfully remunerative work, still it was also exported when the crops were abundant, and it is open to doubt if this depletion of the native stores was beneficial. In receipt for the produce he sells, the cultivator must obtain some equivalent, and the question has to be met, whether he expends that equivalent on increased consumption or on increased capitalisation of his property, or whether he puts it aside as an insurance against drought, or whether he merely squanders it upon pleasures he can ill afford. Writing on this point in 1902, the Government of India expressed it as its opinion that “ the agricultural classes have not, as a rule, yet learnt to regard a good harvest, not as an occasion for larger expenditure, but as a means of insurance against failure of crops.” (a) Before the agricultural classes possessed facilities for marketing their surplus from years of abundance, insurance against years of deficiency was often unavoidable.
The effect of this extravagance has been the enslavement of these classes to the money-lender. But before it is possible to judge this fact in its true proportions it is necessary to investigate the reality of the existence, and extent of the utility, of such stores as were kept in the past.
Modern writers have differed widely in their estimate of the amounts actually preserved. It seems probable in view of the history of past calamities that Robert Knight’s statement that the ryots of Orissa never deemed themselves safe without a “ full two years’ store of rice in their homestead ” (b) is somewhat exaggerated. More probable are the calculations of the Orissa famine report and of Sir H. J. S. Cotton (c) that “ the old hoarding system insured a sufficiency of grain to carry the population of any province through a single bad year.” 3 It is, however, not apparent from the accounts of early historians that immunity against such a single year’s rain failure was really assured. Mention has already been made of the stores collected by the native emperors partly as war-chests and partly as means of protection, and of the pots of grain buried by the peasants in the ground. (a) But before the nineteenth century history mentions only the failure of these savings, never their success. Perhaps the evidence of greatest value is that afforded by Col. Etheridge concerning the famine of 1812. “In some districts mothers struggled with husbands to rescue innocent and helpless children from being killed by their fathers to appease uncontrollable hunger.” (b) In other districts private individuals possessed such stores that no relief was required. In fact the existence of such stores depended on the fertility of the land and the foresight of the people in different localities.
There are some districts at the present day out of the range of railways, such as those of Kumaon and Garhwal on the southern slopes of the Himalayas, where the old customs are still preserved. The deficiency of a single monsoon entails in such regions but little suffering, but it is doubtful if the stores of grain have ever been sufficient in the past to meet calamities of more than one year’s duration.4 But the question is not one of complete immunity, but of the effects of the sudden revolution which overtook the ancient system of insurance. The problem is one of comparative cost, and it is not of merely academic interest to compare the expense entailed by this means of self-protection with that of more modern times.
The initial expense of the storehouses, or of buried pots, when granaries were private and consequently small, was negligible in itself or in comparison with what the Government would have to afford. But beyond that initial expense lay nothing but the exchange value of grain, when that value was at its lowest, and the loss of interest on the capital thus locked up. The real loss was the loss of life because the stores were insufficient, and the loss of the produce of that land which in consequence went out of cultivation. It was partly in view of the cheapness of this system of relief that a minority of the Commissioners in 1880 asserted the absolute necessity of storage of grain by the State. (a) Whether in view of the more complete organisation of the railway system, and the increased European demand for grain, the adoption of such a policy would be advisable at the present day is another question. But the desirability of the storage of fodder is now recognised, and the existence of granaries involves certain economies which are not at first sight apparent.
A famine under modern conditions has a much greater effect upon the country as a whole than in past times. The corn dealers and the railway companies, it is true, have in some instances made abnormal profits.5 But those profits have been made firstly at the cost of the affected area, which is drained of its money, so that the cultivators, without Government assistance, are often completely unable to carry out the ordinary agricultural operations when the rains come. They have been made partly at the cost of commerce in general. For the annual exportable amount of corn has been rendered so uncertain that its value has been reduced, or, in other words, the cost of marketing it increased; and the railways have on some occasions been unable to meet the ordinary demands of merchants, when occupied with the transport of excessive quantities of grain. (a) The effect of storage is to distribute the cost of protection against famine over a greater length of time, the effect of importation is to distribute it rather over a greater area. The general rise of grain prices over the whole of India, and the slightness of the local variations of these prices, have been amongst the most striking characteristics of modern famines. The desirability of a system by which the prosperous should help to bear the burden of the distressed is unquestionable, but the trade statistics of years succeeding famine show a diminution in the country's purchasing power which would be less sudden were insurance in anticipation of drought spread over a longer period. In addition to these indirect losses there is to be reckoned the inevitable expense of modern relief works; to the comparative lack of value in the actual work performed must be added the cost of implements and houses, of hospitals and charity; and against the loss on the capital locked up in granaries must be written off the interest on accumulated debt.
