REPLY TO CRITICISMS.
(July 1876.)
(Before an adjourned Meeting of Bombay Branch of the E. I. Association, on Monday evening, 24th July 1876, in the Framjee Cowasjee Institute. Mr. R. N. Khote in the chair.)
I begin with Mr. Maclean. He has very much misunderstood my papers. As a first instance, when he asks me to deduct the exports of India (less the exports from Native States) from my estimate of the production of India, he does not see that my estimate is for the total production in India, and that what is exported is not to be deducted therefrom.
As a second instance, he asks me to add 15,000,000l. for cotton manufactures. My estimate for production includes all raw cotton of British India, and I have already included in my estimate the additional value the raw cotton acquires by the application of industry in its conversion into cloth. Coal and foreign stores that are used in the mills are paid for from, and are therefore included in, the production I have estimated. The only additional value is that of the labour employed. But even if we allow the whole additional value acquired by raw cotton in its conversion into cloth, what will it be? Mr. Maclean’s “Guide to Bombay” (1875) (which is much later than the time of my notes) gives the number of the then working spindles as about 6 lakhs in the whole of the Bombay Presidency. Taking 5 oz. per day per spindle and 340 working days in the year, the total quantity of raw cotton consumed will be about 81,300 candies, which, at Rs. 150 per candy, amounts to about 1,220,000l. The price of cloth is generally about double the price of raw cotton, as I have ascertained from the details of two or three mills of Bombay; so that the whole addition caused by the mills to the value of raw cotton is only 1,250,000l., say 1,500,000l. sterling to leave a wide margin. Then, again, there are, about the time of my notes, yarn imports into India worth about 2,500,000l., per annum. This, of course, is paid for from the production of the country. The value added to it is its conversion into cloth. Now the cost of weaving is about 25 per cent. of the value of yarn, so that the value thus added is about 600,000l., say 1,000,000l., to include any contingency, making the total value to be added to the raw production of about 2,500,000l. If deduction is made for coal and foreign stores, this amount will be much lessened. Again, we know that hand-spinning is much broken down, and there can be but a little quantity of cloth woven out of hand-spun yarn in India. Giving even 500,000l. more for that industry, the outside total of addition to the raw produce would come to, as a high estimate, 3,000,000l. instead of the 15,000,000l. which Mr. Maclean asks me to add without giving a single figure for his data. Let him give any reasonable data, and I shall gladly modify my figures so far.
As a third instance of misunderstanding my paper, when Mr. Maclean asks me to take 5,000,000l. for gold and silver ornaments made in this country, he forgets that gold and silver are not produced in this country. All bullion is imported, and is paid for from the produce of India; it therefore can add nothing to my estimate of production. The only addition is the industry employed on it to convert it int o ornaments. This industry for the ordinary native ornaments will be amply covered by taking on an average an eighth of the value of the metal, which will give about 625,000l., or say 750,000l. sterling, or even 1,000,000l., while Mr. Maclean wants me to take 5,000,000l.
As a fourth instance : while Mr. Maclean tells me to add 15,000,000l. and 5,000,000l. when there should be hardly one-fifth of these amounts, he does not see that I have actually allowed in my paper for all manufacturing industrial value, to be added to that of raw produce, as 17,000,000l.; and, further, for any omissions 30,000,000l. more (East India Association Journal, vol. ix., No. 4, page 257).
These four instances, I think, would be enough to show the character of Mr. Maclean’s criticism, and I pass over several other similar mistakes and mis-statements. I come to what is considered as his most pointed and most powerful argument, but which in reality is all moonshine. After contradicting flatly in my paper his assertion that the exports of the United States were in excess of imports, I had said that I had no reliable figures for the years after 1869. To this he replies, “Here they are;” and he gives them as follows. I quote his own words: “Mr. Dadabhai says he cannot get ‘authentic figures’ of “American trade for a later year than 1869; here they are for “him:—
| Imports—Merchandize and Bullion. | Exports—Merchandize and Bullion. | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| 1869 | £87,627,917 | 1869 | £99,330,735 |
| 1870 | 97,779,351 | 1870 | 117,534,993 |
| 1871 | 112,552,770 | 1871 | 138,084,908 |
| 1872 | 117,259,889 | 1872 | 128,337,183 |
| 1873 | 132,709,295 | 1873 | 142,240,730 |
| 1874 | 119,172,249 | 1874 | 130,582,689 |
| £667,085,481 | £756,111,238 | ||
“The excess of exports over imports for the six years is therefore, “89,000,000l. sterling, giving a yearly average of nearly 15,000,000l. “against only 11,500,000l. for India. The explanation of the deficit in “imports in the case of the United States is, of course, similar to that “which accounts for so much of the Indian deficit. The United States “form a favourite field for investment of English capital, the interest of “which is paid by America in the form of exports of produce. Yet we “never heard an American citizen complain that his country was being “drained of its wealth for the benefit of foreigners. He is only anxious “ to borrow as much English capital as he can, knowing that, invested “ in reproductive works, it will repay him a hundredfold the paltry rate “ of interest he has to send abroad.”
