(From the Times, 23rd December 1886.)
Sir,—I wish to state some views about bimetallism for the consideration of its advocates. It means that both gold and silver be made legal tender at a fixed ratio—say, for illustration, 16 to 1. Suppose, also, that the intrinsic value of silver is 24 to 1 of gold, or, putting it in a simpler form, say that the legal tender of silver be made ten florins to a gold sovereign, while the intrinsic value of silver is only fifteen florins to £1 gold. The effect of such legal tender would, it appears, be as follows, all other trade circumstances remaining the same :—The producer of silver can take his silver to a mint to be coined. He cannot claim to be paid in gold from such mint. After he receives his coin, he will have to put it into circulation. Though his silver is legal tender, he will not be able to force it on the world, in exchange for any other commodity, at its legal tender—i.e., at its fictitious—value of ten florins to £1 gold. Take the ordinary instance of the hatter. Suppose the silver-holder goes to a hatter and offers ten florins for the hat, the price of which is originally one gold sovereign. The hatter knows that the intrinsic value of the ten florins is not equal to £1. He can and will, therefore, decline to part with his hat at ten florins. His easiest plan, to protect himself from receiving the lower metal at its fictitious value, would be to put the price on his hat in the lower metal at its intrinsic value—i.e., at fifteen florins.
Thus the trade, and in fact all people who can avoid receiving ten florins for £1 gold, will do so in sheer self-defence. For the law which would now arbitrarily give a fictitious higher value to silver, and cause loss to existing gold creditors of all kinds, might at any time withdraw such fictitious value and cause loss to the silver-holders or creditors. There is no, nor can there be any, guarantee that this could or might not be done. So, though silver may be made legal tender at ten florins to £1, the world, knowing its intrinsic value, would not take it at any higher worth. It will decline to pay silver-producers 50 per cent. profit, or whatever it may be.
If the gold basis of the notes of the Bank of England be repealed to-morrow, they will no longer hold their present undoubted currency. If the notes are issued simply on Government credit altogether, they will fluctuate like Consols, according to such credit and all other circumstances that affect Consols. In British India the paper currency is based on a reserve of silver and Government securities. If this sound basis be tampered with, the notes would fall in their value, even though “ the promise to pay on demand” of the Indian Government is printed on them. Nothing that is not intrinsically sound can be foisted on the world by any law. It would be like trying to stop or regulate the action of gravitation by law. The result would be that the actual currency will be reckoned in silver at its intrinsic value, gold being dealt with at its intrinsic premium, causing temporarily confusion and loss to the ignorant and to the existing gold claimants. The parties who would be compelled to receive silver at its legal tender would be all existing gold creditors of every kind, unless some provision is made for their protection. Government will be obliged to accept its revenue in silver at its legal or fictitious value. Government servants, and present holders of Government securities, will also be obliged to accept the same. The loss to Government and their servants will be a permanent one unless taxation is increased and salaries raised. For, with the exception of Government servants, the rest of the world, who are free to make their contracts with Government, will protect themselves by basing their estimates and prices at the intrinsic value of silver, and Government will have to pay so.
Will the Bank of England be bound to part with its gold at the offer of silver in exchange at its legal-tender value? If so, it will be the interest of the silver holders and producers to possess themselves of gold, as the most certain of the two metals in intrinsic value. If the Bank is drained of its gold, what will be the effect on its notes? Will the present note-holders be obliged to accept silver at its fictitious value instead of gold to which they are entitled?
The farmers will be able to sell their own produce at the intrinsic value of silver, but they will tender rents to the landlords at the legal-tender value of silver. Thus a new difficulty will arise between them till, by some arrangement, the dispute is settled. And so on will be the case with all sorts of existing claims in gold.
The inconvenience of the carriage of the heavier weight of silver will partially operate against it, but in advanced commercial countries like England, this inconvenience will not be much felt, as all transactions, especially the larger ones, are conducted by cheques and clearing-houses.
Whatever may be the effect of the increased demand for silver, the object of the bimetallists that a fixed ratio between gold and silver will be forced upon the world by law is not likely to be realized as long as there is an intrinsically different ratio between the values of the two metals.
Now, if the above views be correct, the effect on British India will, it seems, be this. The pensioners in England who are entitled to receive their pensions in gold, the servants of the India Office, the existing present creditors holding railway and other gold loans, or others having any claims in gold on the India Office, will be obliged to receive silver at its fictitious value. But will they submit quietly to such a loss? Will they not force helpless British India to pay in gold or, if in silver, at its intrinsic value? What will the English military authorities do? Will they demand payment in gold or in silver at its intrinsic value, or will they quietly submit to accept silver at its fictitious value? They will simply make up their claims or accounts in the intrinsic value of silver. The Anglo-Indian officials in British India will remain where they are. Their rupee converted into the florin in England will remain intrinsically 15 florins to the pound, or at whatever the intrinsic value of silver may be.
The result, then, most likely, will be that British India will be left where it is now, will have to remit home charges as at present with increased quantity of produce to make up the higher intrinsic value of gold payments; and the present distress and political danger, to which I shall refer further on, will remain the same. The hope that India will be benefited by bimetallism will be, I am afraid, disappointed.
Suppose, on the other hand, the views given above (viz., that the world will not take silver except at its intrinsic value only) be not correct, and that though the intrinsic value of silver be 15 florins to £1, it will, notwithstanding, be actually raised 50 per cent. in its purchasing power; or that the world will pay to the producer of silver his 50 per cent. profit. Then, the effect on British India will, I am afraid, be disastrous. Silver is not produced in British India. It has to be purchased by her with her produce. Being the last purchaser she has to pay the highest price for it. Now, if silver actually rises 50 per cent. in its purchasing power, British India will have to pay so much higher price for it. This means that the agriculturist will have to part with half as much more of his produce as he did before to get his rupee, which he has to pay for Government assessment. In other words, the tax on the taxpayer will, at one bound, be raised 50 per cent., or whatever the higher value of silver may be.
On the other hand, Government servants will have, in effect, their salaries raised 50 per cent. at one bound. The taxpayer will be ruined and the tax eater fattened. Not only will the whole present evil arising from the home charges remain undiminished, but the taxpayer will be burdened with additional taxation of 50 per cent. all round. This can not but be disastrous; and the fears of political danger which both the Indian Government and the Secretary of State for India, have expressed as below, will be vastly aggravated. The Government of India, in the i letter of the 2nd of February last to the Secretary of State for India, thus express their fears and anxieties :—“ This state of affairs would be an evil of the greatest magnitude in any country of the world; in a country such as India it is pregnant with danger.” The Secretary of State for India, in his letter to the Treasury of the 26th of January last, in expressing similar fears, also points out the true cause of the whole evil of British India. He says :—
“The position of India in relation to taxation and the sources of public revenue is very peculiar, not merely . . . but likewise from the character of the Government, which is in the hands of foreigners, who hold all the principal administrative offices and form so large a part of the army. The impatience of taxation, which would have to be borne wholly as a consequence of the foreign rule imposed on the country and virtually to meet additions to charges arising outside the country, would constitute a political danger, the real magnitude of which, it is to be feared, is not at all appreciated by persons who have no knowledge of or concern in the government of India, but which those responsible for that government have long regarded as of the most serious order.”
The whole matter is very important, and needs to be well considered from every point of view.
Yours faithfully,
Steamship Malwa, Suez.
Dadabhai Naoroji.