I. the East India Trade Up to 1660

The East India Trade in the XVIIth Century, Shafaat Ahmad Khan, 1923 · from page 1 · about 174 minutes

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The foundation of the East India trade was mainly an expression of the growing national desire for commerce. The national self-consciousness awakened by the conflict with Spain had roused the dormant energies and half-articulate longings of the Englishmen under Elizabeth. The struggle was at bottom an economic one, and though it assumed a religious character in the conflict with the Spaniards, the main cause was the desire to partake in the trade and to share in the wealth of the Spanish colonies. The union of Portugal with Spain in 1580; the defeat of the Armada, and the determination of Philip to convert the Mediterranean into a Spanish lake intensified the latent desire of the Englishmen to take part in the rich trade to the Indies. The Venetians, who had long served as intermediaries between Europe and the East, and punished with death the revealer of a maritime route,2 sent their last argosy to Southampton in 1587. The loss of their ship put an end to their trade. The consequent demand for the spices and other products of the East increased. The union of Spain with Portugal seemed to bar effectively the entry of the English into the East Indies. The desire had led John Cabot to try to reach Asia by the North Atlantic, as Columbus was supposed to have reached it by the South, and to make London a greater entrepôt for spices than Lisbon.1 The voyages of Cabot, Burrough, and Frobisher, in search of a passage to the Indies, testified to the universal desire for participation in the rich traffic with them.2 Their complete failure did not daunt the spirits of the heroic pioneers; and the gleam of the wealth of the Indies never faded from their sight. No sooner was the country freed from the danger of foreign invasion than some of the merchants memorialized the Queen for permission to send ships to trade in the Indies. Ralph Fitch and Stephens had no doubt led the way, but they do not seem to have exercised the influence with which Sir William Hunter3 has credited them. The Queen's Council was at the time engaged in negotiations for peace with Spain, and the petition of the merchants was not, therefore, given a favourable hearing. The remarkable success of the Dutch Company, however, precipitated matters. They memorialized again, and this time they were favourably listened to. The sum of £30,133 had already been subscribed by 101 merchants. The Charter granted for 'the Honour of our Nation, the Wealth of our People, the Increase of our Navigation, and the Advancement of lawful traffick'4 invested the Company with the exclusive monopoly of trade to the East Indies, and provided for its government by a Governor and twenty-four Committees. Full powers were given to the freemen to meet as often as necessary to 'make reasonable laws, Constitutions, Orders, and ordinances, necessary and convenient for the good government of the Company'. Breaches of such laws were punishable both 'by imprisonment of body, or by fines and amercements'.5 The essential feature of the Company was foreshadowed in the petition of the merchants to Elizabeth, praying her to incorporate them into a Company, 'for that the trade of the Indies, being so far remote from hence, cannot be traded, but in a joint and a united stock'.6 It is no doubt true, as pointed out by Hunter and Dr. Scott,1 that the terminable stock of this Company was a transition between the Regulated and Joint Stock Company. It did not acquire the latter character till 1613. Yet it is apparent from their petition that they intended it to become ultimately a Joint-Stock Company.

The original aim of the East India merchants was the acquisition of a part of the spice trade in the East Indies. But it was quickly discovered that English commodities were in small demand in the East India islands, while the products of India, specially calicoes and saltpetre, were very profitable commodities. Hence the establishment of English factories in India. The Company's sphere of activity was considerably narrowed through financial difficulties. Capital was scarce; the trade was depressed on account of the plague;2 and some of the adventurers paid their shares only after a threat of imprisonment from the Privy Council. The nominal capital of the First Voyage (1601) was returned at £57,473.3 The stock of the voyage was not wound up, but was transferred to the account of the Second Voyage. According to Sambrooke4 the capital of the Second Voyage was £71,350. This was added to the First, and divisions were paid on the total of £128,823. The dividends on the total amount were £195 per cent. But as they were not fully paid till 1609, the average rate of profit on the total amount was about 21 per cent. The Third Voyage began before all the money necessary had been paid by the adventurers.5

There was a loss on the Fourth Voyage, owing to the wreck of the two ships employed. The Fifth Voyage proved, however, the most profitable of the Twelve Voyages, and yielded a return of £334 per cent. on the combined capital of the Third and Fifth Voyages. The average rate of profit seems to have been about £101 per cent. The profits of the last Seven Voyages were on the same magnificent scale. The total capital of the First Joint Stock was £418,691. The general rate of profit on the First Joint Stock and the Voyages, arrived at after deducting the insurance, seems to have been 31 per cent. The existence of separate stocks produced the usual consequences of disorganization. The maintenance of separate factories in Bantam had resulted in constant bickerings. Sambrooke's account is significant. 'The Twelve Voyages drawing towards an end, and in regard of the inconveniencies which befell the trade by having several factories in Bantam for several accounts, each endeavouring to prefer the interests of their distinct employments, they grew up to such an height of difference that they became as enemies one against another, making protests each against the other, which was a great disturbance to the benefit of the trade; to remedy which the then adventurers took it into consideration how to prevent the like in the future, who in conclusion resolved themselves into a Joint Stock, raising a subscription amounting to £418,691.' This characteristic account throws much light on the organization of Companies. The inherent drawbacks involved in the maintenance of separate voyages could be removed only by the creation of a permanent stock, guaranteeing a continuity of policy, permanence of regulations, and rigid regulation of trade for national interest. The coherent and vigorous policy and constitution of the Dutch East India Company supplied a fresh motive for the conversion of a semi-regulated into a purely Joint-Stock Company. Up to 1617 the Dutch Company had divided its profits at an average annual rate of 25 per cent., while the dividends of English undertaking on the capital actually employed came to over 31 per cent. on the Voyages and Joint Stock. The lower return of the Dutch Company was due to its expenditure of considerable sums on the building of forts, &c. The advantages of a permanent capital were not unknown to the directors of the English East India Company. The replacement of uncoordinated voyages by a permanent capital, with a centralized machinery for the regulation of trade, and the enforcement of regulations necessary for its existence, embodied in a concrete form the inner changes that had taken place in the original design of the Company. The regularization of its machinery, and the consequent acquirement of a definite corporate character, facilitated its transition from a purely private Company, formed for the specific purpose of benefiting private traders, into a semi-national institution carrying on a most important trade for the benefit of the nation.

The whole conception of the original functions and constitution of the English Company was ultimately modified. It justified its existence on national grounds. The East India trade was claimed by Mun to be the ‘principal instrument’ whereby ‘foreign treasure’ could be acquired. The Company, argued Mun, did a national service by ‘counterpoising the greatness of the Hollanders’. It was upon this ground that the Company insisted on the absolute importance of safeguarding the interests of the English Company. This could be effected by the Central Government alone. A private Company was powerless against an institution that was armed with all the authority of the State. Hence the necessity of constant support on the part of the State.

It is interesting to compare the two Companies with regard to the amount of support received by each from the State. The first fifteen voyages undertaken by the Dutch had brought large profits to the adventurers. The average annual rate seems to have been about £5 per cent., and, though this was not so high as that of the English East India Company, it may be regarded as very satisfactory, in view of the fact that a considerable amount of money had been spent on the construction of forts in the East. This proved a source of great strength to the Dutch Company. The organization of the disconnected, unorganized, and, in many cases, antagonistic Companies and Copartnerships trading to the East into one strong and completely centralized Company was effected only after the serious drawbacks of this method of carrying on commerce had been recognized. The merchants were not slow to realize its benefits. The Portuguese and Spaniards could never be driven out of their commercial strongholds under the Equator except by a concentration of the private strength and wealth of the merchants. Hence the formation of one East India Company, and hence, moreover, the identification of the Dutch Company with the Central Government. As the State undertook the defence of the Company, it followed that greater power would be conferred on it. Again, as all the authority of the State was exercised by the Dutch East India Company in the East Indies, the quarrels of the latter were taken up by the States-General with a vigour and energy that have hardly been surpassed. All the Chambers of the United Provinces were represented on the Directorate. All the inhabitants of the provinces had the right within a certain time to take shares in the Company. It could make treaties with the East Indian powers, in the name of the States-General of the United Provinces; it could build fortresses, appoint generals, and levy troops. The generals had command over all its forces by land and sea, and exercised undisputed control over its finances. The Company was, therefore, a thoroughly national institution, wielding enormous powers, and exercising all the rights of sovereignty over a large tract of land.1

This close connexion between the Dutch Company and the States-General differentiates the former completely from the English Company. The latter was no doubt given wide powers. These were subsequently enlarged. The Charter granted by James in May, 1609, conferred on the Company the benefits of the ‘whole, entire, and only trade and traffic to the East Indies’ for ever. This was a considerable improvement on that of Elizabeth. The latter had limited the privileges of the Company to fifteen years. Moreover, James’s Charter prohibited all persons from trading within the Company’s limits except by licences obtained from them under their Common Seal.2 It could invoke the authority of the Crown for enforcing obedience, punishing interlopers, and protecting its commerce. Yet the lack of support on the part of the Crown, combined with the paucity of its resources, produced difficulties from the outset. It was never identified with the State; its factors were insulted in the East through its weakness at home; and the Dutch were enabled to expel its factors from many a fair and fertile isle. This is the main feature that distinguishes it from the Dutch Company. The Company could demand support only on the ground that it ministered to the needs of the nation, and carried on the trade, not so much for private as for public benefit. Hence, an entirely new development of the original design. The perfectly rounded unity and harmonization of the various elements that were engendered by the existence of the seemingly contradictory principles—public and private benefit— were not impossible of achievement. The Company could show, and, as a matter of fact, did show, later on, that the sole criterion of any trade is the res publica. ‘If’, asserted the champions of the Company, ‘the East India Trade cannot be carried on by it with advantage to the nation, then its dissolution would be justifiable.’ But they denied the validity of the minor premise from which this conclusion was deduced. They went farther. They adduced proofs to show that the East India trade was the most national of all the trades, and that only a Joint Stock Company, viz. the existing East India Company, could carry it on.

It is totally immaterial, from our present standpoint, whether the statements of the East India Company were well founded. What is really of importance is the fact that the evolution of the idea was productive of far-reaching consequences. As the Company justified its existence on national grounds, it expected the Central Government to adopt its quarrel as that of the State, to support it against all its rivals, and ultimately to wage war for the recovery, or maintenance, of its rights. The State was now called upon to exercise functions which had hitherto been left to the initiative of private merchants. This had other consequences. The defence of its rights, and the support of its subjects’ privileges in the East, logically involved regulation. The two—regulation of commerce, and the maintenance and extension of the commercial and colonial rights and privileges— constitute Mercantilism. Both these elements are essential to a right understanding of that tendency. This will be explained and elucidated in the following pages.

The chief articles of export from India were calicoes, indigo, cotton, raw cotton, raw silk, saltpetre, and spices.

The importance attached by the Company to the spices can hardly be exaggerated. Before the establishment of the East India Company, the main source of supply was Antwerp. Here more than 20,000 persons are said to have been employed by the English merchants. Spices were, and remained for a time, the most important article of export from the East. It was not till after the English had been expelled from the East Indies that the trade declined. Sir Dudley Digges reckoned that the smallest quantity of pepper that the kingdom was esteemed to spend was 1,500 bags, containing 400,000 lb. Mun, however, thought that about 250,000 lb. were consumed in 1620.1 The price of pepper is differently given by three writers. Sir Dudley Digges makes it 4s. a lb. Mun, however, says that it was sold in England at 1s. 8d. a lb. This is, perhaps, a more correct estimate. As the price of the pepper in the East was usually 2½d. a lb., there was thus a considerable profit on this article. The price seems to have fluctuated considerably. This was due mainly to the monopoly exercised by the Dutch. In the Moluccas to such a pitch was the spirit of monopoly carried that the quantity of spice grown was carefully restricted in order to keep up the price. Particular spots were selected suitable for the purpose, and elsewhere, as far as possible, the trees were destroyed.2 It is instructive to compare the price given by the redoubtable Malynes in his ponderous Lex Mercatoria.3 The pepper of Calicut, Malabar, and the island of Sumatra was sold at ten ducats the hundred bought by the bahar of four quintals. From the value of the ducat as given in L. Roberts’s Merchant’s Map of Commerce 4 we deduce the conclusion that the price of pepper was 6d. the lb. It is, however, highly probable that the Malabar pepper was not in great demand at the time. The other variety of pepper given by Malynes is called long pepper. It was at twenty-five ducats the hundred, or 15d. the lb.5

The next important spice is cloves. Not more than about 50,000 lb. of cloves seem to have been consumed in 1614. In 1620, however, the amount was greatly increased, and reached the figure of 150,000 lb. This seems a really large amount when we consider its price. Before the interruption of this trade by the Dutch,1 its price was about 4s. a lb. The profits reaped by the East India merchants were large. It was bought in the East for 9d. a lb., and sold here (in 1620) for 6s. a lb. The most famous variety seems to have grown in the islands of Moluccas. It was bought at 27d. the lb. Another ‘leaner sort’ of cloves deserves mention. It was sold at 13½d. a lb.2

Next to cloves comes nutmegs. The price in 1614 was 2s. 8d. a lb. Before that time it was 5s. a lb. In 1620 the amount seems to have been 150,000 lb. The price in the East was 4d. the lb. In England, in 1620, it was 2s. 6d. a lb. Malynes, however, estimates it at 8d. a lb.

Next to nutmegs comes mace. The price of mace was 10s. a lb. before 1614, but it was lowered to 6s. a lb. in that year. In 1620 it was 8d. a lb. in the East, and 6s. a lb. in England. It is remarkable that Malynes gives the price of mace as 40d. or 3s. 4d. a lb. The enormous difference between the two varieties can hardly be adduced as the main cause.

The popularity of the spices did not show any sign of diminution. The eagerness of the Dutch to acquire the monopoly of all the spices in the East can be accounted for by this cause. The conquest of Constantinople by the Turks had affected the overland trade, and the amount of benefit derived by the East India merchants from the voyages to the East was considerable. The main varieties of spices were very dear at Aleppo. The cost of pepper there was 2s. a lb.; in the East it was only 2½d.; the cost of cloves at the former place was 4s. a lb.; in the Indies it was only 9d. a lb. If the total amount exported from the East Indies had been exported through Aleppo, the loss would have been serious. They cost not more than £511,458. 5s. 8d. At Aleppo, however, the price would have been £1,456,001. 10s.3 This shows the extent of the benefit derived by the East India Company from trade in the Indies. Nor was it the only advantage. It was evident that the large amount of pepper exported to England could not all be consumed in England. It was, therefore, sent 'abroad into Germany, the Netherlands, France, Spain, Italy, Turkie and other places '.1 Consequently, 'out of Spices only, about £200,000 was added to the stock of the Kingdom '.

The Venetian ambassador testifies to the popularity of the spices in England. 'Ships have arrived from the East Indies with the value of 1,400,000 Crowns at least, in diverse kinds of drugs and a quantity of diamonds. They are accustomed to draw supplies from these countries, and there is enough to supply both the State and the rest of the world.' This is significant. It confirms the impression produced by the study of the Company's Court Minutes and the reports of the factors from the East. The next entry is from the same series, but of a different date.2 'From the Indies ', says the Venetian, 'they generally bring pepper, cloves, indigo, things which previously came through Venice, and were distributed through Holland, and Low Germany, France and England, but now with this navigation, the English and Dutch have absorbed all this trade.' This was perfectly true. Venice was eliminated altogether from a share in the East India trade, though she still continued to trade in the Levant.

The importation of spices was not accorded a general approval in England. There was a considerable opposition to the trade, and Mun found it necessary to defend the amount spent on their purchase.3

The other article that acquired importance later on was calico. There does not seem to have been an active demand for calico goods at first. They, however, soon replaced the linens imported. It could not be denied by the East India Company that the commodity was not ‘profitable for the state of Christendom in general’.1 But it was of ‘singular use’. It not only increased the foreign trade of the kingdom, but also abated the excessive prices of ‘Cambricks, Holland, and other Sorts of Linnen Cloth, which daily are brought into this Kingdom for a very great sum of money’.2 The amount of calicoes bought in 1620 seems to have been 50,000 pieces of several sorts, rated at 7s. a piece. They were sold in England at 20s. a piece, for £50,000. This leaves a handsome margin of profit. The cheapness of the articles and the fact that they were re-exported ensured them a steady market.3

Raw silk was another article of importance. The Company’s efforts to import large quantities of raw silk into England may seem inexplicable to us at the present day. The importance of the industry had, however, been borne in upon James I, and considerable progress had already been made. The Italian States were the pioneers of that industry in Europe. The States of Genoa, Florence, and Lucca provided raw silk out of Sicily to the value of £500,000 per annum.4 The East India Company could procure a sufficient supply of silk from Persia alone. There were, however, various difficulties in the way. It was not till 1618 that the Company’s factors were enabled to make a contract with the Shah for 8,000 bales of silk, of 180 lb. per bale. They declared that the silk made in Persia would yearly amount to a million pounds. The Company hoped to sell English commodities of the same value. It sold seventy-one bales of raw silk in September 1619.5 It is instructive to notice that Sir Thomas Roe had advised the Company to pay as much as 7s. 6d. per lb. for the Persian silk.1 The price of China raw silk, however, was slightly lower. It seems to have been 7s. a lb. ; the total amount bought by the Company in 1620–1 was 107,141 lb.

Bengal raw silk had not yet acquired the popularity which it subsequently attained. It was not till the establishment by the East India Company of factories in Patna, &c., and the instruction of Indian weavers by the English ‘artists’ expressly sent from England, that Bengal silk became a serious competitor in the English market. We find only occasional references to the Bengal silk in the early records of the Company. The fluctuations of trade in Persia, the disorders of the Civil War, and the weakened position of the Company produced fluctuations in the demand for silk. There were consequent fluctuations of price, silk selling as high as 28s. a lb. between 1652–4, and falling as low as 18s. 6d. a lb. in 1636. The Company, writing to Surat in March 1657, declared that ‘Raw Silk was in small demand’.

Indigo was another article imported. It was in great demand in Europe, and early attempts had been made to acclimatize it in England. The imports from the East were for a long time confined to indigo. In 1615 a single ship took home from Surat over 1,000 bales of indigo.2 The quantity of indigo purchased by the Company in 1620–1 seems to have been 200,000 lb. The price in the East was 14d. a lb. It was sold here at 5s. a lb. Malynes3 says that the indigo of the better sort, called Carquez, and the common sort, called Aldcas, were sold for 22d. and 18d. a lb. respectively. The West Indian islands proved very serious competitors. The East Indian indigo was, however, much better in quality than the West Indian, and Malynes4 remarks that ‘this rich Indigo’—from the East—‘is better than Laurea, or Lahora, coming from the said West Indies’. The popularity of the article was, however, steadily maintained. The Surat factors wrote, in 1652, ‘that Indigo has hitherto been the most gainful commodity’.

