Introduction

The English Factories in India, 1622–1623, William Foster, 1908 · from page vii · about 67 minutes

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At the close of the last volume we left an English fleet, consisting of five ships and four pinnaces, under Captains Blyth and Weddell, on its way from Surat to Jask. Its mission was to convey to the factors in Persia a stock of goods and money, and to bring back a large quantity of silk which they were expected to have ready on its arrival. Fighting was not expressly included in the programme, but it was likely enough to be necessary, for Ruy Freire was known to be in or near the Gulf with a squadron of war-vessels, and it was his avowed object to destroy the nascent trade between the English and the Persians.

The fleet reached its destination on December 14, 1621, but, in obedience to a message received from the factors, moved at once to Kuhistak, a port considerably nearer to Gombroon. There the two captains found Edward Monnox, then chief in Persia, awaiting them with several of his colleagues. Monnox had fallen under the displeasure of his employers, who had decreed his removal from his post. Robert Jeffries had therefore been sent in this fleet to replace him; but he had died during the voyage, and William Bell was appointed to the vacancy. Monnox embarked in the fleet with no definite position; but his experience and vigorous personality lent great weight to his counsel, and there is little doubt that he was practically the guiding spirit in the momentous decisions that were soon taken.

The Persians and the Portuguese were now at open war, and the latter had played havoc along the coast, burning the port towns and destroying the boats of the unhappy inhabitants, whom Shāh Abbās could do nothing to protect. With regard to offensive operations, the Persians were equally helpless. Even supposing they could make any impression on the fortifications of Ormus, they must first solve the problem of how to maintain a besieging army on that barren island while Ruy Freire's ships commanded the sea. It was true that they had attempted something of the kind on the neighbouring island of Kishm, where they were blockading the fort which the Portuguese had constructed opposite to Ormus to facilitate the dispatch of water and supplies to that place; but Kishm was a much larger island, and afforded plenty of subsistence. However, even there matters were going none too well for the Persians, and the Khān of Shīrāz, whom Shāh Abbās had placed in general charge of the operations, must have been watching with some anxiety the course of events.

The arrival of a strong English fleet promised a means of escaping from his difficulties and of turning the scale against the common enemy. He at once applied to the commanders to join in the attack on Kishm and Ormus, offering all sorts of inducements, and at the same time hinting that, should they refuse to help in a war which had been largely provoked by the favour shown to their nation by Shāh Abbās, the privileges already granted would be withdrawn, and their silk, then on its way down to the coast, would be confiscated. Blyth and Weddell were in a dilemma. On the one hand, it would be a strong measure to join a ‘heathen’ power in attacking the possessions of a European prince who was at this time on particularly good terms with England; and Sir Walter Ralegh's fate afforded a warning of the readiness with which King James could throw over his subjects when vigorously pressed from Madrid. True, the English and Portuguese had been fighting in the East ever since the former appeared in Indian waters; but these struggles had not gone beyond capturing, or endeavouring to capture, the ships of both parties; and when, in a similar case, an English commander (Downton) had been asked to join in an assault on a Portuguese fort, he had refused on the ground that he had no authority to undertake such a business. Moreover, to pit merchant vessels against two strong fortresses, to say nothing of Ruy Freire's galleons, was to hazard considerable loss, and the Company at home was notoriously pacific and likely to disapprove of any warlike operations not actually thrust upon its servants. In any case stores and provisions would be spent, ammunition wasted, and time lost, with the result that the intended voyage of Weddell's fleet to Sumatra and Java might have to be abandoned. On the other hand, a refusal to co-operate meant the loss of their silk and the destruction of the trade which had been so painfully built up during the past five years, and from which so much was expected.

The question was long debated. An attempt was made to find an excuse for compliance in the instructions given to the commanders at Surat; but these seem to have been rather vague, and as a matter of fact the President and Council afterwards denied strenuously that they had ever contemplated any action of the sort. In the end, owing largely to the arguments of Monnox, it was decided to undertake the enterprise and to endeavour to remove once for all the menace of Portuguese supremacy in the Persian Gulf.

An agreement was quickly concluded with the Khān. Its principal conditions were (1) that the spoils should be equally divided; (2) that the yield of the customs duties at Ormus, when taken, should be shared in future between the two nations, the English being for ever customs-free; (3) that Christians captured should be at the disposal of our countrymen, those of other faiths being left to the Persians; and (4) that the Khān should defray half of the expenses for victuals, &c., caused by the detention of the ships.1 The English had further demanded the cession of the castle, but the Persians refused to agree to more than a joint occupation pending the decision of the Shāh. Some trouble was next experienced in persuading the sailors to take part in the enterprise, they ‘alleaging it was no merchandizing businesse, nor were they hired for any such exploit’. Fighting was all very well, but, if they got killed or maimed, who would compensate them or theirs? However, by means of threats and persuasions (including a promise of a month’s extra pay) the malcontents were silenced; and on January 19, 1622, after embarking the silk (lest the Persians should play them false after all), the ships put out to sea. On the 22nd they anchored off Ormus, where the Portuguese squadron, consisting of five galleons, two small ships and a number of frigates, rode under the shelter of the castle. The English had some hopes that the enemy would come out and settle matters in a straightforward encounter; but as no sign appeared of any such intention, they passed on to Kishm, and anchored off the Portuguese castle, where Ruy Freire was commanding in person. The latter at once realized the danger of his position; he was already hard pressed by the besieging Persians, and now that they had been reinforced by the English fleet further resistance was wellnigh hopeless. In response to his overtures for a parley, Monnox went on shore to negotiate terms of surrender. The crucial point of these was the disposal of Ruy Freire's native allies, who were held to be for the most part revolted subjects of the Shah. These the English could not undertake to protect, as under the agreement they were to be handed over to the Persian general; and 'rather then wee will doe that,' said the generous Ruy Freire, 'wee will ende our lives togeather.' To smooth matters over, Monnox obtained from the Persian commander a promise that the lives of the native prisoners should be spared; but evidently Ruy Freire put no faith in such verbal undertakings, and on Monnox's return with this offer he was politely dismissed. Thereupon the English ships bombarded the castle, but they could not get near enough to do much damage. Consequently five guns were landed and a battery constructed, the fire from which soon made a practicable breach; and thereupon the Portuguese surrendered. Ruy Freire and his chief subordinates were taken on board the ships, much to the chagrin of the Persian general, who wished to send them prisoners to his sovereign; the wounded Portuguese were transported to Ormus, and the remainder to Muskat and Suhār; while the natives were made over to the Persians, who put most of them to death. The English casualties had been trifling—three men killed and two wounded; but among the former was William Baffin, master of the London, a skilled navigator whose name is writ large in the history of Arctic exploration. He was directing the battery on shore, 'taking the height and distance of the castle wall, for the better leavelling of his peece to make his shot; but as he was about the same, he received a small shot from the castle into his belly, wherewith he gave three leapes (by report) and died immediatly' (Purchas, vol. ii. p. 1792).

Possession was taken of the castle on February 1, when a Persian garrison was installed, with four Englishmen to keep up the fiction of a joint occupation. Three days later the fleet stood over to Gombroon, to prepare for the larger enterprise of attacking Ormus itself. The Lion, which was under orders for a voyage to Mokha, was dispatched to Surat, with the pinnaces Rose and Richard, carrying Ruy Freire and the other prisoners, with letters explaining the course of events1; and on February 9 the remaining ships anchored off Ormus. The next day a large force of Persian soldiers, under the Imām Qulī Beg, was landed, who took possession of the city and drove the Portuguese into their castle, which stood in a strong position on a spit of land projecting into the sea. It was arranged that the Persians should attack from the side of the city, while the English bombarded the castle and ships from the sea and from a battery they constructed on land. On the 24th the San Pedro, the largest of the galleons, was set ablaze by a fire boat and drifted out to sea a ruined carcass. The Persians mined vigorously, with powder obtained from the British, and on March 17 they blew up a part of the wall, making a considerable breach; whereupon they gave a vigorous assault, but were repulsed. Meanwhile the English had battered the fortifications and the vessels sheltering under them, until, one by one, the latter were destroyed. The garrison now found its situation desperate; no succour was to be expected from Goa or elsewhere; the next assault would probably be successful, and then a general massacre at the hands of the victorious Persians was to be feared. It was decided, therefore, to surrender to the English, and after some negotiations terms were arranged. On April 23 the Portuguese flag fluttered down, after waving for more than a century over Albuquerque's castle, and Ormus was erased for ever from the list of the Eastern possessions of Portugal. On the English side only twenty lives had been lost, but the Persians' casualties are set down at a thousand. The luckless garrison, numbering with women and children about 3,000, was dispatched by the English to Muskat and Suhār.2 Upon the surrender of the stronghold a general pillage ensued, in which the Persians, as the more numerous party, easily bore away the palm. At the outset of operations the plunder of the city had been fairly distributed; but the amount was not large, as the Portuguese had secured most of their valuables in the castle. Now, however, there was a wild scramble, in which, according to one statement (O. C. 1173), the Persians got ten times as much as their allies. What the latter did manage to secure as the Company's share1 had perforce to be sold at low prices, owing to the small number of buyers available; and the net result was about 18,000l. in money and ten brass guns, while against this had to be set the expense and loss of time caused by the three months' operations. Nor were the other conditions of the agreement better observed. The Persians refused to divide the ordnance with the English, maintaining that it must be left in the castle for purposes of joint defence; and they also objected to any Englishmen remaining in the fortress unless the commanders would undertake to leave two ships on guard there. Further they presented a bill, for water, provisions, &c., supplied to the fleet, that left but little balance in the account of the Persian share of the ships' expenses. On the whole, the conviction was general in the fleet that the English had been shamefully treated. One observer reported that the sailors were longing for an opportunity for paying off the score by attacking their quondam allies; and when the Shāh's general applied to the commanders to complete their work by attacking Muskat the refusal was as emphatic as politeness would allow.