These considerations are important when considering on broad lines the protective measures of past and present governments. But one fact alone remains proved, that whatever the cost, whatever the ultimate effect, the immediate efficiency of railways in checking mortality has been unparalleled. Moreover, India is in the process of becoming a single economic unit—a fact the importance of which the growth of her sea-borne trade may in some way measure. But though the efficiency of railways in affording immediate relief is unquestionable, though to them is due the development of commerce, closer inquiry must be made into the nature of the economic change which they initiated, if the history of the famines of the past and the problem of the droughts of the future is to be correctly understood. Considerable division of opinion has existed as to the extent of the poverty of the masses of the population in India. Estimates of the actual income per head of the whole populace have differed somewhat in degree, but have shown a steady tendency to rise as the nineteenth century passed into the twentieth. The lowest is that of Lord Cromer in 1882, which gave a net income of Rs.19·1 ; (a) Naoroji reckons it at a little over Rs.39 ; (b) while J. D. Rees makes a rough estimate at Rs.30, and quotes F. J. Atkinson to the effect that between 1875 and 1895 there was an increase from Rs.25 to Rs.34. (c) The increase of the national revenue has of course been largely due to the growth of industries other than agriculture. But there can be but little doubt that the actual production per head of the purely agricultural population (apart from the opium fields or tea plantations) has considerably increased since the date when “ the reporting authorities ” could write “ that they agreed that there was a large number of cultivators who did not get a full year’s supply from their lands,” a or Sir C. A. Elliott, when settlement officer, that he “ did not hesitate to say that half our agricultural population never know from year’s end to year’s end what it is to have their hunger fully satisfied.” b But this increase in production and possible improvement also in the standard of living was accompanied up to the end of the nineteenth century by an ever greater subjection to the tyranny of the money-lender.
As Major Phipson said, “ An Indian money-lender is nothing but a merchant in the wrong place ” ; c but when two-fifths of the population are in the hands of that class, which the Deccan Raiyats Commission described as being the least fitted in the world to use the powers of an irresponsible landlord, the undesirability of his position becomes the point most worthy of attention.
If the causes of this indebtedness, which grew steadily as the century advanced, can be discovered, there will be afforded a better opportunity to place in its true light the value of the protective measures undertaken by the British Government up to the present day. Weaving and other home industries, as must always be the case at times of economic revolution, have been gradually eliminated, and wages have in many cases not risen equivalently with prices. (a) This adverse ratio of wages to prices, as well as the indebtedness of the cultivating classes other than labourers, may, as the Commission of 1900 declared, be "merely a transient phase of a great economic movement." (b) But for the moment it is not ultimate, but passing effects, it is not the prospects of the famines of the future, but the facts of those of the past, which are under consideration.
The Commission of 1880 gave it as their opinion that in some instances irrigation had an ultimately deleterious effect upon the fertility of the land, owing not merely to the reckless use of water, but also to the increase in the number of crops annually reaped. But such impoverishment can only occur when insufficient manure is returned to the land, and this very insufficiency is itself the effect of lack of capital. The real cause has to be sought in the introduction of a system of legal rights, which during the period of economic transition has hastened the disorganisation of the previously existing social system.
The vastness of India and the heterogeneity of its customs render it as impossible to summarise with accuracy as to give in full detail the systems of land tenure or the nature of land legislation. But despite local variations in laws it is possible to trace the development of those fundamental principles by which the policy of the British Government has been guided. The effect of this policy in the latter half of the nineteenth century, while on the one hand increasing the security and prosperity of agriculture by the improvement of local administration or the restriction of the power of the landlords, has been on the other to give the cultivating classes an economic liberty which when misused could produce economic ruin. For the greater temptations to extravagance thrown in their way owing to the growth of trade, and the increased use of money, have been accompanied by an enhancement of the value and loosening of the tenure of their holdings.