Saltpetre was another useful commodity imported by the Company.1 The importance of saltpetre in the seventeenth century can hardly be exaggerated. At that time powder-making depended on the obtaining of earth from the floors of buildings that had been used for stables.2 The earth required to be put through certain processes in order to extract the saltpetre. The operations of digging and extracting it have been graphically described by the writer of the article on saltpetre.3 The only means whereby the State could supply itself with a sufficient amount was by the grant of patents. The holders were allowed to dig for peterish earth in grounds not only of the meaner sort, but 'also of the better sort, which had not been entered previously'. The cancellation of the patent was not an effective remedy for the due supply of the Government.4 The Company secured a licence from the Crown for the manufacture of gunpowder; but the venture proved a total failure and the loss sustained thereby was serious. The Civil War in England increased the demand for gunpowder, and, consequently, saltpetre. At the same time fresh sources of supply were opened up in Behar. The utility of the article, combined with its scarcity, made its importation a matter of national importance, and the Company became the sole provider of it to the Crown. The Company brought forward the importation of saltpetre as a justification for the maintenance of its privileges, and after recounting all the benefits of that article, triumphantly asked, 'Now, who will supply the Crown with this article, if the Company is dissolved?' The argument was irresistible.

The chief articles of export from England to the East were woollen goods, lead, tin, and coral. The Company was hopeful of supplying English commodities to Persia to the value of a million pounds. They encouraged all their factors to increase the sale of woollen goods in the East. But the high price rendered it impossible for the poorer classes to use the broad-cloth exported from England.1 As a factor remarked in 1605, the Indians could make three suits of clothes for the price of one yard of English cloth.2 Only the Emperor and his courtiers could afford it. The Dutch cloth competed here as elsewhere, and as the Dutch could easily undersell, the competition was severely felt. These causes rendered its sale extremely difficult. The Directors tried in every way to increase its sale. Their efforts were in vain. Though a large amount was exported it found few buyers.3

The other important article of export, iron, suffered in the same way. It could not compete with the cheaper Indian iron, and its export was consequently restricted. We have a very interesting account of the quantities, &c., of English goods exported in 1614.4 The Company sent ‘Bayes, Kersies and most broad clothes dyed and dressed to the Kingdom’s best advantage’ to the value of £14,000; lead, iron, and foreign merchandise to the value of £10,000, ‘ready money in all the ships but £12,000’.

Another article that yielded large profits was coral. It was procured from the Mediterranean, and sold at a great profit. The other articles exported—copper, tin, vermilion, and quicksilver— never achieved any prominence. They figure in the later lists of practically all the cargoes, but it appears that their sale was considerably limited. The shrewd Roe had warned the Company that ‘these people are very curious, and can judge of workmanship well’. He advised them therefore to ‘fit them with variety, for they are soon cloyed with one thing’. The advice was not neglected by the Company.

From 1609 to 1617 the Company’s trade expanded rapidly. The Dutch interferences did not begin to be felt excessively until 1617. Up to that time its progress may be considered phenomenal. The Company, during the period of the four voyages, sent out a considerable number of ships. It sent out five ships in 1613, nine in 1614, eight in 1615, and seven in 1616. This does not include many of the ships built and maintained by the Company. In 1614 it possessed twenty-four ships. The total tonnage of the ships was 10,259 tons.1 As, however, two more ships were being built at Deptford in 1614, we come to the conclusion that the total tonnage of the Company's ships, in 1614, was 12,259. This was not an inconsiderable amount in those days. The largest ship in the kingdom, the Trade's Increase, belonged to the Company. Her tonnage was 1,293 tons and she was the 'largest merchant ship'. King James signified his intention to be present at the launch, and named her the Trade's Increase. The ship was, however, very unfortunate, being wrecked on her second voyage with Sir Henry Middleton, who died on board.2 The Company's shipping showed no signs of decline. The magnificence of its ships excited the admiration of the Venetian ambassador, who wrote in 1618: 'The East India Company have 45 galleons, of more than 2,000 tons each, built for war; and so well constructed and armed as to cause amazement. They usually make the return voyages in the third year, taking all the provisions they need for the 200 men carried by each ship.'3 Linello, the Venetian secretary in England, testified to the excellent workmanship of their ships. 'Seven ships, all new, have been got ready by the merchants in the river here for the East Indies. They are the finest that have ever been seen at sea.'4

The Company had at first exported English products worth only £6,860. The amount of bullion exported in the same year —1601—was £21,742. In 1614 'ready money in all the Ships' was no more than £12,000.5 The amount rose to £52,087 in 1616. The English exports also showed an increase, viz. £16,506, while the capital invested was £109,000.6 The total amount spent on the buying of East India commodities in 1620 was no more than £100,000. This does not include the cost of victualling, &c. We know that the charges were excessive. A concrete example will help to show the amount of money expended by the Company in the East. The charge for the fleet of 1614 amounted to £100,000. Of this amount ships and ‘their Furniture’ cost £34,000; victuals, £30,000; English articles exported, £26,000. Only £12,000 was exported in ready money. The cost of ships and victualling for 1613–16 was £272,544.1

From a letter of Mr. Skrine,2 it is apparent that the shipping of the Company had maintained its reputation. ‘Four ships have lately arrived from India belonging to the East India Company, with cargoes on board which are said to be worth £400,000.’

Another evidence of the Company’s progress is to be found in the increase of customs. Under the Queen ‘Mr Customer Smith had farmed the customs at £1,200’. In 1613 they were £13,000. They were considerably increased in 1615. The customs for the two ships returned in 1615 were £14,000. In 1622, however, they were more than trebled. The exact sum paid in 1622 for customs was £40,000. This shows an unprecedented rise. This was not all. Two years later another £10,000 was added to the King’s customs, and the total amount paid by the Company in 1624 was £50,000.3 In 1622–4 twelve ships were laden by the Company with English goods, consisting chiefly of broadcloths, kerseys, quicksilver, lead, tin, and Spanish ryals, as much as 200,000 ryals being sent out to Surat for the purchase of Indian commodities, and arrived safely in the East Indies.4 The Company ordered for the Christmas fleet of 1624, 600 butts of cider, 500 oxen, and 1,500 hogs to be bought for provisioning.5 In the same three years thirteen ships laden with spices, indigo, sugar, rice, diamonds, silks, Persian carpets, and cotton yarn arrived in England.6 During the same period four of the Company’s ships were wrecked.

The total amount of bullion exported by the Company in the twenty years ending July 1620 was £548,090 in Spanish ryals, although they might have exported £720,000. In the same period they had exported to the value of £292,286 in broad-cloths, kerseys, lead, and tin. The goods which had been bought in India for £356,288 had produced in England no less a sum than £1,914,600. These extraordinary profits throw a flood of light on the state of the East India trade.1

The trade maintained about 10,000 tons of shipping, and employed 1,500 mariners and as many artisans in 1622–4. The savings to England were not negligible. Commodities from the East Indies were brought to England at a quarter of the price hitherto paid in Turkey and Lisbon. Pepper alone to the value of £200,000 was imported into England in 1623, nine-tenths of which was exported within twelve months.2

It will be apparent from the above that the East India trade had made considerable progress up to 1620. It had greatly increased the King’s customs, and it had provided the country with a number of ships, completely armed, and efficiently organized.

The Company’s trade would have been impossible if the natives had refused to deal with them. There is no direct evidence to prove that they did so. On the contrary, we may say that the Company could not carry on its trade without the permission of the natives. This permission was readily granted, and a series of factories was built in the most important parts of Asia. The increased activity of the Company was the result of increased intercourse with the peoples of the East Indies. The latter preferred them to the Portuguese, and were not sorry to see one European power pitted against the other. In India the centralized government was too powerful to be trifled with, while the infraction of its laws was visited with condign punishment. The chief advantage possessed by the Mogul Government was its unity of action. It was not liable to be turned away from the path chosen by itself; nor could its subjects be ill-treated with impunity. The treatment meted out to the Portuguese by the Mogul Government has been described to us in a series of letters from the Company’s factors.3 It testified to the vigour of the Mogul's policy. It showed, moreover, that there was one sovereign authority in India which could enforce its decrees rigorously. The English Company were, therefore, very desirous of establishing factories in India. The Mogul's pharmaund did not, of course, settle everything, and we have evidence of the provincial governors' defiance of the Emperor's orders. This was, however, the characteristic of the later age of the Mogul Empire. At that time its pharmaunds were laws, and its laws could not be violated with impunity. The Company's efforts in this direction were crowned with success. It was less difficult to negotiate with the natives of the East India Islands. The latter were totally disorganized and thoroughly demoralized. The Portuguese had been the dominant European power for over a century, but their days of glory had departed. The hideous barbarity which characterized the actions of even the most eminent men of the later stage of the Portuguese Empire, and the terrible sufferings which the subjects of that empire had to endure, have been vividly described to us in a series of papers.1 It was inevitable that the advent of two European powers in the Eastern seas should be followed by a struggle with the Portuguese. The latter refused to allow them a share in the spices of the East Indies. A conflict between the Catholic power and the Protestant poachers on the reserved traffic of the East was unavoidable. It ended with the crushing defeat of the Portuguese in the East. A 'very hot fight' had already taken place between the Dutch and the Portuguese; though the former lost upwards of 600 men, they were bent on expelling the Portuguese as well as the Spaniards from their strongholds in the Indies. They were joined in this desire by the English.2 Captain Downton engaged the Portuguese fleet, consisting of nine ships, two galleys, and fifty-eight frigates. The English were victorious. Many of the Portuguese were killed, 'besides above 300 men carried in the frigates to Damaun to be buried '.3

The series of factories established by the East India Company testified to its astonishing progress. Captain Lancaster had settled factories at Acheen and Bantam, and obtained favourable privileges from the King of Acheen for the English merchants.1 Articles were afterwards concluded by Captain Best, and confirmed by the Great Mogul, for permission to trade and settle factories in Surat, Cambaya, Ahmedabad, Goga, ‘or any other parts of the country within the Great Mogul’s dominions’.2 Besides Surat, there were English factories at Agra, Ajmere, and Broach.

Nor were the important islands in the Indian Ocean overlooked. In Sumatra the Company had trade with seven of the chief cities or ports, in Borneo with four; and in Java likewise with four principal towns. In Macassar, in the Celebes, a factory had been established. They also plied more or less regular trade with Acheen, Baros, Passaman, Pedir, Priaman, and Jambee.

The English vessels resorted to almost every place where there was the least likelihood of obtaining trade with the natives. On the Eastern coast factories were established at Masulipatam and Pettapoli.3 In Landak a factor describes the savagery of the people of Dyaks ‘who lie in the rivers on purpose to take off the heads of all they can overcome’.4 The Company’s agents were well received at Bangkok, and the Company determined to settle more factors to ‘beat out a trade’ at Siam, Patani, and other places. The attempt to establish a factory in Cochin China ended in the English and the Dutch being ‘killed in the water with harping irons like fishes’.5

In Persia the conclusion of a contract for the supply of silk attended the extension of the English trade there. Ormuz was captured by the combined forces of the English and Persians, and the Portuguese were completely defeated.

With China also trade was attempted by means of junks plying between the English factories at Siam, &c. The sanguine Cocks,6 the Company’s factor in Japan, fed the East India Company with false hopes regarding the Chinese trade, but the inborn conservatism of the Chinese was proof against all seductions, and it was never really established until the middle of the seventeenth century. The same fate befell the trade with Japan. Adams's heroic efforts were attended with some measure of success, but the trade to Japan was never really prosperous, and the death of the Emperor of Japan led to the persecution of Europeans there, which ended only with their expulsion.1

The Dutch had not been idle in the East. They, too, had been consolidating their conquests, building a line of forts to keep down the natives, and extorting treaties from them. The treaties took the form of a guarantee to defend their territory against the Portuguese attack, in exchange for the right to erect forts, establish factories, and enjoy the exclusive privilege of trade.2 After the overthrow of the Portuguese in the Spice Islands, the Dutch, by means of treaties with the native powers, obtained complete commercial control over Amboyna, Ternate, Tidor, Banda, and the smaller islands. The destruction of the old Javanese town of Jacatra was followed by the establishment of a Dutch factory at Batavia. The latter became the capital of their empire. Gradually, the neighbouring States were subdued, and the Dutch Governor-General exercised undisputed sway over the most flourishing and celebrated islands in the East Indies.

Dutch supremacy in the East would have been tolerable if they had allowed foreign nations to trade with the natives. The English had fought with the Dutch against their common enemy, the Portuguese, and there was no reason why this friendship between the two Protestant powers should not continue. They expected some return for the services which they had rendered to Holland in her war against Spain, and they were in hearty sympathy with her, so far as the treatment of Spaniards and Portuguese in the East Indies was concerned. They were speedily undeceived. The Dutch were not reluctant to utilize the services of the English in the East for their own benefit. They found the English Navy indispensable for their operations in the East, but they were not ready to allow them freedom of trade with the natives. The monopoly which they had so laboriously built up would, in their opinion, have been absolutely useless if other European nations had been allowed to trade with their allies. Their main object was the establishment of a monopoly of all the spices in the East, and the consequent exaction of high prices from the buyers in Europe. Competition would destroy all prospects of the realization of this desire. Hence, the bitter rivalry between the two Protestant nations in the East. It took place in almost every important factory there. At Jambee the Hollanders vilified the English; they allowed no communication between the natives of the Moluccas and the English merchants. When the latter were well received by the natives, the Hollanders, ‘with one overwhelming force compelled the English to depart’. As early as 1602–5, we hear of differences between the two nations.1 Honest William Keeling asserts that when he went to ‘Comby the Dutch did us much wrong’. They tried to drive the English from Banda, and offered ‘12,000 Dollars among the country, to make their peace’, but the natives refused. The same thing happened in other parts of Banda. William Keeling was obliged to complain to his masters of the behaviour of the Dutch.2 Peter Williamson Floris was stopped at Pulicat, and told that ‘it should not be lawful for any that come out of Europe to trade there, but such as brought Prince Maurice his Patent, and therefore desired our departure. We answered we had commission from His Majestie of England, and would therefore doe what we could’.3

In the Moluccas the Dutch forbade the natives ‘to bring us any more spices’. They were not content with mere words. They dismantled ‘their forts and caused two great ships to ride by the English merchants’.4 At Bantam they threatened (1616) to pull the English factors out of the factory ‘by the ears’. Sometimes they quarrelled with them in the street, at other times they imprisoned them. ‘At Poulaway’, an island with which the English Company had made a treaty, ‘they abused our people, putting halters about their necks, and leading them through the town with an hour-glass before, publishing that they should be hanged so soon as the glass was run.’1 In Java the English and Flemings fought in 1605 in earnest with their muskets. In the evening Mr. Scot put them in mind that ‘if it had not been for the English, they must have been the most contemptible nation in Europe. Their answer was that Times and Seasons had changed’.2

In Japan the English were much molested by ‘the unruly Hollanders, who, by sound of trumpet, in the harbour of Ferando, proclaimed open war against the English nation both by land and sea, with fire and sword, to take our ships and destroy our persons to the utmost of their powers’.

In India the same tale was repeated, the Hollanders intriguing with the Mogul Governors against the English. In Malacca, owing partly to the dealings of the Dutch, no factory could be established. At whichever of these islands the English went, they were ‘beaten away by superior force’, and ‘the natives threatened with the loss of their heads, if they dealt with the English’.3

It is not too much to say that every factory in the East India Islands was a scene of bitter strife between the two nations.4

The maintenance of the East India trade on the part of the Company could hardly be effected without the support of the Central Government. The successes of the Dutch were due to the wonderful organization of their Company in the East. This had become possible only through the support of the State. The Company symbolized all the authority of the State, and the East India Islands formed part of the Dutch Empire. These two features of the Dutch Company were lacking in its English rival. It had insufficient capital at its disposal. More serious still, while the Dutch Government lent all its support to its Company in the East, the Executive in England exhibited the characteristics to which James's vacillating personality gave fitful expression in its dealings with foreign powers. The ultimate realization of the material interests of the English people in the early seventeenth century could be effected only by the increased support on the part of the Crown. The Executive alone could maintain the privileges of the English in foreign parts. This is the chief reason for the insistence of most of the economists of the first half of the seventeenth century on the absolute importance of safeguarding the commercial privileges of Englishmen, not only in the East, but also in Greenland and in Russia. In Russia, in Greenland, in India, in Persia, in Japan, in China, wherever, in short, the English merchants went, they were met by the Dutch, who opposed them by every means they could devise.

The importance of the East India trade in the seventeenth century lay in the fact that it was one of the most important causes of the development of what I may call Later Mercantilism. It is distinguished from the old by its insistence on the necessity of the protection of English commerce against foreign enemies. The Government is now called upon to defend the right of Englishmen to the East India trade, the herring fishery, and the Russian trade. This is the most important feature of the commercial activity of the seventeenth century. The merchants take the lead and demand armed support on the part of the Crown. The latter is now expected to play a new rôle. It has to develop the English industries by a series of laws, having for their object the exclusion of, first, the Dutch manufactures, and then, from about 1675, the French manufactures from England. This was only one phase of that policy. The other phase of the policy assumed the form of commercial warfare against the rival power. The combination of these two elements resulted in what may be termed the Later Mercantilism. It was the logical deduction from the theories that animated the conduct of the chief commercial nations in the seventeenth century. The main safeguard against ‘the mighty monopoly’ of the Dutch in the East lay in the prompt and energetic support of the Company by the Executive. The same applies to the other scenes of commercial warfare. This support took the form of various ‘prohibitive laws’, and, later on, of actual war against its rival. The movement was due to the agitation of the merchants, and was not imposed from above. It was the result of the interaction of a multiplicity of phenomena.

The commercial rivalry was not confined to the East Indies, but extended to Europe, America, and Africa. A most important feature is its intimate connexion with the naval rivalry. It would be completely meaningless without a due understanding of the naval rivalry between the two nations. Dr. Cunningham’s1 lucid account of the part played by the navy in the development of commerce and the functions it performed under Elizabeth has hardly been surpassed.

