[Abridged from an article which appeared in the “Asiatic Quarterly Review,” Oct. 1898.]
A friendly critic, himself an Indian administrator of high distinction, has made some just and thoughtful remarks on my book on “England and India” in the January number of the Asiatic Quarterly Review from which I may be pardoned for making an extract:
“The key-note of the whole difficulty is sounded by Mr Dutt when he says in his preface that ‘the direct administration of India by the Crown has, along with many great and obvious advantages, this one disadvantage—that the administration is virtually responsible to none.’ The Government of India is a benevolent despotism; the inhabitants of India, whether of Indian or European birth, whether they are officials or non-official, have absolutely no control over its actions. For it is obvious that the British residents—even the civil and military officers of the Crown, unless they are in the Governor-General’s Council—have no more voice in determining the policy of the Government than the native gentlemen, or even the native peasantry. The only power which can, and occasionally does, control the Government of India, is the British Parliament, a body which is subject to all the humours and inconstancies of the electorate of Great Britain.
“Is there any chance, however, of detailed reforms in Indian administration ever forming part of a party programme in Great Britain? and if there were such a chance, is it desirable that the Government of India should be guided in the details of its administration by the voice of the British public? Nothing would more tend to rivet the existing despotism upon the necks of the Indian people, while the despotism, if better intentioned, would certainly be far less intelligent than it is at present.
“No; what is wanted is that more control should be exercised in India, and by the Indian people, over their own affairs.”
Most people with experience in Indian administration will be inclined to agree with Mr Ward that the control over the every-day details of Indian administration should come, not from the electorate of Great Britain, but from the Indian people. If we calmly inquire into the true causes of that feeling of unrest, and even of some degree of bitterness between different classes, which is now observable in India, we shall find that it is really due to a policy which unwisely and ungenerously excludes the people of India from all real control over the administration, and makes them irresponsible and hostile critics instead of loyal partakers in the work of government. And if we pass in brief review some of the recent measures of the Indian Government, we shall find how much the Government have lost, even within the last year or two, in not allowing that partial control to the people of India which the people alone are fit to exercise in the management of their own concerns.
There are not many Englishmen familiar with Indian questions who approve either of the policy which led to the recent Indian Frontier War, or of the decision of the Government to charge the whole cost of that war to the Indian revenues, while England has made a gift of nearly a million towards the expenses of the Egyptian Frontier War. Would it have been a loss or a real gain towards a sound decision on these points if the people of India had some voice, not in ultimately deciding the questions, but in influencing by their constitutionally expressed opinion the decision of the Imperial Government? What the opinion of the people of India would have been, has been well expressed by Mr Ward. “At the present moment the whole country is hotly debating the question not only whether the frontier policy of the Indian Government is wrong or right, but how it came about, and which party is responsible. Yet one thing is perfectly certain; that if the people of India during the last ten years had had any—the slightest—control over the taxation of the country, or the application of its revenues, the Government would have been forced either to abandon its expensive schemes of frontier defence, or to have prosecuted them under the direct sanction of Parliament at the cost of the British Exchequer.” And, we may add, the representatives of the Indian people would not have wired to the Secretary of State for India that India could do without help from England in this year of all years; and Englishmen would not have perpetrated the unspeakable injustice of charging to India the whole cost of the Indian Frontier War, while contributing to Egypt nearly a million towards the Egyptian Frontier War. A greater recognition of the popular sentiment and of popular control in the administration of India would have enabled the Indian Government to avoid a policy which has led to a needless war, or to demand from the Imperial Exchequer a contribution towards the war brought about in pursuance of an Imperial policy. Neither Lord Elgin nor Sir James Westland had a right to speak for India, nor have they spoken wisely.
But let us pass on to another question which is attracting more attention at the present moment. Lord Elgin and Sir James Westland have submitted to the Secretary of State for India their proposals about the Indian Currency. The proposals are now under consideration by a Committee in this country, and we do not desire to anticipate their decision or express any opinion on their merits. But the point which we desire to urge is that the Government of India should not have made any proposals at all without consulting the people of India through their representative men and natural leaders. The point that we desire to urge is that the proposals of the Indian Government would have been sounder and wiser, and could have been urged with greater force, if they had been framed after consulting the people. The people have an interest in their currency far greater than either the Government of India, responsible for the adjustment of the Indian Budget, or the European merchants and traders having transactions in the East. All the investment which the poor people of India ever make is made, not in savings banks, but in the shape of silver jewellery for their women; and the millions of the labourers and the cultivators of India have a right to be heard, through their representatives, before a proposal is made calculated to depreciate the value of their savings made in years and generations past. The agriculturists of India are also deeply indebted to money lenders in all parts of India; and they have a right to be heard, through their representatives, before a proposal is made calculated to increase their indebtedness by artificially increasing the value of a rupee. Nothing brings into greater prominence the defect of the present method of Indian administration than the fact that a few officials, however experienced and however able, should consider themselves justified in making sweeping proposals to alter the value of the Indian Currency, without consulting the nation, whose national wealth these proposals are calculated to depreciate, and whose general indebtedness they are calculated to enhance. It would seem, from the action taken by the Indian Government, as if India existed for the convenience of the Government of India and for the convenience of foreign traders. It would seem as if the convenience of the Indian nation was a “negligible quantity,” and the opinion of representative Indians was superfluous. The most impartial tribunal in the world will decide cases wrongly and unjustly if it decides them after accepting evidence on one side only; and the best and most honest Government in the world necessarily becomes selfish, unsympathetic, and unjust to the people for whom it exists, and ends by sacrificing the interests of the people to the interests of influential classes, if it refuses to grant to the people themselves some share in the control of affairs.