Under Lord Cornwallis, when the State abandoned its claim to be supreme landlord to the Zamindars of Bengal, there was adopted the system of recognising the full proprietary rights of the people in their estates. In other Presidencies of India, owing to differences in the systems of land tenure, the Government sometimes adopted a similar policy, sometimes dealt directly with the tenants and attempted to strengthen their position by giving them a right of occupancy and a right of alienation. Moreover, an attempt was made during the course of the next fifty years to protect the tenant against rack-renting and arbitrary ejectment. But the augmentation of the mortgageable value of land, owing to increased security of tenure, was unaccompanied until the close of the century by any effective check on the temptation to borrow, or by any restriction of the money-lender's ultimate power to distrain. The abolition of usury laws in 1855 affords one instance of the effect, so frequently unfortunate, of the influence of Western thought upon Eastern administration, and although the subsequent tenancy acts have granted to the bankrupt the right to withhold from the distrainer tools and other possessions essential to the conduct of his business, still, it is doubtful whether even at the present day the inapplicability of Bentham's logic is fully realised.
But, apart from other effects, the creation of occupancy rights in 1859, and the substitution of contractual and legal relations in place of the ancient patriarchal relations, tended to weaken the security of the tenants at will, and to increase the friction between the new occupancy tenants and their landlords. So early as 1880, according to the report of the Commission of that date, "landlords and tenants were becoming yearly more hostile; so that a landlord will generally refuse any aid to his occupancy tenants when they are in difficulties, and will do all he can to ruin them and drive them off the land." (a) The effect was in fact twofold, as the Commission proves. In the first place, the tenants had lost their only alternative to the money-lender; in the second, the landlords did all in their power to prevent the creation of rights of occupancy, or, when that failed, to drive the holders of those rights into bankruptcy.
The actual number of ejectments is no doubt an imperfect criterion of the insecurity produced, for the tenants at will would often be reinstated after their power to improve their status had been destroyed. (a) But the number of forced sales in the Punjab became so great in the last decade of the century that the Government made a special inquiry into their cause. In the year 1899–1900 the total area of cultivated land transferred by sale or mortgage to “non-agriculturists” amounted to no less than 190,077 acres. (b) Nor was it only in the Punjab that the economic position of the landed classes was precarious. The Commission of 1898, although expressing as its general, but strictly qualified, opinion that the resisting power of the people in time of famine had increased, criticised strongly the optimism of the local governments, and pointed to the malguzars and the tenants of the Central Provinces, who had fallen hopelessly into debt, and the ryots of the Deccan, as classes amongst whom no signs of improvement could be discovered. (c) It is important to realise the force of these facts if the history of famines is to be understood; but they do not necessarily involve a reflection on the Government's policy. All changes involve distress, and if the change made in the system of tenure was too sudden, if half a century was spent in the solution of the problems which this change involved, it does not necessarily follow that the change in itself was bad, or that prosperity in the future may not compensate for some misery in the past. Half unconsciously a revolution was initiated, and gradually, haltingly at first, but resolutely enough, the Government has attempted to produce order from disorder, and to control the channels in which the stream of change shall run.
But to some extent, no doubt, the distress of certain sections of the agricultural classes during the latter half of the nineteenth century was due to the policy of the Government in reference both to their habits of borrowing and indebtedness, and to the collection of the Land Revenue. For the Government did not at first realise that its property laws had increased the capital saleable value of land without in any way increasing its yearly yield, and that in consequence the cultivator's power of obtaining money had grown, without any equivalent growth in his capacity to produce wealth. It persisted in believing that these classes were possessed of hidden reserves, and brought forward the extent of their borrowings as a paradoxical proof of the strength of their economic position. Thus an excollector of Poona, commenting on the fact that, when pressure was brought to bear, the ryots always ultimately succeeded in paying the land revenue, was able to write: "There could not to my mind be a clearer indication of the fact that the cultivating classes possess a reserve of resources not always attributed to them. It may be that many not in debt before had to apply to the village money-lender, and that many already in debt had to involve themselves in heavier liabilities. But to raise money on loans necessitates the possession of some sort of credit." (a) Nor did this attitude express the unique cynicism of a single individual.