I have come to the conclusion that the same tendency was operative throughout the seventeenth century. In my opinion the influence of the East India trade on the development of a naval policy was felt during the whole of that period. The three forces that moulded the economic thought of the seventeenth century—East India trade, herring fishery, and the dominion of the seas—acted and reacted on one another. They were indissolubly blended. One led imperceptibly into another. The herring fishery could hardly be secured to the English nation unless their dominion of the seas was recognized by the Dutch. But the freedom of the seas, which the Dutch claimed, logically involved freedom of trade. This had been foreseen by Grotius, and defended by him in his Mare Liberum. If so, then the Dutch monopoly of the spices in the East ought to have been destroyed. The Dutch could hardly claim the freedom of the seas in the English Channel and deny the same freedom to the English merchants in the Spice Islands. It is surprising that Grotius neglected the force of these arguments. This may be due to the fact that he wrote primarily against the Portuguese pretensions, and at a time when the Dutch power in the East was comparatively insignificant.

The Dutch fishery was another cause of the commercial rivalry. The early history of that rivalry throws a flood of light on the subsequent proceedings of the English Government. We find the earliest expression thereof in a letter of Chamberlain to Carleton.1 Chamberlain is discussing the advantages of peace with Spain. ‘One of the chiefest reasons I can have for it is a kind of disdain and envie at our neighbours (the Dutch) well doing in that we, for their sake and defence entering into this war, and being barred from all commerce and intercourse of merchandise, they in the meantime thrust us out of all traffick, to our utter undoing if in time it be not looked into, and then our own advancement.’ This is a characteristic utterance. It sums up in a short sentence the gravamen of the charge against the Dutch. The English factors and sailors who wrote a number of dispatches to the Company termed them ‘ungrateful Hollanders’. They regarded their state as a creation of their own Queen, and they naturally expected that the Dutch would requite them with kindness. The grievances voiced by Chamberlain found an echo in the writer of a remarkable pamphlet entitled ‘Observations made upon the Dutch Fishing, About the Year 1601’, by John Keymers.2 It is perhaps the earliest tract on the herring fishery in the British Museum. The number of fishing boats maintained by the Dutch seems to have been 4,100. It is essential to distinguish cod and ling fishery from herring fishery. Some of the seas where the cod fishery was carried on were totally unsuitable for herring fishery. The coasts of England and Scotland seem to have been the best adapted for the purpose. ‘And every one of them do set on work on other vessels to fetch salt and transport fish into other Countries after they are brought into their own Countries out of His Majesty’s Seas.’ The number of busses employed in 1601 seems to have been 2,000. All of them were restricted to ‘Herring only, about Baughamess in Scotland, all along the coasts of England to the Thames mouth’ for above twenty-six weeks.3

One Dutch buss usually took eight, ten, or twelve lasts of herrings at a draught in one night. Contrast this with the English fishery of the time. ‘Our fishing continues but 7 weeks, with small cobbles from 5 to 10 tons.’ ‘When the Herrings came home to our own Roadstead, we take one, two, or three lasts a night.’ The total amount of lasts taken by the Hollanders was about 300,000.1 They were sold to the merchants at £10 or £12 the last. The total amount was therefore £3,300,000. The merchants transported and sold them into Pomerania, Poland, Denmark, and even England, at from £16 to £36 the last more.2 This was a handsome profit, and we are therefore not surprised to find the writer complaining of the impudence of the Dutch and the improvidence of the British race in general. ‘The people of Ireland, and round about the coasts of England, after they have been at Sea, and brought home their vessels full of Fish, will not go to Sea again for more till those be spent and they in debt, so that necessity compels them.’3 Owing to this cause, ‘We are eaten out of Trade and the bread taken out of our own mouths in our own seas, and the great custom carried to foreign states’. The author therefore urged the Englishmen to devote more attention to that industry, owing to the advantages it possessed. It would give employment to mariners, spinners, and hemp winders to make cables and cordage, likewise yarn, twine, and thread, for the making of nets, &c.4

The author of Trade’s Increase5 urged his countrymen to persevere in that industry. ‘As the havens be open to us, as the seas be our own, and as we have all things almost fitting for such a business at home, and naturally. . . . Here then we may get treasure in abundance.’6 The author then replies to the usual arguments: the incapacity of the English sailors, the lack of funds, &c. The connexion between the fishery and the Navy is well brought out, and means are suggested whereby the obstacles could be removed. The author is not original in the treatment of the subject. He copies extensively from Tobias Gentleman. This work exercised great influence on the later plans whereby the industry could be utilized by English fishermen.

He gives an admirable list of the chief places where English fishermen could ply their trade. This is followed by an account of the methods employed by the Dutch. Their industry, frugality, &c., are highly praised and are contrasted with the sloth of England. ‘Shall we neglect so great blessings, O slothful England, and careless Countrymen? Look on but these fellows, that we call the plump Hollanders ; behold their diligence in fishing, and our own careless negligence.’ The writer then urges Englishmen to take a share in an industry in which they ought to be the predominant partner. Their sloth has deprived them of the fairest parts of their seas, and reduced many to beggary. It is unfortunate that we cannot rely on his calculations. His statement that the Dutch maintained 2,000 busses may readily be accepted, as it agrees with those of Keymour and De Witt. It is more difficult to accept his statement that the whole charge for keeping a buss for the whole summer ‘was no more than £335’.1 It was certainly more than that amount. His importance lies in his attempt to deduce the consequences of the maintenance of the industry by England on a large scale. ‘The industry will breed Masters, pilots, Commanders, and sufficient directors of a Course ’,2 but now ‘there is a pitiful want of sufficiently good men.’3

Sir Walter Raleigh’s ‘Selected Observations relating to Trade and Commerce’4 are based on well-authenticated facts, and were relied on by De Witt in his pamphlet on fishery.5 Raleigh’s analysis of the causes that produced the unexampled prosperity of Holland is wonderfully acute. He shows how the Hollanders ‘glean the wealth and strength from us’. Their ‘Liberty of Traffick’, the small duties levied upon their merchants, their grant of free ‘Customs inwards and outwards for any new erected Trade’,—all these, and many other reforms of the like nature, made them the ‘Carriers’ of the world. In a year and a half they carried away from Southampton, Bristol, and Exeter nearly £200,000. This was not all. What grieved Raleigh was the fact ‘that the greatest fishing the world has produced is on the coast of England, Scotland, and Ireland’, and that the ‘subtle Hollanders’ had robbed honest Englishmen of all that treasure. They sent into Russia nearly 1,500 lasts of herrings, and sold them for £27,000; ‘while we but 20 or 30 Lasts’. They carried ‘Fish and Herrings’ to Hamburg, Bremen, and Emden, and sold them for £100,000. To Gelderland, Artois, Zutphen, &c., were carried between 15,000 and 16,000 lasts, and sold for about £300,000.1 They were supreme, not only in the herring fishery, but also ‘in corn trade’; they have the ‘great vintage and staple of salt’. While we sent only ‘rough, undressed, undyed cloth’ ‘there is an exceeding manufactory and Drapery in the Low Countries’.2

While England’s trade in the Baltic countries depended upon three towns, Elbing, Königsberg, and Dantzig, and while she sent only 100 ships a year, ‘the Low Countreys sent into the East Kingdoms yearly about 3,000 ships, trading into every city and port town’.2 They traded with every British port town with 500 or 600 ships, ‘and we chiefly but to three towns in this country, and but with 40 ships’. Raleigh’s pamphlet gave expression to a widely-felt grievance. The commercial rivalry of Holland seemed to presage the economic downfall of England. England possessed ‘all things in super-abundance to increase traffick and timber to build ships and commodities of our own to lade about 1,000 ships and vessels at one time’. The main bulk and mass of herrings from which the Dutch raised so many millions yearly ‘proceeded from English seas and Lands’. Yet ‘all the amends they (the Dutch) make us is, they beat us out of Trade in all parts with our own commodities’.

There was another danger to which Raleigh referred. The employment of 20,000 ships and vessels and 400,000 people, with sixty ships of war, upon the coast of England, Scotland, and Ireland ‘may prove dangerous’. Not all were employed upon the English coasts, however. The exact number seems to have been 3,000 ships. The number of persons employed on the British coast alone was 50,000. These 3,000 ships, however, employed 9,000 other ships and 150,000 men by sea and land.3 The only remedy was the organization of industry by the Crown. The whole trend of the seventeenth century economic thought lay in the same direction. As the danger to commerce became manifest, protection by the State was regarded as the sole means whereby the danger could be averted. Sir Walter Raleigh was not alone in this view. It was held by all the merchants of the time, and passionately advocated. The rivalry between the English and the Dutch in Spitzbergen is apparent in Conway’s Early Voyages to Spitzbergen.1 The English claim that Sir Hugh Willoughby had discovered and found the ‘big island of Spitzbergen’2 was no less preposterous than the Dutch claim to the whole trade of the spices in the East.

In 1610 and 1613 ships had been sent to Spitzbergen. After the Dutch had been sent away by the English they attempted exploration northwards.3 But the success of the English in 1613 was far from conclusive. In 1615 the Dutch were again aggressive, and settled by force at Fairhaven, Bell, and Horn Sound.4 The English confined themselves to the south, near the harbour of Fairhaven, Foreland Sound, and Ice Island. Owing to the high-handed action of Heley, the commander of the Dragon, the Dutch determined to make reprisals in 1618. On the 19th July 1618 they forcibly set upon the English ‘Vice-Admiral’, ‘used the English very unkindly’, and, in fact, utterly overthrew the English voyage that year.5 The next year, 1619, the East India and Muscovy Companies sent out nine ships and two pinnaces under the famous Captain Edge. Again the old story was repeated. ‘Divers Hollanders being in the Northernmost Harbour in the Country, employing great quantity of Boats in chasing the Whale there, off into the sea’, so that five of the Company’s ships were disappointed of their voyage. ‘The voyage was greatly hindered, to the Company’s exceeding great loss.’6 In 1620 seven ships were sent, but again by reason of ‘great store of Flemmings and Danes’, the venture was not successful. ‘They returned home half laden, with 700 tons of oil.’ The next year, 1621, eight ships were hired, but ‘their voyage was overthrown by reason of the foresaid Flemmings and Danes’.7

The disasters of the Company and the ill-success of the whale fishermen recurred with a frequency that is monotonous. All had their origin in the insecure protection against the Dutch. We find the merchants demanding redress and protection against them, not only in the East Indies, but also in Greenland.1 Though this referred primarily to whale fishery, herring fishery fared no better. There was, however, a widespread belief that the herring fishery would hinder the cloth trade. Malynes replies to this argument in his own incomparable way.2 The cloth trade and the herring fishery produced two distinct commodities. ‘One serveth for the Belly, the other for the Back, and both are sold by us and other nations in one or more places, and we both make our returns homewards by commodities, money and Exchange for money by Bills.’ Again, it had been urged that other nations were more ‘painful’ and industrious, and that Englishmen, as Mun said, ‘besotted themselves with Pipe and Pot’. Malynes does not deny the force of the argument, but thinks that the ‘same may be amended by use and custom, seeing our people can endure all climates and hardiness as well as others’.3

It is interesting to compare the views of John De Witt on the subject. There is nothing original in the great statesman’s Account of the Dutch Fishery.4 He relies on Sir Walter Raleigh, Malynes, and Aitzma for the accuracy of his figures. Far more important is the view he takes of the functions performed by the industry in that Dutch national life which he moulded for over a quarter of a century.5 De Witt admirably shows the vital importance of commerce to Holland: ‘The greatest difficulty for so innumerable people has proved the most powerful means to attract all foreign wares into Holland, not only to store them up there, and afterwards to carry them up the country to very many cities, towns, and People lying in the side of them. No Country has so many artificers, and rivers, and canals for the purpose.’ This extract is significant. It throws a searching light on the character and policy of De Witt. The geographical position of Holland determined her commercial position in the world. The apprehension of this fact resulted in an entire modification of the economic theories of the times. The Dutch trade would have been totally impossible without free trade. She was compelled to grant in Europe free trade, to impose low Custom duties, to establish a State bank, and to institute various other economic reforms, because she was the carrier of the world, and any other policy would have been suicidal. De Witt apprehended this simple fact. He calculated that 1,000 busses took 40,000 lasts of herrings. Counting them ‘at least’ 200,000 guelders per last, they would yield in Holland more than a million of guelders.1

What is of far more importance is his account of the Dutch trade in 1667. He says that from 1618 to 1667, or about half a century, the Dutch trade had increased to one-third more. The herring fishery is included in the list. We are not, therefore, surprised to find De Witt defending the Dutch fishery. It employed hundreds of thousands of men, and upon it depended the maintenance of a great part of the Dutch commercial supremacy. It was a matter of life and death to the fishermen, and they were not likely to respect the ‘sanctity’ of English waters. While the Dutch were determined to maintain their hold upon the herring fishery, intense feeling had been aroused in England. The agitation begun by Keymers2 did not die down. They were accused of ‘engrossing the universal trade, not only of Christendom, but indeed of the greater part of the known world’.3 The author charged them with beating out the ‘English in all place of Trade’.4 He is intensely indignant at their treatment of the English in the East Indies, whereby ‘they monopolized 3 sort of spices almost to the whole world, as Cloves, Nuts, and Mace, and, lately, Cinnamon’. Their herring fishing, which employed upon the coast of this land only above 2,000 sail of shipping, was nothing else but poaching upon English preserves. The means they employed were, however, worthy of being imitated in England. The author recounts all the methods employed by the Dutch.

Raleigh’s analysis5 is, however, deeper than De Witt’s. He is not slow to point out the obvious advantages of the Convoy system introduced by the Dutch; the absurdity of encumbering an exclusively merchant ship with a number of guns for defence; the cheapness of their freights, &c.1 The result was that they engrossed the whole trade of all the ‘Bulkie Commodities’, as timber, clap-board, masts, &c. They got the preference of the market of us in other countries. The consequences to England were, in the opinion of the writer, disastrous. Whereas formerly 200 sails of shipping used to be sent, now ‘only 16 sails are sent. The Hollanders send 600 a year’. The Dutch were in the proportion of twenty to one. ‘In Spain, Canaries, and Levant, where they formerly rarely laded one ship of Goods, they have lately laded more than one.’ Another writer thought that the English ‘were so near pinched, that it had been very hard fairly to have wrested ourselves out of the Nets of our Neighbours, had Sweden been as much shut to us as Denmark’.2 The English would be ‘straitened and subjected unless either the Dutch are debarred the course of some necessary Commodities and obstructed in the sale or vent of the native commodities, or their shipping is weakened’. The author points out, in justification of this new policy, that it is by a knowledge of trade and commerce and the course of it, that one Nation or State knows ‘perfectly how to pinch another’. This passage is interesting though not novel. It is but an application of Mun’s vigorous doctrine. The pamphlet was written on the eve of the First Dutch War, and heralded the future commercial and colonial wars waged by the chief European powers during the last two centuries. It throws a searching light on the policy of the statesman who brought about that war. The three questions— East India Trade, Shipping, and Herring Fishery—are now fused into one, the question of commercial victory or defeat. It is simpler, however, to analyse all the causes that brought about the First Dutch War. The analysis yields the above three causes as by far the most important.3

De Witt’s pamphlet on Fishery had emphasized the importance of that industry to Holland. R. L’Estrange’s Discourse of the Fishery4 showed the benefits that would accrue to England from the industry. He valued the herring, cod, and ling taken in ‘ His Majesty’s seas ’ by the turbulent Dutch at ten million pounds per annum. Again, England can carry on the trade much more easily because it is nearer, and, in case of storms, the fishermen are seldom above four or five hours’ sail, whereas the Dutch have usually 200 leagues to sail. England possessed, moreover, abundance of tackle, salt, casks, and victuals.1 Everything, except pitch and tar, could be procured in England.

With regard to the alleged sloth of the Englishmen, the author has no difficulty in showing that the ‘English do daily run greater Hazards and suffer hardships ’.2 The only way whereby the industry can be carried is by the imposition of a general tax and the institution of staple. Creeks and wharfs should be speedily built. The charge of herring busses of eighty tons, furnished at all points for the fishery, together with victuals and wages, was rated by L’Estrange at £900. The trade will ease the kingdom of at least £300,000 per annum by employing all sorts of people, &c.3 Moreover, ‘Fishery will relieve us too by planting a Trade there, which draw on Commerce, and consequently repeople and strengthen us’. The passages quoted are interesting as they show the vital connexion between the Navy and Commerce in the seventeenth century. Moreover, the tendency to the nationalization of that industry is latent in the pamphlets dealing with the subject.

The above sketch of the herring fishery in England has been attempted with a view to pointing out and emphasizing the main causes which, in my opinion, shaped the economic policy and the theories of political economy in the seventeenth century.