It may easily be imagined what a sensation was caused in the dominions of King Philip by the news that Ormus—the most lucrative of the Portuguese possessions in the East—had fallen to a combined attack by the Persians and the English. The intelligence reached Madrid a little before Christmas, 1622, and Lord Digby, the English ambassador, was at once asked for explanations. He smoothed the matter over as well as he could; and, after communicating with his government, assured the Spanish ministers that the East India Company's servants had acted under compulsion from the Persians. Fortunately, the arrival of Prince Charles to woo the Infanta in person engrossed the attention of every one at Madrid, with the result that all embarrassing questions were relegated to the background; while the strained relations, and final rupture, that followed the abandonment of the match prevented any further diplomatic discussion on the subject. The Madrid government, moreover, was not without hopes that the loss of the fortress was merely temporary, for on receipt of the news urgent instructions had been sent to Goa for its speedy recapture. However, the Viceroy had not the means at hand for a resolute effort, and though Ruy Freire hovered for a long time round Ormus, harassing the Persian garrison and effectually preventing any trade, he found no opportunity for attacking it with any prospect of success.

Yet the East India Company was not destined to escape scot-free. The rumour of vast spoils taken from the Portuguese had attracted the attention of King James and his favourite Buckingham, with the result that inquiries were set on foot as to the value of the captures made by the Company's servants, not only at Ormus but also in other parts of the East during recent years. These were declared to have amounted to 100,000l., and Buckingham, as Lord High Admiral, claimed one-tenth as his lawful right. The Company, however, had already, at the suggestion of the King, presented 2,000l. to the Duchess of Buckingham, and they were in no mood to give more unless they were forced. They obtained legal opinion that nothing was due, even by custom, inasmuch as their ships had not acted under letters of marque issued by the Duke; but the reply was that the goods were either taken by piracy from a friendly nation or lawfully as a matter of reprisal; that in the latter case the Lord High Admiral must have his dues, while in the former the Company would be open to an action at law of a most serious nature. As this reasoning failed to convince, Buckingham early in 1624 made stay of the Company's ships, under the pretext that they were needed for service against Spain, and further commenced an action in the Court of Admiralty. These drastic steps had the desired effect, and the 10,000l. was paid to the Duke. At the same time King James had to be placated with the gift of a similar amount. ‘Did I deliver you from the complaint of the Spaniard, and do you return me nothing?’ was his indignant question when the Company respectfully demurred; and in view of the necessity of retaining the royal favour, it was judged expedient to comply with the demand, unjust though it was.1 In return, a formal grant was made to the Company of all goods taken by its servants in the Eastern seas, with a pardon to every one concerned in the accompanying hostilities.2

Nor was the loss of Ormus the only blow that Portugal sustained at the hands of her active rivals at this time. We noted in the previous volume the dispatch from Batavia in the autumn of 1621 of an Anglo-Dutch fleet to cruise against the Portuguese on the Malabar coast. A Dutchman, Jacob Dedel, was leader, with an English captain, Humphrey Fitzherbert, as second in command. They started early in October, 1621, and, after a brief stay at the Nassau Islands, shaped their course towards Mauritius, intending to intercept the Goa carracks homeward bound; but bad weather and sickness frustrated their plans and forced them to make for the Comoros, where they arrived in February, 1622. Fitzherbert had died on the voyage, and Captain Michael Green had been elected to his post. In June the squadron sailed for the African mainland, for the purpose of meeting the Portuguese fleet expected from Europe. A small ship was taken and burnt a little to the northward of Mozambique; and on July 13, sailing southwards, the English and Dutch espied three carracks and a galleon making towards them. These proved to belong to the fleet carrying out to Goa the new Viceroy, Dom Francisco da Gama, Conde de la Vidigueyra. An action followed, which resulted in the Portuguese vice-admiral being driven ashore a hopeless wreck; while her consorts did their best to escape into Mozambique. In this they succeeded, but in the running fight they were so severely handled that both the admiral and the rear-admiral stranded inside the harbour and were lost. The Viceroy and the crews managed to get on land, and at a later date proceeded to Cochin and so to Goa. From one of the wrecked vessels a sum of about 68,000 rials of eight was taken, and this was equally divided between the English and the Dutch. A second visit was now paid to the Comoro Islands, and in August the fleet sailed for the coast of India. On the way the Dutch ships lost company, with the result that their allies wasted a month in looking for them. Towards the end of October the reunited squadron anchored at Swally to provision and refit, sailing again on November 22. Goa was reached at the beginning of December, and from that date till March 9, 1623, a strict blockade was maintained. Then, all chance being gone of the Portuguese sending a vessel to Europe that season, the fleet departed for Batavia, arriving there on June 10.1 Apart from the material losses sustained by the Portuguese, the humiliation of seeing their principal settlement blockaded for three months was keenly felt, and the Spanish King severely censured the unfortunate Viceroy for not taking measures to prevent it (Feb. 24, 1624; see Lisbon Transcripts at I. O.: Books of the Monsoons, vol. vi.).

If the year 1622 was full of bitterness for ‘the Portugals of Goa’, it brought also trouble and alarm to their English rivals. These difficulties were almost entirely the result of the retaliatory measures taken by our countrymen at sea to redress their losses on shore. Thus, towards the close of 1621, President Rastell and his Council had boldly tried a fall with the Surat authorities by causing a considerable sum of money to be taken out of the Prince’s junk to satisfy their claim against Malik Ambar; with the result that they had been turned out of their factory and compelled to seek refuge with the Dutch until a reconciliation was effected by the English surrendering their booty. Similarly, trouble had been caused at Ahmadābād and Cambay by Safī Khān laying an embargo on the goods the factors were preparing to send to Surat. The reason he gave for acting thus was that the English had appropriated 23,000 lārīs of his found in a Portuguese prize; and, after many vain protests, the factors were forced to give bills for the refund of the money. Thereupon the goods were released and safely passed down to Surat.1 The respite, however, was a short one. In March, 1622, some native merchants preferred a fresh claim on account of money alleged to have been taken in a junk of Chaul; and although the English answered that this vessel had been captured not by them but by the Dutch, reply was made 'that wee weare joyned as one, and that all wee tooke or stoole wee shared'. By April 7 the factors had convinced Rustam Khān, the Governor of Ahmadābād, that, in the dominions of the Great Mogul at all events, the two nations were trading independently; yet when, a few days later, Halstead, the English chief, went to complain that his colleague and their broker had been seized and kept prisoners by one of the aggrieved merchants, Rustam Khān ordered him to be arrested as well. When, however, the discussion was renewed next morning in open darbār, the Governor was in a better frame of mind, declared that the Dutch were the only culprits, and ordered the English to be released on giving security. On May 24 a new Governor arrived, in the person of the Rājā Vikramājīt, who was more favourably disposed towards the English factors and lent them assistance, though with many intimations of the presents he expected in return.