To these remarks of Mr. Maclean I reply, that he has taken his figures from the “ Statesman’s Year Book.” This book has made curious mistakes. It has included bullion in the figures for exports of “ merchandize,” and again given bullion separately; and it has not converted the “ currency” value of exports of “ domestic produce” from the Atlantic port into gold. These two and some such other mistakes render this book’s figures for the years quoted above, taken by Mr. Maclean, utterly wrong. I give the following illustration of these mistakes in the figures for the year ending 30th June, 1871. The correct official figures are :—
| Merchandize | $14,421,270 |
| Gold and Silver | 14,038,629 |
| Total | $28,459,899 |
Exports.
| Merchandize. From Atlantic Ports. Currency Value. $464,300,771 … (equal to Gold Value) $414,826,393 | From Pacific Ports. Gold Value. $13,712,624 … | Specie and Bullion (Gold Value). From Atlantic Ports. From Pacific Ports. $76,187,027 … $8,318,229 Total…$84,505,256 |
| Total—Mixed Value, $562,518,651, equal to Gold Value, $513,044,273 |
Total Exports.
| Domestic Exports (Gold Value) | $513,044,273 |
| Re-Exports (Gold Value) | 28,459,899 |
| Total (Gold Value) | $541,504,172 |
Now, instead of the above correct official figure of $541,504,172 as the total exports from the United States (including bullion), the “ Statesman’s Book” makes “ merchandize” $590,978,550 and bullion $98,441,989, which I find to be made up as follows: It takes from the official returns total mixed value of domestic exports, $562,518,651, and then adds to it the total re-exports, $28,459,899, and makes the addition of these two figures as the total for “ merchandize”—viz., $590,978,550. It will be now seen by a comparison of these figures with the official ones, that the “currency” value of the domestic exports from the Atlantic ports is not converted into gold, and that though in the two official totals of $562,518,651 and $28,459,899, bullion is already included, the total of these in the “Statesman’s Book” is given for “merchandize” alone, and a further statement is given for bullion as $98,441,989, made up nearly of $84,505,256 of domestic exports and $14,038,629 of re-exports.
Mr. Maclean takes the total $590,978,550 of “merchandize” (which already includes bullion) and bullion over again, $98,543,885, and makes the exports $689,420,539, or 138,084,908l. It will thus be seen that his figure for 1871 contains bullion to the extent of $98,543,885, or 19,889,198l. taken twice, and the currency value of domestic produce exported from the Atlantic ports is not converted into gold value, making a further error of $49,474,378; or the total error in Mr. Maclean’s figure for exports for 1871 alone is $98,543,885 + 49,474,378 = $148,018,263, or nearly 31,000,000l. sterling at 50d. per $.
I take 50d. per $, as the Parliamentary Returns for Foreign States, No. XII., have taken this rate of exchange.
Mr. Maclean has given the figures for six years. I am not able to verify the figure for 1874, so I give a comparison of the official correct figures and his figures for the years ending June, 1869, to 1873.