Another important cause was the intense naval rivalry. It has been assumed hitherto that the three causes were mutually exclusive, and that there was no connexion whatsoever between the East India trade and the naval war. In my opinion, such a theory is indefensible. The naval rivalry was intense, partly because the naval supremacy was threatened, and partly because commerce, upon which depended ultimately the growth of the Navies of the two rival powers, was the bone of contention. The dominating motive that underlay the actions of the Dutch statesmen was commerce. The Navy itself was regarded simply as an instrument whereby the Dutch commerce could be expanded. Ultimately, therefore, the naval rivalry resolves itself into a commercial rivalry. The methods employed by the Dutch in the First Dutch War will illustrate this. The Dutch State was mainly a commercial State, and the Navy was fostered because upon it depended the safety of their East India and other trades. Hence, we cannot draw a hard and fast line between naval and commercial rivalries. In England, the case was not very different. There too, commerce was the end, and Navy the means. But the commercial advantages of a powerful Navy were not really perceived in England till the time of Charles II. This was due partly to the fact that the foreign trade of England was much more limited than that of Holland, and partly to the fact that her geographical position rendered her completely dependent upon her Navy. Consequently, the dominion of the seas was at first much more highly prized than the dominion of commerce. The relative positions of these two factors was reversed from the time of Charles II onwards. Grotius's Mare Liberum was written in the winter of 1604–5,1 and was directed primarily against the Portuguese. It is perhaps the best exposition of the theory which was universally held in Holland. The whole theory is based really upon a rigorous interpretation of the Roman law of Possession. The Law of Nature, which was to perplex the political philosophers for over two centuries and to undergo various forms through the hands of Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau, is sandwiched in here, as elsewhere. But the shrewdness of Grotius saved him from resting his argument upon such a slender foundation. It is to Ius Gentium that he appeals, and the verdict of history is decisive on the point. Grotius did not wear his learning lightly, and his whole book is sprinkled over with a number of quotations. The scriptural authority seems to him decisive on this point, while the Roman legists seemed to have propounded the doctrines which he advocates. He starts with a ‘primary rule or first principle, the spirit of which is self-evident and immutable; to wit: Every nation is free to travel to every other nation, and to trade with it.’ 2 He has no difficulty in showing that nature has given to all peoples a right of access to all other peoples.1 Chapter ii is interesting, because in it Grotius analyses the Portuguese conception of Sovereignty. He has no difficulty in showing that ‘they lied, both in law and in fact’, if they said that those lands came under their jurisdiction as the reward of discovery. ‘For to discover a thing is not only to seize it with the eyes, but to take possession thereof.’2 The force of Grotius’s argument depends mainly upon this vital difference between discovery and possession. It was to this argument that the Dutch appealed in the seventeenth century. Nor have the Portuguese any right of Sovereignty over the East Indies by virtue of title based on the Papal Donation; nor can they be said to have conquered India. The sea is res communis, or res nullius. He distinguishes between Sovereignty in its strictest term from ‘Common possession’. The distinction is not really scientific, and his book suffers from the lack of a clear demarcation between ‘Occupation’ and ‘Sovereignty’. The two are with him convertible terms, and though the early history of Sovereignty was, in his opinion, totally different from its later developments, his main argument rests upon the Roman law of possession. He thinks that ‘that which cannot be occupied, or which never has been occupied, cannot be the property of anyone, because all property has arisen from occupation’. Moreover, ‘all that which has been so constituted by nature that although serving some one person it still suffices for the common use of all other persons, is to-day and ought in perpetuity to remain in the same condition as when it was first created by nature’.3

The air belongs to this class of things, because it is not susceptible of occupation; and secondly because its common use is destined for all men. For the same reason the sea is common to all, because it is so limitless that it cannot become a possession of any one, and because it is adapted for the use of all, whether we consider it from the point of view of navigation or of fisheries.4 Hence, navigation and fishing ought to be free.5

The conclusions that Grotius deduced from the premises lead to startling results. The freedom of the seas was deduced from the Roman law of property, and throughout his argument he constantly appeals to the Roman jurists. But freedom of the seas was meaningless unless it involved freedom of trade. The former was advocated only because it would lead to freedom of trade with the Spice Islanders. The freedom of trade was based on a primitive right of nations which has a natural and permanent cause.1 Commerce was born out of necessity for the commodities of life, but, after immovables also began to be recognized as private property, the consequent annihilation of universal community of use made commerce a necessity, not only between men whose habitations were far apart but even between men who were neighbours. Consequently, the universal basis of all contracts, namely exchange, is derived from nature.

Consequently, no one nation may justly oppose in any way two nations that desire to enter into a contract with each other.1

Freedom of seas led naturally to freedom of trade, because it was upon the former that the latter was based. Grotius's book has had a permanent effect on International Law.2 But it is important to notice that it was aimed primarily against the Portuguese. It was soon apparent, however, that it was applicable to England. The Dutch fishermen justified their title to the herring fishery on the British coast upon this ground. The seas were not the exclusive property of any one nation, but the common heritage of all.3 Hessel Gerritsz, in his Description of Spitzbergen,1 relied upon this argument when he replied to the claim of the English merchants to all the islands situated in the North, not only those islands which have been discovered up to now, but also those which may be discovered hereafter, as follows: ‘Why then, should not the islands of Faroe, Friesland, and Greenland belong to His Majesty?’ His reply is: ‘The navigation of the sea and fishing are, according to the universal rights of all peoples, common to all and freely permitted.’ This passage brings out the importance of Grotius’s theory. If the dominion of the seas were denied, and the Dutch prohibited from fishing on the English coast, the Dutch would have been deprived of one of the most ancient and fruitful means of subsistence. De Witt had asserted that the industry had existed for 250 years2 and that it supported about 400,000 people. This accounts for the importance attached by the Dutch to Grotius’s Mare Liberum. It became popular, not because it advocated freedom of trade, but because it was the most successful defence of the right of the Dutch to the freedom of the seas. Again, it became popular, not because it was directed against the Portuguese, but because it could be applied to England.

Selden’s Mare Clausum can hardly be called a successful defence. He has much clearer notions of Dominion, Law, and Sovereignty. Grotius had based his argument mainly upon the universal validity of International Law. Selden opposed Positive Law to the Ius Gentium. The one is permissive and possesses no sanctum; the other ‘relates not to all nations, but only to some particulars thereof’.3

It is interesting to compare Selden’s conception of ‘positive law’ with the Austinian theory of law and sovereignty. Another interesting point is Selden’s foundation of his argument on the vexed ‘Original Contract’. While Grotius asserted that the sea was common to all, Selden went back to the original contract theory, and derived ‘dominion’ therefrom. As for the rest, ‘which neither are possessed in several, nor expressly held in common, and have continued vacant', they were seized by the different claimants, and the latter were confirmed in their possession by an agreement, which applied not only to the things which were at first assigned, but also to those which were occupied.1 The effects of private dominion were immediately felt. There was first the inevitable appropriation of 'the same territories, or Field, whose Use before was free for all men in Tillage, Building, Pasturage, &c.' This was inevitable. What is more difficult to understand is Selden's attempt to prove 'that from the same original contract there springs a private Dominion of the Sea, as well as of the land '.2 He does not wear his learning lightly, and the treatise is overweighted with unnecessary quotations and references. The second book is far more interesting.

The first book is deductive, and contains not a few mistakes. The second traces the claim of England to the dominion of the seas. His attempt to prove that the ancient Britons did enjoy and 'possess' the seas of the same name before they were brought under the Roman yoke, and his statement that the southern and eastern seas were an appendage of the British Empire, from the time of Constantine till the Romans quitted England, may seem fantastic to us now.3 He is on firmer historical ground when he asserts that the dominion had been acknowledged by many foreign nations. This had not always been the case. But generally, the English coast had been regarded as 'the exclusive property of England'.4 Selden's book cannot be compared with the production of Grotius. The latter was the expression of a long-felt grievance; the former was aimed primarily at the maintenance of a privilege which, if allowed, would have considerably hampered the colonial and commercial progress of the European countries. Again, it has been thought that Selden was the only writer who replied to Grotius, and that his defence was successful. These suppositions seem to me to be groundless. We find a succession of writers asserting the dominion of the seas, pointing out the connexion between the Navy and Commerce, and far more successfully than Selden's ponderous folio.

John Hagthorpe, Gent., brought out the importance of the Navy to England. The glory and sovereignty of the sea had, said the writer, three competitors, the English, the Dutch, and the Spaniards.1 With regard to Spain, her neglect of industry had left her destitute of any power ; but with the Hollanders the case was different. ‘ They have many good ships, good ordinance.’ Their State was, however, exhausted by long wars, and it seemed to the writer that England should be the most able of all the rest.2 He then brings out the importance of the Navy. ‘ It seemed as needful as ever to seek the increase and augment of shipping, by reviving trades decayed, finding out new, and cherishing the Plantation.’3 The East India, the West India, and the Russian trades are fully represented. If a stock of £200,000 or £300,000 could be contributed by the people, England could furnish 2,000 sail of good ships of ‘ 300 ton apeece, with munition and ordinance fitting ’.4 This naval strength would enable England ‘ to propagate her religion, the Navy strengthened, and this our fruitful mother unburthened of her many, many children, by transporting yearly thither 10,000 people ’ besides volunteers, to the Plantations. The Navy becomes the means whereby colonies are planted, commerce expanded, and England defended. Mun had pointed out that the East India trade was a means ‘ to counterpoise the Hollanders’ swelling greatness by Trade ’, and to keep them from being absolute lords of the seas, if they drove us out of this traffic.5

Mun’s statement is significant, as it brings out the dependence of commerce upon the Navy. Far more important was the argument employed by Malynes in his Lex Mercatoria. It is quite possible that Selden borrowed many of Malynes’s arguments. There is a striking similarity between the two. Malynes admits that, according to Ius Gentium, the navigation through all the world is no less free and open to every one than the use of the air.6 He is careful to point out that the main great seas ‘ do not belong to any one nation ’. They are res nullius. But besides these seas, there are ‘ distinct Dominions upon the sea’. He has in view, of course, the English Channel, and that part of the English coast where the Dutch used to fish. There may be visible marks of dominion. All the sea within 100 leagues from the coast may be termed the dominion of a country. Malynes then shows that the English kings did possess the ancient right. ‘In those days there was no fishing in the Low Countries.’1 It dated only from the time of one Violet, when he and others procured inhabitants to fish for them ‘in His Majesty’s Seas, Streams and Dominions’. Malynes then shows how ‘that noble King’, Henry VIII, used the invention of the ‘Sign of the Portcullis’. Nor is this claim confined to England. The kings of Denmark, Sweden, Russia, and the princes and states of Italy have all claimed the dominion of the seas.2 He therefore concludes that the Dutch had no right to fish in English waters. The controversy did not die down. The quarrel over the dominion of the seas was one of the most important causes of the First Dutch War. The last great tract on this controversy is by Sir John Boroughs.3 Sir John quotes many of the ancient records in the Tower of London. His contention is that the kings of England had been in peaceable possession of the dominion of the English seas by immemorial prescription, and that this was acknowledged by most of the Christian powers. There is really nothing original in this argument. Far more effective is his appeal to the English people to bestir themselves, and to take a share in the rich treasure which they allowed the Dutch to steal. He has no difficulty in showing that the Hollanders had increased in shipping, the total number of ships and busses plying the Herring Fair being 6,400. We get also a remarkably good account of the extent of the Dutch fishery in 1686. The total number of mariners and fishers is put by the author at 112,000; while double or treble the number of women and children were maintained through that industry. He shows that the Dutch trade had increased, and that this had led to the increase of their power. All these benefits were filched from England because the latter allowed her rival to fish in her own waters. The pamphlet was written in 1686. It shows that the controversy had not died down, and that the herring fishery was still regarded as the preserve of the English nation. The controversy is not over even yet, but is, in some respects, as acute in the twentieth century as it was fierce in the seventeenth.

It was these causes that led ultimately to the First Dutch War. There were, of course, a number of others, but they were of comparatively little importance besides the more general causes described above. It is not difficult to estimate the relative importance of each. The English fishermen could not compete with the trained Dutch fishermen. They were handicapped by the failure of the Crown to render any aid to its subjects in their quarrel with the Dutch. James I might get intensely indignant at the outrages committed by the Dutch, but his anger went no farther,1 and the Dutch sailors continued to enjoy the right. Moreover, the herring fishery never assumed the importance that the East India trade did. It does not seem to have been properly organized in the seventeenth century. The tract of Sir John Boroughs shows2 that the Dutch were masters of the situation as late as 1686. Again, no comparison is possible between a thoroughly organized trade, having ramifications in nearly every part of Asia, holding more than two million pounds worth of stock, and owning many forts and places in the East, and an ill-equipped, ill-directed, and ill-protected industry.

I think, therefore, that the herring fishery did not assume the same importance as the East India trade in the seventeenth century. The remaining cause mentioned above, viz. the naval rivalry, was operative in practically every quarrel in the seventeenth century, but it would be a mistake to suppose that the freedom of the seas was claimed by the Dutch as an end in itself. It was because their commerce was dependent upon the allowance of that freedom, that supreme importance was attached to it. If England were allowed to exercise her dominion of the sea, and if the Dutch were prohibited from fishing in ‘His Majesty’s Oceans and Streams’, widespread misery would have stalked through the homes of hundreds of thousands of Dutch. It was upon this account that the Dutch passionately insisted upon the right to which they thought they were entitled, not only by the Law of Nature, but also by International Law. In England, the commercial aspect of this question did not become prominent till the time of Charles II. Though this is so, the writers of the Ante-Restoration did not neglect it. There is really not a single English writer who forgot to point out the significance of the right claimed by England. The Navy would be the means whereby the English plantations would be made populous and English commerce expanded. Nearly every writer cited above treats of it. Some of them show the importance of the Navy to the plantations, but none of them forget to emphasize the connexion between commerce and the Navy. Hence we cannot separate by watertight compartments purely commercial questions from those exclusively naval. All naval causes ultimately resolved themselves into commercial causes. This tendency is manifest in the writings of Sir Josiah Childe. He asserted that ‘though the Dominion of the sea may be obtained by Arms and fortunate battles at sea, it can never be retained, preserved, and maintained, but by the excess and Predominancy of foreign trade’.1 Childe admirably describes the interaction of the various elements of national life. ‘Advance in Trade and Navigation; the increase of Trade and Navigation is a great means to secure our Protestant Religion. Foreign Trade produces Riches, Riches produce Power, Power preserves our Trade and Religion. They mutually work upon, and for the preservation of each other.’2 ‘All tyrannies in the world are supported by Land Armies. A Naval power never affrightens us. Seamen never did, nor ever will, destroy the liberty of their own Country.’3

Childe was not the only writer who traced the connexion between the Navy and commerce. Davenant showed the benefits that England would derive from the policy. ‘Our inclinations to sea’, said Davenant, ‘fitted us as well as the Dutch for the traffic of carrying goods from one country to another. The English ports are safer and fitter than the Dutch ports.' Nothing is so advantageous as the carrying trade of which the Dutch had then the monopoly. 'Hence', concluded Davenant, 'England should imitate the Dutch, buy goods in one country and sell them in another. It breeds seamen, increases Shipping, and improves shipping.'1 Sir Dudley North carried the idea to its logical conclusion.

Of the commercial causes, the East India Trade was one of the most important. The various fishery societies founded in the seventeenth century have been described exhaustively by Professor Scott.2 None of them proved successful. Nor did any one of them assume the importance which the East India trade attained in the same period. Hence its importance in the seventeenth century. The fierce rivalry of the Dutch in the East had been transformed into an armed conflict with the English merchants. This rivalry brought out the insecure foundations on which the English Company rested. It could achieve success only through the help of the State. The latter alone could carry into effect all the measures necessary to the maintenance of the English trade. This was rendered inevitable by the fact that the Dutch East India Company had the complete support of the States-General. The latter had invested the Company with unlimited power, and regarded 'their East India trade as more precious than a gold mine'. It is for this reason that we find the merchants insisting again and again on increased State support, and that Mun and others advocated measures which were denounced by Adam Smith.

The Anglo-Dutch rivalry affected not only the foreign policy, but also the economic theories of the seventeenth century. The State alone could devise measures for the due protection of English interests abroad. Private merchants were helpless in the face of the Dutch competition, and English trade could not be maintained without the support of the Crown. The State is now regarded as the sole means whereby the interests of the English merchants could be maintained. Hence, a totally new significance is attached to the functions that the State was called upon to perform. It now becomes a ‘Commercial State’, imposing a series of restrictive measures against the principal commercial rivals, Holland and France, planting colonies, extending commerce, and utilizing the Navy as a means whereby every one of these functions could be performed. Hence the significance of the Anglo-Dutch rivalry in the seventeenth century.

Nearly every important seventeenth-century tract on the East India trade refers directly or indirectly to Holland. It is this intense rivalry in the East that helps to explain not only the theories of Mun, but also the importance which the later economic writers attached to those theories. He exercised a permanent influence on the seventeenth-century economic thought because he gave the clearest expression to the opinions which were held by nearly every merchant of his day. He merely expressed in lucid and forcible language what others had been feeling for a long time.

Another aspect of the East India trade was now brought under discussion. The extraordinary growth of the East India trade and shipping was not likely to escape the vigilant eyes of the critics. The Company’s ships involved the cutting down of timber and employment of a large number of men on a dangerous undertaking. More serious was its exportation of bullion and importation of East Indian commodities. ‘Our woods’, exclaimed the author of Trade’s Increase,1 ‘are extraordinarily cut down, in regard of the greatness of shipping, which doth devour our timber since the Indian Trade, and merely through their building of the ships of so great burthen, and their repairing timbers raised with land 5s. and more on the load. Nay, almost not to be had for money, which the Company seek to avoid by building in Ireland.’ The policy of Burleigh, and the vigilant care exercised by the Queen as regards the preservation of timber for the Royal Navy2 seemed to have been completely reversed by the Company. ‘If in 5 years, their building beget such a scarcity, what will a little continuance bring forth? A privation will follow, even of all our own timber.’ ‘We must then trade without shipping, or make ships without timber.’1 A far greater harm was done, however, by the exportation of bullion to the ‘heathens’. ‘Let the Comon people say that their commodities are unnecessary. Ask the tradesmen, nay, all men, what they have cheaper. Look into the price of victuals, how it riseth out of their great provisions. Let the whole land murmer at their transport of treasure, and bring in Charles Vth’s opinion to the Portuguese of their East India Trade that they were enemies to Christendom, for they carried away the treasures of Europe to enrich the Heathens.’2 Again, hundreds of men had been ‘consumed’ in the dangerous voyages of the Company. Nor should the other Englishmen be barred from the East India trade. ‘We are all Britons, all subjects to one Royal King, all combined together in one national League, and therefore not to be barred from trading equally to all places, which the King, with the whole assent of the High Court of Parliament, openly professeth.’3

This vigorous onslaught on the East India Company combined in a few sentences the various grievances which were to harass the Company throughout the century, and nearly to bring about its fall. Its importation of Indian commodities into England, its exportation of bullion, its exclusive monopoly—all these were attacked, and all had to be defended. The defence involved the advocacy of Free Trade on the part of the Company. The crude ‘bullionism’ of the day was intensely hostile to the exportation of money. Nor was the ‘natural right of Englishmen to trade’, asserted repeatedly by Burleigh and championed fervently by Sandys,4 compatible with the practical exercise of a monopoly granted by the Crown itself. Hence, in defending its monopoly, the Company was obliged to defend it upon higher grounds than those of private interest. It was now regarded as the only body that could carry on the East India trade. The trade itself was now claimed to be ‘the most national of all the Foreign Trades’.5 Moreover, the importation of Indian commodities was justified on the ground that England should buy in the cheapest market and sell in the dearest. Consequently, all restrictions of trade were injurious. The Company’s advocacy of freedom of trade was, therefore, the result of its importation of large quantities of Indian goods into England. This argument was developed to its logical conclusion by Childe, Davenant, and Sir Dudley North.1 The attacks made on the Company were greatly resented by the Directors, and the latter commissioned Sir Dudley Digges to reply to the author of Trade’s Increase.2