So recently as 1902 a Government publication referring to the Land Revenue contained a remark in some ways parallel. "The rapidity with which the land is passing into the hands of the money-lending classes has sometimes been adduced as evidence of the burdensome character of the assessment. But as a matter of fact there is no better proof of the moderation of the assessment than the great demand which has arisen for it on the part of the money-lending capitalists." a
The point of material importance, however, is not the weight of the actual assessment, but the extent to which the Government has fortuitously aided those money-lenders, partly owing to Western legal theories not wholly compatible with Eastern civilisation, and partly on account of their utility in assisting in the collection of the land taxes. The point is not primarily the percentage of net produce taken by the Government, but the extent to which the modern method of collection and assessment has added to those forces which have tended to remove all incentive to frugality, and personal insurance against famine, and thus to weaken the individual's power of resistance.
The Commissioners of 1900, considering this question in reference to the Presidency of Bombay, concluded that the cultivators failed to reap the full fruits of their industry and were kept in a general state of indebtedness, "that the rigidity of the Revenue system forced them into debt, while the valuable property which they held made it easy to borrow." "This is the state of things to-day," they concluded, " and while it remains unaltered, indebtedness in the Bombay Presidency must continue and increase." (a)
Four years later the necessary reform was accomplished by means of a system of automatic remissions. But the causes of the indebtedness of the Bombay Deccan ryot are in fact peculiar. By the Hindu law of inheritance the holdings, which in many cases have long been too small for the adequate support of a family, tend to be divided into more and more minute sections; the property of a single man is often composed of half a dozen scattered and barren parcels of land; and the slightest variation from the normal rainfall must almost inevitably drive the poorer ryots into debt.
There may indeed in the past, as Sir W. Robinson (b)6 and Sir W. Hunter contended, have been some cases in which " the assessment was so high as not to leave enough food to the cultivator to support himself and his family throughout the year." (c) But the actual percentage of taxation has steadily sunk, and has probably never since 1855 been so high as under native rule. The hardships resulting from the land revenue assessment were the effects of indirect, not direct, causes. Of these causes the most important are the method of the assessment and the rigidity of the demand. The agricultural classes have confessedly never learnt to use a good harvest as an investment against a bad, " so that the assessment can only be met by borrowing or by stinting the necessaries of life." (a) There was a merit in the old native method of collecting as much as was possible, and remitting in years of deficient crops by the simple means of a tacit acknowledgment of the impossibility of collecting, which the more inflexible system of the English does not possess. The Commissioners of 1900 penetrated to the root of the matter when they said, "Whether the assessment be moderate or full, we have no doubt that it cannot be collected in short years without forcing the ryots into debt." (b)
The policy of the Government has indeed been influenced throughout the century by two theories, of which one is only partially true, the other only partially relevant. The first of these theories, the influence of which has been incalculable, is that the Land Revenue was no tax, but the appropriation by the Government of part of the unearned increment of land. Thus it was that a fraction of the landlord's receipts was taken as the basis of the assessment, on the theoretical assumption that the incidence of the tax could not ultimately be shifted. But rack-rent is the paradox of economic rent. When an alternative to agriculture as a means of subsistence is practically non-existent, it is ridiculous to speak of earnings sufficient to call capital and labour into the industry; it is no less ridiculous to contend that rent does not enter into the cost of production, when the effect of that rent is so to lower the standard of living and efficiency that the cultivating classes, forced on to the margin of existence, are rendered unable to sink capital in the land they till, or to maintain the personal energy with which they are endowed. Whether the land revenue is derived from rent or from taxation, or is a "thing per se," a is a question of simple fact. Where the demand is so heavy, or has raised the sums claimed by the landlords to such an extent that the efficiency of the cultivator is decreased, it is a tax oppressive in its nature; where that has not been the case it may be acknowledged as a form of rent. There is, however, a real difficulty in the problem inasmuch as the natural forces of competition do not come into play. There is an element of truth as well as of exaggeration in Vaughan Nash's dictum "that government first fixes the standard of living and cultivation, and then proceeds to drain off all winnings of the people, which rise above the mark which has been fixed." b
The second theory by which the Government has been influenced is that the antiquity of the land revenue as a source of taxation is a justification superior to all objections. To some extent this attitude has been of value inasmuch as it has checked the extension of the Permanent Settlement System of Bengal, which is rather a promise of exemption than a method of taxation. To some extent it has been unfortunate, inasmuch as it has made the Government less willing to consider objections which have been raised, or to take into account the effects of changed economic conditions.
