Iii. the Administration of Sir Josiah Childe

The East India Trade in the XVIIth Century, Shafaat Ahmad Khan, 1923 · from page 193 · about 104 minutes

Read by machine, not yet checked by a person. It may hold small errors.

The accession of James II to the throne did not affect the policy of the Crown towards the Company. There is reason to think that James's support was energetic, continuous, and prompt. He gave the Company a very liberal charter, conferring on it the amplest jurisdiction, with the right of exercising martial law and coining money. He allowed it to set up Admiralty Courts on the West Coast of India. Sir Josiah Childe would have been completely powerless in his conflict with the Mogul without James's support. It is not quite correct to say, as asserted by Professor Scott, Sir William Hunter, and others, that he 'acquired the Company's Stock'. The annual gift of £10,000 to the King was instituted, not by Childe, but 'by those who have sold themselves out, and do not complain against it'. However, 'it has since been taken off by a present of £7,000 Stock by the Company, which his present Majesty does now enjoy'.1 The annual gifts by the Company to Charles and his brother no doubt strengthened them in their attachment to it. The Company's voluntary contributions have already been mentioned.2 We cannot explain the warm support of the two brothers on the hypothesis of self-interest. This was, no doubt, one of the reasons for their support; yet it was not the chief reason. The chief reason for the support of James II lay in his recognition of the impossibility of carrying on the trade in the East by means of a Regulated Company. He merely carried on the policy initiated by the Council of Trade. The latter had recommended the Company, in 1661, 'to the royal protection'.3 James did not withhold it. On the contrary, he extended it. The King's protection was specially needed at a time when the Company was undergoing a change that may be characterized as extraordinary. This was due to the ascendency of Sir Josiah Childe. The latter's connexion with the Company dated back to 1655. He was elected a member of the Committee of twenty-four in 1674, and, with the exception of the year 1676, continued to be so elected. In 1676 the King wrote to the Company not to elect persons 'who have behaved very ill towards His Majesty'.1 The King's dislike of Childe was due not to his opposition to the King's policy, as asserted by Macaulay and others, but to the negligence or incompetence of Childe and Papillon.

In 1672 there was a loud outcry against both the victuallers, Childe and Papillon. The beer supplied by the latter was declared by the Surveyor to 'be small, and stinking'. Childe declared that 'it was sweet, sound, and serviceable'. The next year he seems to have relinquished his office, for another victualler was appointed 'to supply the Navy with provisions'. In 1676 a warrant was issued 'for process of distringas ad computandam against Thomas Papillon, Childe, etc., who ought to have accompted long since'.2 It is this failure of Childe to supply the Navy with provisions that helps us to explain Charles's letter to the Company in 1676. He was, however, elected Governor in 1681, and maintained his ascendancy in the Company's Council until the year of his death. A divergence of opinion took place among the Directors of the Company. At this time the Company's Directorate was torn by political passions, and the Whigs, headed by Papillon, suffered a complete defeat. There is no reason to suppose that Papillon wanted to reconstitute the Company on a broader basis. Papillon himself had supported the Joint-Stock Organization in 1680; and he took a prominent part in the foundation of a Company that was as exclusive as the old Company. The main cause was political. Without the consistent and staunch friendship of the King the Company was utterly helpless. Its alliance was eminently useful, and it is difficult to see what other policy Childe could have adopted. It, no doubt, proved very injurious to the Company after the Revolution. Yet this was due as much to the opposition of the City of London, the Democrats, the defenders of the Regulated Companies, and the Interlopers, as to the hostility of the Whigs. The Crown's friendship was indispensable at the time. The comprehensive plans which Childe had sketched, and the far-reaching measures of which he was the originator, could hardly be carried out without the support of the King. Of his ascendancy in the Council there can be no doubt. The Manuscript Records, the Dispatches in the India Office, and the writings of Childe himself confirm the impression which his contemporaries had formed of his personality. A comparison of the writings given below has revealed the interesting fact that they were all written by the same person; while a deeper analysis of their contents will force one to the conclusion that their author was no other than Sir Josiah Childe.1 The Dispatches of Childe to the Company's factors enunciate the policy advocated by him in his various books, and show his dominance in the Company's Council. Many of the peculiar turns of expression of which he was so fond reappear in the Company's Dispatches. A comparison of his Dispatches to the Company's factors in the East, in 1692 and 1693, with his letters in the Bodleian Library, brings out the interesting fact that he reproduces word for word many of the phrases employed by him in his letters to Secretary Blackborne and others. The comparison of the letters with the records preserved in the India Office Records Department would, by itself, be sufficient to convince one of the reality and vigour of his dictatorship. The impression is confirmed by a perusal of the numerous pamphlets preserved in the British Museum, the India Office Library, and the Bodleian Library, Oxford. Even in 1693 we find him dominant in the Company's Committees. He reads the reports from the Company's factors, directs the routes of the ships, rules even the Governor of the Company, recommends various persons for appointments, advises the Company upon all questions of policy, and, finally, interviews the King and the Government Departments on behalf of the Company.1 His ascendancy remained unchallenged up to 1698, though, after the Revolution, we find him directing the Company in the background. The details of administration are left to Sir Thomas Cooke and others, while the broad lines of the Company's policy are traced out by his own firm and masterful hand. During the eight years of his dictatorship he supervised all the details of the Company. The account given by Prince Butler is substantially correct with regard to this period :

But since the men of Gath arose,
And for their Chief Goliath chose.
And since that mighty giant's reign,
Whose chiefest aim was private gain,
This Trade was drove on by such measures,
As soon exhausted much of our Treasure.2

Childe himself justified his dictatorship. He asserted that ‘the more any Adventurer hath in the stock, the more he is engaged to study and promote its good by all means. A small interest will never awaken a man so often in the night.’ He thoroughly despised the ‘common herd’, and believed in the ‘wise Machiavel’, who ‘tells us that the State of Florence when it was commonwealth never prospered, but when someone else arrived at reputation enough to moderate the counsels of the commonwealth’. Nor did the United Provinces prosper ‘unless some one man had the greatest influence upon their councils’.3 Childe was, perhaps, unconscious of the dangers to which the Company would have been exposed if the hero whom Machiavelli idolized had directed its policy. Yet this shows all the more clearly the paramount importance of estimating the real value of his services to the East India Company. The East India trade, which pursued so chequered a course under the vigorous administration of Sir Josiah, can hardly be understood without a thorough acquaintance with the leading principles which guided his policy. The latter has been regarded as a departure from the peaceful policy advocated by Sir Thomas Roe. It has been asserted, moreover, that the Company were not without occasional premonitions of ‘the great destiny awaiting them’. Sir Josiah Childe has, accordingly, been hailed as the first Englishman who conceived the idea of establishing a political dominion in India. The East India Company is, therefore, regarded as the originator of that policy in the seventeenth century which bore fruit in 1746. There is no evidence for these statements at all. Of all the pamphlets preserved in the Bodleian Library, the British Museum Library, and the India Office Library, those given below are the only ones that deal, either directly or indirectly, with the Company’s war with the Mogul Emperor.1 In none of them is there the faintest suggestion of a desire of the Company for political dominion in India. The idea itself was completely at variance with the seventeenth century mode of thought. Even in the eighteenth century the Directors tried in every way to extricate themselves from the responsibilities thrust on them by Clive. How then was it possible in the seventeenth century? The mistake of Sir William Hunter and others arose through their incomplete study of the Records. This is specially the case with regard to the words 'political' and 'dominion', which the Directors use so loosely. 'Political' meant, of course, commercial to them; nor is it fair to detach a few phrases from some of the grandiloquent dispatches of Childe, and to regard them as expressing the policy to which he was devoted. As Childe himself said in 1694: 'The Dutch never thrive by Plantations. What they do in the East Indies being only by War, Trade, and building of Fortified Towns and Castles, upon the sea coasts, to secure the commerce of the places.'1 His real policy is unfolded in the MS. Records preserved in the India Office Records Department. The MS. Letter Books, Nos. 6, 7, 8, and 9, trace the evolution of that policy. His chief aim was neither conquest nor independence, but security of the East India trade. Again, he advocated the 'Dutch method' of raising revenue in India, not their method of plantations. Again and again he insists on the absolute necessity of raising revenue in India 'by Dutch, Indian or Portuguese methods . . . to defray the charge of their protection and preservation from wrong and violence'. 'We hope Mr. Gyfford will have adventured in some reasonable way to increase our revenue there to such a degree as may fully answer the whole charge of Government, Garrison, Factory, Shops and other contingencies, which certainly is not so monstrous a difficulty as to be long hammering out. If the Dutch had had that place, they would have raised 20s. for every shilling raised. We should imitate their wisdom, though we hate their injustice and oppression.' 'We do require the President to increase the revenue considerably by such means as he and the Council shall think fit.’ ‘If our Principal Governors and Servants in India could once arrive at the wisdom of making fortified places in India defray their cost and charge, the Dutch should have no joy of their [taking] Bantam.’1 In practically every important dispatch we find him stressing the importance of raising ample revenue. The duties of the factors did not stop, however, with the raising of revenue. The Indians living under the rule of the Company were to be treated with indulgence. This aspect of Childe’s career has never been sufficiently emphasized. Yet his dispatches from England attach as much importance to the duty of treating the Indians fairly, as they do to the necessity of raising revenue. ‘Our aims are sincere, good, and politique, and we endeavour to proceed with exact truth and justice, as well as courage, and where the end is good, and the means good, it pleaseth God for the most part to give a blessing.’ Though he may imitate the Dutch method of raising revenue, he is not inclined to adopt the means they adopted to effect it. ‘Though we have given a hint in raising revenue to imitate the Dutch methods, yet we will not expose you to anything that may put you into the disaffection of the people.’ ‘This generall liberty and frank encouragement to all your inhabitants indifferently will make your place great and famous in a short time.’ ‘We would have you to be always most kind and indulgent to the inhabitants that observe our laws, and protect them in the same uninterrupted liberty of the several religions in which they were born and bred as you do those of our own church and nation.’2 The piety which breathes through every page dealing with the treatment of the inhabitants is in strong contrast with the shrewd common sense, the constant scoldings, and the frequent complaints which the Manuscript Letter Books reveal. His ideal was a patriarchal state, dealing tenderly with the prejudices of the inhabitants, meting out prompt justice, and enacting wise laws. He wanted, moreover, to make the Company’s chief factories the ‘Mart of the Nations’, so that they may ‘flourish, and prosper exceedingly. That being the means by which God Almighty promised to make Jerusalem great.’ The lofty ideals and the intense passion for toleration, which these dispatches reveal, were not alien to Childe's nature. He had advocated them forcibly, both in his New Discourse of Trade and in his Essay on the East India Trade. It is the systematization of these disconnected and inchoate truisms into leading principles, organically connected with the minutest detail of his administration, and their application to the complex conditions of Indian life, that mark him out as the first great Englishman who pointed out the path that was trodden by Elphinstone and Monro, by Malcolm and Henry Lawrence. His administration of St. Helena has been strongly condemned by Sir William Hunter and others. They have relied exclusively upon the evidence furnished by his enemies. The following dispatches will, however, show conclusively that he was not negligent in applying the same principles to the inhabitants in St. Helena. He recognized the difference between Bombay and St. Helena, and modified his policy accordingly. Yet the broad outlines of his policy are the same. He aimed at the development of St. Helena into a self-sufficing colony, 'provided with all manner of provisions that can be raised upon the island'; he emphasized the necessity of industry and labour on the part of the inhabitants, 'so that the island may yield whatever is necessary for their comfort and subsistence'; he had 'thoughts of making the colony a large sugar plantation with mills', &c.; he 'had also thought of making it a large indicoe plantation as soon as he found a proper place'; 'the making of saltpetre there, upon discoursing with many persons for the improvement of the island,' was also regarded as practicable. His rules for the island were modelled upon those made for Bombay. Yet the island was 'very chargeable'; its turbulent inhabitants rose frequently into revolts; they supplied provisions to the Interlopers, while Mr. Church, the 'minister', was the 'first aboard the Interloper Pitt that came in last voyage, especially considering that the island hath cost us £40,000, without one penny profit hitherto more than refreshment for ourselves'. The suppression of the revolt was attended by the hideous barbarity characteristic of the times. Childe was no doubt very harsh to the rebels, and the subsequent proceedings of the Court savoured of the Inquisition. Nor can he be acquitted of tyranny. But he declared that 'there had been four rebellions in the island, and His Majesty may justly blame our conduct if there be a fifth ',1 and asked whether he had not been 'too lenient and compassionate, and never thought of the mistake of thinking that kindness and indulgence would work upon such an ill-natured and levelling constitution as those islands were founded upon '.