The “Statesman’s Book’s” wrong figures :—
| IMPORTS. | EXPORTS. | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| Merchandize. | Bullion. | Merchandize. | Bullion. |
| 1869… $417,506,379 | $19,807,876 | 1869… $439,134,529 | $57,138,380 |
| 1870… 462,377,587 | 26,419,179 | 1870… 529,519,302 | 58,155,666 |
| 1871… 541,493,774 | 21,270,024 | 1871… 590,978,550 | 98,441,989 |
| 1872… 572,510,304 | 13,743,689 | 1872… 561,808,381 | 79,877,534 |
| 1873… 642,030,539 | 21,480,937 | 1873… 626,595,077 | 84,608,574 |
| $2,635,918,583 | $102,721,705 | $2,748,035,839 | $378,222,143 |
| Add… 102,721,705 | … | Add… 378,222,143 | … |
| Total $2,738,640,288 | $3,126,257,982 | ||
| 2,738,640,288 | |||
| $387,617,694, Excess of Exports. | |||
Mr. Maclean’s total error for the five years, 1869 to 1873, is therefore $278,552,110 + 387,617,694 = $666,169,804 = 138,785,000l., at 50d. per $; or $133,233,961 = 27,757,000l. per annum.
In making, however, a comparison between the trade returns of India and the United States, there is one important matter to be considered, and when taken into account, as it ought to be, the imports of the United States will be some 16 per cent. more than they are above shown to be. In India the exports are declared at the value at the port of export. It is the same with the United States. The imports in India are declared at the “wholesale cash price less trade discount”† at the port of import, which means the value at the foreign port of export, plus freight, insurance, and other charges to the Indian port of import, and also plus 10 per cent. for profits. This is the principle on which the imports are declared in the Custom Houses in India when the tariff value is not already fixed, or the market price not agreed upon by the importer and the Custom House. But in the case of the United States the declared value‡ of imports is only the value declared at the foreign port from which the merchandize was exported, which means without adding the cost of freight, insurance and other charges, and 10 per cent. profits. Now Mr. Edward Young, the “Chief of the Bureau of Statistics, Treasury Department" of the United States, calculates 6 per cent. as representing the freight from foreign ports to America.
This 6 per cent. for freight (without taking the further additional charges for insurance, commission, &c., into account), together with the 10 per cent. as calculated in India for declaration for imports, makes it necessary to add 16 per cent. to the imports of the United States, before the actual excess of imports of the United States, on the principle adopted in India, can be ascertained and compared with that of India. In that case the actual excess of imports over exports in the United States will be $717,774,734 = 149,536,403l.† for the five years, 1869 to 1873, or $143,554,947 = 29,907,280l. per annum. Thus the correct result about the United States (on the principle of the Indian Custom House) is that, instead of there being an excess of exports of 15,000,000l. sterling per annum, there is actually an excess of imports of double that amount, or nearly 30,000,000l. sterling; thus making a difference between Mr. Maclean’s and the correct figures of nearly 45,000,000l. sterling per annum.
Mr. Maclean clearly admits my most important statements; he says: “It has been estimated that the amount of the annual earnings “of Englishmen connected with India which are thus transmitted “home cannot be less than 20,000,000l., and we should be inclined to “place it at a very much higher figure.”‡
Again: “To decrease these (home remittances) by clipping establish- “ments, or rather re-framing on an economical basis, by never employing “other than natives of this country‡ except when good policy and “public convenience demand it, and, if possible, by establishing some “check on the extravagant follies of the Secretary of State, should be “the task of the Indian Government.”
| † Total Imports | $2,745,141,403 |
| Add 16 per cent. | 439,222,624 |
| $3,184,364,027 | |
| Deduct Exports…… | 2,466,589,293 |
This is just what I say, that there is an enormous transfer of the wealth of this country to England, and the remedy is the employment of Natives only, beyond the exigencies of the British rule. But for this single circumstance, his remarks about the United States would apply to India perfectly well—viz., “He (the American) is only anxious to “borrow as much English capital as he can, knowing that, invested in “reproductive works, it will repay him a hundredfold the paltry rate of “interest he has to send abroad.”
The Indian will do just the same; but while the American derives the full benefit of what he borrows, the Indian, borrowing with one hand, has to give the money away to England with the other hand in these “home remittances” of Englishmen and “home charges,” getting for himself the burden only of the debt. The very idea of comparing the circumstances and condition of the United States and India as being similar, is simply absurd; on this point another reason will be given further on.
I will now answer Mr. Shapoorjee, who says India is in the same boat with the United States. In support of his assertion, he says the United States have foreign debts of about 1,625,000,000l. I requested him to show me any official or sufficiently reliable authority for these figures, and he shows me none.