The troubles at Ahmadābād were, however, light in comparison with those at Agra. The latter originated in the capture of a frigate from Lārībandar (in Sind) by Bickley's squadron on its way to Persia in November, 1619. Under the pretext that, as there was a Portuguese pass on board, the goods probably belonged to merchants of that nation, the cargo was confiscated, though the vessel itself was released; but this hypothesis proved groundless, and the natives who had been thus despoiled, arming themselves with extracts from the customhouse records, made their way to Agra to seek justice at the hands of the Emperor. We find them there in the autumn of 1621, and Āsaf Khān advising the English factors to satisfy a claim which was evidently just. But 10,000 rupees—the amount demanded—was a large sum to part with except under the pressure of necessity; and, acting under instructions from Surat, the factors raised difficulties and protracted matters until Jahāngīr departed on another progress. The complainants, after vainly endeavouring to obtain justice from the Agra authorities (who were afraid to interfere in the dispute), followed the royal camp and once more addressed their petitions to Āsaf Khān. Worked upon by their complaints, and also, it would seem, by representations from Cambay and Ahmadābād, he completely lost patience with his English protégés. By his instructions, on the morning of January 5, 1622, Hughes and Parker, the only two Englishmen left at Agra, were made prisoners, and possession taken of their goods, money, and papers. After a few days' confinement they were released on giving security; but, in spite of all efforts, their property remained under sequestration. Appeals to Āsaf Khān proved useless, for his attention was engrossed by the illness and death of his father, the Itimād-uddaula; while the tardy acquiescence of the President and Council at Surat in the desirability of compounding with the Sind merchants was now of little service. In March the two factors wrote that they had at length received an answer from Āsaf Khān, but it was merely an angry refusal to restore their goods until full restitution had been made in Gujarāt. By his orders the Sind merchants were awarded Rs. 10,200 from the effects of the English, and after a time Hughes and Parker were again arrested and imprisoned in the Fort.

Meanwhile Robert Young and John Willoughby, who had been sent from Agra to Samāna at the beginning of December, 1621, had likewise found themselves in trouble. On hearing of the imprisonment of their colleagues they fled from Samāna to Sirhind. There, ignoring orders from Hughes to return to Agra, they decided to make for Lahore, and thence, if possible, journey overland to Persia. Young went on ahead, but on reaching Lahore he was at once seized by Āsaf Khān's wakīl. After a while he succeeded in obtaining his liberty, and rejoined Willoughby at Samāna. We next hear of him at Agra, where he arrived early in April, having dispatched Willoughby to the royal camp, apparently with letters soliciting the release of Hughes and Parker. No attempt seems to have been made to interfere with Young at Agra, and he was allowed to use the Company's house, though their goods still remained under seal. On May 16 intelligence reached Burhānpur that the other two factors had been allowed to return to their house under a guard; and on June 5 Hughes himself wrote that Willoughby had succeeded in obtaining from Āsaf Khān an order for their release and the restoration of the goods, &c., with the exception of the money paid or reserved for compensation to the merchants from Sind. The order took effect on May 26; and preparations were at once made for dissolving the factory, in obedience to orders received from Surat. Young had already departed for that place on May 14, and Parker started with a caravan of goods on June 4. Willoughby, who had been directed to remain at court for a while, was furnished with a supply of money, and told to secure his own safety;1 and Hughes wrote on August 1 that he himself was about to close the factory and make his way down to the coast. From that date we hear nothing of him, except a notice, in February, 1623, that he was then dead; and it seems probable that he died at Agra while preparing to depart.

The withdrawal from Agra was part of a general scheme for the concentration of the factors in Surat and neighbourhood with a view to carrying out the long-cherished plan of seizing the Indian junks returning from the Red Sea, and thus forcing a general redress of grievances. On March 26, 1622, the Lion and two pinnaces (the Rose and the Richard) were dispatched to Mokha, with Salbank and Heynes as the chief merchants; and orders were given to them to return in company with the junks and to be prepared to seize them when the word should be given. Meanwhile the factors at Agra, Ahmadābād, and Burhānpur were warned to close their operations and get down to Surat by the appointed day. As we have seen, the establishment at Agra was broken up in time; but at neither of the other two was it found possible to comply with the instructions. At Ahmadābād a caravan was prepared for Surat early in September, but was delayed in starting by heavy rain; and further trouble was caused by the illness of Nathaniel Halstead, the chief factor. He died on September 18 or 19, whereupon the authorities at once seized everything in the factory, under the pretence that it was the estate of an alien, and therefore forfeited to the State. Probably the English made some resistance, for they were beaten, and only escaped further ill-treatment by means of a bribe. Their appeals to the Emperor's farmān guaranteeing them peaceable possession of the goods of any of their number dying in the country were disregarded; they were forced to bury their deceased comrade attired only in their shirts and breeches; and the Rājā refused to release them and their goods until they had procured a certificate from the Governor of Surat that Halstead was really the Company's representative. Such outrageous treatment was likely to make the Ahmadābād factors sympathize fully in their Surat colleagues' complaint of 'the increased height of presente insolencie and our miserable thraldome', and their determination to become their own 'justiceres of wrongs and henderances sustaned' (pp. 79, 80).

The factors at Burhānpur had also been prevented from withdrawing with their goods by the date determined upon. The disturbed state of the country led to the stoppage of one caravan just outside Burhānpur, and to the seizure of another at Handiā. Owing to Bangham's exertions at Māndū, the release of both was obtained; but this caused great delay, and in November there was still a considerable quantity of goods in the hands of Hutchinson at Burhānpur. When, therefore, the Richard appeared off Swally, on September 11, to announce that the Surat junk was following, and to inquire whether she should be seized on arrival, Rastell and his colleagues were reluctantly compelled to forgo their intentions and to send word that no action should be taken; but they assured their friends at Batavia that 'our resolution still houlds; and the opertunytie, with our owne preparednes thereunto, doth promise us happie succese' (p. 167).

The fleet under Blyth and Weddell did not return from Persia until September 24, 1622, and then with crews much reduced by sickness. At the beginning of October, three ships—the Blessing, Reformation, and Discovery—arrived from England, under John Hall. They brought a stock of about 10,000l., and instructions for reducing the Persia trade unless more satisfactory privileges could be obtained (Court Minutes, January 23 and 25, 1622). For this purpose a royal letter was forwarded, in which King James begged the Shāh to remedy the merchants' grievances with respect to the extortions of his officials and the assaults of the Portuguese.1 To convey this letter to the factors, and to bring away any goods they might have ready, Captain Hall was dispatched on December 6 with two of his own ships—the Blessing and the Reformation—and two of Weddell's—the Whale and the Dolphin—besides the pinnace Primrose. Blyth in the London, and Weddell with the Jonas and the Lion, went home to England with rich cargoes. The Discovery was sent, in company with the pinnace Rose, to the Fleet of Defence before Goa, whence the former was to continue her voyage to Batavia. Meanwhile Heynes and other factors had proceeded to Baroda, Ahmadābād, and Cambay to buy calicoes for a fresh voyage to Mokha. We may note, in passing, the curious statement on pp. 144, 171 that Jahāngīr had sent to Cambay two lakhs of rupees to be invested in goods for the Red Sea, the proceeds to be given to the poor at Mecca.

Hall's ships arrived at Gombroon on December 30. The Persia factors had got together a considerable quantity of silk and some other goods, and part of these were put on board the Whale and Dolphin, which sailed on their return voyage on January 9, 1623. One reason for their hurried departure was a fear on the part of the factors that an attempt would be made to detain them in order to force the English to take part in the expedition to Muskat, on which the Persians were still obstinately bent. However, although some surprise was expressed at their haste, no action was taken; the ships sailed without hindrance, and reached Swally on January 30. The other two vessels remained at Gombroon for a fortnight after the departure of their consorts, embarking the rest of the silk and a number of native passengers. The Imām Qulī Khān, who had arrived with a large force for the enterprise against Muskat, pressed Captain Hall to lend the services of his ships; but the latter protested that he dared not do anything of the kind without special authority. The only assistance he would afford was by selling to the Khān the Primrose (at a handsome advance on her value). This matter settled, the Blessing and Reformation sailed for Swally, and arrived there on February 11, 1623.

Within a week or two they were called upon to undertake a service of a very different nature. The Surat factors were still smarting under the loss of the caravan plundered by Malik Ambar's soldiers in March, 1621. Their abortive attempts to obtain compensation, first, by a direct embassy to Malik Ambar, and secondly, by seizing a Chaul junk and money at Surat belonging to Dābhol merchants, have been narrated in the previous volume. From an entry in the present instalment (p. 101) we learn that in July, 1622, negotiations were proceeding at Surat with an agent of Malik Ambar for the restoration of the junk on condition that the English were refunded the prime cost of the goods in their caravan (Rs. 210,000: see p. 316 of last volume), plus Rs. 3,000 for the private losses of the factors. Rastell and his colleagues waited for more than six months, in the hope that these terms would be accepted and the money paid. Then, as the fleet for the Red Sea was almost ready to sail and its attitude towards any ships met with belonging to the Deccan kings must be defined, it was resolved (February 18, 1623) to force matters to a head by seizing any ships to be found at Chaul and Dābhol. For this purpose Captain Hall was directed to sail in the Blessing to the latter port, where the Reformation was to join him after visiting Chaul. Accordingly, on February 27 the Blessing anchored off Dābhol; she was welcomed with apparent cordiality by the townspeople, and for five or six days trading went on in amicable fashion. On the appearance of the Reformation a sudden change took place. Hall went out to meet her in his boat, and, taking over command, ran her straight into the harbour. Answering an alarmed inquiry from the town with the announcement that his object was to have satisfaction for the English losses, he at once took steps to carry off a couple of frigates that were lying in front of the customhouse partly laden. This was smartly effected under a shower of bullets and arrows, to which the English replied with their heavy guns. As soon as the tide would permit, the Blessing came to the aid of her consort, and together they bombarded the town and castle for a night and a day. Then Hall foolishly landed with a party of sailors. The result might have been expected: a murderous fire was poured on the party from the houses of the town, and the men fled to their boats with the loss of twenty of their number.1 Although the prizes were got safely out of the harbour, they had in turn to be fired and abandoned during the return voyage to Swally.