The extension of the Company's sphere of influence, and the development of the East India trade, could be achieved only through factories. His merit lies, not in initiating the movement for the establishment of British dominion in India, but in providing for the security of the trade. That security could be achieved only through fortified factories. His policy is best studied in his dispatch to Fort St. George, dated 22nd October 1686. 'We do think it is an excellent station for our affairs, to have one fort in every prince's dominion, with whose subjects we trade, which on the side of India are the Mogul in Bengala; the King of Golconda, where we have Fort St. George; The Gingee Country, where we have yet no fort; and that country between Trincumbar and Negapatam, where we have yet neither fort nor factory.'2 'The more we think, the more advantage we apprehend in having a fortified settlement for the residence of our Agent and Council of the Bay, in such a place as our great ships may lie within command of the guns of our forts, and where we may have ground enough to cultivate for the subsistence of such a body of people as we have at Fort St. George.'3 The ideal of Childe is a strongly fortified factory, well provided with 'paddy', and capable of commercial development. The maintenance of a fort is essential, for, 'though our business is only trade and security, not conquest, which the Dutch aimed at, we dare not trade boldly, nor leave great stocks, where we have not the security of a fort'.4

The Directors recognized that conquest by the Company was impracticable. ‘All war is so contrary to our constitution as well as our interest, that we cannot too often inculcate to you our aversion thereunto.’1 That the Company did not follow the Dutch methods of conquest will be evident from Childe’s reply to the President of Fort St. George who had asserted that ‘the Dutch raised no revenue, but in conquered places’. ‘It is monstrous that you should attempt to impose upon us such a fallacy. . . . It is only the trade and populousness of the place that gives opportunity to the Governors to create a revenue, and not the manner of their first entrance, whether by conquest, or compact, or treachery.’2 The Dutch are no doubt regarded as the ‘mirrors of the East India policy, and the only patterns to be imitated by any that would lay secure foundations for a lasting East India Trade’,3 but it is their method of raising revenue, not their policy of conquest, which the Company tried to follow. The trade could hardly be maintained without the security of the Company’s forts. Childe knew it in 1681; and if he had had any opportunity for redressing the grievances of the Company, he would have precipitated the war with the Mogul. The causes of the war were many, and as they have been exhaustively dealt with by Hunter, I need not go into them here. He omits, however, the most important causes which in my opinion led to it. These are: (1) the encouragement of the Interlopers by the Moguls; (2) the Dutch activity in the East. We read of frequent complaints by Childe of the way in which the Interlopers were aided by the Moguls; and the activities of the Interlopers have been described in detail by Colonel Yule. What, however, has not been described is the effect of these activities upon the Mogul Governors. The effect was uniformly bad. Childe himself acknowledged it, in his dispatch, dated 28th October 1685. ‘We have heard how shamefully our People have been abused in the late Interloping times by the Mogul’s Governors and Officers at Suratt, where our servants were searched to their shirts, while the French, Dutch, and Danes pass un-molested.

They durst not have offered these insolences to our Nation, but they thought us a house divided against itself; and in consequence we could not stand long. They were in the right as to postures 3 years ago. But God be thanked, the case is now altered, and we think you will hear of no more Interlopers in India.’1 The complaint is repeated in the Company’s letter to the Mogul. ‘We pray that your officers may be required to forbear searching the persons of our servants. . . . While the Dutch and the Danes are free, the English are searched.’2 This difference of treatment is accounted for by the fact that the Company’s conflict with the Interlopers had rendered it powerless for a time. The Mogul Governors could hardly be expected to realize the differences between the Company and the Interlopers. Moreover, it was to their advantage to keep up the feud, for by that means they could derive the greatest benefit. The Company, however, was guided by Childe at the time, and he was not likely to delay the adoption of effective measures against the Interlopers. The India Office Letter Book, No. 7, containing all his dispatches between 1682–5, gives full details of his offensive. ‘Suits with the Interlopers go on well,’ he says in one of his dispatches, ‘the Litigations between us and the Interlopers of the last two years go on well, according to the method of proceeding in the Laws of this kingdom.’ This was written in 1684. In 1686 he writes: ‘Here is no interloper arriyed, since Captain Day, and we question whether any of them abroad will venture in.’ We find him writing jubilantly in 1687, ‘you will hear no more of the Interlopers’.

The revival of the Dutch activity in the East, and the expulsion of the English factors from Bantam in 1682, determined the Directors to fortify their factories in India. It was this, more than any other cause, that led to the insistence of the Directors upon the importance of this point. They wrote to the President of Fort St. George, in May 1683, ‘We would have you to fortify our fort and town, by degrees, that it may be tenable against the assaults of any India Prince, and the Dutch power of India, if we should appear to have any difference with them hereafter, about the Bantam business’.1 Childe thus tersely explains the difference between the old and the new spirit. ‘It may be asked why could not the Company subsist with as small a duty as they levied formerly. The answer is, they may subsist as they did formerly, having their factories generally at the mercy of the Heathens among whom they lived, but then they shall be so weak in India, as the Dutch when they please may rout them of all India in one year, as they have already out of all the noblest parts of India.’2 There was no change in their attitude towards the Dutch the following year. ‘Our main design in sending this warlike fleet [under Captain Nicholson] and so many companies of soldiers [to Bengal] . . . we desire you to promote by all the means which lies in your power, as a matter that more eminently concerns the honour of our sovereign and his kingdom than any advantage that can accrue thereby to the Company during our lives, save the honour of preventing the Dutch from their great design of expelling the English nation from the trade of India.’3 ‘Do not quarrel with the Dutch, and don’t be aggressors in any of their quarrels, but resist force by force.’4 These were the main causes of the war with the Mogul. The Dutch and the Interlopers harassed the Company’s factors, preyed upon its commerce, and intrigued against its servants with the Mogul’s Governors. There is reason to think that some of them were utterly corrupt, intensely partial, and totally negligent. Their treatment of the factors could hardly be called satisfactory. Yet this was due, in the main, to the weakness of the Company itself. It was not powerful enough to crush all the Interlopers. Its servants were incompetent and dishonest. We find the Directors complaining, in a series of dispatches, of the conduct of their factors, and bringing many a charge against their servants. We are not, therefore, surprised to find that the Mogul Governors took advantage of their disunion, and consequent impotence, and treated them shamefully. The Company itself knew the cause of the other invidious distinctions about which it had complained to the Mogul. They were mistaken, however, in supposing that these distinctions could be removed by force. This was the one fatal mistake of which Childe was guilty. He had a thorough grasp of the situation in India. He had, moreover, a profound insight into the means by which the situation could be met. His insistence on the importance of fortified factories, and his determination to suppress the Interlopers at any cost, were thoroughly characteristic of his policy. The two were logically connected. Without the one the other would have been futile. Security is essential to order, and without security the East India trade would have become the prey of the pirate, the Dutch, the Danes, and others. Hence his desire for fortified towns. He did not regard them as a means whereby the English empire could be established in India, but as instruments by which ‘ our servants, shipping, and estate could be secured ’.1 His policy, therefore, was not the policy of Clive, but the policy of Sir Thomas Roe, with this difference, that the peaceful trade which Roe had desired could be secured only by means of forts.

Though the Company’s war with the Mogul was a disastrous failure, it showed the importance of the East India trade to England. The effects of this failure on its position at home were disastrous. Childe boasted that ‘ such hath been God’s blessing upon the company’s Arms, their unavoidable necessity, and their righteous cause, that the war, beyond all men’s opinions, has ended to the Eternal Honour of the English Nation in those parts of the world, and a truce concluded upon such honourable articles, that if a blank had been delivered to the Company in England, to write down their own Terms, they would not have desired more than is granted by the said Articles ’.2 His letters to his factors are pitched in a minor key. ‘ We received your melancholy letter of the 19th May last, with former of the 10th February, and observed the contents, which made great noise here, and raised the spirits and wings of our old Adversaries, the Interlopers, who were so elated at the first news of the Invasion of Bombay, that some of them reported that all was lost, and therefore applied for a new Company to be established by the Act of Parliament.’ 3 The ‘ old Adversaries ’ were not slow to take advantage of the difficult situation in which the Company was placed. Accordingly, ‘the committee of the East India Company and their Abettors having made so great a noise, last week, of the advantageous peace they had obtained of the Great Mogul’, they thought it their duty to publish a true account of the War. They reproduced not only the humiliating Phirmaund granted contemptuously by Aurangzebe,1 but also the despairing letter of their ‘wise general’ to Sir Josiah.2 The war not only disorganized the finances of the Company, but also supplied fresh recruits to its opponents. They were denounced as ‘murderers’, and charged with destroying ‘poor innocent Banias, and other merchants’.3 ‘It is not to be hoped we shall ever gain our credit in India. Nor have we reason to believe that the Mogul and his people will be heartily reconciled to the present East India Company.’ The conclusion was obvious. The Mogul’s Phirmaund ‘stands upon Record in the Court of that Great Prince, to the Eternal Infamy of the English Nation, whereby not only the Honour of the English, but the Interest of the East India Company, have suffered an immense and irreparable Damage, though some few, by unwarrantable and prodigious means, have gained prodigious estates’.4 Childe’s mendacious statements about the war were shown to be false. His adversaries no doubt possessed an advantage in that respect. The war with the Mogul, and the keen discussion that centred round it, were, however, insignificant, in comparison with the fundamental questions that were discussed in connexion with the East India trade. Childe’s policy had aimed at the alliance of the Company with the Crown. This was eminently satisfactory up to 1689. After the Revolution the opponents who had been kept in check raised their heads again. Even the downfall of James would not have been followed by the violent attacks that were started in 1689. It was the transference of part of the powers possessed by James to the Parliament of 1689 that essentially modified the attitude of the latter towards the Company. There is no reason to doubt that William III would have supported the East India Company against the violent attacks to which it was subjected. The Whigs, in 1683, quoted many precedents to prove the freedom of trade; they were powerless against the Crown. In 1689, however, the King’s Prerogative was denied. Hence the Company suffered not only by the change of dynasty, but also by the change of sovereignty. Nor was this the only change effected by the Revolution. The question of Prerogative had been fought over for a long time, and it was at last decided in favour of Parliament in 1689. It was the application of the theories of the Revolution to the various elements that were the constituents of national welfare that completely modified the standpoint from which the East India trade had hitherto been regarded. It was no longer regarded as the exclusive monopoly of a tyrannical company, with ample jurisdiction, but as a source of national gain, which every Englishman ought to share. The Company was, therefore, opposed not only by (i) Interlopers, as before, but also (ii) by the defenders of the Regulated Companies, (iii) the bullionists, (iv) the Whigs, (v) the clothiers, (vi) the personal enemies of Childe. The objection of the democrats was based mainly on constitutional grounds. The monopoly of the East India Company was regarded by them as a direct negation of the principles of the Revolution. ‘Freedom of Trade is a fundamental part of English Liberty, and it is surprising to me that since the Revolution Englishmen should be deprived of the liberty of Trading to any part of the known world.’1 ‘There can be no colour of reason why the Company should have £744,000 given them in that Trade for nothing, but only admitting others into a share of it, who have as much right to the trade, by the Law of the Land, as the Company themselves; nor is it reasonable the subjects of England should be forced to purchase of their fellowsubjects the admittance into a Trade at so dear a rate, when they cannot be legally excluded from it.’2

We do not find any trace of the ‘natural right’ which figured so prominently in the speeches of Cecil. A right, however, does exist, and, as ‘all the subjects of England have an equal right to Trade to the East Indies, the establishing the Company would give away that right to a few men only, and thereby exclude the rest from it for 21 years '.1 It was, said the Whigs, 'against common justice and the birthright of Englishmen to exclude any of them from so great a part of the Trade of the Nation, and that Bristol, Exeter, Plymouth, and Hull should not trade to the East Indies as well as London'.2 'The Establishing this Company at this time would plainly admit of the Pretended Power of excluding the subjects of England from a Freedom of Trade by Charter, to the Freedom of which they have not only a Right by Birth, but it is likewise particularly taken care of and secured to them by several express statutes, the exercise of which powers, for want of being checked by former Parliaments, has already given colour for a pretence to claim it by Prescription, the ill consequences of which no man can foresee.'3 The importance of these statements is in the fact that the East India trade had come to be regarded as a national concern, which could be dealt with by Parliament alone. The Prerogative of the Crown had been asserted by Jeffreys in the case of Sandys.4 It was now denied by the Company's opponents, who asserted that the King in his royal capacity could do no wrong. 'He cannot weaken the Nation by restraining, and thereby endangering, the safety of the Nation to a few, and exclude the rest of the Nation from the Benefit of it. He cannot ruin the Multitudes of his Laborious and Industrious subjects seeking a vent of their Labours in Foreign parts, if they cannot do it at home. It is dishonourable to the Nation to prefer a few and a Faction of his Subjects, above the Generality of the Nation, and Welfare of it.'5 The opinion was shared by other writers of the time. 'The King had not by Law a power to grant the Trade to some persons exclusive of others.'6 Again, the Whig landlords, who became dominant after the Revolution, claimed a share in the profits derived from the East India trade. We have a series of proposals, advocating the establishment of a New East India Company, with a capital of £1,400,000, ‘so that the Landed Men of the Kingdom, who are the most burdened with Taxes, and who suffer so much in their Rents and Estates, may not be prejudiced, but rather advantaged’.1 The author suggests that the Trade should be managed ‘by a Number of Persons, chosen by Parliament, and accountable thereto’. ‘They should be empowered to take money at Interest, not exceeding £1,400,000, for carrying on this Trade. There should be settled, for ever, one single month’s Tax in a year, after the rate of £70,000 per month, as a Fund to be Perpetual Interest at 5 p. c. of £1,400,000.’ It was claimed that ‘besides the money employed in this Trade, there will be land security as a perpetual Fund for the Interest settled, which will give the Company such a credit, they can never want money at the lowest Interest that anywhere it can be had’.2 The ‘owners of money’, however, did not think it feasible to hand over the East India Company to the tender mercies of the landlords, and accordingly we have another proposal, advocating ‘the division of profit between the owners of money and land’. The latter were to subscribe £700,000 to the new Company. This, however, was not enough for Mr. Thomas Neale. Accordingly, the latter proposed that the Company should be continued, but settled by Parliament, exclusive of others. ‘Its capital was not to exceed £1,400,000.’ Moreover, ‘all the Dividends were to be made on that footing, and that every owner of £100 stock should have a dividend of £5 per cent. in the first place yearly’. It should agree to have one single month’s tax of £70,000 yearly, settled by Parliament, to ensure the said stock, and to borrow money upon.3 The opponents of the Company claimed many advantages for their scheme. They asserted that ‘it will be an encouragement for Adventurers to make new Discoveries, when every one may have the management of his own affairs, and reap the benefit of his own Benefit’. Moreover, ‘there will be a larger Importation from India. This will lower the price of these goods; the many sellers at our markets give us a great advantage to surmount our European competitors in that Trade’.1 To the objection that ‘many buyers will enhance the prices of commodities in India’, they replied that where there are more buyers, more goods are produced. ‘For these want neither land nor people in that vast Continent, who are ingenious and civilized, great traders, and understand their business as well as any in Europe.’ ‘More cotton will be sowed and gathered, and made into calicoes than now is, if there be greater demand for them. Silk may be multiplied almost ad infinitum, as has been clearly proved by Cassemba Zaar.’ ‘By enlarging the Trade to India, more men and defensible ships will be employed, many unknown places discovered, the customs augmented, gentlemen’s younger sons found a profitable employment, greater quantities of English goods will be exported.’2 It was suggested, moreover, that ‘all others should have liberty to trade thither, paying 20 p. c. outwards to the Company, and all who desire such a license shall be obliged to give notice to the Company’.3 ‘The revenues of the Crown and our Navigation will be very much increased.’4 They asserted, moreover, that ‘the way to prevent foreign Nations increasing their Trade to India, is to open the Trade to all British subjects, who would drive it with such vigour as to discourage other Nations, which would greatly increase the customs and enlarge the navigation of this kingdom’.5 The weakness of the Company’s opponents was due to the fact that each of them desired his own interest. The Interloper advocated freedom of trade, because without that freedom it was virtually impossible for him to contend against the authority of the Company. There is reason to believe that these adventurers became very bold, and that some of them turned pirates.6 They plundered the goods of Europeans and Indians, and treated them brutally. The resolution of the House of Commons declaring ‘the right of all Englishmen to trade to the East Indies, unless prohibited by Act of Parliament’ encouraged the Interlopers. Their numbers increased. So did the number of atrocities which they committed. Childe now allied himself with the Mogul powers, and instructed his factors to punish not only those who molested the Company’s factors, but also the subjects of ‘our ally, the Mogul’.1 It can hardly be doubted that open trade was impossible in India, and the Company was perfectly right when it attributed the ill-treatment of its factors by the Mogul’s Governors to the actions of the Interlopers. It especially complained of the sums of money paid by the Interlopers to the Mogul. ‘It was, in their opinion, one of the principal causes of the Insolency of those Heathen Governors in denying all ancient Privileges to the Company, except they might extort from time to time what they pleased from them, as they do from the Interlopers.’2 Childe agreed in principle that some trades might be better and more beneficially carried on by a ‘General Admission of all merchants’, but it must be ‘where the countries traded to are near home; where little money is required at a time to carry such a Trade on; where no one Nation can be capable of engrossing the trade; where no forts are necessary, and where you can support your commerce with a strong hand. But this is not the case of the East India Company’.3 This was, perhaps, the most effective argument employed by the Company. The freedom of trade so much desired by the theorists was, no doubt, beneficial. But this freedom could hardly be maintained in the East Indies, as the Dutch, the French, and the Danes, with their powerful companies, would have expelled the English from the East and ‘engrossed the Trade’. This had occurred actually in the Spice Islands, and the Company did not fail to point out the moral.