Let us take up another question which is also attracting much attention at the present moment. The question of constructing more railways in India from the State funds, or under guarantee of profit granted by the state, is often discussed. The question is decided in every case by the Secretary of State for India on such information as is placed before him by the Government of India. Would it be an unwise departure from this policy to consult the representatives of the people whose money is spent? The general opinion among the people of India is that, now that the great military lines have been constructed, now that the lines really required for famine protection have been laid down, the Government should not directly or indirectly make the people’s money responsible for further lines. The impression is that India is not rich enough to construct those new lines which are being multiplied from year to year; that it is an unsound, hurtful, and disastrous policy to continuously add to the national debt of India in order to construct these new lines which the people do not want, and which the country’s finances do not justify. The impression is that pressure is brought to bear upon the Government by influential classes of capitalists and manufacturers for opening such new lines for serving special interests, and that the Government, with every desire to be honest and impartial, sacrifices the interests of the people, because the people are not constitutionally allowed to express and enforce their views as against the views of the influential classes. The impression is (to use the words of the late Sir George Campbell, sometime Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal) that when British capitalists have put their money in losing concerns in India, people in London bully and abuse the Government of India to get the concerns taken over, and eventually they are successful. There may or may not be some truth in these impressions; but the demand that the Indian people’s money should not be invested on new lines of railway in India, or on the road from Burma to China, without consulting the people’s wishes, is just and reasonable. To borrow money in England to an unlimited extent to further extend the railway system in India or outside India proper, is for the Indian Government a policy of extravagance and of injustice to the people.
It is necessary to further elucidate our remarks by a reference to the history of the Import Duties of India ? It will be in the recollection of most Indian officials that the Government of India and Government at home have repeatedly made “graceful concessions,” and have sacrificed Indian revenues, because the people of India have no constitutional power to back their Government and to resist unjust demands. But the end is not yet. On the 9th of this month (August 1898), the Secretary of State for India was asked in the House of Commons to admit British manufacture in India at a further reduction of one-fourth the duty on foreign goods, after the example of Canada. Lord George Hamilton declined to do so, but the assailants have only to persist to carry their point. Neither Conservatives nor Liberals are strong enough to resist for any length of years such demands backed by twenty or thirty or forty solid votes in the House. And unless the people of India are allowed the constitutional right to stand by their Government, and to defend their national revenues and their national interests, the humiliating sight will be witnessed again and again of the British Government in India knowingly and openly sacrificing the interests of the people of India under the mandate of British voters at home.
From the question of Railways and of Import duties let us turn to another question which is engaging the attention of Indian legislators at the present moment, viz., the condition of cultivators in Southern India. No question is more intimately connected with the material well-being of the people of India than that of landadministration; and the question will never be settled satisfactorily so long as representatives of the people are not allowed a constitutional method of expressing and enforcing their opinions in the matter of land settlements. An intelligent Indian landlord or publicist has often a more familiar grasp of the subject than European officials who have written reports on it all their lifetime; and the proceedings of the Godavari District Conference, of which we find reports in the Indian papers recently received, show how well the representative men of Madras are fitted to take a real share in shaping and controlling land administration in that province.
The historical review of the status of the Madras cultivator given by the President of the Conference is most instructive. Over forty years ago, in the Madras Administration Report of 1855-56, the Government declared that “under the Ryotwari system every registered holder of land is recognised as its proprietor, and pays direct to Government. He cannot be ejected by Government so long as he pays the fixed assessment.” In 1857 the Madras Board of Revenue stated in their report to the Government that “ a Madras ryot is able to retain his land in perpetuity without any increase of assessment, as long as he continues to fulfil his engagement." And the Government in its review of Mr Rickett’s report wrote: “The proprietary right of a ryot is perfect, and as long as he pays the fixed assessment on his land he can be ousted by no one.” The italics are ours; and we desire to invite attention to the fact that the assessment of the land held by the Madras ryot was considered fixed, and not liable to increase, forty years ago.
The subject received the attention of statesmen like Lord Lawrence, Lord Mayo, and Lord Northbrook, Viceroys who paid more attention to improving the material condition of the people of India than to seeking a “scientific frontier” among the hills and fastnesses of Afghanistan. It was at last given a final shape by Lord Ripon, who in 1882 sanctioned a modified form of permanent settlement. It was published in the settlement Manual and Standing Orders, as well as in Government Orders on the Agricultural Committee’s Report, that in all districts adequately assessed, the assessment, so far as it was based upon classification of soils and calculation of grain outturns, was permanent and unalterable; and that revisions would be made in future settlements only with reference to prices.