Reference has already been made to the increasing ruralisation of India and the dangers which this movement involves.7 So long ago as 1880 a Famine Commission pointed out that no protective measures could be adequate which did not include some attempt to diversify forms of employment. (a) It is, however, no light task to stem the flow of an economic tide. The agriculturists continued to increase in numbers, and that increase has been brought about by absorption of other classes, not merely by spontaneous growth. All modern industrial development involves specialisation and concentration of employment. It is no more necessarily to the disadvantage of one land that its native industries should wane, and its production of raw materials wax, than to another that the reverse should happen. If the home industries in India have suffered in the struggle with Western manufactures, English agriculture has suffered equally from free competition. But India is clothed more cheaply, and England is fed more cheaply, and the productivity of the land of the one, and of the industrial agents of the other, has more than equated their losses.
The mere productivity of a country, however, is an imperfect measure of its prosperity. Industrial specialisation may involve social dangers, and the benefit of concentration depend upon its form. There is an obvious theoretical advantage in concentrating labour and capital on those industries which will most rapidly, most certainly, and for the longest period render an increasing return on the amounts invested. The productivity of land is limited by its chemical composition, that of manufactures by the inventive capacity of man. In agriculture machinery must ultimately displace labour, or labour displace machinery. In industry the growth of the one creates an increased demand for the other.
Apart from this purely theoretical point, however, there are direct and peculiar dangers in the decay of native industries in India. It was estimated that in the famine of 1899–1900 the loss to that country through failure of crops amounted to something over £80,000,000. (a) The greater the percentage of the population employed and of the capital invested in an undertaking subject to such fluctuations, the less will be the rigidity of the country and its power to withstand the strain of deficient monsoons. Doubtless manufacturers would themselves suffer in times of drought owing to the diminution in demand, but they would not add in the same way to the year's deficit by inability to produce. The situation at the moment indeed, though it be but a passing phase, is perhaps more unfortunate than would be a still greater concentration on agriculture. For the position of the native artisans has been undermined, without complete substitution having been accomplished. As the Gaikwar of Baroda has said, “It is the humble weavers in towns and villages, the poor braziers and coppersmiths working in their sheds, the resourceless potters and ironsmiths and carpenters, who follow their ancestral vocations in their ancestral homes, who form the main portion of the industrial population, and who demand our sympathy and help. It is they (more than the agriculturist, or the mill and factory labourers) that are most impoverished in these days and are the first victims to famines.” (a) If real help is to be extended to these classes, and the famine problem is to be ultimately solved, then other industries uninfluenced by the variations of seasons must be able to utilise their labours. It is these classes and the agricultural labourer who have lost the most and gained the least in India’s industrial revolution. The Commission of 1898 drew attention to the decrease in the real wages of labour in Bengal and the North-West Provinces, (b) and although since that date the conditions in North India have improved, in Madras, in parts of the Deccan, and Bombay the rise in wages has been less rapid than that in the cost of living. (c) Manufactured goods of the West have been imported, raw produce has been given in exchange; the price level of the former has sunk with the increase of supply, the price level of the latter has risen with the increase in demand. It is true, no doubt, that those districts which export the greatest quantities of raw produce and grain are on the whole the least subject to drought. But the importation of manufactured articles, and the consequent decay of home industries, cannot be measured by the statistics of the export trade. Though pulse and millets, the products of the poorer districts of India, constitute but a minute fraction of the total export of grain, the explanation of the strength of the demand of those districts for British textiles is to be found in the figures of the coastal trade and the extent of internal commerce.