The agitation for open trade is typical of the period. The East India trade had come to be regarded as the source from which the different classes of society would reap enormous benefits. The landowners, the moneyed men, the King, the gentlemen’s younger sons, and the English manufacturers—all were to share the profits. Hence the desire for freedom of trade to the East Indies. If, however, such freedom was impossible, the contention was that it was better to have a Regulated rather than a Joint-Stock Company for the East. The scheme had many attractive features, and in some respects it was superior to the Joint-Stock organization which was the characteristic feature of the East India Company. ‘The best way to carry on trade is by the Establishing of a Regulated Company, whereby all the subjects may trade upon a legal foot.’1 ‘The way of Nations trading to the East Indies is not by incorporated Company, with a Joint Stock, but free and open to all that would follow it. The most proper means to preserve that Trade is to make it National. The people of Holland found it, for while the Trade was free they had the greatest benefit by it. The Joint Stock after arising proved an enclosure of Trade from them.’2 Their denunciations of the East India Company’s monopoly, and their constant complaints of the tyranny exercised by the ‘topping men’ in the Committee, were aimed, no doubt, at Childe. The latter did not find it difficult to prove the superiority of the Joint-Stock organization over a Regulated Company. He pointed out the monopoly exercised by the Regulated Companies themselves, and showed that Regulated Companies had degenerated into close Corporations. The Company had aimed at the establishment of fortified factories in India in order that it ‘might secure itself against the Craft and Treachery, or open Force, of the People with which they traded’. There can be no doubt that the security of trade required fortified factories. It may also be conceded that the nature of trade required a ‘variety of settlements, and factories to deal with the Indian Merchants that came thither at stated and particular times to trade’. Yet the Company was hardly in a position to carry that policy into effect. Its opponents were not slow to point out the difficulties of the task. ‘If forts and castles were of any use in India, it could only be in countries of small princes; but they can never be of any use in the Mogul’s Dominions, who is one of the Greatest Princes in the World.’ ‘As regards security, we trade in all parts of the Mogul’s Dominion with as much security as Foreigners do in London.’ They pointed out justly that ‘the Company could not oppose the Dutch or Indians in time of War, and in Peace it must be our Strength at home that must secure us against any of their Insults abroad’. As one writer put it tersely: ‘If we want Peace with the Natives, we want no forts, and if we are encouraged by the Forts to make war, the Company shall soon repent.’ Moreover, the forts which the Company valued so much were useless. They showed the uselessness of Madras, ‘which they had bought of a prince for £12,000, of Tonquin, built only with Canes called Bamboos, and of Bencoolen’.1 We must, instead of relying on forts, &c., rely mainly on the goodwill and honesty of the Indians, for they are ‘men of that sense and morality, that where they meet those that deal with honest and fair dealing, there is no fear of their displeasure’. The Company’s forts being useless, the best course for England to adopt was the appointment of an ambassador to the Mogul’s Court. Roger Coke suggested a League of Commerce with the Indian princes. By this means, ‘the English trading with them will be reciprocally protected, as well by the king as by those Princes. Besides, we ought, in honour, to send an Ambassador to those princes, upon whom the Company have made such injurious wars, and whose subjects have been robbed.’2 A convenient number of persons should be ‘empowered to raise money for maintaining our Ambassador at the Mogul’s Court, and Consuls at the Principal Ports ’.1 These proposals were adopted by the New Company in 1698, and an ambassador was actually sent to the Mogul’s Court. But the failure of that embassy convinced the Company’s opponents of the futility of the project. The policy might have proved successful under Charles II. It was completely successful under James I. In 1698, however, the appointment of an ambassador by the New Company could not but lead to disunion and strife. This had been foretold by a writer.2 His forebodings were confirmed by the disgraceful quarrels between the two Companies in India. They were on firmer ground when they attacked Childe’s policy of fortified factories. The real cause of the failure of that policy was the weakness of the East India Company. It was not able to wage a war with the Mogul successfully, as ‘the Mogul was a powerful prince’. Childe, perhaps, did not know this, otherwise he would not have sent ten companies of infantry against 100,000 soldiers. His mistake lay, not in formulating that policy, but in trying to carry it out at a time when the Company’s position was far from satisfactory, against a king who had unlimited resources at his disposal.

A more formidable attack was delivered from another quarter. The agitation against the exportation of bullion had died down under Charles II. The Company had secured the approval of Charles, and had satisfied the Government that the amount exported had been greatly exaggerated. After the Revolution, however, its lack of support exposed it to the fierce attacks of the bullionists. It was asserted by a writer that the ‘trade carried away large quantities of money which is not only the sinews of war, but medium of trade’. For ‘money in a body Politick is as blood in the Body Natural, giving life to every part’.3 It would have been comparatively easy to silence this opposition if the Company had restricted itself to the importation of raw materials. But the conditions under which the trade was carried on rendered Mun’s defence of the East India trade useless. Now not only was the bullion exported increased in amount, but also the Indian commodities imported into England competed with the English manufactures. This was expressed concisely by one writer: 'This trade is the worst possible of all, because it carries from us our Gold and Silver, which we cannot well spare, and brings us back Toys, Handicrafts, and Manufactured Goods, which we least want.'1

The sentiments not only of the common people, but also of the bullionists, were expressed in the following lines :

Whilst they promote what Indians make,
The Employment they from the English take,
Then how shall Tenants pay their Rents,
When Trade and Coins (are) to India sent ?
How shall folks live, and Taxes pay,
When Poor want work, and go away ?
Such cargoes as these ships bring over,
In England were never seen before.2

It is apparent from a mass of documents that this exportation was universally unpopular.3 There is ample reason to suppose that the bullionists would have found no hearing if the weavers and others had profited by the extension of the East India trade. This, however, was not the case. Nothing is more significant of the times than the conception of the State as an organism, in which each part serves the other, and each class and industry acts and reacts on the other. The Community is regarded as a unified body. The different classes are no doubt moved by different interests. The landlords were notoriously the most important class after the Revolution, and it would be idle to deny that their interests conflicted in many respects with those of other classes. Yet, in so far as the public welfare was concerned, all of them gravitated towards that ideal. All their arguments would be incomprehensible at the present day unless we place this condition prominently before us. Childe and others declared boldly that the State alone could judge whether any measure conduced to public safety. The merchants were totally unfitted to form any sound judgement on the matter, for they would naturally prefer their gains to the public right. In the controversy of the bullionists the leading idea is the same. The amount of bullion exported would have been comparatively unimportant if it had not affected the community in its totality. It was the consequences of the acts, and not the acts themselves, that were the object of the bullionists' attacks. In estimating the dire results of the measure, they made the mistake of exaggerating their importance. This was perhaps unavoidable. Only by vivid recital of all the wrongs done to the different classes could the nation be aroused to its danger. It was on this account that Pollexfen denounced the exportation of bullion. 'The original of our riches is from the labour, diligence, and industry of our people in getting out of the bowels of the earth, from our lands and seas, what may be improved and made useful for carrying on our foreign trade, upon which also depends the increase of our seamen and navigation, in which our strength consists, and the support of millions whose lot Providence has cast on trade. The great concern thus depending on trade, it may properly be said, it is to the body politic as blood to the body natural, not only to support the main, but particular members of it, and, if not allowed due nourishment, may afford too much nourishment to some, but occasion a consumption or withering of the rest. Hope of gain is the mother of trade in general, but more particularly of such as get trades incorporated in Joint Stocks, which seldom extend to relieve the meanest, but usually the richest traders, who make it their business to get it incorporated.'1 This passage shows strikingly the importance attached by the writers of the seventeenth century to the exportation of bullion. There is no reason to suppose that gold was regarded by them as the source of all wealth. Their conception of wealth seems to have been much deeper than has been generally supposed. They attached more importance to ‘immaterial’ wealth than to ‘material’ wealth; they carried the analysis of the functions of State much farther; they were sensible of the dangers of the domination of one interest over the rest; and, finally, they identified the material progress of the country with the maintenance of the Colbertism of the times.

Throughout these discussions we are struck by the frequency of their appeals to an external authority. It was the existence of this authority—the State—that made possible the composition of these differences. The ultimate foundation of all government rests on the fact that it reconciles all the divergent interests, and is not identified with a particular class. Viewed mainly from this standpoint the appeal of the bullionists possesses much more force. Why, they asked, should we send the money to employ the poor in India, when we have great numbers of poor at home?1 The question of exportation of bullion was intimately connected with the wider question of protection of English industries. ‘Would it not’, asked Prince Butler,2 in a vein of peculiar irony, ‘be better that we should be at 400 or 500 thousand Pounds Charge per annum, for Indian Vanities, having such plenty of money, than for the sake of employing our own people upon our own Wool, disoblige several Maids and their Mistresses, who would then be at loss how to dress themselves in their Chamber, Parlour, and Closets?’ ‘Had not’, asked the same redoubtable antagonist,3 ‘a hundred thousand Poor rather come to their Parishes for want of work, and all the land of England fall two years’ purchase, than that the Cookmaids should not be Cloathed in India Silks, and the ladies in Callicoes?’ ‘Do not the East India Merchantmen know the interest of the Nation better than the country gentlemen?’ It seemed to the English manufacturers a crime against the English nation that the English gold and silver should be exchanged for ‘Cobwebs and Cockershells’. The Company, they asserted, ‘debauched the nation with Cobwebs and cockershells, in return for English gold and silver’.1 ‘There needs no more to show the necessity of making a speedy Law to prohibit the Avaricious Practices of those men that would sacrifice their own country for their private Gain.’2 To the arguments of the East India Company that silver and gold were commodities, and that the Company brought the returns of the East India goods in gold, they replied that what came back in goods to be consumed here made no amends ‘for the Treasure exported, and Trades that cannot be balanced without our own Products ought to be rectified some other way, and not by sending our money to India to buy Goods for that purpose’. To some of them gold and silver were the riches or treasure of a nation. ‘Though Jewels, Lead and Tin, be durable, so yet not possessing other qualifications, do not so well esteem to be Treasure. Nor can Silks and Woollen Goods be esteemed Riches between man and man.’3 Sir William Petty admirably explained the profit derived by England from the exportation of bullion to the East. ‘Question 7. Will not England be impoverished by merchants carrying out the said 100 shillings? Answer: No; if he brings home for them as much silk as will yield above 100 shillings (perhaps 200 shillings in Spain, and then the same 200 shillings into England); or, if he bring home as much Pepper as an Englishman will give him 200 of the like shillings for; so the merchants and England shall gain by exporting 100 shillings.’4 The danger to the Company lay in the alliance of the bullionist with the clothier. The two had many things in common. Both disapproved of the East India trade; but they did it on different grounds. The bullionist regarded the drain of gold to the East as the main cause of the impoverishment of the people. He attributed the unemployment, the decline of trade in 1696 and 1697, and the consequent poverty of the working classes, to the exportation of the nation’s ‘Riches and Treasures’ to the heathens. The English merchants, and the English weavers, ascribed the misery, the poverty, and the wretchedness of the poor not to the war, which was really one of the causes, but to the importation of Indian commodities into England. It is very difficult to draw a hard and fast line between the complaints of the two. They have been treated here separately, for the sake of simplicity. In practice the complaints voiced by the bullionist, and those by the merchant, were fused into one loud outcry against the universal enemy. The clothiers had complained of the competition of the East India commodities as early as 1675.1 Between 1690 and 1699 the situation became much more serious. It is not until we find the clothiers' complaints figuring prominently in the Journals of the House of Commons that we become aware of the serious hardship and the keen competition to which they were subjected by the increased importation of Indian manufactures. Some of their statements were no doubt grossly inaccurate. A few would convict their authors of libel in a modern court of law. Yet a careful comparison of the pamphlets preserved in the British Museum, the India Office Library, and the Bodleian Library has convinced me that the hardships they suffered were due to a great extent to the East India manufacturers. The opposition of the bullionist would have been futile without the help of the manufacturers. They would have been silenced if the Company had been able to prove that the bullion exported to India brought in greater treasure to the nation. This would have involved merely a restatement of Mun's defence of the East India trade. In 1690–1700, however, the Company could not employ Mun's arguments at all. This was due to the fact that the exportation of a large amount of bullion was followed by the importation of an increasing amount of Indian commodities. It was the competition of the latter with the English manufactures that rendered the protests of the bullionists so serious.