On the way back Hall heard tidings of a heavy disaster. The plans of the President and Council for the new year included the dispatch of all their available ships (four in number) to the Red Sea in order that they might capture the Indian junks on their return at the end of the monsoon. The Whale and Dolphin were already partly laden for England—chiefly with Persian silk—and it was intended upon their return to fill them up with Indian goods and then dispatch them home. The Blessing and Reformation were expected back from Dābhol in time to join them; but, as the appointed time passed without news of those vessels, on Sunday, March 16, the Whale and Dolphin put to sea. The same evening, in perfectly fair weather, while standing along the coast towards Damān, the former suddenly heeled over and sank. Most of those on board—including Woodcock, the master, and Heynes, the chief factor—were saved by the Dolphin, but Salbank, Crispe, and thirty-five others lost their lives. This disaster, which was due to overloading,1 deprived the Company of a good ship and a cargo estimated as worth 150,000l.2 Practically the loss was a total one; for though boats were dispatched to the scene and men stationed along the coast to look for the wreckage, little or nothing was recovered.

After a slight delay, the Dolphin proceeded on her voyage. Hall reached Swally with the Blessing on March 23, and eight days later he too sailed for Mokha. The Reformation came in immediately after his departure, and in a few days followed him, with instructions to winter at Aden or in some port near Ras-al-hadd, should she be unable to get into the Red Sea before the change of monsoon. To all three ships instructions were given not to meddle with any junk on the outward voyage, for fear of causing trouble at Mokha; and even on the return journey no capture was to be made until they were well out of the Straits. To prevent pillaging, no Englishmen were to be put into the prizes, which should be kept under command merely ‘by the awfull power of your ordinance’ and the removal of the chief men to the English ships as hostages. On nearing the Indian coast, one of the vessels was to be sent ahead to notify the Surat factors and take them on board, in order that they might ‘avoide the furey and insolency of these people’. Having dispatched the fleet on this important errand, the English merchants returned to their ordinary business of buying and selling, while waiting for the next act in the drama. Their intentions, however, did not altogether escape suspicion. A letter on p. 204 shows that the authorities at Ahmadābād had been warned both from Surat and Cambay that the royal junk would be seized on its return from Mokha; while Van den Broeck wrote in June to Batavia that the English had evidently something extraordinary in view, as they had withdrawn their factories at Agra, Burhānpur, Cambay, and Ahmadābād, and were now only at Surat and the neighbouring station of Broach (Hague Transcripts, series i. vol. vi. no. 198). But civil war had broken out; Prince Khurram (Shāh Jahān) was in open rebellion, and Gujarāt became a battleground. Men had therefore other things to think about than the possible designs of the English upon the local shipping; and even when the seizure became an accomplished fact it excited less attention amid the general confusion than would have been the case in quieter times.

To explain these hostilities it is necessary to go back for a year or two. The root-trouble was the old question of the succession to the throne. The Emperor, though by no means aged, was in weak health, and each of his four sons was eager to be his successor. Khusrū, the eldest, had injured his chance by contesting the crown with his father at the time of the latter's accession, and ever since he had been held in a captivity more or less stringent. Parwīz, the second, was a drunkard and a man of slender ability; and his pretensions found little support. Most persons thought—and, as it proved, rightly—that the successful candidate would be Khurram, the third son, whose capacity was undeniable and who had scored some striking military successes, though, according to Roe, he was not by any means so popular as his eldest brother. Jahāngīr himself seemed for a time to favour Khurram, who also enjoyed the support of Nūr Jahān, his father's favourite wife, and his own aunt by marriage. At the close of the Deccan war in 1617 the Prince received almost royal honours; the title of Shāh Jahān was given to him, and Gujarāt—the most important province of the empire— was added to his governments. His success, however, appears to have roused the fears or jealousy of Nūr Jahān, and from that time forward she set herself in opposition to his cause. Already there had been rumours that her support had been offered to Khusrū on condition that he would marry her daughter by her former husband,1 and, though these negotiations came to nothing, Shāh Jahān was so suspicious of what was going on that when in 1620 he was ordered to undertake a fresh campaign against the Deccan Kings he refused to march unless Khusrū were made over to him for safe custody. With this demand Jahāngīr weakly complied, and the unfortunate prince was delivered into the hands of his rival, who kept him, honourably treated but jealously guarded, at his head quarters in the Deccan.

But though he had thus caged one competitor, the position of Shāh Jahān was by no means secure. Nūr Jahān had now fixed upon Sultan Shahriyār, the Emperor's youngest son, as a suitable husband for her daughter, and the marriage was solemnized in the spring of 1621. Henceforward, it was certain, this prince would enjoy the support of the Empress and her party. Parwīz, too, had increased his interest with his father by the affectionate concern he had shown on the occasion of a severe attack of asthma from which the latter suffered in the summer of the same year. At the beginning of 1622, therefore, Shāh Jahān and his supporters were troubled at the aspect of affairs; and it seems to have been decided that a bold stroke was necessary to remove at least one stumbling-block from the path of the Prince's ambition.

At the end of January or beginning of February Burhānpur was startled by the news that Khusrū was dead1. Colic was officially assigned as the cause ; but the popular voice declared that he had been foully murdered by his brother's servants, and it can scarcely be doubted that this verdict was correct. Elphinstone, it is true, suggests that 'we ought not too readily to believe that a life not sullied by any other crime could be stained by one of so deep a dye' ; but the evidence is too strong to be disregarded, and the most that we can say for Shāh Jahān is that the murder may have been committed with his tacit consent rather than by his express command.2 Moreover, it is scarcely correct to represent him as guiltless of other political crimes. At the time of his accession to the throne, as Elphinstone himself records, his brother, Prince Shahriyār, and his two cousins, the sons of Prince Dāniyāl, were all put to death by his orders. Further it may be noted that Sir Thomas Roe (Embassy, p. 299) reports an attempt by Khurram's servants in 1616 to murder Khusrū in the interests of their master.

Jahāngīr seems to have made no open sign of resentment at this deed of violence, though he ordered the corpse, which had been buried at Burhānpur, to be disinterred and taken to Delhi (p. 79). Afterwards he changed his mind and directed that the unfortunate prince should be buried beside his mother at Allahābād. Hughes writes from Agra (p. 94) that the mournful procession arrived there on June 20, and was to start for Allahābād the following day. The splendid mausoleum which was erected over the remains is still an object of interest to the visitor.

The murder of Khusrū was not only a crime but also a blunder of the first magnitude on the part of Shāh Jahān, for the open bid thus made for the succession was certain to alarm his father, and to dispose him to listen to the Prince's enemies. An opportunity of lessening his power soon occurred. The Persians invaded the territories on the north-west and laid siege to Kandahār, whereupon Jahāngīr was induced to order the Prince to take the field against the enemy. Shāh Jahān, however, saw in this a plot to cut him off from his adherents in Gujarāt and his army in the Deccan; and so he excused himself from setting forward until the close of the rainy season. His backwardness was now made an excuse for strengthening his rival, for thereupon Shahriyār was appointed to conduct the campaign with an imposing army, a large number of the royal troops being withdrawn from Shāh Jahān for this purpose (June, 1622). The latter's anger was shown by his seizing some of Nūr Jahān's and Shahriyār's jāgīrs near Dholpūr1, after a fight in which several men were killed on both sides. This brought upon him a stern reproof from his father; and when the Prince's dīwān, Afzal Khān, was dispatched to court to make his master's excuses, Jahāngīr refused to admit him to his presence.