Digges can hardly be regarded as an ideal controversialist. His personal abuse of the author of Trade’s Increase is paralleled only by the wealth of his arguments and the vigour of his criticism. He has no difficulty in showing that the loss of men was greatly exaggerated. ‘The East India ships come home so strong and serviceable, that without cost of Plank or Timber, they have been found fit to send out again into the Indies.’3 No doubt four ships were lost at sea, but ‘is the loss of 4 ships, so long at sea, so great a loss, especially in 14 years, of our yet infant and discovering Trade, while we seek for Traffick with Strange Nations’?4 Men were, no doubt, killed on the voyage, though the ‘malice of this man has killed many that came home in safetie, and some that were never there’. ‘With regard to the “consumption of timber”, what are they (woods) good for, if not for building ships?’ ‘The Providence that bids us go and plant commands us to use our well-grown timber ere it rot, as that would soonest that is fittest for great shipping. His Majesty was loth to have our timber spent on Beggars’ Nests, new tenements, whose rotten rents make many gentlemen before their time, or that our woods should be consumed on Fir and Furness for glasses and such trifles when God hath blest us with a Fuell in the bowels of the earth, the waft whereof can do no hurt.’5 Digges’s chief merit lay in his disposal of the crude arguments with which the Company was assailed. He was not so successful with regard to the importation of Indian commodities, and exportation of money to India. Nor could the exportation of bullion be viewed with indifference by the mercantilists of the day. The East India Company had been authorized to export foreign coin to the value of £30,000. This had increased to £60,000, and later still to £100,000.1 In four years, 1613–16, they had exported £111,499.2 During the first twenty years of the Company's existence £548,000 had been exported in Spanish ryals.3 From March 1620 to March 1624 the Company exported bullion to the value of £264,516.4 The total amount exported by the Company (£812,516) in twenty-four years may not seem large at the present time, but to a generation which identified money with wealth, and regarded all exportation of money as so much loss of wealth, the continued increase in the Company's imports of Indian products, and exports of bullion, seemed highly dangerous. It conflicted with the fundamental tenets of Protectionism, and it seemed to prepare the way for the inundation of English markets with useless Indian products. The author of Trade's Increase had but echoed a common complaint, and, with the growth of the trade, the complaints became louder. Yet the fallacy of unalloyed bullionism was patent both to the practical merchant and the theoretical economist. As early as 1601 Malynes had exposed the fallacy.5 In his opinion, the wealth of nations cannot decrease but by three manners of ways : (1) ‘by the transportation of ready money or bullion out of the country; (2) by selling of our home commodities too good cheaper; (3) by buying the forreign commodities, wherein chiefly consists the aforesaid overbalancing, which is the cause of inequality, the giving in effect both money and commodities to have forreign money for them.’6 Yet if more money can be obtained by the exportation of a smaller amount, its exportation ought to be permitted. This conception of money as, and its complete identification with, wealth was modified by him on a closer scrutiny of the nature of money itself. Hence, ‘in countries where we have no ordinary exchanges, neither the exportation of our money is prejudicial to the realm, if we bring for it again needful and necessary wares for the same, being both a kind of permutation or barter ’.1 This extension of the prevailing conception of the functions of money had a permanent effect upon the fortunes of the Company. It was developed by Digges and Mun into a consistent and cogent plea for the exportation of money. It was transformed by Sir Dudley North and Davenant into a powerful argument for the freedom of trade, and the abolition of obnoxious restraints on it. Again Malynes's statement ‘ that the plenty of money maketh generally things dear, and scarcities of money maketh likewise generally things good cheaper ’ contains the germ of the Quantity Theory of money.2 The ‘ over-balancing ’ on which he insisted so much was incorporated by Mun in his treatise, and developing gradually into the well-known ‘ Balance of Trade ’ was observed with sedulous care throughout the century. Nor was his theory of Foreign Exchanges so fantastic as may appear at first. It, no doubt, deserved all the castigation it received at the hands of Mun and Misselden.3 Mun found no difficulty in exposing the fallacies underlying Malynes's argument, and, taking up each of the ‘ Feats ’ which Malynes had attributed to the Exchangers, showed the true nature of the Exchanges. Nor was Misselden far wrong when he asserted 4 that ‘ it is not the rate of exchanges, whether it is higher or lower, that maketh the prices of commodities dearer or cheaper, but it is the plenty or scarcity of commodities, their use or non-use, that maketh rise or fall in prices ’.5

The theory tentatively put forward by Malynes was extended by Digges. ‘ The importation of East India Commodities had broken the monopoly of the Hollanders ; had saved the nation £69,666. 13s. 4d.,6 and had cheapened the articles.’ Moreover, the exportation of English products to the East Indies had considerably increased. ‘While the exportation of English cloth, tin, &c., amounted to £24,000, that of bullion (in 1614) was only £12,000.’ There was, moreover, the benefit derived by the nation from the employment of men, construction of ships, and increase of customs.1 Nor were the benefits derived from the importation of ‘Comfortable Spices’ to be despised, for who had not heard of the healing powers of ‘Drugges and Spices’?

If the nation gained so many advantages from the exportation of bullion, it was absurd to complain of the exportation of money. For how can the nation get money except by the exportation of money? If the exportation of a smaller amount result in the importation of a much larger amount, then the exportation ought rather to be encouraged than discouraged. Digges had pointed out the advantages thereof. Mun began where Digges had ended. The defence put forward by Malynes, and extended by Digges, was not only developed into a clear-cut and well-reasoned principle, but was connected with his theory of foreign trade. It is here that the East India trade becomes of such paramount importance in the right understanding of the economic theories of the period. He can hardly be called the founder of the Mercantile system. Nor was he the first English writer who emphasized the importance of foreign trade. In the pamphlets written by Misselden, Malynes, Digges, Tobias Gentleman,2 and the author of Trade's Increase, the supreme importance of foreign trade was clearly pointed out. The due recognition of this was the characteristic feature of the seventeenth century. The impetus thereto had been given by the rivalry with Spain. After the destruction of the Armada, the wonderful national revival under Elizabeth increased commercial and colonial activity. Foreign trade acquired a new significance. It became a chief, and, with Mun, the sole means of acquiring the treasure so much valued at the time. The author of Trade's Increase had pointed to its importance; Raleigh had remarked upon the activities of the Dutch and the negligence of the Englishmen in that respect; Digges had pointed to the enormous profits secured through the East India trade. Mun's chief merit consists in systematizing the various views on foreign trade into a coherent and consistent whole. Money was, no doubt, the object of foreign trade. Yet this was not the sole object. 'The ordinary means to increase the wealth and treasure is by Foreign Trade, wherein we must ever observe this rule: to sell more to strangers yearly than we consume of theirs in value.'1 But money is not treasure in every case. 'Neither is it said that money is the Life of Trade, as if it could not subsist without the same. For we know that there was great trading by way of commutation or barter when there was little money stirring in the world.'2 That money may be dispensed with is proved by the fact that the 'Italians and some other nations dispense with the actual use of money by assigning their credits from one to another daily for very large sums, with ease and satisfaction by writings only'.3 Mun himself recognized that his advocacy of the exportation of money is so contrary to the common opinion, 'that it will require many and strong arguments to prove it, before it can be accepted of the Multitude'.4

Money is not valued in and for itself, for 'plenty of money does not improve our lands. For when the merchant hath a great dispatch beyond the sea, he doth presently return to buy up the greater commodities which doth improve the Land Rent, and enables many men to buy land, which must make them dear.' Yet all this is mainly dependent upon foreign trade, for if 'the Foreign Trade come to a stop or declination by neglect at home, or injury abroad, whereby the merchants are impoverished, then all the said Benefits, and our Lands fall in pieces'.5 Hence the supreme importance of foreign trade. Treasure can be acquired only through foreign trade. The conception of treasure too undergoes a change. It becomes the medium whereby the land is improved in value, the price of wool rises, and other benefits are conferred. As foreign trade is the only means whereby we can acquire this treasure, so the East India trade is the 'Principall Instrument' therein, because it has so much increased the traffic of the nation.6 The trade gives employment to 12,000 men. Of the £208,000 worth of pepper imported in 1627, no less than £180,000 was re-exported to foreign states. The Company, moreover, had become a defender of the Commonwealth ‘to counterpoise the Hollanders’ swelling greatness by trade, and to keep them from being Absolute Lords of the Seas’.1

Nor were the drugs of the East unnecessary. ‘Who is so ignorant in any commonwealth which will not consent to the moderate use of wholesome Druggs and Comfortable Spices?’2 Nor should the prohibition of the exportation of bullion be allowed, for, though the Company yearly export £100,000, the money exported brings in commodities which are sold here for £494,223. 6s. 8d.3 Nor is it the keeping of our money in the kingdom which makes a quick and ample trade, but ‘the necessity and use of our wares in foreign countries, and our want of their commodities which causeth the vent and consumption on all sides’.4 ‘For if we only behold the actions of the husbandman in the seed-time when he casteth away much good corn into the ground, we will rather accompt him a madman rather than a husbandman; but when we consider his labours in the harvest, which is the end of his endeavours, we find the worth and plentiful increase of his action.’5

Mun’s thoroughgoing plea for the exportation of money essentially fixed the circle of seventeenth-century economic thought. The chief defenders of the East India Company under William, North, Davenant, Childe, utilized his arguments to prove the necessity of exportation.

It does not, however, seem to have had immediate effects. Popular opinion, against which Mun had railed, still attributed the scarcity of money in 1622 to the drain of money by the Company. As early as 1615 the author of Trade’s Increase had voiced their opinion. James I had felt compelled to assure the Company by Proclamation, in 1619, that ‘it was not his intention to revoke or discharge any liberty which the East India Company had, or ought to have, by the lawful use and exercise of their charter’.6 Nor did the clamour die down. In the Parliament of 1621 ‘the scarcity of money was represented to be so great that the tenants gave up their farms, and land had fallen from 20 years’ purchase to 19, 18, and even to 13 years’. Some ascribed this to the East India’s Company’s patent to carry out coin; while the Committee of Grievances appointed by Parliament attributed the scarcity of coin to the unequal balancing of trade, and to the East India Company.1 Even the King was obliged to investigate the point, and among the instructions to the Standing Commission of 1622 we find the following: ‘To inquire whether the East India Company do justly and truly perform their contract with us concerning the exportation of money, because they have been much taxed by men for exporting the coin and treasure of this realm to furnish their trade withal, or that would otherwise have come in hither for the use of our subjects, and that they do not return such merchandise from India as doth recompense that loss into our Kingdom.’ The Parliament of 1624 returned to the charge. Buckingham, unable to extort money from the East India Company, moved in the House of Lords for stay of the Company’s ships. Others cried out, ‘Stay the money that they send out of the land’, which some reported to be £80,000 this year. There was intense excitement. There was a motion ‘to search the books’. ‘Mr. Deputy, hearing the motion, grew hot, stood up’ and explained the advantages that the country derived from the trade. As there is no further mention of the matter, it presumably dropped.2

The Parliament merely reflected the opinion of the majority of the people. The Venetian ambassador, writing in 1618, has the following: ‘From England they take away gold and silver. Thus this trade is not of great use to the kingdom, as, although some individuals make large profits, they introduce into England things which are not necessary for them, and many men are lost on the voyage.'1 There is no change four years later. 'It (the East India trade) brings them nothing but exaction and hard knocks, and absorbs a large quantity of gold which does not return, in return for spices, and causes great waste among the sailors, eight dying out of 10.'2 Nor were they guiltless of the scarcity of money at the time. The same ambassador, writing on 16th December 1622, thus describes the scarcity: 'This Kingdom has never been so short of gold. They attribute it to exportation of gold to the East Indies and Flanders, where its value is increased. His Majesty is desperately in need of it. Payments are made only to few, and with great difficulty.'3

Misselden ascribed this want of money to the East India Company.4 'It was the special remote cause of our want of money.' The greatest drawback, however, was the want of an East India stock. 'This causes the body of the commonwealth to be wounded sore, through the sides of the particular members thereof. For the Stock of the East India Company being of great value, and collected and contracted from all other particular trades of the Commonwealth, and a great part thereof being enlarged and detained now for more than 5 years past, the Commonwealth hath lost the value of the Stock itself, and all the increase of Trade which might have been produced in the several trades of the subjects, whereby abundance of treasure might have been brought into this land in all this time.'5 'The money that is traded out into those parts is continually issued out, and never returneth.'6 Moreover, the Commonwealth was deprived of the use of many of its principal members, 'by whose industry, art, and action the Commonwealth might wonderfully have been increased.' The loss is 'sensible in the drapery of the Kingdom, whereby the poor are set on work, and in all the other trades of the Kingdom; and hath begot that Dampe and Dearness in all the Trades of the Kingdom which we unhappily feel at this day'.7

Misselden's indictment of the East India trade was answered by his lifelong opponent, Malynes. The influence of Mun is apparent on every page dealing with the East India Company. Leaving aside his mystery of Exchange, which he inserted in every discussion, and to which he referred nearly all the prominent economic phenomena of the day, the main argument is a mere repetition in different words. There is the same outlook upon, and the same radical changes in the conception of, the functions of money. ‘When the said Indian Commodities are sent from England into Turkey, Leghorn, Genoa, the Low Countries, Marseilles, and other places, and are sold for ready money, the same is employed again upon Currants, Wines, Cotton Wool and Yarn, Galls, and divers other Commodities, wherewith the ships being reladen, yet a great proportion remaineth to be brought over in moneys.’1 The chief causes, as usual with him, were the narrow policy of the Merchant Adventurers, and the frauds of the Exchangers. Misselden’s sudden change of his opinion may be due to the fact that the East India Company had appointed him their Commissioner for Holland.2 The benefits to the nation are again estimated at £100,000. There, however, is a wider conception of the East India trade. It not only yields £500,000, but also employs ‘10,000 Tons of Shipping, and 3,000 Mariners, Carpenters, and other artificers’.3 ‘Moreover, the King’s Customs will be greatly increased by the Trade.’4 The adoption of Mun’s arguments by Malynes and Misselden showed the influence of the former on the evolution of the chief argument for the existence of the East India Company.

Both the critics and the defenders of the East India Company were, however, unanimous in regarding the foreign trade as the chief means of securing treasure. As England possessed no gold mines, said Mun, the only means whereby the treasure could be acquired was foreign trade. As treasure was identified with foreign trade, all the means whereby the latter could be secured were to be utilized and efficiently employed. The chief commercial rivals were to be removed by the State itself, and their commodities prohibited. Hence the connexion of foreign trade with Protectionism. A Company that had the organized will and unlimited support of the State at its back was a far more serious rival than a number of private merchants without any adequate authority from the Government. The theory of the State is completely transformed by the rivalry of the merchants of two commercial powers. The State is no longer the passive spectator of its people's activities, but an active asserter of their rights to the East India trade, the Greenland fishery, and other trades. Hence the importance of Mun in the history of economic thought. A clear recognition of the importance of foreign trade went hand in hand with a bitter hatred of the Dutch. This was due mainly to the fact that they were the most determined opponents of the English merchants in the East Indies, in Russia, and in Greenland. It is instructive to trace the stages through which these quarrels passed before they became ‘matters of state’.1 At first, the East India merchants bear all the troubles meekly, and though they complain, the complaint is not addressed to the King. It is still regarded as a quarrel among merchants, and the State is not called upon to redress their grievances. At length, the East India Company, ‘having long endured notorious injuries’, were, in 1611, ‘enforced to break silence, and complain of their griefs’.2 In their petition they implored the ‘Lord Treasurer’s assistance and mediation with the States for redress’; the petition described how Captain Middleton was forcibly put from all trade at Banda, and went on to narrate other injuries committed by the Dutch. Winwood’s reply to Salisbury’s dispatch about the Company’s petition is striking. The Dutch Company, he asserted, is a body by itself, high and mighty, and will not acknowledge the authority of the States-General more than shall be for their private interest.3 At last three Commissioners, accompanied by Hugo Grotius, arrived in London in March, 1613.4

The first memorial of the Dutch brought out the essential differences between the two parties. The Dutch asserted that they had spent large sums in maintaining their trade, and they thought it very hard that the King’s subjects should trade in those parts. The English Commissioners, on the other hand, maintained their right to trade there, and justified it by appealing to the Ius Gentium which Grotius had so forcibly defended.1 The real aims of the Dutch were not hidden from the shrewd English merchants. Sir Thomas Smythe's letter to Winwood shows plainly the effect produced by the meeting. ‘We have treated all along’, says Smythe, ‘with no other benefit, but only that we now know that they endeavour to seclude us from trading in those parts; where hitherto we have had it from fear of the Portuguese, and with the good affection of the country people.’2 The Dutch Commissioners had many conferences with the English, but were unable to settle the differences. The King at last advised that these should be referred to a future treaty. He expressed his willingness to depute Commissioners for that purpose. The Conference, which had lasted two months, broke up without effecting any settlement. Meanwhile, the quarrels in the East increased in intensity. The Company had dispatched a vessel to Bachian, one of the Moluccas, early in 1613, but the factors could get no trade there, ‘because of the sway of the Flemings’. They were forced to yield the island of Machian, which had been offered to Sir Henry Middleton, ‘to the Flemings’. The people desired to trade with the English, ‘but the Flemings sent great ships to prevent it, and threatened the islanders with punishment’.3 The Company's factors might hope that their masters would ‘not put up with such insupportable injuries’, but they were powerless for the time.

The following year Caron, the Dutch Ambassador, made for common action on the part of the two Companies ‘in a loving and friendly trade’. The Dutch were to make use of trading to Cambaya, while the English Company was to be admitted to the Moluccas, but in such a manner ‘that no places may be overlayed’.4

This was certainly a considerable improvement upon the former proposals, but it left the original problem unsolved. There was no guarantee that the two powers would cease their rivalries upon the assignation of their respective spheres. The proposal merely expressed the leading ideas of the Dutch on the freedom of commerce in the East. They were determined to maintain a monopoly, even though the monopoly might be exercised by them in parts alone, and not in all the East India Islands. This was made clear at the meeting of the Commissioners in 1615. The English merchants desired nothing more than the removal of all interruptions to free trade to all parts of the East Indies, especially to the Spice Islands.1 The Dutch, however, desired no competition in the East. At the first meeting they brought forward two propositions to which they adhered throughout the seventeenth century. They refused the English Company all share in the East India trade because (1) they had, at great expense and danger, established their trade in the East Indies, by ‘taking, supervising, and building of many forts; and (2) because they had contracted amity with diverse kings there, and therefore do not think it reason that any man should go about to deprive them of those benefits and advantages, which they expect and look for, after much effusions of blood, great charges, travails, and perils’.