The price of the Company's stock is, no doubt, important. This does not, however, lessen the difficulty. The Company's stock sold at different prices in different times, and, as its price depended upon circumstances that had no connexion with the growth or decline of the East India trade, it would be totally unhistorical to treat it as the sole criterion. Hence, the profits cannot be stated exactly. Though an exact statement be impossible, a rough approximation is useful, and, for this reason, ‘T. S.’s’ figures are important. After stating the amount of profits that the Company derived from the East India trade, ‘T. S.’ mentions the loss. He could not exactly compute the ‘great loss that has come to the Nation, by want of employment to so many thousands of people in London and Canterbury’. Nor could he estimate the loss sustained by the nation through the unemployment of the poor. The latter was considered by him to be ‘irreparable and no equivalent to be found for it’. An equivalent is, however, found. It amounts, in round figures, to £1,200,000.1 The figures are obviously exaggerated, and can hardly be relied upon. Yet they serve to bring into prominence the popular opinion on the influence of the East India trade. Nor can we say that these statements were totally groundless. There was a large amount of truth in the complaints of the English weavers.2 The Indian manufactures were alleged to have directly hindered the ‘Expence of our own manufactures made in London, Norwich, Canterbury, Bristol, and many other places’.3

‘We have’, asserted a writer,1 ‘already and are now inciting the Indians and Chineses that are a numerous and Laborious People, and can and do live without Fire or Clothing, and with a Trivial Expence for Food.’ ‘It is’, declared the writer, ‘impolitick and utterly destructive of our own manufactures.’ We find a succession of writers denouncing the East India trade upon this ground. ‘The Indians’, asserted Pollexfen, ‘will take any nation’s money that come to them. They exclude none.’ In this controversy the manufacturer and the bullionist were in complete agreement. It seemed to the latter to be unworthy of a Christian to enrich the heathen at the expense of the English. As one acute writer pointed out, ‘It was the English that first put the Indians on that great excess they now are, of throwing, dyeing, and weaving, when both they and the Indians could not do less than laugh in their sleeves at the Act that prevents

(for the linen drapers, calenderers, upholsterers, and persons who have lent money on the Customs) acknowledged that ‘there never was so much cloth exported from the Indies’, p. 238. John Andrews, dealer in India and English silks, declared that, during the last four years, ‘there has been more consigned than in any years before’. ‘The English cannot nearly supply the nation.’ Mr. Dodd, for the Bill, declared that the Bill was for the advantage of the people of England. Englishmen were as competent as foreigners. ‘We can outdo the Dutch and French Silks. We can make them as cheap as they can.’ A very interesting account of the Norwich trade is to be found in the same volume. A Mr. Lamb, ‘employed by his friends and relations at Norwich’, declared that several sorts of stuffs were made in imitation of Indian goods. ‘We are forced to go 40 or 50 miles for looms, &c. We want hands to work.’ ‘The trade is gone to other places.’ ‘We have lost the whole trade.’ It is very interesting to estimate the influence of the East India commodities on Spitalfields, the home of the silk industry. A Mr. Smith, ‘who had lived some time in Spitalfield’, declared that ‘when the East India ships come in, half our weavers play’. ‘For two or three years we have increased and employed French refugees, and can employ more if further encouraged.’ Compare the testimony of Mr. Medcalf, the factor at Canterbury, ‘the East India goods are prejudicial to us’. Compare the evidence of John Mennel, linen-draper, ib., ‘I never knew such a consumption of East India goods before’. Compare the petition of the Churchwardens of Bethnal Green, ib., pp. 509–11. ‘The poor of our hamlet are grown extreme numerous amongst us, in regard many weavers and others employed in and about the silk and woollen manufactures, have entered His Majesty’s service.’ ‘The weaving trade and several other trades depending thereon are extinguished among us, which formerly used to be the chief maintainer and support of the necessities of our poor; the importing of wrought Silks, Bengals, and printed and stained calicoes from India and Persia being the chief occasion thereof.’ ‘A great number of weavers are out of work, who formerly used to contribute to the necessities of others.’ Petitioners pray their Lordships to restrain the India silks, &c. throwing and dyeing’. ‘It was’, bewailed the writer, ‘the English that sent over artists of all these trades and patterns that might suit the European humour.’1 They argued that, if the increase of woollen manufacture in Ireland was judged prejudicial, because the Irish could underwork and so undersell the English weaver, the East India manufactures ought to be regarded in the same light.2

Wool had hitherto been regarded as the staple manufacture of England. Childe and Davenant were, probably, the most thorough-going Free Traders of the time. Even they were unanimous upon that point. The staple commodity ought, they thought, to be developed by England, and every means tried to make the manufacture perfect. This had been voiced in a well known broadside3 :

The Loom, the Comb, the Spinning Wheel,
Do all support this kingdom’s Weal.
If you will wear your own silk and woollen,
You will keep your coin, your poor, your bullion.

The complaints of the competition of East India manufactures are repeated in a number of pamphlets. ‘Finding’, asserted the petitioners, ‘that the late great Importation and Wear of their Indian Manufactures are increasing and have already, in a great measure, ruined the Canterbury Trade, and obliged the weavers to fall upon all sorts of woollen manufactures, to the prejudice of several places where such manufactures have long been established, we are therefore come again, to represent our deplorable case, and pray the consideration of this Parliament.’ ‘It is worthy of consideration’, asserted another writer, that ‘abundance of particular weavers and Traders that are destroyed both in Canterbury and Norwich, do employ more numbers of people than any country or Corporation Workhouse’.4 By these means, ‘thousands of Broad Looms, and hundreds of Throwsters’ and Twisters’ Mills stand to spoil, and burn, and many thousands of people forced to transport themselves, or beg, or steal, or starve, while the Mogul’s subjects are encouraged and employed, and multitudes of Looms and Mills made to imitate those Silks and Stuffs lately exposed at Skinner’s Hall ’.1

The effects of this competition would, in the opinion of the writer, be disastrous. In the end the East India trade must produce ‘empty purses, empty Houses, empty Towns, a small, poor, weak, and slender people’. Another result would be a fall in the value of lands. ‘As things are, nothing can prevent ruin.’

Nothing is more instructive than the arguments by which the prohibition of the East India trade was defended. The weavers justified it mainly upon the ground that the increased imports would result, not only in the ruin of the woollen manufactures, but also in the impoverishment of the nation. It is extremely doubtful whether the opposition of the weavers would have had any effect if the other classes of community had held aloof. The ladies seem to have been the greatest offenders, so far as the wearing of Indian silks was concerned.2

The above documents show the nature of the opposition to the East India trade. The woollen manufactures were considered the staple commodity of England, and any trade that competed with them was regarded as highly injurious. It is, however, doubtful whether the weavers’ representations would have had any effect, apart from the aid which the opposition of the joiners and other classes rendered them. The joiners complained of the dispatch of English workers, ‘and models and Patterns of all sorts of Cabinet goods to the East’. They returned from thence such quantities of Cabinet wares manufactured there, after the English fashion, that ‘the said trade is in great danger of being utterly ruined by the ingrossment of the said merchants’.1 I have not been able to trace any other complaint by the Joiners’ Company. This may be due to the fact that cabinet and lacquered goods from Tonquin, &c., proved very costly. We find the Directors requesting their Factors at Tonquin not to send any more goods, ‘as they were very costly’.2

Perhaps the best testimony to the existence of a keen competition is to be found in the Manuscript Letter Books in the India Office containing the dispatches of the Company’s directors to their factors in the East. The history of the progress of the Indian commodities in England can be traced by following the dispatches of the directors. They supply us with minute information on all the Indian manufactures that were in demand in England at the time. From them we know the quantity and quality of the articles required, while the best method of packing them is shown us in an unconsciously humorous way. The strength of the Company’s opponents rested mainly upon the way in which they pointed out the inner connexion among the several industries. They attempted to show that the question was of a far more significant nature than the Company had supposed. The ultimate consequence of this trade would, in their opinion, be disastrous. ‘The nation would be impoverished; the population will decrease; if the people falls, the Rents will do also'; and, 'as the woollen and worsted manufactures depended on the silk and stuff manufactures, and as, moreover, other allied trades, Upholsteries, Iron, Steel, Cabinet-making', &c., had begun to suffer, the total English trade would receive a shock from which it would be difficult to recover. National ruin would follow. The English weavers attacked it therefore, on national, and not on sectional grounds. The whole fabric of the Colbertism would have collapsed if the theories of the defenders of the East India trade had been carried to their logical conclusions.

Of the numerous pamphleteers of the period three stand out prominent. Prince Butler attacked the Company with a vigour that is still unsurpassed.1 'Had not', asked Prince Butler, 'a hundred thousand poor rather come to their Parishes for want of work, and all the land of England fall two years' purchase, than that the Cookmaids should not be cloathed in India Silks and the ladies in the Calicoes?' 'Would it not', inquired that merciless critic, 'be better if we send for the corn to the East Indies, for theirs is much cheaper than ours? And employ the Dutch Shipping, for they always sail much cheaper than we do, and then we may send our own ships to all foreign nations that either want or hire them?' Carey was another opponent who figured prominently at the time. In a series of pamphlets he traced the history of the East India trade; replied to the arguments of the Linen Drapers; and effectively silenced the latter. Finally, 'T. S.', a weaver, defended the Mercantilism of the day against the assaults of the Free Traders of the time. The cogency of his arguments, combined with the directness and brilliancy of his style, rendered him a formidable opponent. In a succession of pamphlets he controverted Davenant's figures; defended the position he had taken up in his first pamphlet; and showed the extent of the influence which the East India trade exercised upon English manufactures. Davenant can hardly be said to have come off victorious. His statements were questioned; his honour was brought into question; while his Jacobite leanings were made an excuse for a rabid attack upon his integrity.

Davenant’s feeble replies do not seem to have produced much effect.1

The attacks continued without a pause, and the ranks of the Company’s opponents were now joined by the merchants of London. They complained specially of its methods of disposing of its goods by private contract among shareholders. ‘They monopolize those commodities in best demand at rates to their own use.’ There was, moreover, ‘manipulation of the sale by the alteration of the Lots on the part of the Managers, even though Publick Notice has been given in Printed Books of an intended Sale’.2 We are not surprised to find the merchants taking a leading part in the foundation of a New East India Company. Their opposition to the Company was due mainly to their desire to partake of the riches of the East. They had always protested against their exclusion from the Company, and regarded with unconcealed dislike the policy which it had inaugurated under Childe, while their grievances were intensified by the losses which they had suffered during the war with France. We find Somers writing to William III as follows: ‘The London merchants, as well as other merchants of the greatest estates, being joined in opposing the Charter, they say that in such an unhappy junction, when they are deprived of the Mediterranean trade, and are such losers everywhere else, they ought not to be excluded from the trade of so great a part of the world.’ They pressed ‘to be permitted to send out 5 ships to the East, promising to export Commodities to the value of £100,000’.3

The opposition of the English manufacturers was directed against the East India trade. There is no reason to suppose that they joined the ranks of the Company’s opponents mainly because they disliked the Joint-Stock organization. It was immaterial to them whether the trade to India was carried on by a Joint-Stock or by a Regulated Company. Their object being the prohibition of the importation of East Indian Commodities into England, they were ready to ally themselves with any power that would render them effective aid in their campaign against the East India trade.