For some time the Prince remained sullenly at his head quarters in the fort of Mālndū, and it was not until the year was nearing its close that he finally committed himself to a contest with his father. Then the royal officers in Gujarāt were expelled from their posts, and two armies were set on foot under Rustam Khān and the Rājā Vikramājīt (p. 176). In view of the threatening attitude of the Prince, Āsaf Khān was sent by the Emperor to remove the royal treasure from Agra; but on learning that Shāh Jahān, accompanied by the Khānkhānān, was advancing with a large army, he considered it best to leave the treasure where it was, and so he returned hastily to court empty-handed. The Prince fixed his camp at Fatehpur Sīkrī, whence he sent forward 16,000 men to capture the fort and city. They were, however, repulsed in their attack on the former (February 6, 1623: see p. 197) and had to content themselves with plundering the townspeople. Jahāngīr, meanwhile, had established himself at Delhi and had appointed Mahābat Khān to conduct the campaign against his son, with the assistance of Abdullah Khān. The Prince's army, under the leadership of the Rājā Vikramājīt and Dārāb Khān (the son of the Khānkhānān), advanced to Bilūchpur, forty miles south of Delhi, where they came into conflict with the royal forces. Abdullah Khān, who had been for some time in correspondence with the rebels, deserted to them during the battle; but this defection was more than counterbalanced by the death of the Rājā Vikramājīt, and the result was a severe defeat of the Prince's forces (p. 218). Shāh Jahān retreated towards Mālwā, while his father advanced slowly to Fatehpur Sīkrī (p. 222). Parwīz (now entitled Shāh Parwīz) was at this stage entrusted with the command of the main army, though Mahābat Khān remained the real director of operations; and Shāh Jahān was gradually pressed back towards Māndū. His cause appeared so hopeless that many of his leading supporters deserted him, Rustam Khān among them; and soon after the Khānkānān himself went over to the royal forces. The latter advanced steadily, in spite of the rains; Burhānpur was occupied, and Shāh Jahān, with Dārāb Khān and the troops that still remained loyal to him, took refuge in the territories of the King of Golconda. The latter, on being appealed to, gave a reluctant permission to the rebels to pass through his dominions for the purpose of reaching Orissa. Their march brought them to Masulipatam in November, 1623, and a letter on p. 313 gives a vivid account of their visit to that town.

Meanwhile a royal army was engaged in subduing Gujarāt. This task was entrusted to the youthful son of the murdered Khusrū, Shāhzāda Dāwar Bakhsh (also known as Sultān Bulāqī), who had been appointed Sūbadār of the province, under the guardianship of his maternal grandfather, Khān-i-Azam. After the defeat and death of Vikramājīt at Bilūchpur (at the end of March or early in April), Shāh Jahān had entrusted the administration of Gujarāt to Abdullah Khān; while to Vikramājīt's brother, who had been acting as Governor, was assigned the task of carrying to the Prince the treasure at Ahmadābād and a jewelled throne on which five lakhs had been spent (Tūzak). Before, however, Abdullah Khān could appear upon the scene, the imperial standard had been raised by Safī Khān 1 and Nāhir Khān, who had received sufficient support to enable them to seize Ahmadābād for Jahāngīr (p. 233). Mahmūd Taqī, the Dīwān, and other adherents of the Prince were thrown into prison; the treasure was intercepted and the throne was broken up to provide money for the war (p. 245). Soon the rebel forces, under Abdullah Khān, approached the city, whereupon Safī Khān and his associates sallied forth to meet them. The battle took place near Sarkhej on June 14, 1623, and resulted in the utter rout of Abdullah Khān's army (p. 240). Nearly three thousand of his men were killed, including two of his chief lieutenants, Himmat Khān and Sālih Beg; Abdullah Khān himself fled to Surat, and thence to the Prince's head quarters at Burhānpur. On July 3 the factors witnessed the entry into Ahmadābād of the royal troops under Prince Dāwar Bakhsh and Khān-i-Azam, and were not much impressed by the sight (p. 244). However, the war was practically over. On hearing of the defeat of Abdullah Khān, the inhabitants of Broach declared for the Emperor and refused to admit the Prince's officers (p. 243). The town was occupied on July 7 by a detachment from Ahmadābād (p. 246); in the middle of August Ankleswar was taken without resistance (p. 256); and on the 26th Bahādur Khān, Governor of Baroda, advanced from Broach towards Surat (p. 259) for the purpose of reducing that city. Apparently the inhabitants had already intimated their intention of submitting, but Hākim Abdullah, the Governor, and Jam Qulī Beg, the military commandant, took refuge in the castle and retaliated by firing on the town (p. 262). The arrival of Bahādur Khān (about September 24) produced some overtures for surrender, and on October 11 he was admitted to the castle and received the conditional submission of the garrison, pending the conclusion of some negotiations which had been set on foot with Khān-i-Azam (p. 276). Mirzā Shādmān, son of the latter, arrived on the 12th, and took over the direction of affairs; but after about a week Bahādur Khān was reinstated as Governor, and in that capacity he on the 21st received the final submission of the castle (p. 288). The Prince and Khān-i-Azam then made their appearance in Surat, but their stay was cut short by the receipt of a farmān from Jahāngīr, directing the former to return to Ahmadābād and the latter to repair to the court at Ajmer (p. 297). Safī Khān—now become the Nawāb Saif Khān, in recognition of his services—was left in charge on their departure.

Such was the general course of events during this eventful period. We must now look back to the dispatch of Hall's squadron to Mokha (April, 1623) and trace the steps taken by the English to carry out their plan of seizing the Indian junks. Of the three ships sent, the Reformation (as had been feared) was unable to get into the Red Sea in time and spent the rainy season in the Persian Gulf instead. The Dolphin reached Mokha on May 9, and was joined by the Blessing on the 24th. At first the factors hesitated to trust themselves on shore, remembering the seizure of the Dutch the previous year and the surprise of part of the Rose's crew at Aden about the same time. However, at the persuasion of the local merchants and on receipt of a farmān from the Pasha of Sana, they decided to take a house and land their goods. A letter having been received from the ten surviving English captives, who were kept in slavery at Sana, it was decided to make an effort to obtain their release, and this was with some difficulty arranged on payment of about 4,000 rials. Meanwhile, though markets were bad, sales were effected to the value of 34,000 rials, and the voyage was pronounced to have been a success from the mercantile point of view.

The Blessing left Mokha on August 7, and was followed by the Dolphin on the 23rd. Once out of the Straits they proceeded to put into practice the instructions they had received. Junks of Dābhol, Gokhā, Diu, and Surat fell by turns into the net; and one belonging to Chaul, though released, was plundered of nearly 40,000 rials and a quantity of goods. On October 3, the Reformation joined company, and two days later Captain Hall anchored at Swally with eight junks under his guns.1 President Rastell and the majority of the factors, favoured by the general confusion at Surat, had already made their way quietly down to Swally and embarked on the William, which had just arrived from England under Captain Brown. Hopkinson and a few more had agreed to stay in Surat, in spite of the risks they ran in so doing, and the letters exchanged give a lively picture of the course of events, while some valuable sidelights are furnished by the correspondence of Pieter van den Broeck, the Dutch Agent at Surat (Hague Transcripts, series i. vol. vi. no. 198 et seq.).

Early in October it was known that the English had seized the homecoming junks and that the President and his Council had embarked, with the avowed intention of not returning except upon the grant of terms to their liking. There was general consternation at this and not a little resentment, though the merchants chiefly affected thought it well to speak Hopkinson fair and to beg the Dutch chief, Van den Broeck, to intercede for them. The Governor of the town, Bahādur Khān, was preoccupied with the problem of how to reduce the castle before the arrival of the Prince and Khān-i-Azam; and moreover he recognized that all the forces of the Mogul Empire were powerless against a single European ship. It was of course open to him to seize the goods and persons of the remaining Englishmen; but for these Rastell held ample security in the passengers and cargoes of the junks. He therefore temporized and waited. On October 12 (as already noted) he was superseded by Mīrzā Shādmān, son of Khān-i-Azam, and either simultaneously or shortly after Saif Khān appeared on the scene. Close behind him were the Prince and Khān-i-Azam, who pitched their camp at Jahāngīrpur. Hitherto the action of the English had not been taken very seriously by the authorities. The incident was looked upon as a squabble among merchants, to be settled by the usual promises and perhaps a small cash payment. But on the 18th Rastell and his Council formulated demands amounting to over two millions of mahmūdīs (about 100,000l.), and threatened that, unless satisfaction were quickly given and an agreement made for the future regulation of the trade, the junks and their contents would be carried away and the English factory abandoned. The claim, details of which will be found on p. 283, is not to be taken too seriously, for evidently it was intended to be subject to reduction; but the natives might well consider its contents outrageous. About a third of the amount was for 150 chests of coral which the English had been prohibited from selling, and which they therefore insisted the Surat merchants should purchase at the valuation made in the customhouse. This outlay the latter might of course expect to recover in time from the sale proceeds, but it is evident that they were very unwilling to have the commodity forced upon them in this fashion (p. 341). Other items included 200,000 mahmūdīs as compensation for oppressions suffered at the hands of the late Governor, Is-hāq Beg: claims on account of the wrongs done to the factors at Agra, Ahmadābād, Olpād, &c.; bribes given at various times and now re-demanded; and some small debts due to private men. The greatest of all was 936,069 mahmūdīs on account of the caravan plundered by Malik Ambar's soldiers in 1621. The reasoning by which the Mogul's officers were held responsible for a robbery committed by their opponents was ingenious, but scarcely convincing; and it was probably well known that (as we have already seen) a year before the English had been willing to accept in full settlement little more than half the amount they now claimed.