Had Mr. Shapoorjee read my papers carefully, he would not have said a word about America’s public debt, for he would have seen that I have excluded from my total of imports and exports those very years in which the United States contracted nearly the whole of its public debt (1863 to 1866). Again, Mr. Shapoorjee tells us that the railways of the United States “could not have cost “less than 20,000l. a mile,” while the “Railway Manual” for 1873-4, which he has kindly lent me, gives the average cost at $55,116, and the “Statesman’s Book” gives $50,000 a-mile. This is about 10,000l. to 11,000l., or nearly half of Mr. Shapoorjee’s figure; and thus nearly half of his “850,000,000l., if not more,” of foreign capital for railways disappears. Now I give one more reason why Mr. Shapoorjee’s figure of 1,625,000,000l. sterling as the present foreign debt of the United States cannot be accepted. Mr. Edward Young, whom I have already mentioned,—the highest official authority on the Treasury statistics of the United States,—calculates and gives (in his official “Monthly reports on the Commerce and Navigation of the “United States for the year ending June 30, 1874,” page 352) his own personal and unofficial estimate of the “aggregate foreign debts “of the United States.” He says; “Although there were no national “securities held abroad at the commencement of our late war, yet some “of the bonds of the commonwealth of Pennsylvania, and probably of “Massachusetts and other States, as well as railroad shares and securi- “ties, were owned in Europe. In the absence of accurate data on the “subject, it is believed that $50,000,000 is an ample estimate for these “ante bellum securities. With this addition, our aggregate foreign debt “amounts to nearly twelve hundred million dollars.” Such is Mr. Young’s estimate of the aggregate debts, “national, State, municipal, and “corporation, held in foreign countries”—i.e., $1,200,000,000—when Mr. Shapoorjee asks us to take the figures nearly seven times larger;— 1,625,000,000l. equal to $7,800,000,000. I trust I may be excused for not accepting his figures, and his conclusions based thereon. Again, Mr. Shapoorjee has been good enough to give me an extract from the Westminster Review of January 1876. This extract gives (in 1875) the national production of the United Kingdom as 28l. per head of population, of the United States as 28l. per head, and of Russia as 7l. 10s. per head; France, 22l.; Austria, 18l.; and Italy, 15l.; while India hardly produces 2l. a-head. The simple fact, then, that the United States is the second richest country in the world, and its people have all their revenues and resources at their own command and for their own benefit only, is enough to show that it is simply absurd and idle to compare it, in its circumstances and condition, as being in the same boat with the half-starving and ever-draining India. When the Americans are subjected to a “home remittance” to a foreign country of some “very much higher figure” than 20,000,000l. sterling a-year, and “home charges,” and when a large number of foreigners engross all official and important positions to their own exclusion, causing thereby such heavy drain, then will be the proper time to make a comparison between America and India.
The comparison with Russia and other European States is equally unreasonable. In spite of the inferior administration of Russia, and the great military expenditure, its national income is nearly four times as much as that of India, a nd that of the other European States is much larger still; and they have no “home remittances and charges” to remit, which India has to do from its wretched income of hardly 2l. per head per annum.
Mr. Schrottky misunderstands me when he thinks that in the present ssion about the material condition of India, I mention the necessity of the employment of natives as anything more than the only remedy by which the capital of the country can be saved to itself, to enable the agricultural as well as all other industries to get the necessary lifeblood for their maintenance and progress. If it were possible that every European coming to India would make it his home, so that the item of the “home remittances and charges” would be nearly eliminated, it would not matter at all, as far as the present question of the material prosperity of the country is concerned, whether the European or the Native is in office. The only remedy is, that either the Europeans must, like the Mahomedan conquerors, become Natives and remain in the country, or remain out of office beyond the exigency of the British rule. If not, then it is idle to hope that India can rise in material prosperity, or be anything else but a wretched drudge for England’s benefit. On the other hand, a natural and just policy would make India, with its teeming population, the best customer for England, and the best field for England’s enterprise, and its agriculture would derive all the aid which Mr. Schrottky could desire in the goodness of his heart.