The opposition to the foundation of a Scotch East India Company exhibited all the characteristic features of a commercial war between the two countries. Not only was the Parliament moved to seize the papers of subscribers to the Scotch Company resident in England, and to impeach the leading members of the Company of high crimes and misdemeanours,1 but also the leading English Companies and manufacturers joined with the English East India Company in a bitter attack on the promoters of the Company. The English East India Company pointed out the dangers that would arise from the formation of a Scotch Company. If the Scotch Company paid no taxes on Indian articles Scotland would be made a free port for all East India commodities, and, consequently, several articles formerly supplied from England would in the future be sold by the Scotch Company. The danger pointed out by the Company paled into insignificance in comparison with a far more serious danger. If the Scotch Company were allowed to carry on its trade with the stock and assistance of the English, ‘little or none of our English provisions will be made use of by them in carrying on their trade, but they will immediately endeavour to set up all our manufactures in Scotland, and thereby not only supply India, but other markets with them, and inevitably lessen our exportation of the English manufactures’.2

The other English Companies were no less hostile to the Scotch Company. The Hamburg Company advocated effectual prohibition of all Englishmen ‘from being concerned in the Scotch Company’; the Royal African Company feared that the Scotch Company would ‘engross the whole trade to Africa from the English’; the Commissioners of Customs thought that the Scotch Company ‘must have a very fatal influence upon the trade, navigation, revenue and Customs of England’; the Leeward Islanders advocated ‘the prohibition of all Englishmen from dealing with the Company’. The Levant Company was of the opinion that ‘all English subjects, and Jews, should be prohibited from dealing with the Scotch Company’. It thought that ‘mariners, artificers, shipwrights, and others should be discouraged from all employment or assistance to the Scotch Company’. The situation was believed to be so dangerous that the Commissioners sent a letter to the Governors of Carolina, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, and Jersey Island, in which, after referring to the mischiefs likely to be brought on the English trade through the Scotch Company, they urged them ‘to a vigorous execution of the several laws made in England for the security of the plantation trade, and making this kingdom the staple, both of the Commodities of other countries and places for the supply of the said plantations’.1

The protests of the English Companies show that the danger to the English manufactures was real, and that, though the Turkey Company might oppose the English East India Company, it was not unaware of the importance of the trade to the Indies. The pamphlets that poured in at the time showed the influence exercised by the East India trade. They discussed every aspect of it with a minuteness and industry that are hardly surpassed. They show the intensity of the passions engendered by the quarrel. They show, moreover, the deep interest taken by the public in the East India trade. It is doubtful whether, without the aid of the weavers and others, the opposition of the Company’s opponents would have proved effective. It is certain, however, that the difficulties of the Company played into the hands of its opponents. The latter would have achieved no success whatever if the position of the Company had remained sound. This was unfortunately not the case.

The Company’s opponents had a certain amount of justification for the attacks which they made on the disorganization of its finances.1 It is not quite clear whether it recovered completely from the shock of 1683. We find that the Company's stock continued to fall in the following year.2 In 1681 the Company was indebted to the amount of £61,352. 7s. 5d.3 They paid four dividends of £25 per cent., between 11th October 1685 and 20th April 1688. Another dividend of £5 was paid on 2nd April 1689, the last was paid on 8th April 1691, so that the dividends from 1657 to 1681 amounted to 440½ per cent., while those from 1681 to 1691, after doubling the same, as the stock was doubled, amounted, according to that nominal duplicate, to 400 per cent. Altogether, dividends of £840½ per cent. had been paid from 1657 to 1691 on the original stock of £369,891. 5s.4 It is instructive to compare the return which the Company presented to Parliament. It estimated its stock in England at £564,603. 17s. 8d.; its quick stock in India at £828,860. 0s. 5d.; total £1,393,463. 18s. 1d.5 It acknowledged that it owed £525,702. 9s. in England. Deducting the debt, it arrived at a balance of £867,761. 9s. 1d. This included its stock in England and India. The debt in England seems, however, to have amounted to about £675,732 on 31st March 1698.6 Moreover, the Company had neglected to mention their debts in India. White declared that when the Company's general ‘gave them the go-bye, the Company was indebted to the merchants there at £300,000’.7 This statement is difficult to accept, as George White was not an impartial critic of the Company. We know, however, that it was indebted to the amount of £230,000 at Surat in 1695.8 Nor did the Company deny its liabilities in India. It asserted that it had been able to borrow money in India because ‘it had also great credit at Surat, and that the Indian merchants lent the Company between 40 and 50,000 Rs. cheaper'. It declared that it owed, in January 1691, 200,000 at Bombay and Surat. This may have been true. If so, it is difficult to reconcile this statement with its assertion that 'most, if not all, its debts had been paid' by 1691. We know that it owed £230,000 in 1695 at Surat.1 We are therefore forced to conclude that it deliberately deceived the House of Commons by presenting a false return.

Another account of the East India Company's finances is instructive. Its debts at Surat amounted, in 1694, to £257,062. 10s. It owed in England £817,127. 3s. 7d. The total debt was, therefore, £1,110,981. 9s. 0d. This account was presented on 12th March 1696. Its stock was, however, valued at £2,336,483. The amount was undoubtedly exaggerated. It included various doubtful items in its accounts. Many of the items included in the Company's account were struck out by the Committee of the House of Commons.2 It is difficult to see what other course it could have followed. The Company valued all their forts, &c., at £370,000. It can hardly be said that the valuation was reasonable. The Company had valued all their forts in 1657 at £20,000, and as, since then, they had lost several forts, it seems unreasonable to demand such a large sum for the remaining forts of the Company. It had no doubt spent large sums on Bombay and other factories in India, but the total amount expended could hardly have been higher than £100,000. Nor is it certain that the forts of the Company were justly valued by its opponents. George White regarded the proposal of the East India Company to remove the mart of trade from Surat to Bombay as but a 'dream'; 'at Madras, the Company had driven away many, and put a general Damp and Discontent on all'; as to the Company's forts on the West Coast of Sumatra, Bencoolen, and Indrapura, 'they are notoriously unhealthy'; with regard to its fort at 'Carwar', it was 'still more Romantick in talking of a Fort and Town at Retore in the Queen of Attinga’s country, where all the Company have is a mean, slight house, made of Cajans, that half a dozen men would pull down to the ground in an hour’; the same applies to ‘forts’ in the Gengee country, &c.1

After taking the above facts into consideration, and comparing the different documents, I have come to the conclusion that the Company’s financial position was unsound. The war with the Mogul had cost it £400,000; the capture of a number of the Company’s ships during the war with France added to its difficulties. Moreover, a large amount of money had been spent on bribery in 1693. Hence, we are not surprised to find it decline quickly. In their petition to Parliament on 10th June 16982 they returned their stock at £1,574,608. 10s. 1d. They were, however, ‘willing to submit to a valuation of 50 per cent. for their Stock, 20 per cent. for their Dead Stock and 30 per cent. for their Quick Stock’. This petition shows the extent to which the Company’s stock had fallen. It is necessary, however, to remind the reader that this was the price they had set themselves, and that others were by no means agreed upon the point. They had acknowledged that dividends had been paid out of capital, owing to the inability of their factors in India to buy Indian goods through the Mogul’s war with Golconda. ‘The Company’s stock lying dead, both in England and India, the said Dividends were made.’3 The Company’s opponents asserted that their stock ‘was not worth 20 p. c.’; while ‘their quick stock was not worth 3 p. c.’4 The new Company asserted that their accounts ‘could not be relied on’, and that, though they estimated their quick stock in 1696 at £1,600,000, it was not clear whether they could actually be credited with that amount. They declared these statements to be false, and showed that two ships included in their returns had been captured by the French, and that the cargo of the Thomas, worth £61,875, which they had included in their estimate, was employed by the factors.1

I conclude, therefore, that the Company’s stock had fallen considerably ; that in 1698 it was much less than 50 per cent. in value ; that it would have subscribed a larger amount to the New Company if it had had more money at its disposal ; and that, during the years 1689–1700, its finances were in a disorganized state.

It seems probable that its difficulties were enhanced by the curious devices to which Childe resorted in order to raise the price of the Company’s stock. The ‘pernicious art of Stock Jobbing’ may not have been new to England, but it seems to have been perfected by the fertile mind of Childe. That astute operator took steps to reap the full benefit of his enterprise by instructing brokers, who were known to act for him, to sell when he had just received favourable information, while, on a reaction being established, other agents purchased quickly.2 These practices seem to have passed unnoticed up till 1695. However, from 1696 onwards we hear a series of complaints on the subject. England’s Almanac3 denounced this race of harpies, while another declared that ‘the trade had degenerated into a Trick ; and instead of employing a stock in honest adventures abroad, there is lately set up a new Society of Artificers, who blow the Price of the Stock up and down, as best suits their design, and encroaching themselves by the ruin of others ; and this Legerdemain is managed by a strange sort of Insects, called Stock Jobbers, who devour men on our Exchange, as the Locusts of old did the Herbage of Egypt’.4 This explains the startling fluctuations in the price of the Company's stock. Defoe asserted that 'within ten years or thereabouts' the Company's stock sold from £300 per cent. to £37 per cent.1

These devious ways of Childe do not seem to have produced any good. It is highly probable that the fall of the Company's stock was due partly to this cause.

It will be apparent from the above that the Company's position was not invulnerable. Its disorganized finances rendered it comparatively weak to foil all the attacks of its adversaries. It is doubtful whether it would have succeeded in silencing the opposition. The alliance of the English manufacturers with the enemies of the Company lacked stability and coherence. It had been brought about mainly because both disapproved of the Company. Their opposition to the East India Company was based, however, on totally different grounds. The English manufacturers attacked the Company chiefly because it was responsible for the importation of Indian manufactures into England. This would, they asserted, ruin the leading English industries. The Interlopers disliked it mainly because it restricted their freedom of trade. It was, they declared, a 'pernicious contraction of trade'. 'The subjects of England', stated another writer, 'have the undoubted right to trade to all parts, not prohibited by Act of Parliament.' It is significant that the writer does not mention the various proclamations of Charles II, prohibiting all outsiders from trading to the East, and lays emphasis on the 'Act of Parliament'. This freedom of trade is confirmed (1) by 'The several Statutes', which assert the 'Right to Freedom of Trade'; (2) by the opinion of judges; (3) by His Majesty's message sent to the House of Commons last Sessions; (4) by the several petitions of the Company to Parliament, 'praying to have it established by an Act of Parliament'.2

The Interlopers were joined by a new type of opponents. As Papillon and others were no less determined to get rid of the Company, and to establish a new one, an alliance between the two sections was easy. Nor was it impossible to cement the bond between the English weavers and the personal enemies of Childe. The bond, however, was weak and was liable to break at any moment, owing mainly to the divergence of their interests. The Interlopers and Papillon's followers could hardly sympathize with the grievances of the English weavers. If these grievances had been attended to, and the Indian manufactures prohibited, the trade for which they had been fighting would have disappeared from England. It is evident that the foundation of this alliance was insecure, and that a calculating and shrewd merchant would have found it easy to dissolve it. It was not, however, possible at the time, mainly because the designs of the opponents of the Company were not disclosed till the foundation of the New East India Company in 1698. It was only in that year that the various elements of which the opposition was composed began to fall asunder, and to reveal the inherent weakness of that alliance. The eyes of the weavers were then opened, and they demanded the prohibition of the East India manufactures, against the interest of their quondam allies. ‘The proposal of advancing two millions’, complained the weavers, ‘for the supply of the Government, was the great inducement for the establishment of the new Company, and the reason the manufacturers did not complain, and solicit against the establishment, as they had formerly done, proceeded from the fair promises given by the New East India Company men, and the hope of more favourable opportunity, being unwilling to disturb the loan.’1 Accordingly, ‘the manufacturers, being deceived by the New East India Company's fair promises, are therefore come again to represent their deplorable case’. The complaint was echoed by other merchants. ‘The restraining the (East India) manufactures is no more than what Mr. Sheppard, Mr. George Heathcote, and many more of the chief promoters of the subscription (to the New Company) oftentimes declared to them was absolutely necessary to be done, but desired it might then be postponed, for fear of discouraging the Loan. By which fair speeches they gained a good opinion, which we hope they will study to preserve for the good of the Nation.’2 Accordingly, ‘the manufacturers being deceived by the East India Traders’ Fair Promises, and finding that of late great Importation and Wear of their Indian Manufactures are increasing, and have already in a great measure ruined the Canterbury Trade, and obliged the London weavers to fall upon all sorts of Woollen Manufactures to the prejudice of several places where such manufactures have for a long time been established ’, they had come to lay their petitions before the Parliament.1

It is necessary to insist here that the manufacturers did not become conscious of the divergence of their interest until 1698. The alliance formed in 1690 might have dissolved sooner if the Company had been able to answer all the charges that were brought against it with success. There is no evidence to show that it accomplished this. We cannot dismiss all the charges against it as unworthy of serious attention. This has been done by several historians. I cannot follow in their footsteps. I think that the Company was guilty of serious errors, and that some of its actions were indefensible. This is specially the case with regard to its war with the Mogul. Childe’s mistake had consisted in the declaration of war at a time when the Company was in financial difficulties. It may, no doubt, have been forced upon it by the action of the Mogul Governors. Even so, the Company was not justified in committing acts of gross dishonesty. It was charged with borrowing large sums from the Indian bankers, and with failing to pay its debts. It is evident2 that it owed £257,062. 10s. at Surat in 1694. It will, therefore, be safe to conclude that the debt was larger before the beginning of the war than in 1694. Nor can we deny that the seizure of the Indian vessels in the Indian Ocean, before the declaration of war, was unjustifiable. The Company’s statement ‘ that no ships were taken before the war ’ can hardly be accepted. It admitted the seizing of Indian goods on freight in their own vessels, but asserted that they had been paid for.3 Nor can we rely upon the statement of the Company that the Indian ships captured by them were small in number. The seizure of the vessels seems to me to have been the chief inducement for the precipitation of the war. It had taken ships in prizes to the value of £1,500,000. This was proved in the Exchequer Court upon a Bill brought by the Attorney General for the King’s Tenth.1

The Company’s treatment of the rebels of St. Helena left much to be desired. It was undoubtedly cruel.2 It admitted that seven persons had been put to death in the island. Of these seven, five were executed on the authority of the King’s Commission, and two by a jury. With regard to the King’s Commission, ‘ it is a matter of law ’; with regard to the jury they asserted that ‘ the Company are in no way guilty of it, since it was done without any order or direction from them ’. It seems clear that the Company was forced to adopt these measures, owing to the fact that by this means alone could they maintain discipline on the island. Though we cannot approve of the proceedings of the Commissioners, we cannot deny that the rebellion required firm handling. They were charged, moreover, (1) with raising the customs duties in their factories; (2) with ‘ seizing the goods and ships of our fellow subjects ’; (3) ‘ with multiplying the votes in order that particular persons may engraft themselves ’. It was asserted, moreover, (4) that they had made dividends out of their capital; and that they had ‘ expended great sums of money under the title of secret service money ’.