It is useless to regret the changes which world commerce and world competition involve. The duty of production is to demand. But the fact that an ancient system has decayed does not exclude the possibility of establishing a better, and the passing of the old order in India has not been unaccompanied by the growth of a new. But a more detailed investigation is necessary before the prospects of the future can be estimated, or the facts of the past fully realised.
The strength of the economic position of such a country as India does not depend only on the actual value of the commodities produced.
It may be more cheap to export raw goods and import manufactured goods. But if India is to win a stronger position as buyer and seller in the markets of the world, she must deepen the channels and regulate the action of her stream of produce. If she is to bear the strain which drought entails, she must stiffen her back against it. She is a country rich in minerals, rich in railways, abundantly supplied with labour power. The output of her coal mines and her iron and brass foundries has increased but slowly. Even together with her petroleum refineries and her paper mills and her lac factories it constitutes but a minute fraction of her national revenue. Home weaving is still the greatest of her industries after agriculture, though not even the most ardent of its champions dare prophesy its continuance. (a) The fate of her silk, and of her indigo and sugar trades seems sealed. New processes have undermined the two latter, drought has irreparably damaged the former. (b) Cotton and jute alone have made rapid progress. But cotton is itself subject to the influences of climatic conditions, and the growth of its manufacture has not been concomitant with growth of the production of fibre.8 If the concentration of the agents of production on a great variety of undertakings is to prove advantageous, it must be on industries unaffected by drought. If the natural forces of international competition have not accomplished that aim, then deliberate and determined action alone can achieve it. It has been said that the inefficiency of the Indian labourer, his unwillingness to leave his village and his home, his refusal to submit to regulations, render competition with the Western world impossible. If it be true that the supply of labour for factories is inadequate, or that to check the tendency to ruralisation is impossible, then all attempts to broaden the basis of protective measures against famine must prove fruitless. But where, as in the Cawnpore cotton mills, real difficulty has been experienced, the fault lay rather in the conditions of labour than in the unwillingness of the people. There is no lack of proof that where the conditions of work are good no recruiting agency beyond the employees themselves is required. (a) Nor is the relative inefficiency of the native labourer in industry sufficient ground for abandoning the hope of employing him. Droughts are an inevitable tax on the community, and if that tax can be more lightly paid in the long run by raising the price of manufactured wares, then such an action is justified. How compensation can best be made for the decay of indigenous industries, if the present tendencies be dangerous, is a problem for the financial experts of the Indian Government. The majority have shown little inclination to advocate protection, (b) and probably the views of Professor Lees Smith would be largely endorsed by official opinion. “ Economic progress,” he has written, “ is dependent upon pressure of keen competition. Industries which are in a position of unhealthy security because they are sheltered behind a tariff wall lose the spirit of improvement.” India’s “ great danger is inertia. The resources of the country are not being opened up by Indian initiative.” (c) The truth of the economic generalisations is obvious enough. But the lack of initiative on the part of the people is the natural outcome of the disappearance of their means of livelihood. It is a misconception of the doctrine of the survival of the fittest merely to view with complaisance the deaths of those that succumb. It is a misconception of the doctrine of free trade merely to refuse to regulate industrial development. A bureaucracy may not be eminently suited to inspire enthusiasm; but it can exaggerate its fear of producing inertia. It has at least peculiar opportunities for assisting, for teaching, and for protecting. The upper classes in India, who are liberally educated, overcrowd the legal and journalistic professions; but they have been inspired with few business ambitions, and possess no technical experience. New companies in India, which advertise for capital in England, often make no endeavour to raise it in the country itself; and sometimes, when a genuine effort is made, it is found that the interest obtainable on industrial enterprise is insufficient in the East to call capital into the market because the competition among capitalists is less keen. But when peculiar opportunities have been offered initiative in India has not been lacking. The cotton industry owes its origin to the failure of American competition during the Civil War; the jute industry to the failure of the Russian hemp supply during the Crimean War. Industries are mutually dependent, and gain strength by the conversion of "waste" into "bye" products. But the possibility of that conversion itself depends on the scope and strength of demand, and the complexity of the economic structure.