To Mr. Trant I have only to say that his political economy may be applicable to a Native-governed country, but when he takes the element of the “home remittances and charges” into account, he will not differ much from me.
In reply to Mr. Collett’s remarks, I have to request him to take several elements into account which he appears to have forgotten.
1. To add 15 per cent. profits to exports. (During the American War, the percentage of profits on the exported produce was very much larger.)
| The United Kingdom | 25 per cent. | (1858 to 1870) |
| Australia | 15 „ „ | (1858 to 1868) |
| British North America | 29 „ „ | (1858 to 1868) |
| United States (as under) | 18 „ „ | (1869 to 1873) |
| Imports | $2,745,141,403 | |
| Add 6 per cent. Freight (leaving other charges)— Commission, Insurance, &c.—alone | 164,708,484 | |
| $2,909,849,887 | ||
| Deduct Exports | 2,466,589,293 | |
| Excess of Imports or Profits—say 18 per cent. above Exports | $443,260,594 | |
- 2. To deduct from import nearly 140,000,000l. of foreign debt (public and railway) incurred during the eighteen years he has taken.
- 3. To remember that the profits of opium as well as of all India’s commerce are as much India’s property and resources as the profits in coal, iron, and all other exported produce and manufactures of England are England’s property and resources, though all such profits are derived from foreign nations; and that all the profits of opium and general commerce of India are included in my total production of India.
- 4. To remember that, notwithstanding that opium and the profits of commerce are legitimate property and resources of India, even after deducting these amounts, or that, in addition to these amounts being sent away to England, there is the further amount of about 200,000,000l. in principal alone gone to England during the thirty-eight years I have taken; and that Mr. Collett has not pointed out any mistake in my calculations.
For his eighteen years also, if he will take the items he has forgotten, his results will not differ from mine.
| For 1858 to 1875 his figure for Exports is | £910,995,000 |
| Add 15 per cent. Profits | 136,649,250 |
| Total proceeds of Exports | £1,047,644,250 |
| His Imports are | £764,310,000 |
| Deduct Loans Imported, about | 140,000,000 |
| Actual Commercial Imports (including Government Store)… | £624,310,000 |
| Excess of proceeds of Exports | £423,334,250 |
| Deduct Railway Interest | 51,133,987 |
| Transfer to England from India’s resources (excluding Interest on Railway Loans) | 372,200,263 |
| This transfer is equal to the whole of the Opium Revenue | £108,156,107 |
| The whole of profits on Exports | 136,649,250 |
| And furthermore, from India’s resources | 127,394,906 |
or nearly 130,000,000l. in addition to the railway interest. The actual transfer is even larger than this, as will be seen further on.
Mark, then, during Mr. Collett’s eighteen years all opium revenue, all profits of commerce and guaranteed interest on railways, are transferred to England, and 130,000,000l., besides making a total, in principal alone, of 424,000,000l., or 372,000,000l. excluding railway interest. Moreover, it must be remembered that during the American War great profits were made, and this having to be added to the exports, is so much more transferred to England.
Thus, as Mr. Collett’s figures are imperfect, I need not trouble the meeting with any comments on the confusion into which he has fallen on account thereof. I have taken his own figures and shown what they lead to, as the best way of pointing out his mistake.
Thanks to my critics, they have led me into a closer examination of some points, and I find the case of India worse than what I have already made out, I have to modify some of my figures, which I now do.
I have shown that the imports into India (including bullion) from 1835 to 1872 are 943,000,000l. Now, in making out a nation’s balancesheet with foreign countries, the balance of profit should be taken between the price of exports at the port of export, and the price of imports as laid down or costing at the port of import, and not the market price at the place of import, which include the profit on the import obtained in the importing country itself.