With regard to the first charge the Company admitted that they had raised the customs, but defended it on the ground that the cost of the enlargement of their forts had to be borne by somebody. ‘ They have in a small measure raised their Customs, but so far from oppressing the English or Natives, that in all but 5 per cent. Customs and 18 pence ground rent for a large house, 12 pence for a middling house, and 9 pence for a small one, together with some ordinary port charges (were imposed), and the inhabitants of the house were well contented.’1 As regards the second charge the Company asserted that the Joint Stock was the only form of organization suitable in the East, and that the Interlopers were really the main cause of the war. As regards the third and fourth charges the Company’s reply was not conclusive. They admitted that they had paid dividends out of capital, but defended it on the ground that capital was lying idle at the time, as the factors could not buy commodities in India owing to the Mogul’s war with Golconda.2 This may probably be true.

The most serious of all the charges was that relating to the fortifications of the Company. A succession of pamphlets denounced that policy.3 White asserted that ‘many hundreds of our seamen have been sacrificed to the irrational obstinacy and wicked designs of those who have assumed an Arbitrary Predominancy over the Company’s affairs’. He predicted that ‘blood will certainly be required at their hands in another world, however much they may escape with Impunity in this’.4 The Company defended the policy of fortifications upon grounds of security. It is difficult to see what objection could have been taken to that policy. It was absolutely essential to the maintenance of English trade in India. The main grounds for the construction of forts were nowhere more lucidly stated than before the House of Lords. The Company put forward with prophetic foresight the following reasons for the introduction of a new policy. ‘Though at this time the Mogul has subdued a great part of India, yet, whenever he dies, it is very probable that that great Empire will break into several pieces, and great wars will arise, and certainly our fortifications will, in such cases, preserve our trade and factories, and hinder them from being overrun by one party or other, especially if it be considered that Bombay did hold out a siege of 16 months against 16,000 of the Moors.’5 The prophecy was fulfilled to the letter, after the death of Aurangzebe, when the Company was forced to rely upon its forts for defence.

A review of the above charges leads us to the conclusion that many of them were frivolous and were dictated by unworthy considerations. It cannot be denied, however, that some of them were true, and that the Company's defence against these charges was weak and unconvincing. This explains the apparent solidarity of the two wings of the opposition. Their union depended upon their opposition to the Company. They were sustained in their opposition by the conviction that the public would support them in their crusade, and that Parliament would render them effectual aid in their assaults on the Tory Company. The prospects of the opposition to the Company were considered so hopeful that by 16th January 1690 £100,000 had been subscribed to be used as a campaign fund, and soon afterwards £180,000 was raised.1

It was rumoured as early as 16th June 1689 that the Company was likely to be dissolved.2 A 'list of all those persons who have taken a great deal of pains, and lost much time to discover the iniquity and Evil Practices of the East India Company' was drawn up, and the persons named therein were recommended as fit persons for the Committee of the New East India Company. In the list we find the familiar names of Thomas Pitt, Sir Basil Firebrace, Sir John Houblon, Sir John Banks, and Gilbert Heathcote. They had already presented to Parliament in September 1691, Heads of Complaint against the Company. There are sixteen heads in all, and each of them contains proofs of complaint, by prominent men, such as Pitt, Dr. St. John, Mr. Johnson, &c. The paper is full of the usual complaints against the Company. They reappear in a Speech delivered in the House of Commons.3

The main object of the opponents was the dissolution of the existing body, and the establishment of a new Company. 'Grafting on the Remains of the present Stock' would be meaningless unless it were known beforehand 'whether there is anything left to Graft upon'; nor was it easy to ascertain the 'Debt and Engagements’ of the old Company.1 The stock of the Company, asserted its opponents, was only an ‘imaginary sum’, as it had not any real stock of its own to carry on the trade. The Company was, moreover, guilty of ‘Rapine and Impiety, and it would not consist with the honour of the House, who had voted them guilty of Murdering the subjects of England, to maintain the present Company’. The establishment of a new and the dissolution of the old agreed, moreover, ‘with the genius of the Nation’.2 The old Company were regarded as ‘beggars’, who were unable to carry on the trade. ‘Moreover’, asserted its opponents, ‘Forts and Garrisons were a perfect Lumber and Trumpery, and absolutely useless to the Trade.’3 A more serious loss was that of the invaluable jewel, ‘our Reputation and Honour’, nor could the Mogul be expected to tolerate a Company that had committed such heinous crimes in India.4

I cannot accept Professor Scott’s5 view that the Company’s opponents did not want to dissolve the existing body. The authorities cited above will prove my theory. In fact, the opponents could never have succeeded in enlisting the English manufacturers under their standards unless the latter had been assured that a new Company would be formed, and that that Company would import fewer Indian commodities. It was this that led the manufacturers to support Heathcote and Papillon. If they had known that their object was amalgamation with the existing body, or the creation of a new Joint-Stock Company, they would certainly have refused their aid. Nearly all the pamphlets—and they were many—that were written against the Company demand the dissolution of the old Company. Moderate men were disgusted with the violence of both parties. They admitted that the Company was guilty of some fault, but asked ‘is this the reason that the whole Company should be dissolved and innocent Adventurers severely punished?’ ‘The expulsion of the Fellows of Magdalen College was as nothing in comparison with this attempt on the present East India Company.’ The former concerned only twenty or thirty men, ‘while the breaking of the Company will divest at least a 1,000 people of their Rights and Properties. Among the Adventurers of the Stock are great many Widows and Orphans.’1 It is rare to find such a moderation of language expressed in the pamphlet literature of the period.

The quarrel was now transferred from the printing presses to Parliament. The attitude of the House of Commons towards the East India Company has been discussed by Macaulay and Hunter. Professor Scott has also devoted attention thereto. I think, however, that their treatment is not satisfactory. They assume that the House of Commons was determined to dissolve the East India Company, and that its request to William was the inevitable outcome of the causes that had operated since 1689. It is undeniable that just after the Revolution the Commons formed a Committee to inquire into the state of the East India Company, and that all petitions against the Company were referred to it. Nor were the petitions few in number. They poured in, almost from every quarter.2

The House referred these complaints to a Committee; and it cannot be denied that on that Committee sat some of the most determined opponents of the Company. This does not, however, invalidate the theory that there was no thought of dissolving the Company. Nor does it prove that the East India Company found no defenders in the House. The dispatches of Childe reveal a totally different state of things. He remained very hopeful of getting his charter confirmed by Parliament.3

It is apparent from a study of his dispatches that he expected the confirmation of the Company's charter, and that he was certain of success. It is clear that if the House had acted honestly by the Company, and if the agreements entered into on 18th December 1691 had been carried out, the subsequent troubles from which the Company suffered would have been avoided. The House agreed on that date that the assets of the Company were to be written down to £774,000, and that a new subscription should be taken so as to bring the capital up to a million and a half. No person was to hold more than £5,000 stock. The Company agreed to these terms, and promised to furnish security for the amount. Sir Josiah Childe became a security for £100,000, and it seemed as if the matter was settled, and that the new subscription would result in the removal of all opposition to the Company.1 The House ought now to have acted honestly, and to have brought in a Bill for establishing the Company. A Bill was actually brought in, but it provided for the establishment of 'an East India Company'. The substitution of the indefinite for the definite article in the above has not been noticed by the historians, and they have charged the Company with obstinacy. Their view is based mainly upon the Account of some Transactions in the Commons, 1693, in Somers' Tracts, vol. x. The account leaves out the above detail. This fact seems to me to be essential for a right understanding of the position of the Company. Up till 8th January 1692 the negotiations had been conducted smoothly. The Company had promised to find security, and it seemed that a Bill would be brought in. On 8th January 1692, however, a motion was made to 'bring in a Bill to establish an East India

the Great Seal time enough to send you a copy. In the meantime, His Majesty has been pleased to cause the Interlopers that were creeping out to be effectually stopt, so that we have reason to hope that neither we nor you shall ever again be troubled with any of those kinds of mischief-makers': Fort St. George General, 10th April 1693. He is not dismayed by the resolution of the House of Commons, declaring the right of all Englishmen to trade to the East Indies. 'This, we hope, brings us nearer to our desired Parliamentary Settlement.' 'Yet, peradventure some ill-minded persons that love to fish in troubled waters may shelter themselves under this vote, and may be creeping out,' the President is instructed to take the necessary action, Dispatch to Fort St. George, 2nd Feb. 1694. A dispatch of a later date says, 'We have reason to hope that the Lords and Commons will soon confirm the Charter'. These hopes were never realized.

Company'. An amendment was proposed to substitute 'the' for 'an' East India Company. The House divided, and there voted for the amendment 85, against 115. Hence, the amendment was rejected. It is not too much to say that the rejection was primarily responsible for the subsequent troubles by which the Company was harassed for over nine years. The Company was completely right when, in a letter to the Commons,1 it pointed out that the resolution of 8th January 1692 was inconsistent with its agreement of 18th December 1691. The Bill had been read a second time and passed by 171 votes to 116.2 The Company, therefore, declared that if the House passed it, then they desired to be excused 'from presenting security'.

We cannot withhold our sympathy from the Company for the trick that had been played upon it by the Commons. Yet Macaulay and those who came after him have repeated the well-known tale. The Commons thereupon requested William to dissolve the Company.3 William seems to have tried to accommodate the differences between the Company and its opponents. It is instructive to compare the eight volumes of State Papers in the Public Record Office dealing with the Company under Charles II, with the beggarly volume for William III's time, that contains little or no State document, but a collection of pamphlets, &c., against the Company.4 Under Charles II every side of the question is treated with patience and wisdom, and important matters are discussed with calmness. Under William III the scene has shifted. The Parliament now takes a leading part, and all the party passions are let loose. There is no restraining influence. William's voice is lost in the roar of the battle. He tries to bring about a settlement, but he is powerless. The question, instead of being tried by experienced merchants and well-known statesmen, is now a subject of dispute among the two parties. The enormous mass of pamphlet literature of the period testifies to the absence of any controlling hand that could mould the opinions and shape the policy of an unorganized assembly of 500 men. After the rejection of the Government’s proposal the Company began the favourite policy of divide et impera. It was not difficult for Childe to see that the creation of divisions among his opponents was the safest course to adopt. Accordingly, we find him employing his tools for this purpose. He himself remains in the background. ‘Sir Josiah Childe being examined, said he never disposed of £10 of the Company, to his Remembrance, and always affected ignorance in that matter.’1 His ignorance did not prevent him from recommending Acton, ‘as being an honest man, who ought to do service to the Company in Parliament, because of his Acquaintance’.2 As regards the Company’s opponents, he asserted that ‘there was a Committee of twenty-five who sat de die in diem to destroy the Company’. He therefore told Sir Thomas Cooke, the Governor, ‘that he thought Sir Basil Firebrace the fittest to divide them’.3 Sir Basil seems to have been thoroughly fitted for the task. About half the Interlopers came to terms on the basis of receiving a bonus of 25 per cent. on their respective expenditure, and half the profits. Others refused to take part in the accommodation unless they were given 30 per cent. bonus.4 Sir Basil himself was rewarded with a gratuity of £10,000, and a further sum of £30,000 to make up the difference in the price of the stock.5 The subscription of 1693 amounted to £1,220,314. 13s. 3d., of which £593,605 was subscribed by the old Adventurers, and £626,709. 2s. 10d. by the new Adventurers.6 From a printed list in the Public Record Office7 I find, after calculation, that the number of old Adventurers was 494, and that of new 730. This speaks volumes for the enterprise of Childe. He had overcome the fierce agitation in the Commons, and had succeeded in maintaining the privileges of the Company against its rivals. The inquiry into bribery and corrupt practices seriously damaged the Company’s reputation.8 Yet Childe escaped without a word of censure. He was too wary to fall into the trap. The Company weathered the storm of 1695.

Nor is there any reason to doubt that it would have weathered the storm of 1698 if its financial condition had been sound. It had sufficient time to subscribe the total amount, and thus to assume complete control over the new Company. The Company expressed its readiness to supply the Government with the amount required, provided that its present stock, worth £1,574,608. 10s. 1d., were valued at 50 per cent. They were ready to open books for new subscription and to make up the present stock, reduced to £787,304. 5s. 3d., not exceeding two millions. They were, moreover, prepared to raise ‘so much money upon the whole, as the Fund of the eight per cent. shall amount to, not exceeding two millions, provided they are settled by Act of Parliament’.1 They brought in another proposal, and expressed their readiness to raise £200,000 as the first payment (for two millions).

The House seems to have received the proposal favourably, but no further action was taken by the old Company. On the 14th July books were opened, ‘when it was still in the Power of the Company to have subscribed the greater part of the two millions, and so have had the charter if they pleased’.2 They could not do so, chiefly because they had not got sufficient capital. Hence they contented themselves with subscribing £315,000.

The existence of two rival Companies would have jeopardized the interests of the Englishmen in the East. The disunion that resulted, and the discreditable quarrels that took place between 1698–1700 would, if carried further, have led to the expulsion of the English from India. Both parties were conscious of the dangers of the situation, and the negotiations, begun almost immediately after the establishment of the new Company, for the union of the two Companies, were completely successful. The two Companies were united in 1709. The principle for which Childe had fought was maintained. He had asserted the superiority of the Joint-Stock System over the Regulated System. It was comparatively easy for his opponents to combine together and attack a common enemy. When, however, they were allowed to form a Company, the divergence of interests became manifest. The opposition soon fell to pieces. The failure of the opposition testified to the superiority of the Joint-Stock System. Without the latter there is no reason to doubt that the expulsion of the English from India would have followed. Without the ceaseless energy, the indomitable courage, and the remarkable dexterity of Childe, the trade would have been lost to the nation. It was he who faced the storm, and piloted the Company through enormous difficulties.