What form the economic development of India will take in the future it is scarcely possible to prophesy. Of the two great problems which the industrial revolution has involved—the problem of agriculture and the problem of industry—the one is in process of solution, and the other remains still unsolved. But all measures which have been adopted in the past, or may be deemed advisable in the future, must be modified by the threat of drought, and directed towards the avoidance of famine. They may be either affirmative or negative; they may attempt either to prevent drought, or to insure against loss from it. It is possible now to estimate more accurately what the real value of the insurance measures of the past has been.
Foreign competition resulting from the improvement of the means of communication has entailed the decay of home industries. A direct loss of labour power has been suffered; for climate and custom render work on the fields possible only at certain times of the day and year, and among certain classes of society. Improved facilities for the marketing of his produce have raised the income and increased the prosperity of the cultivator; but the abundance of actual cash resulting from the sale of grain and increased power to borrow have tempted him to reckless expenditure. Though the value of land in rice, wheat, cotton, and jute growing districts has been considerably raised by the growth of demand, the enhancement of the capital value of land holdings produced by the granting of property rights has not necessarily involved any increase in the productivity of those holdings. The agricultural classes have suffered a direct loss of the capital which they carried on their persons in the form of bangles and rings, owing to the closing of the mint to the free coinage of silver. Thus a new form of capital in some ways fictitious in its value, always dangerous in its misuse, has been substituted for a capital acquired by the economy of wealth. The money-lender has developed from a pawnbroker and a speculator in "futures" into a potential distrainor. In not a few cases he has used his power to promote lavish expenditure on foreign commodities or domestic feasts, with the object of ultimate distraint in view. Temptations to unnecessary extravagance have been accompanied in some instances by a growing pressure from above for rent, by an inelastic demand for land revenue, and to a less degree in the more distant past, by an insecurity resulting from enhanced assessments. The wage earner has suffered in some districts from a rise in prices, the artisan from a diminution in demand for his wares.
But these forces which have influenced the development of India have not been at work in all places or at all times. They are the fundamental causes of a general development, not necessarily the particular causes of any peculiar phenomena.
Against them are struggling those other forces which are created by the improved methods of modern industry and modern commerce. The statute book which shall regulate the course of industrial development has yet to be written; but real progress has been made in agriculture by the land legislation of the last twelve years.
Although the preceding tenancy acts9 had protected occupancy tenants from rack-renting and ejectment, and the instruments of their industry from distraint, they had up to 1901 never succeeded in checking indebtedness, or wholly preventing oppression by landlords. A step forward had been made in 1898, when, by the Central Provinces Tenancy Act, rents were fixed for the term of settlement. But it was not until the first year of the twentieth century, when the alienation of land to non-agricultural classes was finally prohibited, that the power of the money-lender was restrained.
“On ne résiste pas aux lois économiques,” (a) comments Chailley-Bert on this Act, and it is indeed open to doubt if legislation, which does not ameliorate, can check the logical results of distress. The act decreased the mortgageable value of land; it did not check the instinct to borrow which past legislation had fostered.
Protection against famine under modern conditions is a question of moral and material progress, and, owing to the nature of those conditions, the moral progress is the pre-essential of the material. That moral progress has been achieved by the same method as Raiffeisen adopted in Germany over half a century earlier.10 The power of the money-lender has been curtailed by the removal of his raison d’être, and the frugality of the people fostered by making them their own bankers.
The Co-operative Societies Acts of 1904 and 1912 have prevented the recklessness of individuals by enforcing mutual responsibility, and lending on character, and that of the members as a whole, by enforcing unlimited liability. Agriculture is promoted by loans to individual cultivators for the purchase of its requisites; and that duty which the Government by the Acts of 1883 and 1884 (a) attempted to perform is being gradually rendered unnecessary by the energy of the people themselves.
The value of this movement it is too early to estimate; but, granted the success which the latest figures seem to augur,11 it is difficult to conceive a limit to its usefulness. The Government had in part solved the problem of famine insurance and protection by the financial decentralisation and provincial responsibility initiated in 1870, and by the Famine Insurance Fund of 1878; private charity had assisted by the foundation of the Indian People's Famine Trust,12 but the ultimate solution lay in individual frugality, and that frugality co-operation alone has succeeded in promoting.