Lastly, we come to the present policy of the Madras Government, by which, we are informed, the Government reserves to itself the right of revising assessments, either with reference to rise or fall in prices, or in reference to other considerations requiring re-classification of soils or re-calculation of grain returns.
The point to which we desire specially to call attention is that these successive steps, taken from 1857 to 1882, and from 1882 to 1897, divesting the Madras cultivator of his former rights, and making him more poor, more indebted and more subject to recurring famines, have been adopted without consulting the people and without the knowledge of the people. The worst blunders which British administrators have committed in India are those which impoverish the cultivating population of India; and these blunders have been committed because the people have not been asked and have not been consulted in matters relating to their own interests and their own welfare.
Those who decide on these matters in the dark chambers of the India Office or of the Executive Councils of India, no doubt endeavour to act with moderation, with justice, and with knowledge and ability; but it is no reflection on those high officials to state that one side of the question, the official aspect, comes more prominently to their consideration than the popular aspect; and that financial considerations demand their attention more urgently than considerations of the rights of the people. And yet there are such things as vested rights even among the unrepresented people of India, and the worst blunders committed in India are due to the fact that there is no one to represent them, no one to speak for them, no one to urge them, and no one to defend them, in those close offices where they are considered. No class of officials in the world are more careful, and able, and desirous to be just, than high Indian officials, from the members of the Provincial and Viceregal Executive Councils to the members of the Indian Council; and yet it is a fact that the interests and rights of the people are not and cannot receive adequate and full and sufficient consideration under a system of administration under which the people are absolutely unrepresented in the offices which ultimately shape their destinies. So true is the remark of John Stuart Mill that “ it is an inherent condition of human affairs that no intention, however sincere, of protecting the interests of others can make it safe or salutary to tie up their own hands.”
In the interests of good administration, therefore, it is absolutely necessary to provide some means,—not for transferring to Indian hands the ultimate decision of Indian questions,—but for securing some representation of Indian opinion in those Executive Councils in England and in India which decide on great Indian questions. And it would improve British administration in India if each Indian Province sent one member to the Viceroy’s Executive Council, and one member to the Council of the Secretary of State for India. It is not an unreasonable aspiration of the people of India that five of the members of the Viceroy’s Executive Council, and five of the members of the Council of the Secretary of State for India, should be sent up by the five great Provinces of India. And it is not an unreasonable hope that the Governor of each Province should himself be aided by an Executive Council, half the members of which should be elected from among the people.
Side by side with this reform in the Executive Councils, a corresponding reform of the Legislative Councils is needed. Each large Province in India is divided into twenty or thirty or forty Districts, and it is not unreasonable for the people of India to hope that each District should be allowed to send one representative to the Provincial Legislative Council. The number of nominated or official members may also be increased, if necessary, and the new Councils thus constituted may meet three or four or five days in the week, to discuss questions relating to laws and administration, and to represent fully and adequately the wishes and sentiments and views of the people. Such really representative Councils would bring the Government of India in real touch with the people, and would popularise and strengthen and consolidate British rule in India.
The co-operation of representative Indian members would be of great value in dealing with administrative questions, which are growing more and more difficult with the clash of contending interests. It would be a help to the Governors of the great Provinces of Bengal and the North-west, of Madras, Bombay, and the Punjab, at all times, and specially in times of disturbance and alarm, of distress and famines, to have by them some men chosen from among the people to advise and help in the administration of their own concerns. It would help the Viceroy and the Secretary of State to understand better the feelings, wishes, and interests of the people, if they were in daily personal communication with representative men from the people in their Councils. It would create a bond of sympathy, which unfortunately does not exist now, between the administration and the people whose concerns are administered. It would secure an adequate and sympathetic consideration of the interests of the people, as against the interests of particular classes, in all questions coming up before the Councils. It would strengthen the Councils in local knowledge and experience, and to some extent make them broad-based on the people’s will. It would remove that worst defect of British rule in India,—a defect which is more pronounced now than it was seventy years ago, in the days of Munro and Elphinstone, Malcolm and Bentinck, —the utter want of touch between the people and their rulers. And it would substitute an intelligent and rational method of dealing with the great, loyal, and civilised population of India for a method which regards human beings as live stock, good for milking and shearing, but incapable of understanding their own interests or promoting their own well-being.
A great deal is often said and written about changing the system of government in India. We are against all violent changes. The system of rule which has been slowly organised by experienced administrators during a period of over a century should not be lightly set aside. The reform suggested in this paper is a natural development of the present system of government, and does not seek to set it aside for a new system. The time has come, with the progress of education, for some reform in the lines indicated in the preceding pages ; and some carefully considered measures in this direction will not only make Indian administration more efficient and more popular, but will strengthen British rule in India. It will help British administrators with the experience and local knowledge of educated Indians; it will teach the Indians themselves to take a legitimate and patriotic pride in the Government in which they are permitted to take a share; and it will provide the best safeguards which local experience and wisdom can provide against those recurring famines which are desolating India under the British rule.
Romesh Dutt.
August 1898.