It cannot be denied that the Dutch had expended large sums in the East, and that they were entitled to the rewards to which they looked forward, and which they ultimately obtained. But they claimed much more than a proportionate reward for all their expenses. They claimed a right to expel every other power from the Spice Islands, and to monopolize the whole commodity in the East. The English Commissioners, on the other hand, rested their claim for ‘free trade into the East Indies, and every part thereof, as well by the Law of Nations, as by the admittance of Kings and Princes’. The free trade, which they claimed, had been advocated by Grotius, and they pertinently asked the countrymen of Grotius whether they were ready to deny freedom of trade and to advocate freedom of the seas. The Dutch reply was ingenious. They now threw away the Laws of Nature and Nations to which they had appealed in their advocacy of freedom of the seas, styling them as ‘indefinite in themselves’, and informed the English Commissioners that ‘they were limited by the Municipal laws and institutions of people and governments, whereby it is evident in all Kingdoms that it is not lawful for every man to buy every commodity of every person, in every place, and at all times ’. Moreover, every person was at liberty to ‘ tie himself, and since certain Indians have done that by promising the sale of Spices unto the Hollanders, there is nothing more agreeable to natural equity, and Law of Nations ’.

The English pointed to the earlier treaty made by Sir Francis Drake with the ruler of Ternate, and claimed that the contract entered into in 1579 should have precedence of all later agreements. The English claim was not really very sound. Sir Francis Drake’s treaty could hardly be relied upon by the Company. It certainly had no such wide effects as the Company attributed to it.1 They were on firmer ground when they asserted that the Dutch were claiming precisely that which the Spaniards had claimed in the West and East Indies, and that, in some respects, the Dutch monopoly was more galling than the Spanish monopoly. The Dutch retorted that they were claiming monopoly of only a part of Asia. To this the English rejoined that it made no difference. Both ‘ used the same reasons to keep others from commerce in those parts, which they would exempt from the Common Right and Law of Nations ’. Throughout all these negotiations, the English insisted upon ‘ the Law of Nations ’, ‘ primitive law ’, and ‘ law of nature ’. Their deduction of the right of trade from the law of nature may appear illogical to us, but the universal major premise upon which it was based had not only been assumed by Grotius, but also defended, and expanded into a fervent plea for the freedom of the seas. Throughout the century the same question recurs with almost mechanical frequency. The English Company in their petitions, manifestoes, &c., to James I, Cromwell, and Charles II demand freedom of trade to the East Indies. We find the old words as late as 1680. The Dutch, on their side, claim freedom of the seas, and as vehemently deny the right of the English to freedom of trade with the Spice Islands. Neither party conceded what the other demanded, and both of them utilized the law of nature for their own benefit. The history of these theories is a melancholy commentary, not only on the Mare Liberum of Grotius, but also on the Leviathan of Hobbes, and the Social Contract of Rousseau.

The result of these academic discussions was foreseen by the shrewd English merchants. They concluded thus : ‘ It appears that their purpose and intent is to exclude His Majesty’s subjects from the trade of the Spices in the East Indies and to engross the same wholly to themselves.’1 Though there was no prospect of settlement on these lines, the differences might have been removed by the union of the two Companies. As early as 1610 it had been suggested by Holland.2 But the English ambassador rejected the proposal, as he thought the smaller English Company would have been swallowed up by the larger body. The idea was eagerly adopted by James I. He urged upon the Company the necessity of union with its Dutch rival. He ‘disliked the Company refusing to join with the Dutch if they should fall upon a Joint Stock’. The reasons adduced by the Company were intelligible enough. It urged in defence of its conduct, that ‘the Dutch maintained their merchandise with their state, and had made no dividends but small matter’. This was really the crux of the situation. The liberty of trade which the Company desired ought to be supported by all the resources of the State, and the privileges enjoyed by the English merchants ought to be maintained by all the power at its disposal.3

The English merchants were naturally apprehensive of the Dutch plans. The Commissioners informed the Company that the Dutch Company had fifty-one ships in the East Indies and a Stock of £900,000, and owed £400,000 at interest, which, they added, ‘is a great discouragement to their adventurers’.4 The veteran Caron was not, however, dismayed. He knew the advantages of the union to the Dutch Company, and he required the help of the English navy in a possible war with the Spaniards. He proposed that each Company should put £1,100,000 or £1,200,000 into the Stock.1 The Company's reasons for its refusal to unite were clear. They could derive no advantage from the union. The special place for which the English strove did not yield sufficient to counteract the excessive charges; they suspected the designs of the Dutch, whom they accused of endeavouring to draw the English Company to participate in their charges in the Indies against the Spaniards and the Portuguese, and so 'to help themselves out of the gain made by the English'. Nor were they afraid of the Spaniards of the East. They thought that 'in time they will eat him out of that trade, only by underselling him in all parts of Christendom'. Accordingly, 'finding the resolution of the Hollanders to keep the English away where they can, by forts, ships, or soldiers', it was thought fit to return no answer to Caron's proposal.2 The Company acted very prudently on this occasion. They saw the inevitable drawbacks of the union of a weaker with a powerful body, and instinctively shrank from the desired combination. Meanwhile, the rivalry in the East had not ceased. At whichever of these islands the English went they were 'beaten away' by superior force, and the natives threatened 'with the loss of their heads if they dealt with the English'.3

The commercial rivalry in the East had developed into an armed struggle. In 1617 the complaints against the Dutch became incessant. From almost every factory in the East the same account is repeated. 'The Flemings thunder it most terrible in these parts,' wrote the President of the English factors in January. 'Their untruths are daily more discovered, and they are rather feared than respected by their brutal carriage,' wrote another factor. A third factor declared that 'the Hollanders are mortal enemies to the English in their trade'. Poulaway was reduced by the Dutch, and the heroic Courthope was struggling against overwhelming odds. By 1620 eleven laden English sail had been captured by the Dutch, while the English Company had only taken the Black Lion, worth 71,000 ryals. Almost all the captured English ships were laden with goods and bullion.1

It would be tedious to go through the complaints of every English factor in the East Indies. They are universal, and the letters and dispatches of the period teem with references to the ‘bloody’, ‘insolent’, ‘cruel’, ‘ungrateful’ Hollanders.2 The Company was obliged to draw the attention of the King to this state of affairs, and drew up two sets of complaints.3 In these documents the Company complained of ‘the efforts of Hollanders to dispossess them by force’ of many places in the East Indies; of their most outrageous behaviour, as any mortal enemies could do; of the unjust seizure of the Company’s ships, ‘and keeping their men prisoners in irons’, and declaring they will take from the English all the trade in the East Indies.4 The negotiations with the Dutch Commissioners were several times broken off. On one occasion the Lords, taken by surprise at the Dutch deputies’ preparations for departure, professedly entreated Caron to stay them; but the King directed for answer that if they will be wilful to go, it was their own fault, and His Majesty would not stay them. There were loud complaints on both sides.5 James I seems at this time to have been dominated by his ruling passion, that of peace. It was utterly distasteful to him that two Protestant powers should haggle over points, the importance of which he did not know at the time. He therefore urged upon the Company the expediency of arriving at a settlement with the Dutch Commissioners. His Majesty expressed his determination to effect it, and to be ‘no more partial to either side than if they were both of his own subjects’.1 This was, no doubt, a lofty ideal, and would have been worthy of imitation if either party had conformed to it. There is ample evidence to convince us that neither party did. At a meeting held on 21st May, the Committee of the East India Company were of the opinion that ‘this treaty was but a colour to give time to work all the insupportable wrongs against them, and therefore fit to press it home unto His Majesty’.2

The main points of difference between the two Companies were the maintenance of forts and the division of spices in the East India islands. The article of the contemplated treaty stipulated that the existing fortifications should remain in the hands of the original owners. This was disliked by the Company on the ground that ‘having one fort at Pooloroon, the Company conclude that they should demand the right to build others at Ternate, Motir, and Poolaway’.3 The Company knew that their safety depended ultimately upon their forts in the islands, and that if they allowed the Dutch to keep more than four times the number of their forts, they would be overwhelmed in a short time.

Another question that gave some trouble was the division of the spices. The Company accepted the share allotted them by the Dutch.4 Nor did they object to pay for the defence of the islands out of a fund to be raised by a duty on exports. The treaty provided for the maintenance of a combined English and Dutch fleet, consisting of four representatives from each Company. The King’s eagerness to conclude an agreement could not be repressed by the English Company’s protests, and the Company at length referred the vexed question of fortifications to James. The King’s decision was not delayed long. ‘He dissolved the difficulties of the East India business and by his own wisdom and authority brought them to accord.’5 The States-General were delighted. They said ‘how honourable and just the King was, and all honour and thanks was by them wholly ascribed to His Majesty’.1 The impartiality shown by James, and praised by the Venetian ambassador,2 had a very unhappy effect on the Company’s fortunes in the East. While the States applauded him and while he himself posed as a peacemaker who had conferred peace on the three kingdoms,3 the English statesmen and the English Company were of a different mind. Chamberlain acknowledged that ‘things are passed as the others would have it, which makes the world suspect that they (the Dutch) have found great friends, and make much use of their wicked mammon’.4 Carleton himself admitted that the treaty might have been more advantageous to us ‘in point of fortifications’, but, he added, ‘these are stiff not to quit the prize’.5

Another design of the Dutch had fortunately been frustrated by the shrewd common sense of the English Company. They had asked for the union, not only of the East Indies, but also of the Virginia Company, as early as 1610.6 Their aims were clear. By uniting with the English Companies they would be able to partake of a share in the English plantations, and to hold complete sway in the Eastern seas. They could, moreover, ask James for help against Spain in their impending war against the latter. Caron now again brought forward the proposal, and asked for a meeting of Commissioners on both parts to treat of the settling a Joint Stock between the two Companies.7 The King, as usual, favoured the idea.8 The Company was in a very difficult position. They could not refuse the King’s request without incurring his displeasure. Nor could they commit suicide by uniting with an unprofitable undertaking. Roe strongly advised the Company ‘never to join Stock with the Dutch to profit and loss, for their garrisons, charges, and losses by negligence would’, he said, ‘engage the English Company to bear part of their follies for no profit’. His representation to ‘Mr. Secretary and some of the Lords’ had the desired effect, and the project dropped. James I’s policy towards the East India Company illustrates in a special manner the effect exercised by the Anglo-Dutch struggle in the East. The quarrel between the English and Dutch Companies is treated by him merely as a dispute between two private Companies, who were foolish enough to disturb the peace. The representations of Carleton to the States-General are cautiously worded, and there is no sign of the treatment of the quarrel as a matter of State. James was genuinely desirous of removing all grievances, and used his authority so impartially as to decide all questions in 1619 ‘absolutely in favour of the Dutch’. Of the real nature of the dispute he seemed to be totally unconscious.

After the conclusion of the treaty we notice, however, a distinct change. A series of battles in the East Indies convinced him of the hollowness of the ground on which he was treading. It was not by ejaculating pious expressions in his Peacemaker,1 but by maintaining the privileges of the English merchants in the East Indies by force of arms, and employing all the resources of the State against the most serious commercial rivals in the East, that he could represent the nation. The rivalry in the East had not ceased in the meanwhile. The Dutch had been defeated in a ‘cruell bloody fight’ in 1619. In October the English squadron in Sumatra met with a serious defeat.2 The great Dutch Governor-General, Coen, made the expulsion of the English from the islands the corner-stone of his policy. He advised his successor ‘not to trust the English and French any more than open enemies, and give no way to the shortening of sovereignty. Everything ought to be done to obtain prerogative over the English.’3

Commerce now becomes the prize for which wars are waged and colonies planted. It was this intense rivalry with the Dutch in the East Indies that helps to explain not only the economic writings but also the foreign policy of the period. All the economists of the period were eminently practical, and were connected either directly or indirectly with commerce. This applies to Mun, Roberts, Robinson, Malynes, Digges, Raleigh, and a host of other writers. It seemed imperative to them that the State should carry out its policy in accordance with the material interests of the people by giving increased support to their claims. These representations seem to have had no effect on James I till 1619. After that date, we notice a very remarkable change. The discontent of the merchants had not been removed, and there were loud complaints of the treaty. The King was obliged to assure 'the Company that he esteems the East India Company a great ornament and strength unto his kingdom, whom he hath and will maintain'. More significant still were the following words :—' He doubted not to procure them in some convenient time their own desires in the Indies, which if the Dutch should deny, that quarrel should be no longer the Company's but of the State, and that if the Dutch hold not good correspondency with his subjects beyond the Line, he will not hold any with them here.'1 James had at length become conscious of the difficult situation in which the Company had been placed through his lack of support. Unless he was able to adopt the cause of the Company as the cause of the State, and to render effectual aid to the Company in all its quarrels with the Dutch, the dissolution of the Company was certain. Hence this modification of his original policy. The increasing bitterness engendered by the rivalry in the East led to increased support of the East India Company on the part of the Crown.

The treaty of 1619 was to remain in force twenty years, but in less than twenty months both English and Dutch were compelled to open fresh negotiations. The same disputes continued to arise between the two Companies, and the same complaints were made by the English Company. The causes of the quarrel would have been foreseen by any capable negotiator. The English Company had promised to maintain ten ships in the Spice Islands, and their neglect to maintain them was a breach of the treaty. There were other causes. The Dutch charged the English Company with refusal to pay their part of the charges in keeping soldiers there. The Company’s factors alleged, however, that the object of the Dutch was to impose such heavy charges upon the English as would ultimately compel them to relinquish their trade in the Spice Islands, and that then the Dutch would remain the sole European masters of this most remunerative commerce.

The negotiations of 1622 were as tedious as those of 1619. The English and Dutch Commissioners held many conferences, but the ‘wayward proceedings’ of the Commissioners made most of the Lords careless to meet, and the negotiations were broken off more than once.1 An intercepted letter of the Spanish Ambassador to Gondomar tells us that the ‘controversy between the English and the Dutch concerning their business increases daily, and were it not that the King favours the rebels to the prejudice of his own subjects, the treaty would have been broken, for they have proclaimed there that they have no greater enemies than the Dutch’.2 ‘Scandalous words’ passed between the merchants on both sides, and on one occasion the papers laid before the Lords Commissioners were torn up. Calvert told Carleton that the Dutch had with much art made many offers, varied and gilded over, and ‘because we will not swallow the gudgeon they grow angry’. The Lords Commissioners believed that the Dutch had no intention to come to any reasonable terms. After the lapse of about a month, points of accommodation were again debated, and the negotiations renewed. The most important of the points that required settlement was the règlement of trade in the East. This was really the crux of the situation, and was the subject of the Company’s petitions to the Crown throughout the century.3 Its settlement would have prevented most of the subsequent quarrels. The Lords Commissioners had pointed out that this was the most important point, and that if it were settled both Companies might be made happy enough. In their Second Report they again pointed out the necessity of this.4 The King, however, was of a different mind. In spite of the advice of the Commissioners, he granted the Dutch a private audience and recommended the Lords Commissioners ‘to keep themselves to the treaty, and not give way to any novelty’.1 Hence, the most important point was left over by the Commissioners, who stated that ‘as the King commanded, to keep themselves to the treaty and not give way to any novelty, so they think the point touching règlement, which merely concerns trade, may as well be agreed upon amongst the merchants themselves’. A treaty was at length signed in January, 1623.2 It was as worthless as that of 1619. John Chamberlain echoed the universal complaint when he asserted that ‘whatever they are, our East India Company will never be the better for them’.3 James’s treatment of the East India Company can hardly be reconciled with his promises. It was due in a great measure to the complications on the continent. The treaties between England and the United Provinces then fighting against the Spanish dominion no doubt greatly influenced the King in his dealings with the States-General and the two Companies.4 This was only a phase of the situation, but it showed the dangers of dependence upon the promises of James. The Massacre of Amboyna was, however, too terrible a calamity to be lightly passed over. It produced immediate effect. The King’s eyes were opened to the serious nature of that event, and we find the clearest expression of his indignation in his dispatches to the Ambassador at the Hague. The negotiations that ensued are interesting, as they enable us to explain the strange proposals of the King to partition the United Provinces.

The acute commercial rivalry between the two countries was nowhere better displayed than at Amboyna, and the King’s foreign policy underwent considerable modification. He proposed to partition the United Provinces, and the Spanish Ambassador sent a series of dispatches on the project. Dr. Gardiner has supplied us with valuable extracts from those dispatches,5 but he has failed to account for this aberration of James. Really it was due to the clamours aroused by the English merchants. The massacre produced a deep impression.1 Carleton made vigorous protests to the States, and demanded immediate satisfaction for the injuries done to the East India Company. James's conduct was admirable throughout. He lent all his support to the representations of the Company; promised to exact damages from the Dutch, and to seize the Dutch ships in the Narrow Seas. The whole volume of documents, calendared by Sainsbury,2 shows clearly the change that had been brought about in the King's policy. The commercial rivalry in the East had now developed into an armed conflict. Mr. Secretary told the East India Company that 'the King's present force in the Narrow Seas was small; that the Dutch were strong and resolute to fight, and for setting out any present force, the King wanted money, but that he intended to arm both by sea and land, and was resolved to buoy up the reputation of the Kingdom, and in the doing of that would have the means to right all '.3

The whole volume of Calendars (1622–4) shows the overwhelming effect produced by these events. The Court Minutes of the period show the various stages through which the proposal to 'make this a business of the State' passed. They show, moreover, the main thing that the merchants desired. Again and again we find the merchants saying 'that unless protected they must leave the trade '.4 James's policy in 1624 is in curious contrast with his policy in 1619. Then he desired the composition of these disputes, and the union of the two Companies. Now, in 1624, he is ready to back the Company by arming 'both by sea and land'. It is nothing else but a recognition of the claims of the East India merchants and the carrying out of that policy which had been recommended by a number of economists. The East India trade, therefore, plays a new rôle. As foreign trade was regarded as the chief means of obtaining the treasure and as the East India trade was regarded (by Mun and others) as the ‘Principal Instrument’ whereby the foreign trade could be obtained, the East India trade becomes the principal cause of the seventeenth-century mercantilism. The State is now conceived as the chief agency by which the protection of the merchants’ interests may be effected. James I descends from his lofty heights, and agrees to adopt ‘their business as the business of the State’, and foreign policy is regulated in accordance with the wishes of the merchants. Hence, the importance of the East India trade for a right understanding of the economic and foreign policies of the Government in the seventeenth century.