The demands thus put forward roused no little resentment among the Surat merchants and officials. Saif Khān, who was personally responsible for one of the incidents for which compensation was claimed, was particularly indignant. His first scheme was to enlist on his side the Dutch, who had at the time four vessels in the roads and might, he hoped, be induced to rescue the junks from the clutches of the English. Sending for Van den Broeck, he offered that if the Dutch would recover the Mogul ships and men and give protection in future against such 'piracies' they should be granted a monopoly of the trade. But, tempting as the offer was, the Agent dared not pay the price demanded, and his answer was that he could not undertake such an enterprise without the assent of the Governor-General at Batavia. Thereupon Saif Khān in a rage declared that the Dutch were in league with the English;. and ordered a guard to be placed over their factory. This occurred on October 18. Five days later Van den Broeck was again sent for, this time by Khān-i-Azam, and was once more pressed to attack the English. As he still refused, the demand was lowered to the dispatch of one or two Dutchmen to the ships, in company with some natives, to endeavour to accommodate matters. At the same time, in order to bring pressure to bear on Rastell and his Council, a number of English sailors, &c. (twenty-seven in all) were seized at Swally and elsewhere and brought prisoners to Surat, while the English factory was closely guarded, and their native broker, on the pretext that he had helped to send some provisions by sea from Broach to the ships, was mercilessly scourged. After a while, as these measures produced no effect, the soldiers were withdrawn, and fresh overtures made for an accommodation of the dispute. This was evidently hastened by the receipt of the orders already mentioned for the departure of the Prince and Khān-i-Azam. The latter was anxious to have the dispute settled before he left, if only because he hoped for a handsome present from the English; he therefore roundly rated Saif Khān for raising difficulties, and charged him, upon pain of the royal displeasure, to conclude an agreement as quickly as possible. This was easier said than done, for the English held stiffly to their demands, and at a consultation held on November 5 decided that unless matters were arranged in two days the whole fleet should fall down to Surat Bar, preparatory to sailing for Persia with their prizes. Under the stimulus of this threat, the two parties came to terms on November 10. It was agreed that the claim on account of the caravan plundered by Malik Ambar's soldiers should not be insisted upon, but that the English should recoup themselves as far as possible by seizing the effects of Chaul and Dābhol merchants wherever they could find them, including those in the detained junks; they were also allowed to appropriate, out of property seized by them belonging to Shāh Jahān, the sum of 7,267½ rials which they had taken from Dābhol merchants at Surat in 1621, but had been forced by the Prince's officers to restore; and further they were promised assistance in recovering the balance from Malik Ambar. The coral the native merchants agreed to purchase on the terms laid down, the English undertaking not to import more for a period of two years. As regards the minor claims, the President and Council were to retain from the money and goods seized in the junks sufficient to re-imburse the money forced from them at Ahmadābād, Agra, and Baroda, as also for certain debts, &c.; while aid was promised in recovering the cost of the indigo stolen from Young's caravan in 1619. The hypothetical demands for loss of trade, &c. were abandoned. Generally speaking, the English got back most of their actual losses during the past few years, and in addition were relieved of their stock of coral at a remunerative price. Of equal importance were the stipulations made and assented to regarding the future. By these the English were granted free trade throughout the Mogul's dominions, including Bengal; they were allowed to rent the house and grounds of Khwāja Hasan Alī for their Surat factory; they were permitted to buy or build four frigates each year; several minor forms of oppression were provided against, their goods were freed from land tolls, and an arrangement was made by which a sum of 40,000 mahmūdīs (nearly 2,000l.) was to be paid yearly in lieu of all customs at Surat, both outwards and inwards.1

The English had thus won all along the line. They had secured compensation for their chief losses, and important concessions for the future; they had humiliated Is-hāq Beg and others of their leading opponents, and, as they would have said, had taught the natives a useful lesson. But there was evidently deep resentment among the latter at the means employed. Hopkinson and Willoughby warned Rastell that Is-hāq Beg's servants had been overheard to say that their master was only playing with the English until he could get their chief men into his power, and that then he would carry them all to court. They also reported the murmuring of the merchants that 'their port is spoyled', and that the English had broken the agreement made two years before. It was retorted that that agreement was a forced one, and therefore of no validity; but the argument equally applied to the present case, and the factors on shore expressed an opinion that little confidence could be placed in the assurances that had been given. Events proved only too quickly the soundness of these misgivings.

For the present, however, all seemed to go well. The Nawāb Saif Khān and the other chiefs duly signed the agreement (apparently on November 13), and further (on Hopkinson's demand) took an oath on the Qurān to observe it, while the English were likewise sworn on the Bible. A copy was then sent to Khān-i-Azam, and on November 15 a farmān from Prince Dāwar Bakhsh ratified and confirmed the arrangement come to between the respective parties. The owner of the house selected for the factory was forced to accept the English as tenants at an unexpectedly low rent (p. 321); and Rastell and his colleagues were duly installed. On November 19 a general consultation was held, at which it was decided to send the Reformation to Achin and Bantam with 80,000 rials and a stock of goods; to dispatch Heynes and Lancaster to Persia in the William and the Blessing; to depute Young with two more factors to court, to sell certain jewels and other articles, and to obtain the Emperor's ratification of the recent agreement; and to send Hutchinson and four others to Ahmadābād for the purpose of providing an investment for England. Hopkinson was at the same time appointed to succeed James as Accountant at Surat, and Hoare to be Warehousekeeper there.

Before quitting the factories of the West Coast, we may note that the present volume contains one or two references to the traveller Pietro Della Valle, to whose narrative we are indebted for some interesting glimpses of the life led by the factors at Surat. He reached Swally at the end of January, 1623, having come from Gombroon as a passenger on board the Whale; and amongst his luggage, of which Captain Woodcock was so anxious to be rid (pp. 200, 202), was the embalmed body of his wife, which he carried with him over land and sea until, in 1626, he was able to inter it in his family vault at Rome. It had been necessary to smuggle the corpse aboard in the utmost secrecy, lest the superstitious seamen should refuse to sail. On his arrival at Swally, Della Valle was welcomed by President Rastell, of whom he says: ‘He spoke Italian very well, and made me many civil offers and complements, showing himself in all things a person sufficiently accomplish'd and of generous deportment, according as his gentile and graceful aspect bespoke him ’.1 Rastell was very anxious that the traveller should take up his abode with him, but as Della Valle had with him his adopted daughter (a Georgian girl) and there were no ladies at the English factory, he thought it better to find quarters elsewhere. He was, however, frequently entertained both by the Dutch and the English; and he gives a picturesque account of the state maintained by the two chiefs. ‘ The Dutch Commendator and the English President . . . live in sufficient splendor and after the manner of the greatest persons of the country. They go abroad with a great train, sometimes also of their own men on horseback, but especially with a great number of Indian servants on foot, arm'd according to the mode with sword, buckler, bows and arrows . . . Moreover, these Governours . . . use to have carry'd before their coach, or horse when they ride, a very high bannerol or streamer, by a man on foot (which likewise is a custom of all men of quality here), and likewise to have a sadled horse led by hand before them.’ After making an excursion to Cambay and Ahmadābād, Della Valle embarked at Swally (March, 1623) in a Portuguese boat bound for Damān, where he obtained a passage to Goa.