I may illustrate thus: I laid out Rs. 1,000 in cotton and sent it to England. There it realized proceeds, say, Rs. 1,150. This may be remitted to me in silver, so that when the transaction is completed, I receive into my hands Rs. 1,150, in the place of Rs. 1.000 which I had first laid out, so that the country has added Rs. 150 thereby to its capital. But suppose, instead of getting silver, I imported, say, ten bales of piece goods which were laid down in Bombay for Rs. 1,150. The gain to the country so far is the same in both cases—an addition of Rs. 150. But any gain to me after that in the sale of these piece goods in India itself is no gain to India. Suppose I sold these goods for Rs. 1,300. That simply means that I had these goods and another person had Rs. 1,300, and we simply exchanged. The country has no addition made to its already existing property. It is the same—viz., the ten bales of piece goods and Rs. 1,300; only they have changed hands. Bearing this in mind, and also that the declared value of imports into India is not the laying down price, but the market† price, which means the laying down price plus 10 per cent. profit, it is necessary, for ascertaining the real profits from the foreign commerce of India, to deduct 10 per cent. from the declared value of imports (merchandize). Doing this the total imports from 1835 to 1872 should be taken at 943,000,000l., minus 62,000,000l., which will be equal to 881,000,000l. In that case the real deficit of imports under what the imports ought to have been (1,438,000,000l.) will be 557,000,000l. in place of the nearly 500,000,000l. I have given in my paper.
The figure of the amount, after deducting opium and profits of commerce, will be 248,000,000l. instead of nearly 200,000,000l.; or the total transfer of wealth to England in addition to the railway interest (40,000,000l.) will be 517,000,000l., instead of 453,000,000l. given in my paper, and the yearly average of every five years of this amount of 517,000,000l. will be proportionately larger—about 13 per cent. The averages will be about—
| 1835 to 1839 | £6,000,000 |
| 1840 to 1844 | 6,600,000 |
| 1845 to 1849 | 8,700,000 |
| 1850 to 1854 | 8,400,000 |
| 1855 to 1859 | 8,700,000 |
| † 1860 to 1864 | 19,000,000 |
| 1865 to 1869 | 27,500,000 |
| 1870 to 1872 | 31,000,000 |
This average during the American War would be much increased if the whole profits on the exported produce of the time could be ascertained.
In preparing this reply I have had to work out all the figures hurriedly, but I hope they will be found correct.
I have not seen the late Administration Reports, but I trust they give fuller details than the previous ones with which I had to deal, and if so, more precise results could be obtained as to the actual annual production of the country, which is the most important point to be settled to give us an accurate knowledge of the actual poverty or otherwise of this country.
Since I wrote the above I purchased a copy of the latest Administration Report of Bengal (1874–5) in the hope of obtaining from it some more definite statistics about production than I have been able to embody in my paper. Great was my disappointment when I read Sir R. Temple’s statement: “Again, the survey embraced only the exterior bound- “aries of each village or parish, and afforded no details of cultiva- “tion and waste, culturable or unculturable.” The question at issue is a simple matter of facts and science. Is there so much cultivated land or not? is there so much produce or not? and are such and such the prices or not? And then common arithmetic gives you certain results. No amount of indirect reasoning or assumption can falsify facts and arithmetic, and make 2 and 2 equal 5. So far as the official statistics are imperfect, it is the duty of the Government to give to the public full details. We know the national production of other countries, and there is no reason why the Indian Government should not be able to give us similar important information. That would be the best and surest guide and test of the actual condition of the people of India, and our rulers would see from them their way clearly to the most proper and effectual remedies. I have not the least doubt in my mind that if the English Government once clearly see the evil, they will not shrink from applying the proper remedies. My estimate of 40s. a-head has been accepted and argued upon by an Under-Secretary of State (Mr. G. Duff) and a Viceroy (Lord Mayo), and another Viceroy (Lord Lawrence) has told us that the mass of the people are half-fed. It is not the question of the ordinary proportion of the poor in every country. Mr. Grant Duff, in his reply to Mr. Lawson, asked whether the “already poor population of India” was to be ground down to the very “dust” by the removal of the opium duty. So the margin between the present condition of India and of being ground down “to the very “dust” is only the opium revenne. Is this prosperity? I have been lately reading the expression, “balance in favour of India.” The writers evidently suppose that what they call the balance of trade in favour of India was something that India had to receive some time or other. They do not seem to understand that of all the deficit of import against the proceeds of export, not a single pie in cash or goods is to be received by India; that, similarly, of all the excess of imports in all the other parts of the British Empire to the extent of 15 to 25 per cent. over exports, or 18 per cent. in the United States, not a single farthing has to be paid to any country. It is, in fact, the profit of their exports and the deficit of India is so much transfer of its wealth to England.