It is instructive to contrast the policy of Charles I with that of James. While the latter was genuinely anxious for the progress of the East India Company and rendered considerable help towards the end of his reign, the former utilized the misfortunes of the Company for his own benefit. Though, on the representation of the East India Company, three Dutch ships from Surat was stayed by Charles at Portsmouth,1 they were unexpectedly released, and the Company justly characterized it as a ‘discouragement to their trade’.2 The reason given by the King for their release did not satisfy the Company, and they justly suspected Charles of sacrificing their interests for his own benefit. This was proved by Charles’s reply to a letter from Josias de Vosherghen, the Resident and Councillor of Denmark, about the business. In this the King promised to release the Dutch ships in case the Resident came to an agreement with the Dutch Company to raise money on certain jewels equivalent to the arrested goods.3 Subsequently he obtained three tons of gold for the release of the Dutch ships.4

The Company’s petition to the Privy Council on this subject was remarkably candid. It referred to the promises of support made to the Company and went on to state the grounds on which it was obliged to asked for the support of the King. The attempts of the committees of the Company to raise a stock of £600,000 to be adventured in four years, or £150,000 for one year, were fruitless. The discouragements of the Company were increased daily by reports given out by the ‘Hollanders that the ships have been released for money given underhand, concerning which 3 tons of gold have flowen’.1 The petition brings out the low state into which the Company had fallen, mainly through the conduct of Charles. The negotiations in reference to the Amboyna massacre slowly drag their course in the documents of the time.2

Charles I’s accession had not improved the prospects. While James had manifested considerable theoretical interest in the fortunes of the Company and had negotiated on its behalf, Charles I utilized the negotiations in his own interests, created a rival body with coequal powers, and ensured its complete decline by pursuing the fitful, vacillating policy which was ultimately to prove his own ruin. As we have seen, the ships arrested by him, on the representation of the English Company, were returned to the Dutch, on receiving a bribe of three tons of gold.3 The Bewinthebbers gave out that they had ‘already obtained a grant of their release on condition to redeem His Majesty’s Jewels’.4 The Company were quite justified in regarding him as ‘a great discouragement’ to their trade.5 Nor could his requests for the loan of £10,000 from the Company be complied with. The Company might cheerfully grant more than double that to Charles II. It was not prepared to lend the father even half that amount.6

Nor was Charles bound by the Charter which had been granted by James. As early as 1630 Captain Quail had been sent to the Red Sea to capture the ships and goods of Spaniards. On the strength of this authority, he made prize of a Malabar junk. As the Company had granted passes to the ship it was held liable for the outrage.7 Endymion Porter, the courtier and favourite, taking advantage of the licence to Quail, obtained a licence to fit out two ships as privateers. The funds necessary were obtained by taking certain London merchants into partnership, amongst whom were Kynaston and Bonnell. The latter was closely connected with Courteen, one of the prominent capitalists of the period. The venture developed into a Company, invested with considerable powers, and patronized by the King. Charles himself held stock to the extent of £10,000.1 Courteen provided £120,000,2 the Earl of Shrewsbury adventured £2,500, and Sir Paul Pindar £36,000.3 The successes of these voyages emboldened the adventurers, and they now wanted the grant of such privileges as would place their undertaking on a more permanent basis. The King acceded to their request, and authorized the adventurers to Goa and other parts to trade at all places in India where the Company had not settled factories prior to 12th December 1635.4 Charles justified the permission on the ground that the East India Company had 'neglected to plant and settle trade in those parts, and had made no fortifications to encourage any in future times to adventure thither, contrary to the practice of the Dutch and Portuguese '.5 But these mistakes could not be repaired by the creation of a rival Company, with equal powers, and greater financial support. The King did not make his position quite clear to either of the rivals, though he assured the old Company that no hindrance was intended to the Company's trade, and that ships would not go near the Company's factories, but were meant only for a voyage of discovery.6

The Company can surely be excused if it placed little faith in the King's promise. He ignored the Company's protests, released Kynaston, when the latter was prosecuted in the Admiralty Court by the East India Company, and expressly ordered the Company to send out directions that their servants were not to trade at Bhatkal or at any other place where Courteen and his associates had settled factories.7 He ought either to have suppressed the old Company, after giving it three years' notice, or to have prohibited the formation of a rival Company. He did neither, and instead of pursuing a clear policy, he played a part which made him a just object of suspicion to both parties. The existence of two English Companies, each vested with great privileges, and each competing with the other, could lead only to one thing—the expulsion of the English from Asia. The King was probably not aware of the danger. His support of the new Company encouraged them in their efforts, and ensured them financial support among the influential men of the day. Yet the old Company had to pay for the piracies they committed in the Indian Ocean, and, as the Indian Government could hardly distinguish between the two English Companies, the former held the Company responsible for the damages sustained by their subjects, imprisoned their factors, and confiscated their goods. Nor were the Dutch idle. They tightened their grasp on commerce, captured several ships of the new association, and consolidated their former gains.1

The King was at last aroused to the gravity of the situation, and appointed a strong committee of the Privy Council to discuss the question. The opponents of the old Company attributed the decline in the trade to the mismanagement of the Company, advocated the plantation ‘of Colonies in India after the Dutch model’, and desired a Regulated rather than a Joint-Stock system. The chief profits, it was asserted, ‘were taken up by some of the merchants, while the rest suffered more’.2 The opponents agreed, however, upon the importance of the East India trade. The trade, says a writer, had continued for 35 years, and had profoundly modified the commerce of Europe; for whereas formerly England received East India commodities from the Mediterranean, the reverse was now the case.3 If this trade were deserted, it would enrich the Hollanders, and make them ‘very proud neighbours’.4 Nor could the trade be thrown open, for no individual could afford the expense of sending out a ship and awaiting its return.5 The only way out of the difficulty was the disavowal of the interlopers, combined with the active support of the East India Company by the King. This had been suggested by the writer of a memorandum on the East India trade.1 Nor did the intended plantations of Madagascar and Mauritius tend to end the dispute.2

The Committee presented its report in December, 1639.3 The King, at last, threw over Courteen's Association; promised to revoke all the patents granted to it; to negotiate with the Dutch with regard to the reparation claimed by the Company; and, finally, to renew the Company's Charter as soon as a sufficient sum was subscribed.4

All these causes combined to make its position extremely difficult. The growth of the Company's trade up to 1624 has been traced above. From 1624 till the grant of a new Charter by the Protector, the Company was harassed by a series of misfortunes.

The competition of a rival Company, the lack of Charles's support, the divisions amongst the shareholders and the Civil War, all combined to reduce it to an extremely low condition. We get, in 1629, a valuable account of the Company's affairs in its Answer to Smethwick.5 It appears that since their new Joint Stock the Company had sent out fifty-seven ships, containing 26,690 tons, besides eighteen pinnaces to be worn out by trading from port to port in the Indies. For relading these ships they sent in money and goods £1,145,442, and there had been raised in the Indies £289,643, in all £1,435,085. Again, the Company proved that 'a few months before', or about 1628, they had in Jacatra £1,100,000 ryals of 8, which, besides the stock sent afterwards, would have laded home 15 of their greatest ships and yielded here at least £1,100,000. Yet the difficulties they had to face were enormous. Their factors in the East could never employ more than 150,000 ryals in a year, owing to the siege of Bantam by the Dutch; their fort and house at Lagundy were so unhealthy that the Company were obliged to abandon them after the loss of 120 men; their house and warehouse at Batavia had cost 40,000 ryals. Moreover, the generality had not paid in above £40,000 per annum, whereas in former years they paid in £200,000 per annum. Consequently they had not only been forced to continue great sums at interest, but their credit failing upon the Company's seal, they had been forced to supply on their particular credit and bonds £80,000, whereby they were in debt £70,000 more than they had in England to pay. Their debt at interest in June 1628 was £230,000. In March 1629 it had increased to £300,000.1 They had, moreover, £20,000 per annum interest to pay. Their Stock had fallen 20 per cent., and was not then worth more than £80.2 During 1625–9 twenty-eight ships were laden by the East India Company and arrived in the East Indies. The Company built and purchased twelve ships to replace those which had been lost or laid up as unserviceable.3

The position of their factors was becoming intolerable. At Bantam the English were for a long time debarred from trade by the Dutch; at Batavia they had to spend 40,000 ryals in buying a house and building warehouses, which were afterwards ransacked, pulled down, and fired by the Dutch. They were also compelled to buy pepper and commodities at exorbitant prices.4

The Company's factors were insulted not only by the Dutch, but also by the Indian rulers. At Masulipatam the English factors protested against the conduct of the Indian Governor, and were eventually obliged to leave that place, and take all their goods with them.5 At Surat the Company's factors were all imprisoned in irons 'to be the shameful subjects of daily threats, revilings, scorns and disdainful derisions of whole rabbles of people '.6

It is not therefore surprising that the Company, harassed by so many misfortunes, resolved to dissolve itself. Charles told them that if they would go on stoutly, like honest and worthy merchants, he would leave nothing undone that might encourage and countenance them. So they resolved to proceed in their trade, and thereupon ordered that six stout ships be prepared, richly laden, to be set forth with all expedition.1

There is only one gleam that relieves the all-pervading gloom. The representations of the Company's factors in Persia had the effect of turning the attention of the Company to trade in that country, and of inducing many members to underwrite for large sums of money to furnish ships for voyages thither. The Shah's firmaund and contracts for silk, for which the Company were to deliver three parts in merchandise and one part in money, were the chief inducements to undertake these voyages.2 It was resolved, moreover, that the ships should trade at Surat and Bantam, as well as in Persia. The total subscriptions for the new Stock amounted to £125,000.3

The hopes of the Company were at this time directed to Persia, where a profitable trade in silks had been promised. The Company devoted its energies to encouraging this great industry, and spent large sums in fitting out voyages to develop the trade. Altogether three voyages were fitted out. The profits reaped were sufficiently high to attract many of the shareholders of the Company's old Stock. But the two had no necessary connexion, and consequently the accounts of the voyages and the old Stock were separate. This involved such a confusion of accounts that at last it was resolved to turn over these voyages to the Third Joint Stock. Their valuation led to increased discussion and consequent weakness. At last, however, it was resolved to value the first Persian voyage at £160, the second at £180, and the third at £140 per cent. Moreover, as the adventurers in the first had already received their principal and £40 per cent, profit, and in the second their principal and £50 per cent. profit, the third was ordered to receive its principal, while the remains and profits of the said voyages were for the first £20 per cent., for the second £30 per cent., and £40 per cent. for the third.4

During the years 1629–35 the Company employed thirty-six ships to carry on their trade. Thirty-one ships arrived in the East Indies between 1629–34. Nine of the Company's vessels on their return to England were valued at £543,000. The principal lading of six of them was pepper, cloves, and indigo, valued at £303,000. The silk contract with the Shah had resulted in large imports of that article.1 Some light is thrown on the transactions of the Company by the following entry:—'After large debate and many arguments delivered on both sides, it was concluded to sell the whole of the pepper,' worth £150,000, 'to Daniel Harvey for transportation at 15½d. per lb. at 5, 6 months' time from the 1st November.' 2

Another source of trouble to the Company was the increased demand for customs. A fresh 'book of rates' had been issued in July 1635, and came into force at the beginning of November 1636. In this new schedule the rateable price of pepper was trebled, although pepper had largely fallen in value. Its rateable price was advanced from 1s. 8d. to 5s. a lb., whereby the duty, being charged ad valorem, was raised from one penny to three-pence, while the selling price had fallen from 2s. 6d. to 1s. 1d., from which, deducting 6d. for freight and charges, there remained only 7d. as the net price, and only 4d., after deducting the duty of 3d., which thus appears to have been 75 per cent. of the real price.3 A vigorous protest made to the Privy Council had no effect. To these losses must be added that caused to the Company by the Pepper Contract. This has been misrepresented by several historians. But, as Foster points out,4 the transaction was perfectly valid, and the loan was granted on good security. The King bought 607,522 lb. of pepper for £63,283. 11s. 1d., upon the security of Cottington, Pindar, and others. This was to be discharged by payments of £14,000 at intervals of six months. The pepper, when sold, realized only £50,626. 17s. 1d. Against this must be reckoned the interest which would have had to be paid for a loan of equal amount, and the net loss to the King on this transaction was, therefore, only £6,581. 0s. 10d. This was equivalent to borrowing the cash at about 17 per cent. It was really a good stroke of business. The security was ample, and the Company could prosecute the guarantors if the King refused to pay the amount. Only a small portion of the amount was, however, actually repaid, and the Company had to bear considerable loss.

The East India trade received a great impetus by the decision of Charles to support it, though there is no reason to suppose that he completely severed his connexion with Courteen’s Association. Even so, the Order in Council dated 10th December 1639 heartened the Company, and it tried to raise a new subscription. But owing to many discouragements, the flotation of a new Stock was hopeless. The outbreak of the Civil War rendered all charters conferred by the King liable to suspicion, nor was there any guarantee that these privileges would be respected. The Committees, therefore, fell back upon the plan of Particular Voyages, for little more than a year, on a separate subscription.1 The response was not satisfactory, for the first list totalled only £65,000. Further subscriptions raised the sum to £80,450.2 The Third Joint Stock was brought to a close on 14th October 1642. The remains were valued at 25 per cent. of the capital, apart from the amount which was hoped for from the Dutch, which would, if received, suffice to pay 12½ per cent. more. Adventurers were allowed to leave their division to form part of the capital of a new Fourth Stock, to which they might contribute any further sums they desired.3 The response was fairly satisfactory.

There is a discrepancy between the total announced by the Governor on 28th August 1645 and that given by Jeremy Sambrooke.4 The former placed it at £105,000, while the latter computed it at £104,540. The sum can hardly be regarded as satisfactory.

The years 1644–9 did not bring a return of prosperity. Courteen’s Association was actively pursuing its rivalry with the older body. There were, moreover, other adventurers who traded on their own account. All that the Company could do was to launch another general voyage. The appeal met with a liberal response. The total amount actually received seems to have been £141,200.5 Among the prominent subscribers we come across the familiar names of Maurice Thomson, Martin Noell, Andrews, and Blackman.

The decay of the Company's trade during the period 1624–54 is the theme of a number of petitions to Parliament. A comparison of its trade in 1617 with that in 1643 will bring out prominently the low condition into which the Company had fallen. We catch a glimpse of the real difficulties by which it was surrounded in a series of papers in an Appendix to the Report of the Historical MSS. Commission.1 The author states that the Company were resolved to divide and leave the trade. ‘It is certain, as it is managed, it is a trade of loss to particular adventurers, and merchants will not prosecute a losing voyage.’2 It is evident that the Company were quite in earnest when they declared their readiness to dissolve (‘They dare not profess to dissolve, being fearful to offend His Majesty’). As regards the suggestion that the trade can be managed without a Joint Stock, the writer points out forcibly the disastrous consequence that would ensue. Another drawback from which the Company suffered was the existence of ‘a rooted faction among them’. The existence of this faction is evidenced by a succession of disputes with the fantastic individual Smethwick.3

It was evident in face of such difficulties that the trade could hardly be carried on by the Company. It had tried to secure an ordinance from the Houses whereby exclusive trade would be guaranteed by Parliament. It is remarkable that the democratic House of Commons granted the request. On 5th December 1646,4 it granted the Company exclusive trade in the regions extending from the Cape to Japan, provided that its membership remained open to any one willing to pay £5 for the privilege. Courteen and his partners were to withdraw their ships and goods within three years. An Act of Parliament was to be passed in due course to confirm the Company's privileges; and a new subscription was to be opened for continuing the trade. The Ordinance was, however, rejected by the Lords on 16th March 1647.5 The Company was extremely disappointed. The Governor thought that it would be best to draw home their factors and goods, for ‘if every one was to be allowed to go to the Indies, depredations would be committed for which the Company would be held responsible by the Authorities there, and great loss would result’.1 Other petitions were sent, but they do not seem to have borne fruit, and the abolition of the House of Lords on 6th February 1649 introduced further complications.2

The main cause of the decline of the Company was the policy of Charles I. Civil war was, no doubt, one of the causes, but its decline was due primarily to the policy of the King himself. The Company was ready to dissolve long before the outbreak of the Civil War, and was persuaded to carry on the trade mainly because it feared ‘His Majesty’s dread’.3 The history of the Company shows the disastrous effects of the inaction of the King. Mainly through his lack of support, the powerful body that was once the wonder and envy of foreigners had been reduced to insignificance.

The history of the Company enables us to appreciate at their due weight the theories of the economists of the period. The merchants desired consistent pursuit of a policy with definite, objective aims. The foreign trade could be maintained only by the protection accorded by the State. The State was called upon to represent them in their dealings with foreign powers, to exclude their rivals from a share in the English and Plantation trades, and to redress their grievances by every means at its disposal. Hence the exaggerated importance which Mun attached to the employment of various devices for the destruction of the Dutch monopoly. The movement originated by Mun was carried on by Robinson.4 The pamphlet throws strong light on the burning questions of the day, and, while advocating many reforms desired by Mun, Misselden, Childe, and others, such as the establishment of a merchants’ court, the permission to import foreign commodities, ‘which we are in need of’, and the institution of a State bank, on the model of the Bank of Amsterdam, it strikes a completely new note. Mun had urged that the East India trade could never be carried on without the support of the Crown. Robinson's merit lies in his logical development of Mun's theories. 'If we suffer them (the Hollanders) to beat us quite out of the Indies, we must not only lose the Trade we drive in other parts with the advance of East India commodities and pay dear for what we spend ourselves, but so soon as they begin to practise, the rest of our trade in the Mediterranean will as fast decline; the Hollanders' cheap freights being able of itself to eat us out in time, without any other stratagem or plot.'1 The reason was that 'the Hollanders' policy of State desires nothing so much as to weary (us) out, and constrain us to abandon it'.2 The State alone could prevent the utter extirpation of the English from the East. 'For proving there (in the East Indies) too weak, it may here be righted by His Majesty. Otherwise, nothing will certainly keep the Hollanders from attempting utter extirpation.' Nor will the opening of the East India trade, as advocated by some, be of any use. For 'if the Hollanders can countermine a whole society, so well settled, so well governed, with so great a Stock, what may be expected from ordinary private merchants? The Hollanders will have so much advantage over them, and they not being otherwise able to make a voyage, at once turn pirates, and prey one another.' Hence, the necessity for a Corporation. 'A Corporation it must be, and a powerful one too, that follows this trade, able to plant Colonies by degrees, and make head in the Indies, if need be, against the Hollanders' encroachments.' 'We must have Colonies established up and down where their shipping may be sure of relief in their distress.' Not only, however, is the conception of the East India trade widened, but the duties of the State as regards commerce are also modified. The Company may prove weak in the East, 'but it may be righted here, by His Majesty'. But this change in the king's policy towards the rivals of England must be accompanied by a change of his attitude towards the East India Company. 'There must be His Majesty's protection of the East India Company, whereby they may regain that trade, and settle another in Persia.' The king must maintain a watchful eye over the Dutch, and threaten war if they refuse to limit their ‘armaments’. ‘England must procure that other States rest content with only such a number of men of war, as may not make us with just cause suspect their strength and force.’ This startling proposal is followed by another equally startling. The East India trade must be made thoroughly national. If merchants cannot be found, ‘then His Majesty and the nation may have a just cause to keep it up, though it were to lose at first; and if all means fail, moneys levied for maintaining it against the Dutch’. The complaint was echoed by Lewes Roberts.1 Roberts defended the exportation of bullion on substantially the same grounds as those stated by Mun, Malynes, and Digges.2 He thought that the decline of the Company was due to the want of timely protection and encouragement from the State. ‘This had reduced them to that bad point and low pressure wherein we observe them to be.’ 3

In Robinson we find the culmination of the movement that had been carried on by Raleigh, Mun, Tobias Gentleman, Malynes, and others.4 He carries out to their logical conclusion the theories propounded by Mun. The East India trade was to be taken over by the State, and carried on for the benefit of the nation. Its commercial rivals were not to be allowed to maintain more than a fixed number of men-of-war, and if they exceeded the number England was to declare war and reduce their ships within proper limits. Again, all the subjects of the king, ‘if wronged there’, ‘were to be righted here by the State’. This idea of the duties of the State was not novel. It had been acted upon by the Dutch, and, to a certain extent, by James I in 1623–4. But Charles I had totally neglected to perform any one of the duties mentioned by Robinson. Mun had combined the foreign trade and the East India trade into an organic whole. Both, however, were dependent upon the State’s support. Hence, in Robinson’s suggestions, the State becomes the apex of the system. It initiates measures, declares war against its commercial rivals, and redresses the grievances of its subjects.