Notes

  1. 1. A Reply to ‘Great Oppressions, etc.’, Bodleian Library, fol. θ. 658, no. 31.
  2. 2. See previous chapter.
  3. 3. Proceedings of the Council of Trade, Add. MSS. Brit. Mus. 22115, ff. 39, 91.
  4. 1. MS. Court Book, no. 29, p. 245 ff.; no. 30, p. 1 ff.
  5. 2. Calendar of State Papers, Domestic, 10th Dec. 1672; ib., 23rd June 1673; ib., 1st Dec. 1673; Calendar of State Papers, Treasury Book, 1676–9, Parts I and II, p. 258, 1st July 1676.
  6. 1. i. New Discourse of Trade. ii. East India Trade, op. cit. iii. The East India Company's Answer to the Allegations, etc., Brit. Mus. 816. m. 11 (74). iv. Answer to all the Material Objections against the present East India Co. v. The Humble Answer of the Governor and Court of Committees of the East India Company to a Paper of Proposals, India Office Tracts, no. 268. vi. The Letters of Childe, in the Bodleian Library, Rawlinson MSS., A. 303, nos. 200-313. vii. The MS. Letter Books, containing Childe's Dispatches to the Factors in the East, nos. 7, 8, and 9, 1682-97.
  7. 1. Letters of Childe, in the Bodleian Library, Rawlinson MSS. A. 303, nos. 208, 212, 213, 222, 265, 266.
  8. 2. Prince Butler's Tale, Brit. Mus. 816. m. 13 (127).
  9. 3. Childe's East India Trade, op. cit. ; Answer to the Allegations of the Turkey Company, op. cit.; Answer to all the Material Objections, British Museum; The East India Company's Reply to the Privy Council, 1693, India Office Tracts, no. 268. This argument is employed by Childe in all his important writings.
  10. 1. (i) Supplement to Former Treatise, by Childe, India Office Tracts, vol. lxxxiii, assigns the cause of the war to ‘the necessity for recovering satisfaction for damages received, and the restoration of privileges’. There is no mention of political sovereignty in the whole book. (ii) A brief abstract of the great oppressions and injuries which the Company have acted, &c., Bodleian Library, Fol. Θ. 658, no. 19, accuses the Company of carrying on war for the purpose of freeing themselves from the enormous debts which they owed in India. (iii) The Present State of the East India Company’s Affairs, Bodleian Library, Fol. Θ. 658, no. 74, charges Childe with carrying on an unjust war with the Great Mogul. There is no reference to Childe’s desire to establish political dominion in India. (iv) Reasons against making the East India Company, &c., Brit. Mus. 816. m. 11 (58), denounces the Company ‘for its violence and depredations’ on the subjects of the Great Mogul. (v) News from the East Indies, Brit. Mus. m. 11 (77), reproduces the Mogul’s Phirmaund, showing the low state of the Company’s factors in India. (vi) An Account of the East India Company’s War with the Great Mogul, Brit. Mus. 816. m. 11 (79), charges the Company with grave crimes. (vii) Proposals for Settling the East India Trade, Brit. Mus. 1029. k. 37, exposes the absurdity of levying war against the Great Mogul. (viii) Some Remarks on the East India Company’s Accompt and Propositions, Brit. Mus. 816. m. 11 (95), shows the uselessness of Bombay, Bencoolen, &c. (ix) The East India Company’s Reply to the Petition of Charles Price, Brit. Mus. 102. k. 40, attributes the war to the ‘Insolency of the Heathen Governors’. (x) The Company’s Answer to White, ib., ascribes the war to the Interlopers. (xi) Some Considerations on the Nature and Importance of the Trade, Brit. Mus. 1139. g. 4, advances good arguments for maintaining forts, but only as a precaution against the ‘cruelty’ of the Indian Governors. (xii) Hamilton’s Account of the East Indies, very prejudiced. (xiii) A Letter to a Friend concerning the East India Company, India Office Tracts, vol. 268, opposes the policy of keeping forts in India. (xiv) A Letter from a Lawyer of the Inner Temple, India Office Tracts. (xv) A Letter to a Member of Parliament, India Office Tracts, vol. 268, calls the Company murderers for levying war. (xvi) Treatise on the Coins of England accuses the Company of robbing the Mogul’s subjects. (xvii) A Discourse concerning [p. 198] the East India Trade: A Reply to Childe, India Office Tracts, no. 268. 'It does not appear that forts are necessary.' (xviii) The East India Company's Answers to the Proposals, India Office Tracts, no. 268. Childe defends the forts on the ground 'that they are necessary for safety', &c.
  11. 1. New Discourse of Trade, p. 194.
  12. 1. Records of Fort St. George, vol. iii, pp. 20, 26, 167, 171, 174.
  13. 2. Records, vol. iii, pp. 13, 14, 38–40, 147, 167, 190–1.
  14. 1. Childe's Dispatches to the Governor of St. Helena, MS. Letter Book, no. 6, dispatches dated 16th May 1679. Compare his dispatch dated 24th March 1680, containing the rules for the island. The rules show the paternal care exercised by the Company for the welfare of the inhabitants of the island. Dispatch dated 20th May 1681, MS. Letter Book, no. 7, 1682–5, p. 177. Dispatch to St. Helena. Dispatch dated 26th Nov. 1684 refers to the cost of the new settlement. On p. 417 occurs the Commission to Commissioners for the Island of St. Helena. Dispatch dated 6th May 1685. The Deplorable Case of the Poor Distressed Planters in the Island of St. Helena, under the cruel oppressions of the East India Company, Brit. Mus. 816. m. 11 (58).
  15. 2. MS. Letter Book, no. 8, India Office Records Department.
  16. 3. Records, vol. iii, p. 82.
  17. 4. Dispatch dated 2nd July 1684.
  18. 1. See the Dispatch in MS. Letter Book, no. 6, India Office Dispatch, dated 15th March 1681.
  19. 2. Dispatch to Fort St. George, dated 6th June 1687, MS. Letter Book, no. 8, India Office.
  20. 3. MS. Letter Book, no. 8, Dispatch to Bombay, 15th Oct. 1686.
  21. 1. Ib., India Office Records.
  22. 2. Ib., no. 8, p. 101. No date given in the dispatch; probably 1686.
  23. 1. Records, vol. iii, p. 72.
  24. 2. Dispatch, 14th Jan. 1685.
  25. 3. Dispatch dated 14th Jan. 1686.
  26. 4. MS. Letter Book, no. 8.
  27. 1. Dispatch, April 1688. MS. Letter Book, no. 8.
  28. 2. Supplement to Essay, p. 9, India Office Tracts, no. 83.
  29. 3. MS. Letter Book, dispatch 31st Jan. 1690.
  30. 1. See News from the East Indies, Brit. Mus. 816. m. 11 (77).
  31. 2. An Account of the Company’s War with the Great Mogul, Brit. Mus. 816. m. 11 (79). Proposals for settling East India Trade.
  32. 3. Ib.
  33. 4. News from the East Indies. A Brief Abstract, Bodleian Library, Fol. Θ. 658. no. 19; Some Remarks on the Present State of the East India Company’s Affairs, ib., no. 74.
  34. 1. Wood’s Survey of Trade, India Office Tracts, vol. lxxxiii, p. 105.
  35. 2. A Letter to a Member of Parliament, India Office Tracts, vol. 268.
  36. 1. Reasons humbly offered against Establishing the present Company by an Act of Parliament, Brit. Mus. 816. m. 11 (56).
  37. 2. Reasons against Establishing an East India Company, Brit. Mus. 816. m. 11 (57).
  38. 3. A Letter to a Member of Parliament, India Office Tracts, vol. 268, pp. 6-7.
  39. 4. Howell's State Trials, pp. 371-554.
  40. 5. A Treatise concerning the Coins of England, by R. C. (Roger Coke), India Office Tracts, no. 268, pp. 39-40.
  41. 6. An Answer to the Case of the East India Company, Brit. Mus. 711. c. 35, p. 5.
  42. 1. The East India Trade, Brit. Mus. 816. m. 11 (81).
  43. 2. Page 2.
  44. 3. To Preserve the East India Trade, by T. N., Brit. Mus. 816. m. 11 (86); The East India Trade, Brit. Mus. 816. m. 11 (82).
  45. 1. Proposals for Settling the East India Trade, British Museum.
  46. 2. Remedies to prevent the mischief from the late Act of Scotch Parliament, Brit. Mus. 816. m. 11 (85).
  47. 3. The Heads of a Scheme whereby to Establish the present East India Company, Brit. Mus. 816. m. 11 (54).
  48. 4. Proposal for a more Beneficial and Equal Establishment, Brit. Mus. 816. m. 11 (60).
  49. 5. A remarkable Tract in Lincoln’s Inn Library, entitled Reasons against the Bill for the better securing of the Lawful Trade of His Majesty’s Subjects to and from the East Indies.
  50. 6. The Calendars of State Papers, Domestic, covering the reign of William III up to 1696, and the first volume of State Papers, Domestic, 1702-3, show that the Indian Ocean was infested with pirates. Pp. 343, 347, 442, 551.
  51. 1. MS. Letter Book, no. 9. ‘If any Interloper, or Pirate, whatever shall offer any hostility to any of the Mogull’s Subjects, or any other people of India or Persia in amity with His Majesty,’ they should be seized and tried. Dispatch 29 Feb. 1692.
  52. 2. The Company’s Answer to the Petition of Charles Price, Brit. Mus. 102. k. 40. Compare the Company’s Answer to Two Petitions of Samuel White, British Museum. It denounces White as a ‘Great Enemy to this Kingdom in general’.
  53. 3. Some Considerations on the Nature and Importance of East India Trade, Brit. Mus. 1139. g. 4. Compare Childe’s vigorous defence of the Joint-Stock System, in India Office Tracts, vol. 268, An Account of Transactions in the Honble. House of Commons, 1693.
  54. 1. Proposals, &c., Brit. Mus. 1029. k. 37.
  55. 2. A Regulated Company more National than a Joint Stock, Brit. Mus. 816. m. 11 (71).
  56. 1. Discourse concerning Trade, a reply to Childe, India Office Tracts, no. 268, p. 13; A Letter to a Friend, India Office Tracts, vol. 268; Roger Coke's Observations on Coins, ib.; Reasons against making the Present Company the Root for carrying on the future Trade, Brit. Mus. 816. m. 11 (58); A Letter to a Member of Parliament, India Office Tracts, no. 268, pp. 2–10; Some Remarks on the East India Company's Accompt and Propositions for Establishing that Trade, Brit. Mus. 816. m. 11 (95).
  57. 2. Observations on Coins, India Office Tracts, vol. 268, p. 41.
  58. 1. Proposals, Brit. Mus. 1029. k. 37.
  59. 2. Letter from a Lawyer of the Inner Temple, India Office Tracts, vol. 268.
  60. 3. Reasons Humbly offered for the passing of the Bill, &c., by T. S., Brit. Mus., 1697, pp. 8–10.
  61. 1. England and India Inconsistent in their Manufactures, India Office Tracts, vol. lxxxiii, p. 15. 'Now let us cast an eye about the English Nation, especially those whose manufactures are opposite to India; let him reflect the total loss of so many species of manufactures, and let us inquire into the cries of the poor for employment and bread in these places,' and it will be found that the East India trade is the prime cause of all these miseries. Profit and loss of the East India Trade stated to the consideration of the present Parliament, Brit. Mus. 816. m. 11 (92). Printed in 1700.
  62. 2. England's Almanac, Brit. Mus. 816. m. 11 (92). Printed in 1700.
  63. 3. It will be shown in the next chapter that the complaints of the bullionists were justified; and that not only did the amount exported increase, but also the importation of Indian commodities increased.
  64. 1. MSS. of the House of Lords, New Series, vol. ii, 1695-7, p. 44. Mr. Pollexfen's paper, dated 17th Feb., marked p.
  65. 1. The Weavers’ Twelve Queries Answered, Brit. Mus. 816. m. 14 (122). Compare English Winding Sheet, Bodleian Library, Fol. θ. 658, no. 6, p. 2. ‘The East India Wrought Silks are the exportations purchased with our good, hard silver, whenas we had otherwise served those parts with silks of our own manufacturing, which had kept and increased our numbers 10 times more than they now are.’
  66. 2. Prince Butler’s Queries relating to the East India Trade, Brit. Mus. 816. m. 13 (128).
  67. 3. Querical Demonstrations, by Prince Butler, Brit. Mus.
  68. 1. An answer to a late Tract entitled ‘An Essay on the East India Trade’, Brit. Mus. 8245. a. 15, pp. 4-11.
  69. 2. Ib., p. 22.
  70. 3. India and England, &c., p. 7.
  71. 4. Petty, Quantulumcunque concerning Money, in MacCulloch's Scarce and Valuable Tracts on Money, p. 159. This argument was developed by Davenant into a powerful plea for freedom of trade, and will be treated in the concluding chapter.
  72. 1. See previous chapter.
  73. 1. Profit and Loss of the East India Trade stated, Brit. Mus. 100. m. 46, pp. 15–17.
  74. 2. For the effects of the East India Trade on the English industries see Chapter IV.
  75. 3. An Answer to the most material objections that have been raised against restraining the East India Trade, Brit. Mus. 816. m. 11 (91), p. 3. Compare the petitions of the following to the House of Commons:—A petition of Felt Makers. ‘Petitioners are an ancient Corporation, supported by many Acts of Parliament and are very numerous.’ ‘The East India Company have lately caused great quantities of Hats to be made in India, which they have imported into this Kingdom, which, if not prevented, would be the ruin of the trade of this Kingdom, by reason of the cheapness of materials and work in India.’ Journals of the House of Commons, 13th Jan. 1694, p. 59. The Masters, Wardens, and Assistants of the Company of Weavers, in Canterbury, presented a petition on 11th June 1698. Journals, vol. xii, p. 309. ‘Petitioners’ trade depends on weaving all sorts of flowered, striped, and plain silks, and stuffs mixed with silk and wool, and hath, of late, been very much diminished by the importation and consumption of Indian wrought silks and stuffs.’ ‘If the trade is not restrained, it would inevitably destroy all this manufacture.’ Ib., A petition of the Mayor and Commonalty of City of Canterbury read. ‘The trade of weaving all sorts of Silks and Stuffs, mixed with Wool and Silk, within this city, hath employed and maintained a great number of poor people who have lived very comfortably, till, of late years, the trade hath decreased, and the poor sort left destitute, without Employment.’ ‘Prays the House to encourage the said Trade by the Bill depending for the East India Trade.’ Compare the following from the MSS. of the House of Lords: Pollexfen declared that ‘the East India Trade is now different to what it was’. The ‘Company formerly brought home no manufactures, but since 1670, they have brought manufactures, as Cabinets, China wares, &c., and this in return of our money’, vol. ii, 1695–7, p. 10. Sir Thomas Powys