We turn now to the two English factories on the Coast of Coromandel, viz. Masulipatam and Pulicat. Between these and the factories in the dominions of the Great Mogul there was little more than the geographical tie. It was to Batavia, and not to Surat, that the establishments on the East Coast looked, both for orders and for supplies; and their depressed condition at this period reflected only too faithfully the poverty and confusion reigning at the parent Presidency. The so-called Treaty of Defence in 1619 had freed the English in the Far East from active hostilities on the part of the Dutch, and had given them a right to the shelter of the Dutch fortresses and a share in the trade; but these benefits had been accompanied by financial obligations which, in the weak state of their finances, proved far too heavy to bear. They were to pay one-third of the fort and garrison charges in the Moluccas, Bandas, and Amboyna, and one-half of those at Pulicat; and were in addition to maintain ten ships to cruise against the Spaniards and Portuguese. To meet these burdens it was necessary that they should drive a larger trade than before; but, far from being able to do this, the President and Council at Batavia found themselves almost at their wits' end for money. The Company at home, intent rather on the newly-developed trade of India and Persia, neglected to remit them funds, conceiving that they would be sufficiently supplied by the restitutions to be made by the Dutch under the terms of the Treaty. The latter, however, were in no hurry to supply their competitors with cash, and the disputes which arose over the various claims and counterclaims furnished an excellent excuse for delaying a settlement. Again, the Treaty left open several questions of the greatest importance—particularly that of the exact status of the English in the Dutch settlements—and these at once produced an acrimonious controversy. Our countrymen complained that they were made amenable to the Dutch tribunals and forced to pay excise and other duties; that war was needlessly maintained with Bantam, thus shutting them out from the pepper trade of Java; that the charges to which the English had to contribute were purposely inflated, and included much that could not justly be carried to the joint account; that the Dutch, by paying their soldiers partly in goods, spoiled the local markets, and made it impossible for the English to sell their Coromandel cottons. At the same time President Fursland and his colleagues were obliged to admit that they themselves had failed to fulfil their obligations under the Treaty to contribute ten ships for the common defence. They pleaded that this was a matter of impossibility, as they had not the requisite vessels available; and after the cruise of 1621–3, already described, they abandoned all pretence of complying with this article. The requisite contributions to the cost of the forts in the Moluccas, the Bandas, and Amboyna, they did their utmost to provide; but this expense proved so onerous that, in January, 1623, the President and Council resolved to abandon their factories in those parts. Before this decision could be actually carried out, though the requisite orders had been sent, occurred the famous ‘Massacre of Amboyna’, ten Englishmen being tortured and put to death, after an irregular trial, on a charge of conspiring to capture the Dutch fortress in that island (February 27, 1623); and with this outrage vanished all hopes of future co-operation of the two nations in the Far East. The President and his colleagues determined to quit Batavia as soon as practicable, and establish themselves somewhere outside Dutch jurisdiction; and in the meantime to restrict their operations as much as possible. By the end of the year the factories at Patani, Pulicat, Siam, and Hirado (Japan) had been dissolved, and the only ones left under the control of the English President and Council at Batavia were those at Masulipatam, Achin, Jambi, Japara, and Macassar.

We are only concerned here with Masulipatam and Pulicat, but in these two settlements we find the same angry feelings prevailing as at the Presidency itself. The first letter from the former place (p. 45) roundly accuses the Dutch of breaking the agreement in regard to the trade at Pulicat, and of doing all they can ' to discoradge or weary oute our employers, and to graspe this trade in their onely manadginge'. On the other hand, Mills and Milward, the two factors at Pulicat, writing on July 26, 1622, admit that the Dutch have shown them, personally, much courtesy and friendliness; and it appears that in the following month, when the new Dutch Agent, Abraham van Uffelen, visited Pulicat in company with Andries Souri, the outgoing Agent, a serious effort was made by them to remove all causes of friction. Some of the English demands were, it is true, set aside as unreasonable, and others were referred to Batavia; but in the case of the rest assurances of redress were given. The grievance of inadequate accommodation was remedied by allotting the factors 'a reasonable faire howse' (at a rent) and promising to build them a more suitable one. No concessions, however, could make up for the want of an adequate supply of capital. 'The Dutch in their glorie laugh in their sleves att our present miseries', wrote Mills to Batavia, adding that the English investments were 'not in a tenth degree comparable to theirs'; and he sums up the position of himself and colleague by saying that their employment on the present footing 'is neyther benificial to our maisters, creditt to our nacion, nor content to ourselves' (p. 121). Similarly, the two factors informed the Company in the same autumn that their expenditure was out of all proportion to their trade. The English share of the Fort charges came to 549½ rials of eight per month, in addition to their own expenses, while the whole sum received from Batavia during the year was only 20,000 rials.

Such being the state of affairs, the Pulicat factors quickly came to the conclusion that they could do better elsewhere. There were many other places on the coast where cotton goods could be obtained without paying costly garrison charges. On February 8, 1623, they wrote to Masulipatam that they had received overtures ‘from the greateste man in this quarter, who so kindlie invittes us to seat ourselves within his authorytie, with his firman that wee shall live uppon what conditions wee shall desire and to our harts contente; and wee weell knowe the place will afford all manner of our desired investment and divers othere sorts which wee ar here furnished’ (p. 193). This information is regrettably vague, but in any case nothing came of the overtures. However, the President and Council at Batavia had already decided (p. 194) that it was not worth while to maintain a factory at Pulicat, and on April 11, 1623, they formally determined to withdraw the establishment. The reasons given were the need of reducing expenses and the fact that Coromandel cloth would not now be required in any quantity, as the English factories in the Moluccas, &c., were also to be closed. The Dutch at Batavia offered no objection to the proposal, though they intimated that, should the English desire at any time to return to Pulicat, the question would arise as to their paying part of the cost of the garrison during their absence. The Ruby was accordingly dispatched at once to Pulicat with orders for the dissolution of the factory. She reached her destination on June 18; the merchants embarked with their goods and gear, and on July 1, 1623, sailed away for Masulipatam (p. 246). Thus ended the Anglo-Dutch partnership on the Coromandel Coast.

Before quitting the subject of Pulicat, attention should perhaps be directed to the references on pp. 105, 122, 141, 147, and 229 to the wholesale purchase of slaves at that place and Tegnapatam by the Dutch, for export to their settlements in the Far East1; to those on pp. 121 and 147 regarding the effect of the new orders obliging the Dutch either to marry or to abandon their native consorts; to the notices of Dutch rights of coinage on pp. 102, 127; and to the details on pp. 133, 134, and 138 of a threatened attack on Pulicat by a Nāyak whose name is given as ‘Chemenique’ or ‘Cemenique’. We may also note in passing the overtures made by the Nāyak of Tanjūr for the establishment of an English factory in his territories (pp. 117, 337); the result of these will be seen in the next volume.

The English factory at Masulipatam appears to have suffered, like that at Pulicat, from want of means and a consequent depression of trade. One harassing restriction was, however, removed. In 1621 a new Governor had arrived, who had farmed the revenue at 15,000 pagodas per annum more than any of his predecessors had paid; and one of the devices by which he sought to recoup himself was the exclusive concession to one shroff of the right of buying, selling, or exchanging all gold and silver brought to the port (see the previous volume, p. 265). To this injurious arrangement the Dutch and English, backed by the native merchants, opposed a passive resistance, with the result that after about three months it ‘fell of itselfe’ (p. 46). William Methwold gave up the post of Agent to Matthew Duke early in October, 1622, and sailed to Batavia and thence to England, to answer the charges which had been preferred against him. As Duke was also anxious to return home, Thomas Mills was appointed to succeed him on the dissolution of the Pulicat factory. This change appears to have been made on October 3, 1623, when the Ruby departed for Batavia (p. 317). About a month after that date occurred the visit of Prince Shāh Jahān to Masulipatam, to which reference has already been made. After burying his cashbox in the garden for greater security, Mills rode out with the deputation sent to greet His Highness, and the latter, he says, ‘takinge some notice of me, repeating thrice (?) over “Englese”, gave mee a peece of his favor by a wagg with his head’ (p. 314). During his stay the Prince took little further notice of the English merchants, but some of his captains paid frequent visits to the factory for the sake of the liquor there to be obtained. After a stay of five days the army was once more set in motion, and resumed its march towards Bengal, to the great relief of the inhabitants. For the rest of the year the factors had little to report, save the receipt of a farmān from the King of Golconda, ordering them to make compensation for some goods of his seized in a junk captured by Captain Hall's squadron near Socotra. Of this demand they apprised the President and Council of Surat, and urged that satisfaction should be made without delay. Their other news related chiefly to the Dutch, who had been very roughly handled by the native officials in consequence of their depredations on Portuguese and other shipping trading with Masulipatam. Abraham van Uffelen, the Dutch Governor, was carried off prisoner, and was so brutally used that he died on January 22, 1624.