Moreover, a new school of thought is arising in India. The policy of laissez-faire towards industry is now being gradually abandoned. Governmental inquiries are made into the condition of industry; information is published, local governments have even experimented in new processes. (b) The results up to now may be meagre; but the first steps have been taken, and to turn back is impossible. The realisation of the necessity of encouraging personal endeavour is overcoming the fear of restraining spontaneity of action. Once it is realised that not merely agriculture, but the whole economic welfare of the land is endangered by droughts, measures will be adopted to strengthen and protect the whole economic structure of society, and those measures will be active, not negative, creative, not defensive.
Notes
- (a). Vide Census Report, 1901, vol. i. p. 208.
- a. Chailley-Bert, L'Inde, p. 7.
- a. 1900 Comm., pt. i. pp. 91 and 141.
- (a). Blackwood’s Magazine, May 1910.
- (a). India, p. 234.
- a. Sewell, A Forgotten Empire, pp. 161–245, 264.
- b. Hunter's Orissa, vol. ii. p. 182.
- a. 1898 Comm., p. 338.
- (a). (a) Report on Relief Operations, 1907, p. 137.
- a. Land Revenue Policy (published by order of the Governor-General in Council, 1902), p. 141.
- b. Quoted Digby, “Prosperous” India, p. 510.
- c. Sir H. J. S. Cotton, New India, p. 97. “Three-quarters of a year’s supply.”
- a. (a) Vide Mackenzie MSS., vol. vi. p. 33.
- b. Eth., Report, pp. 33, 43.
- (a). 1880 Comm., Min. Report, pt. i. pp. 66–9.
- (a). (a) Vide Railway Report, 1877–8 (C. 2179), sec. 62.
- a. Quoted Digby, "Prosperous" India, p. 442. Estimate 1882.
- b. Naoroji, Poverty of India, 1901 ed., pp. 2, 19, 31.
- c. J. D. Rees, The Real India, p. 293.
- (a). Report on Econ. Condition of Masses in Bengal Pres., 1887–88.
- (b). Quoted Digby, “ Prosperous ” India, p. 509.
- (c). Ind. Poverty and Ind. Famine, Major C. B. Phipson.
- a. 1898 Comm., p. 363. Vide "Prices and Wages."
- b. 1901 Comm., p. 77.
- (a). 1880 Comm., pt. ii. p. 117.
- a. Vide W. H. Moreland, Rev. Admin. of U.P.
- b. Punjab Admin. Report, 1900–1, p. 21.
- c. 1898 Comm., pp. 361–2.
- (a). Quoted V. Nash, The Great Famine, 1900, p. 90.
- (a). Land Revenue Policy, p. 261.
- (a). 1901 Comm., pp. 106–7.
- (b). Acc. and Papers, 1878, LIX. pt. i. p. 2.
- (c). Sir W. Hunter before the Governor-General's Council, 1879. Quoted Dutt, Econ. Hist., p. 490.
- a. Land Revenue Policy, p. 42.
- b. 1901 Comm., p. 91.
- (a). Baden-Powell, Land Revenue, p. 49.
- (b). Vide Nash, The Great Famine, 1900, p. 245.
- a. 1880 Comm., pt. ii. p. 175 seq.
- (a). T. W. Holderness, Paper read before Society of Arts, March 13, 1902.
- a. (a) Report of Industrial Conference, 1907, pp. 26–7.
- b. (b) 1898 Comm., p. 361.
- c. (c) Vide “Prices and Wages.”
- (a). Vide Report of Third Industrial Conference, 1907.
- (b). Vide Mukerji, Report Inquiry into State of the Tasar Silk Industry, Bengal, 1905.
- a. Vide Paper read by S. W. Fremantle before Society of Arts, April 20, 1909.
- b. Vide Government Blue Book, ccl. 1931.
- c. Lees Smith, India and the Tariff Problem, pp. 66–7.
- a. Chailley-Bert, op. cit., p. 277.
- (a). Loans Act, XIX., 1883; Loans Act, XII., 1884.
- (b). E.g. steam pumps, aluminium, and chrome leather in Madras.—Vide A. Chatterton, Note on Industrial Work in India, 1905.