  76. 1. An English Winding Sheet for the East India Manufactors. Bodleian Library, Fol. θ. 658, no. 6.
  77. 1. English Winding Sheet, op. cit.
  78. 2. A Short Abstract of a case presented to Parliament, circa 1700. Bodleian Library, Fol. θ. 658, no. 11. Compare an Answer to the most Material objections that have been raised against restraining the East India Trade, Brit. Mus. 816, m. 11 (91), p. 3.
  79. 3. England’s Almanac, Brit. Mus., op. cit.
  80. 4. English Winding Sheet.
  81. 1. Ib. Compare the following: ‘The Parish of Bishopsgate, whose many By Lanes and Alleys being chiefly inhabited by workers of silk and their dependents, doth so abound with Poverty that for the maintenance and prevention thereof, though their Assessment is doubled upon most of their Inhabitants of what they used to pay to the Poor Rate, they are nevertheless obliged to pay 34 months’ Assessment thereto, to pay former debts.’ The parish was indebted to the amount of £300.
  82. 2. An interesting pamphlet addressed to the ladies says: ‘It has been proved that many poor manufacturers being destitute of work, and consequently of subsistence, have been found dead in the streets and fields, where they have perished. An infinite number of us are already reduced to great misery. The Poor Rates have doubled, and in some cases trebled.’ Brit. Mus. 816. m. 14 (84). A Scheme for preventing the export of wool proposed, among other things, ‘to reduce the vast quantities of Indian Commodity lately worn, which appears a great prejudice to the Traders and Dealers in Woollen Manufactures, and this Nation especially, the ancient and famous artists in the City of Norwich and County of Norfolk’. To the Rt. Hon’ble the House of Commons. Brit. Mus. 816. m. 14 (107).
  83. 1. A Case of the Joiners’ Company against the importation of Manufactured Cabinet-work from the East Indies, Brit. Mus. 816. m. 13 (2). Compare the following: ‘It is visible now, how the Fancy and Humour of the Female Sex, with the advantage the Late Law hath given them, inclines several men of great stocks, and many of them out of necessity, and against their judgement, merely for the employment of their Estates to advantage, to strike into this pernicious India Trade; so that the vogue and cry is like our Watermen with “a hye India, hye India, hye” to almost a total neglect and Disrespect of the good and welfare of the Turkey and other more advantageous Trades of England, with a subversion of our most profitable manufactures.’ English Winding Sheet for East India Manufactors, Bodleian Library, Fol. θ. 658, no. 6, p. 3. Compare the following, ib., p. 4: ‘As they have already almost swallowed and engrossed the Silk weaving, Throwing, and Fan-making of England, brought all our Cabinet-making into contempt; they will by the same ways and means ruin all Trades and Manufacturies. ... The very mercers they strive to spoil by their setting up Retail Warehouses; and if not prevented, they will if possible effect it. ... Their plenty of Copper and Tin will give them opportunity to ruin both our Braziers, and Pewterers, Tin-men and Mines. The Joyners and Carvers they have pretty well encroached upon.’ India was, I presume, to take the place of Paris as a dictator of fashion. ‘Though Modish Garments from France was always accounted grievous to us, yet from East India, multitudes of them are brought to the great prejudice of the Tailors.’
  84. 2. MS. Letter Book, no. 9.
  85. 1. Compare Butler's Tale; Querical Demonstrations; Prince Butler's Queries, op. cit.
  86. 1. See below, Chapter IV.
  87. 2. The Grounds of Complaint of Several Merchants and other Traders of the City of London, Bodleian Library, Fol. θ. 658, no. 23. Compare the following letter of Somers to William III: ‘There are several other petitions from clothiers in diverse countries, and from traders representing the deplorable condition they are in by interruption of the Turkey trade,’ and praying to be allowed to trade to the Indies. State Papers, Domestic, William III. Compare the following petition of ‘diverse merchants and traders in and about the city of London’, against the East India Company: ‘The trade to the East Indies is of great importance, yet by the manifold abuses of the present East India Company, both at home and abroad, it is like to be utterly lost to this Kingdom, and to fall into the hands of Foreigners, unless timely prevented by some better Regulation,’ Journals of the House of Commons, vol. x, 28th Oct. 1691, p. 541.
  88. 3. Somers to William III, State Papers, Domestic, William III.
  89. 1. Journals of the House of Commons, vol. xi, p. 407. Compare an interesting pamphlet in the Lincoln’s Inn Library, entitled The Case of the Late African and Indian Companies of Scotland.
  90. 2. MSS. of the House of Lords, New Series, vol. ii, 1695–7, p. 14.
  91. 1. MSS. of the House of Lords, New Series, vol. ii, 1695–7, pp. 14–24.
  92. 1. Professor Scott has investigated this aspect of the Company's history with admirable thoroughness and lucidity. I think, however, that his treatment of this period is not altogether satisfactory. In my opinion, the finances of the Company were in a disorganized state at the time. I am convinced that a deeper study of the Journals of the House of Commons would have led him to modify some of his conclusions. Compare Scott, The Constitution and Finances of the Joint Stock Companies, vol. ii.
  93. 2. See the authority cited in the preceding chapter.
  94. 3. Journals of the House of Commons, vol. xii, 1697–9, pp. 311–12.
  95. 4. Journals of the House of Commons.
  96. 5. Public Record Office, C.O. 77, vol. xvi.
  97. 6. See Journals of the House of Commons.
  98. 7. White's paper in the Public Record Office, C.O. 77, vol. xvi, no. 3.
  99. 8. Brit. Mus. Add. MSS. 5540. f. 111.
  100. 1. Answer of the East India Company to certain Heads of Complaint exhibited against them; the Company's Answer to thirteen Articles delivered by their Adversaries, Bodleian Library, Θ. 658, no. 31; Public Record Office, C.O. 77, vol. xvi. This volume contains three bundles of unbound papers, 1689-1700, 1701-25, 1726-44.
  101. 2. Journals, vol. xi, 12th March 1696.
  102. 1. George White, op. cit; compare also The Pretence of the present East India Companies Property stated and considered, Bodleian Library, Θ. 658, no. 34; Sam. against Sheperd, ib., no. 62. I content myself with citing only two pamphlets here. Nearly all the pamphlets of the time refer to the Company’s forts.
  103. 2. Journals of the House of Commons, p. 308.
  104. 3. A Reply to the Brief Abstract of Great Oppressions, &c., Bodleian Library, Fol. Θ. 658, no. 31.
  105. 4. An Answer to the case of the East India Company, Brit. Mus. 711, c. 35.
  106. 1. Some Considerations on the proposals of the East India Company, Brit. Mus.; Some Remarks upon the East India Company’s Accompt and Propositions, Brit. Mus. 816. m. 11 (95); A Reply to Popular Arguments, Brit. Mus. 816. m. 11 (61); The Old Company’s Complaints Answered, Brit. Mus. 816. m. 11 (69); The Clauses in the Act of Parliament, Brit. Mus. 816. m. 11 (67); An Extract of an Act for raising two millions, with Observations, Brit. Mus. 816. m. 11 (66); An Act for raising two millions, Brit. Mus. 816. m. 11 (65). Compare the following interesting pamphlets on the hard lot of the separate traders in the Lincoln’s Inn Library : The Case of Persons concerned in the separate Trade; The Case of John Powell. The Case of the English Company trading to the East Indies, Bodleian Library, Fol. θ. 658, no. 33, gives a very interesting account of the negotiations that preceded the formation of the New East India Company.
  107. 2. Compare Scott, vol. ii, p. 258; Defoe, Villany of Stock Jobbers Detected.
  108. 3. Brit. Mus., op. cit.
  109. 4. An Account of the Trade to East Indies, Public Record Office, C.O. 77, vol. xvi.
  110. 1. Villany of Stock Jobbers Detected.
  111. 2. Reasons Humbly Offered, Bodleian Library, Fol. θ. 658, no. 2; Reasons Humbly proposed for securing the Rights of Subjects to Freedom of Trade, Bodleian Library, Fol. θ. 658, no. 2b; The Pretence of the present East India Companies Property stated and considered, ib., no. 34.
  112. 1. A Short Abstract of a Case which was last Sessions presented to Parliament, Brit. Mus. 816. m. 11 (93).
  113. 2. The Answer to the Most Material Objections that have been raised [p. 235] against Restraining the East India Trade, Brit. Mus. 816. m. 11 (91), pp. 3–4.
  114. 1. A Short Abstract of a Case which was last Sessions presented to Parliament : Being a true Relation of the Rise and Progress of the East India Company, Bodleian Library, Fol. θ. 658, no. 11.
  115. 2. See above.
  116. 3. The Answer of the East India Company to certain Heads of Complaint, 13th Nov. 1691, Public Record Office, C.O. 77, vol. xvi; Reply of the East India Company to thirteen Articles, Public Record Office, ib.
  117. 1. Case of the Mariners which served the East India Company in the Wars in the East Indies, Bodleian Library, Fol. Θ. 658, no. 21.
  118. 2. Compare the Petition of the Islanders of St. Helena to James II, Public Record Office, C.O. 77, vol. xv, no. 180. Refers to ‘ that monster of rebellion, Oliver (Cromwell) ’, and asserts that the Company’s Governor followed the same principles. The Mournful Cries of the Planters of St. Helena, Brit. Mus., op. cit.
  119. 1. Answer of the East India Company, Public Record Office, C.O. 77, vol. xvi.
  120. 2. Ib.
  121. 3. See the pamphlets cited in the beginning of this chapter.
  122. 4. An Account of the Trade to the East Indies, Public Record Office, C.O. 77, vol. xvi.
  123. 5. MSS. of the House of Lords, N. S., vol. ii, p. 40.
  124. 1. Luttrell, vol. ii, pp. 7, 8; Bruce, Annals, vol. iii, p. 83.
  125. 2. Evelyn's Diary.
  126. 3. Public Record Office, C.O. 77, vol. xvi. The list of persons is dated ‘1693’. Brit. Mus. Add. MSS. 22185.
  127. 1. Reasons Humbly offered against Grafting upon or confirming the present East India Company, Bodleian Library, Fol. Θ. 658, no. 22.
  128. 2. Reasons humbly offered against Grafting or Splicing, and for dissolving this present East-India Company, Bodleian Library, Fol. Θ. 658, no. 69, January 16 89/90.
  129. 3. Sam. against Sheperd, Bodleian Library, Fol. Θ. 658, no. 62. A very interesting pamphlet; it contrasts the views held on the above before, with those held after, 1699.
  130. 4. George White, op. cit.
  131. 5. Op. cit., vol. ii.
  132. 1. A Letter to a Friend concerning the East India Company, Public Record Office, C.O. 77, vol. xvi. It is signed J. B. and is undated.
  133. 2. Journals of the House of Commons, vol. x. Compare pp. 92, 120, 167, 363, 397, 541, 560–1, 592, 617, 637, 642, 643 (important), 652.
  134. 3. Compare his dispatch dated 11th Sept. 1689. ‘You will receive many particulars of bustle and noise that the Interlopers and their adherents made in the last Sessions of the House of Commons’ in MS. Letter Book, no. 9. In October 1690 we find him more hopeful: ‘We will begin no new settlement in any place in India until our Charter be established by Act of Parliament with the same powers and authorities as the Dutch Company have exercised in India’, Fort St. George General, MS. Letter Book, no. 9. The hope is expressed in the following dispatches as well: 19th Dec. 1690 and 18th Jan. 1693. In April 1693 we find him writing gleefully to the President of Fort St. George ‘His Majesty has ordered a new Charter to be granted to the Company, which is now a-drawing, and we hope may pass
  135. 1. Journals of the House of Commons, pp. 592, 617, 642, 643.
  136. 1. Journals of the House of Commons, p. 652.
  137. 2. p. 637.
  138. 3. Ib., vol. x, p. 652.
  139. 4. There is only one volume that deals with William's reign, C.O. 77, vol. xvi. It is unbound.
  140. 1. Childe’s Examination, in Collection of Debates in Parliament, 1694–5, op. cit.
  141. 2. Ib.
  142. 3. lb.
  143. 4. Examination of Sir Thomas Cooke, India Office, vol. 268.
  144. 5. Ib.
  145. 6. Journals of the House of Commons, Report of Committee, 14th July 1698.
  146. 7. C.O. 77, vol. xvi.
  147. 8. Collection of Debates, in 1694–5, op. cit.
  148. 1. Journals of the House of Commons, 10th June 1698.
  149. 2. The Case of the English East India Company Trading to the East Indies, Bodleian Library, Fol. Θ. 658, no. 33; An Act for raising two millions, with Observations, Brit. Mus. 816. m. 11 (66); An Act for raising two millions, Brit. Mus. 816. m. 11 (65). Compare a very interesting pamphlet on the hard lot of the separate Traders, in the Lincoln's Inn Library, The Case of Persons concerned in the separate Trade; The Case of John Powell.