Among minor points of interest we may note the many references to the Dutch factories at Surat, Agra, and elsewhere, and to the Danish establishment at Tranquebar: the particulars given regarding the diamond mines of Kollūr (pp. 49, 221, &c.): the allusions to the provision of gunpowder at Pulicat and the exportation of great quantities of saltpetre from thence to Europe (p. 336): and a reference to the practice of insuring goods conveyed by sea from Cambay to Surat (p. 101). From a dispute between two of the English commanders as to precedence, we learn that when the President of Surat embarked on any of the ships he hoisted his flag as commander-in-chief for the time being (p. 327); while several other references show that the Company's captains had now been placed in subordination to the civil powers, though they were still occasionally recalcitrant (p. 113). Finally, attention may be drawn to the notice on p. 25 of the coinage of mahmūdīs at Mulher. Though fifty years had passed since the subjugation of Gujarāt by Akbar, the inhabitants of that province still preferred their ancient coins to the rupees of their conquerors (p. 124); and the difficulty seems to have been got over by the Mogul authorities conniving at the minting of mahmūdīs in the semi-independent state of Bāglān.

Notes

  1. 1. From the letters on pp. 35, 65 it appears that the amount agreed upon as the Persian contribution (exclusive of the expense of ammunition) was 600 tūmāns (2,000l.) per month. In O. C. 1173, however, it is stated that the payment actually made was 900 tūmāns for the three months during which they were engaged in the operations.
  2. 1. Ruy Freire and three more managed to escape from the Lion soon after its arrival at Surat (pp. 60, 83). For a story that Ruy Freire had plied the crew with drugged wine see Craesbeeck (infra) and the Court Minutes of August 6, 1623.
  3. 2. For details of the siege see the narratives of Pinder, Wilson, and Monnox in Purchas's second volume (pp. 1787–1805). The original of Monnox's account is at the India Office (O.C. 1032). Other contemporary references will be found in the Persia Records there (vol. i.), and in Della Valle's Travels. Herbert, Fryer, and Tavernier give traditional accounts, containing many inaccuracies. On the Portuguese side the following may be consulted: Faria y Sousa's Asia Portuguesa (vol. iii. pp. 355 et seq.); the Lisbon Transcripts at the India Office (Books of the Monsoons, vols. v. and vi.); Commentarios do Grande Capitam Ruy Freyre de Andrade, compiled by Paulo Craesbeeck (Lisbon, 1647); and Luciano Cordeiro's Como se perdeu Ormuz (Lisbon, 1896).
  4. 1. The officers and men of the fleet no doubt got some private booty. In August, 1623, the Spanish ambassador complained to King James that the London had brought home spoils to the value of 500,000l. (sic), and that even the dishes used by the crew were of silver, stamped with the arms of many noble families of Portugal. Woodcock, the master of the Whale, was accused of having 'gotten an unknown booty at Ormus', and though he denied this, the Court would not believe him innocent (Minutes, November 19, 1624). The same report, in an exaggerated form, is given by Herbert, who declares that Woodcock 'lighted upon a frigot that was stealing away, loden with pearles and inestimable treasure, above a million of royalls for his part only'.
  5. 1. A portion of these exactions may be regarded as debitable to other captures; but when we add the expenses caused by the detention of a large fleet for eight months in Persian waters it is evident that pecuniarily the Company was (for the time at all events) a considerable loser by the Ormus enterprise.
  6. 2. See Mr. Sainsbury's Calendar of State Papers, East Indies, 1622–24; Dr. Gardiner's History, vol. v. p. 237; Howell's Familiar Letters (ed. 1890), p. 157, &c.
  7. 1. For Dutch accounts of the cruise see Hague Transcripts, series i. vol. vi.
  8. 1. See the previous volume, p. xxxvi. &c.; also a Dutch letter from Surat (August 7, 1622, N. S.) in the Hague Transcripts, series i. vol. iv.
  9. 1. He returned to Surat in the following spring by way of Samāna and Agra.
  10. 1. This letter, which was dated February 14, 1622, found its way into a private collection in Holland and thence to the Rijks-Museum at Amsterdam. In 1894, however, the Koninklijk Oudheidkundig Genootschap, to whom it belonged, generously presented it to the India Office, where it now forms no. 7A of the Parchment Records. A facsimile was published in the Journal of Indian Art for October, 1896.
  11. 1. See Hall's own account on p. 340. In Della Valle's account (vol. i. p. 136) it is said that a Portuguese factor headed the townspeople in their resistance to the English.
  12. 1. According to the Dutch Agent at Surat (Hague Transcripts, series i. vol. vi. no. 198) the ballast had been thrown overboard to make room for private trade and the goods of native passengers. This was denied by Woodcock on his return to England, declaring that ‘she had in her 150 tonnes of stoanes and 40 tons of pepper’. However the Court told him that ‘all the deposicions and circumstances considerable in this do concurr that she oversett by beeing overladen in her upper works, carrying 40 peeces of ordnance, whereof four brass cannon of 4,000 weight aleece, besides greate stoare of goodes for private trade, and that the shipp was not stiff enough under water’ (Court Minutes, September 8, 1624).
  13. 2. Court Minutes, May 31, 1624. The Governor subsequently placed the loss at ‘a hundred and odd thowsand poundes’ (Ibid., July 2, 1624). Van den Broeck (Hague Transcripts, series i. vol. vi. no. 198) gives it as 1,600,000 florins.
  14. 1. The Embassy of Sir Thomas Roe, pp. 363, 404, 407. See also Della Valle (Hakluyt Society's edition), vol. i. p. 56.
  15. 1. The native chroniclers appear to differ as to the date of this important event. Mr. Henry Beveridge is of opinion that the most probable one is that given in the Iqbālnāma of Mutamad Khān (an excellent authority), viz. 20 Bahman (see the Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society, July, 1907, p. 597). This corresponds with January 29, 1622, which agrees very well with the indications furnished by the letters from Burhānpur in the present volume (see pp. 30, 41).
  16. 2. The popular verdict is echoed not only in the letters of the English factors, but in Della Valle (vol. i. p. 58) and Van den Broeck (Voyagie naar Indie, p. 104). Herbert (Some Yeares Travels, 1638, p. 80) has a circumstantial narrative of the murder, in which he says that Khusrū was strangled in the night by 'Reza or Rajea Bandor' at the instigation of 'Ganganna' (the Khānkhānān), and that Shāh Jahān's absence from Burhānpur at the time was part of the scheme. His authority appears to be John De Laet's De Imperio Magni Mogolis (1631), which contains a translation of a narrative for which De Laet was indebted to Van den Broeck. In the account there given (p. 243) the assassin is simply called Reza. Beale (Oriental Biogr. Dict.) quotes the Maāsir Kutb Shāhī as stating that Khusrū was strangled by a man named Razā by order of Shāh Jahān. Dow (History of Hindostan, vol. iii. p. 62) gives the name as 'Raja Bandor' and says the murder took place 'under the walls of Azere' [Asīr].
  17. 1. Elliot's History, vol. vi. p. 383. Elphinstone (p. 564) says that the jāgīrs held by Shāh Jahān in Hindūstān had been transferred to Shahriyār without the consent of the former. Possibly these were the lands in dispute.
  18. 1. In spite of the fact that he was brother-in-law to the Prince, both of them having married daughters of Asaf Khān.
  19. 1. According to Van den Broeck, all the vessels thus captured held passes from the English which were supposed to guarantee them against molestation. This is probably an exaggeration. In a later letter (O. C. 1180), however, the Surat factors admit that the Chaul junk had a pass from the English merchants at Mokha, but they claim that this was [p. xxx] not valid because it had only been granted for fear of violence. We know also that a pass was demanded for the Gōghā junk (p. 204); but whether it was granted is not stated.
  20. 1. Van den Broeck insinuates that in stipulating for this the English merchants were chiefly studying their own interests, as the annual payment would be made out of the Company's treasury and their private trade would escape duty. It cannot, however, be doubted that the arrangement would have been a gain to the Company, since it would have done away with all the delays and opportunities for petty exactions arising from the necessity of passing goods through the customhouse. As a matter of fact, it never came into force, for the concession was withdrawn by the revised agreement of September, 1624 (O. C. 1295). It will be remembered that Sir Thomas Roe had offered in 1616 an annual composition of Rs. 12,000 for the Surat customs, but the amount was considered insufficient (The Embassy, pp. 210, 470, &c.).
  21. 1. Hakluyt Society's edition, vol. i. p. 19.
  22. 1. In his Relations of the Kingdome of Golchonda (Purchas His Pilgrimage, ed. 1626, p. 993) Methwold says: ‘Since the last King [of Vijayanagar] (who deceased about fiftene yeeres since) there have arisen severall competitors for the crowne, unto whom the Naickes have adhered according to their factions or affections; from whence hath followed a continuall civill warre in some parts of the countrey, and such extreame want and famine in most of it that parents have brought thousands of their young children to the seaside, selling there a child for five fanums [noted in the margin as equivalent to 2s. 6d.] worth of rice; transported from thence into other parts of India [i. e. the East Indies] and sold againe to good advantage—if the gaines be good that ariseth from the sale of soules.’