Mr. Dadabhai concluded by thanking the meeting for extending so much indulgence to him, and the many gentlemen who had come forward to join in the discussion. When they first met in that hall, their fear was that they would have none to oppose or to criticise the paper; but he was agreeably surprised to find that it had been criticised by so many, and he was sure that this would bring out the real truth, and he hoped that in future his critics would exert their influence to make India some thing like the United States. (“ Hear, hear,” and cheers.)
THE REMEDY.
When I wrote these notes in 1873, or read them in 1876, I little dreamt that they would so soon obtain such terrible confirmation as the present deplorable famines have given them.
The chief cause of India’s poverty, misery, and all material evils, is the exhaustion of its previous wealth, the continuously increasing exhausting and weakening drain from its annual production by the very excessive expenditure on the European portion of all its services, and the burden of a large amount a year to be paid to foreign countries for interest on the public debt, which is chiefly caused by the British rule.
The obvious remedy is to allow India to keep what it produces, and to help it as much as it lay in the power of the British nation to reduce her burden of the interest on the public debt; with a reasonable provision for the means absolutely necessary for the maintenance of the British rule.
For this purpose it is necessary, on the one hand, to limit within a certain amount, the total of every kind of expenditure (pay, pensions and every possible kind of allowance), for the European portion of all the services both in England and India, directly or indirectly connected with or under the control of Government (including, therefore, guaranteed railways or other works, manufactures, local funds, &c.); and to guarantee the public debt; and on the other hand, for the important political object of maintaining the British rule, to reserve by law for Europeans alone, such places of power as may be absolutely necessary for the purpose with a fair proportion of the army, within the limited amount of expenditure for the European portion of all the services.
Under some judicious arrangement of the kind I propose, the people of India, being allowed to keep most of what they produced, will rise in material prosperity under, what is upon the whole, a good system of administration, blessing the hand that gave such prosperity, and increasing the benefit to the English people also manifold, by the extensive commercial relations that must necessarily be then developed between England and India: and all fears of any danger to the British rule will be dispelled, both from the gratitude, loyalty, and self-interest of the people of India, and from the possession of important posts of power and a fair portion of the army by Europeans alone. Then will Macaulay’s words be verified to the glory of England, as also to her benefit:—
“We shall never consent to administer the pousta to a whole community, to stupefy andalyse a great people whom God has committed to our charge;” and we shall not “keep a hundred millions (two hundred millions), of men from being our customers, in order that they might continue to be our slaves.”
Notes
- . Monthly Reports on the Commerce and Navigation of the United States, by the Chief of the Bureau of Statistics, for the year ending 30th June 1871, p. 386.
- . Monthly Reports on Commerce and Navigation of the United States, by Edward Young, Ph. D., Chief of the Bureau of Statistics, for the year ending 30th June 1874, p. 177.
- †. Customs Act (6) of 1863, section 180, also inquiry at the Custom House, gave 10 per cent. to be added on the importer’s invoice, or 20 per cent. on the manufacturer’s invoice.
- ‡. Annual Report of Commerce and Navigation, 1873, says (p. 3) : “Import “entries : sworn specie values at foreign places of export.”
- . Monthly Reports for the year ending 30th June, 1874, p. 352: “The value “of the imports of merchandize, as presented in the first table, being those at the “ports of shipment, it will be proper to add thereto the amount of freights to the “several ports of the United States . . . it is believed that 6 per cent. on the total “value of imports is an estimate of approximate accuracy.”
- †. Excess of Imports …$717,774,734, at 50d., for five years = £149,536,403 Average per annum $143,554,947, at 50d. = £29,907,280.
- ‡. The italics are mine.
- . For the following countries the profits, or excess of imports over exports, are as under, subject to modification for foreign debts or loans :— (East India Association Journal, vol. ix., No. 4, page 263.)
- . East India Association Journal, vol. ix., No. 4, p. 264.
- †. See the first note at page 149.
- . Imports—merchandize, 1834-5 to 1872, 618,000,000l., 10 per cent. of which is nearly 62,000,000l.
- †. I could not find the amount of enfaced paper given for every year before 1860. I have, therefore, taken the whole amount in 1860, which increases the average for 1860-64, and correspondingly diminishes the average of the previous years, but not to a large extent.