The First Dutch War would, therefore, be inexplicable without a due understanding of the above theories. The merchants desired complete protection from the State, and called upon the latter to redress their grievances by declaring war. Charles I and James I were too weak to carry this policy into effect. Their weakness at home made a vigorous foreign policy impossible. The establishment of the Commonwealth produced a mass of literature on commerce. The victorious Republic, though still an outcast among nations, could not be ignored. It supplied, in an eminent degree, that element which was wanting in the foreign policies of James and Charles I. This element was the element of vigour. Only by the vigorous pursuit of the material interests of the nation could the rights of the English merchants be safeguarded. The economic pamphlets of the times are characterized by the same outlook. The theories of Robinson and Roberts will be quite unintelligible unless the exact condition of the East India trade is rightly understood.

The East India trade between 1640–54 supplied a very useful commentary on the above theories. The competition of Courteen's Association, and later, Assada Merchants, the depredations of the pirates, the raising of the Customs duties, and the factious opposition, had all contributed to depress the trade and the Company. Their debt in 1640 was £250,000 or over, and it was still growing. They could not raise more than £22,500 for their new Joint Stock. Nor were their petitions to Parliament of any avail. The Governor of the Company proposed to inform the King, in 1641, ‘that the discouragements to the Company had so disheartened the Adventurers that the trade is likely to come to a standstill’.1 The enormous increase in private trade arose naturally out of the loosening of the hands of authority. The Charter of the Company had been granted by the King against whom the Parliament was waging a deadly war. The Levellers would dislike its authority.2

Though Courteen's son had lost all his money, and was now a fugitive, his place was taken by a group of West India merchants, headed by Martin Noell and Maurice Thomson.1 As the trade to the East Indies was now practically open, and any adventurous merchant might charter a ship and trade there, the Assada merchants had fully taken advantage of the freedom and had sent several ships. They were, therefore, opposed to the grant of a charter that would prohibit them from venturing on the Indian Ocean, and would empower the East India Company to confiscate their goods. They were, moreover, desirous of establishing plantations at Assada, as that would, in their opinion, provide them with a centre of lucrative commerce with East Africa, Asia, and even America. Moreover, they wanted to extend the sphere of the Company's activity to Guinea, China, and Japan. Nor did they regard the management of the Company as thoroughly satisfactory. 'A Joint Stock has produced neither profit nor encouragement to the Adventurers.' The liberty of trade followed as a corollary from the grant of political liberty 'and they considered that the prohibition was absolutely against the national liberties'.2 They, therefore, advocated 'a free, well regulated trade' rather than a Joint Stock. This advocacy of the freedom of trade was not novel, and as early as the reign of Elizabeth Cecil had denounced those who would take away the Englishman's 'natural right of trade'.3

What was entirely novel, however, was the change in the opinion on commerce in general, and the East India trade in particular. The State now assumes the functions which were exercised with so much success by the central government under Charles II. Nor could Noell have failed to mould Cromwell's opinion on the subject.4 The Company could hardly reject all the proposals put forward by the Assada merchants. Its trade had declined; it had lost many ships in the war; and it had, finally, some of those merchants on its own Committee. It was, however, very suspicious of the ultimate success of the rash projects of Thomson, nor was it convinced that Assada could be made profitable to the adventurers.1 'It desired a settled factory as much as any,' but it rightly pointed out that its successful execution would require money, which it did not possess in abundance. It was prepared, however, to concede the other propositions, and an agreement was therefore arrived at.2

Under this agreement, the amount of stock to be raised was fixed at £300,000, and the question of the form of government for the future Company was left to the decision of the future shareholders. The plantation at Assada was to be proceeded with, while a settled, fortified habitation 'in India was to be established as soon as possible '.3 The amalgamation of the two Companies facilitated the ratification of the agreement by the Parliament, and the Company was secured against further attacks by the resolution of Parliament that 'the East India Trade be carried on by one Company with one Joint Stock, and the management thereof be under a regulation in such a manner as the Parliament shall think fit '.4 Though the subscription to the new Joint Stock did not bring in more than £200,000, it may be regarded as fairly satisfactory. The United Stock thus formed, in 1650, had been heavily subscribed by the Assada merchants, and they claimed a share in the management of the Company.5 It was now decided to appoint two sets of Committees, one for each body. The United Joint Stock chose thirteen of its members. One of them was Thomson.6 Thomson's policy aimed at the complete transformation of the Company into a Regulated Company, planting colonies after the Dutch model, allowing every adventurer who desired to trade in the East, upon payment of a fee, and extending its commerce to Japan, China, and Guinea. He was backed up by many shareholders, and at the General Meeting held on 10th May 1654 considerable diversity of opinion was manifested on the subject. The Thomson party advocated the reorganization of the Company on a broader basis, though the Committee appointed reported in favour of the Joint-Stock system.1 Thomson, however, was not dismayed. The Company's petition to Cromwell, praying him to confirm the Company's charter and to prohibit interloping ships from trading to India, was replied to by the party in a series of petitions to the Council and the Protector.2 His strength lay in the unification of the various grievances, and the utilization of the latter in his own interests. The Leveller, the city merchant excluded from the Company, the Puritan soldier who had fought against the King, would unite in condemning a Company that had been founded on a charter granted by a king, and that excluded every other English merchant from a share in the trade. A regulated trade would, on the other hand, encourage ‘industry and ingenuity, and afford latitude and scope for both, every one having the ordering of his own business’. It would, moreover, increase the number of traders, and would give opportunity to all to adventure their estate at any time. ‘This regulated way of trade will give some advantage over the Dutch, as going at less charge and having more opportunity to improve the industry of the managers in India.’3 It was the Joint-Stock system that was the cause of the decline of trade. The lack of profit, the want of success, and the decay were all due to the exclusive monopoly of the East India Company.

The State was now regarded by both parties as the sole instrument whereby the East India trade could be effectively carried on. Robinson had suggested the nationalization of the East India trade. Under Cromwell the functions assigned to the State are widened. ‘Without the protection and countenance of the State’, says a petition of the East India Company, ‘no man can promise himself safety or profit in the India Trade.’4 This is expressed in the most thoroughgoing manner by a writer of the time. The State was to undertake the management of the East India trade. The writer thought that ‘£200,000 would carry it’. If it was not carried by the State, but by the Company, the result would be that ‘these would serve the nation with what they please, at what price they please, and if they alone be allowed to trade in Spices, they can make what profit they like ’.1 ‘ Without assistance from His Highness and the State, nothing can do any good to the trade.’

This feature is common to nearly all the pamphlets of the period. The State is regarded as the means whereby the wishes of the authors can be realized. Perhaps the new ideas were nowhere better expressed than in Wylde’s tract on the East India trade.2 It is headed a ‘ Remonstrance to the Lord Protector ’. Wylde urges the Protector to apply lex talionis to the Dutch, ‘ whom to turn out of those trades will be but what they have long laboured at, and had even now effected it, had not your Highness beaten them into better manners here at home ’. The Dutch were to be ‘ beaten into better manners ’. This was not all. The Portuguese, too, should be compelled to disgorge some of their ill-gotten wealth in the East. His Highness should acquire a ‘ commodious harbour in India ; and should secure the town of Dieu from the inhabitants thereof ’. The Great Mogul was to be offered an alliance, and he will ‘ willingly embrace an offer of aiding him by sea in his war against ’ the King of Bijapur. Nor should the Molucca and Banda islands be neglected, as the state of the Dutch garrisons there was little better than that of slaves. They would, asserted Wylde, be only too glad to come under Cromwell’s protection. Wylde knew that the East India Company was totally unable to carry such a comprehensive scheme into effect. He therefore urged the Protector to raise a National Stock of a million sterling. All classes were to subscribe to it, and all the counties were to provide their quota. The East Indian commodities were to be allowed entry into the plantations, and ‘ Calicoes, and diverse sorts of stuffs, made in India, and very proper for the hot countries ’, were to be imported into Barbadoes.

This comprehensive scheme was not carried into effect, because the Protector was busy elsewhere. That the remonstrance of Wylde had some effect is evident from the following document : ‘ Having with all respect and thankfulness considered His Highness’s intention to endeavour the settlement of a national interest in India, the East India Company propose, as places most convenient, the town of Bassein, with the port Bone-Bay.'1 Moreover, a letter in Thurloe2 says that the news of the Protector's resolution to dissolve the East India Company 'had produced consternation among the merchants at Amsterdam'.

The Company's answer to its critics was not different, so far as the protection of the State was concerned. Both parties were unanimous upon that point. The decay of trade, which the Thomson party attributed to the Joint-Stock system, was asserted by the Company to be due to the want of that system. The Company claimed that it had steadied the prices and done away with 'cut-throat' competition.3 The results of the open trade had by no means been happy. Cloth, which was bought formerly for 10s., cost 16s. 4d. at the time. The ships of private merchants were competing frantically with one another in the Eastern ports, with the result that they were being forced to sell and buy at whatever rates the Indian merchants demanded.4 A letter from Madras5 says that in 1656 the price of coarse saltpetre in Bengal was more than double that of the refined sort in 1655, owing to the competition of English ships, 'striving to outvy one another both in price and presents'.6 This account is confirmed by the author of Britannia Languens. 'Whilst the trade was open, in the years 54, 55, and 56, our merchants sold the Indian commodities so low that they furnished more parts of Europe then since we have done, nay, Holland and Amsterdam itself.'7 Pollexfen asserted—in 1680—that during the time when the trade was open, the prices of the East India commodities went down considerably.

The Company, therefore, were completely justified in pointing out the consequences of the open trade in the East. They asserted that if the trade were laid open, 'there will be many sellers, all anxious to dispose their merchandise, thereby cheapening the price and raising that of Indian commodities'. Again, if it were not united, it would be ‘subject to the affronts and oppressions of other nations, to which, having to do with fourteen sovereign princes and with the Dutch and Portuguese as competitors, it is very liable’.1 Perhaps the most remarkable defence was that made by ‘Samuel Lamb’ of London.2 The pamphlet is characterized by the breadth of view which is such a distinguishing trait of the period. The writer pleads for many reforms, and is specially enthusiastic in his description of the Dutch banks. He gives many reasons for the successes of the Dutch. The main reason, however, is the policy of their statesmen. Many of them are merchants in present trade, ‘or have been bred so in their minorities’.3 He praises their good customs, ‘their care and their vigilancy’. ‘The chief and considerable way, by which they have wrought themselves what they are, are banks.’ Lamb then discusses the advantages that England would derive from the institution of banks and Merchants’ Courts. This, however, would not remove the Dutch menace. The English merchants must be prepared to strike hard. Otherwise, ‘the studious industry of our neighbours in Holland will soon overbalance us, if not timely prevented’. ‘As the Spaniard aims to get the universal monarchy of Christendom, so the Hollander the universal trade, not only of Christendom, but of all the known world.’4 This was apparent from the condition of the East India Company. The East India Company had employed in that time 15,000 tons of shipping, ‘but they were so decayed, through the undermining of the Dutch, that they had hardly one ship remaining at their giving over’. Hence, the Company ought to be encouraged by the Protector and given a charter. The Joint Stock was the only organization that is suitable for the purpose. In this pamphlet we see how the various causes interacted on one another. ‘The nation which hath most warlike shipping and mariners will command in chief at sea; and he that commands the sea may command in trade; and he that commands the trade will have the most money.’5

The policy of Cromwell has been differently stated. Hunter thought Cromwell took a personal interest in the East India Company. But the information we possess does not justify us in holding this view. He seems to have regarded it as a purely private concern, and he was not inclined to meddle with any private business.1 He was no doubt busy at the time (1651), and the Company’s tactless petitions could hardly be entertained favourably by a stranger. He was a friend of Martin Noell,2 and was no doubt guided by his policy. Noell himself was a busy West Indian merchant, and had taken a leading part in the opposition to the Company.3 He was a determined opponent of the Joint-Stock system, and the Protector no doubt favoured the idea of the establishment of a national interest. The authorities cited above seem to confirm the view. He may well have disliked the monopoly exercised by the Company. He certainly granted commissions to ‘many private ships’ with the consequence, as the Company complained in a petition to the Protector in 1656, ‘that the price of native goods in India had been raised 40 or 50 per cent., while that of English ships had been lowered’.4 There are numbers of references to the licences granted at the time to private merchants in the Calendars of State Papers, Domestic Series. We may conclude, therefore, that the Protector favoured the policy of Noell. His ‘astounding’ proposal to the Dutch Commissioners about the partition of Asia and America has been discussed by Dr. Gardiner.5 It shows that the Protector’s knowledge of those countries was, to say the least, very superficial.

The Company was, however, in a critical situation at the time. Its trade had declined; interlopers were underselling English goods in the East, and carrying on an insecure trade by resorting to questionable devices. The markets were glutted with Eastern commodities and the owners were obliged to send the surplus to continental countries, including Holland, where the cheap rates at which the goods were offered depressed the shares of the Dutch East India Company.6

The Company had made several attempts to obtain a confirmation of their charter from the Protector. There was, however, no sign of the Protector and his Council coming to a decision regarding the trade. At last, on 14th October 1656, the Committees of the United Joint Stock resolved to propose to their shareholders that the Company’s privileges in the East should be sold for £14,000 to ‘some Englishmen’.1 It was decided, however, to make one more effort, and a fresh petition was therefore presented on 20th October. It was referred by the Council to a Committee of eight of their members, with Colonel Philip Jones as chairman. This did not, however, settle the difficulty. The year 1656 wore on, and nothing was accomplished. The Company grew desperate and resolved, at a general meeting held in January 1657, to appoint a sale on 14th February of all their rights and properties in the Indies, and bills were ordered to be set up on the Exchange notifying their intention.2 The threat had the desired effect. Even Noell fell into line with the Company’s policy, and a charter was granted in 1657.3 ‘It confirmed all privileges and immunities granted by James and added fresh ones.’4 Perhaps this is all that we are entitled to say about it, as it was suppressed by the Company immediately after the Restoration. It had, however, one important result. The vexed question of organization that had troubled the Company for more than ten years was at last settled. The Company was granted an exclusive monopoly of the trade in the East and was allowed to fortify and plant in any of its settlements. The grant had immediate effects. The money subscribed for a new stock ‘exceeded all expectation’. The total was £739,782. The amount subscribed shows the increasing popularity of the East India trade. It is, moreover, a testimony to the soundness of the Joint Stock organization in the seventeenth century. The people were not willing to invest considerably in an institution whose existence was threatened either by a domestic or by a foreign rival. The amount proved, however, to be more than the Company could immediately use with any prospect of profit. Consequently, after the first two instalments, aggregating 25 per cent., had been collected, it was decided to reduce the next two payments to 12½ per cent. each; and the rest of the capital was never called in. The capital of the New General Stock was therefore a little under £370,000.1

The Committees of the Company set to work to push the trade with vigour. In December 1657 it was agreed that the lease held by the Guinea Company should be transferred to the East India Company for £1,300. Numerous ships were sent out to the East.2 The Company's sphere of activity was widened. Two English vessels reached Canton in safety, and returned to England in 1659.

This wonderful revival of the East India Company testified to the vigour of the Protector's foreign policy. There is no evidence to prove that he took a personal interest therein. The East India merchants do not seem to have been consulted in the course of his negotiations with the Dutch for peace. They remained in the background. They reaped, however, the benefits that accrued from the Treaty of Westminster, 5th April 1654. The treaty provided, among other things, that the Dutch were to punish those who had been responsible for the Massacre of Amboyna, and that all claims for losses prior to the outbreak of the war were to be referred to a Joint Anglo-Dutch Commission. The English Company's claim for £2,696,000 was no less fantastic than those of the Dutch Company, who claimed £2,920,000. The English Company was ultimately awarded £85,000, and was also given back Pularoon. The Company, however, was obliged to lend £50,000 to the State. On 26th October 1656 it was obliged to lend £10,000 to the Commissioners of Customs. The total amount which the State owed has been calculated by Mr. Foster3 at £46,000. There is no reason to believe that the money was ever repaid.

But the disadvantages of these measures were more than counterbalanced by the vigour of the Protector's foreign policy. The Company had gained what Mun desired. Its most serious rivals had been totally defeated and its trade protected by the State. Cromwell himself did not like the Dutch war,1 yet he was obliged to carry it on for the maintenance of the material interests of the merchants. It was the merchants demanding redress for various grievances against the Dutch, grievances that had been accumulating for over half a century, that compelled him to fight the Dutch to the bitter end. The causes of the rivalry have already been mentioned.2 The war would have been declared long ago, if a vigorous foreign policy had been possible at the time. It is for this reason that Cromwell may be called the founder of the mercantile system. It is this intimate connexion of the foreign policy of the Protector with, and its effect on, the maintenance of the East India trade that is so characteristic of the Cromwellian period. The Protector himself may not have been conscious of this.3 He certainly disliked the Dutch because they preferred commercial advantages. Yet the bold outline of his policy is quite clear. By employing the total resources of a vigorous State against the Dutch in the interests of commerce and navigation, it facilitated the Protectionism of Charles II and the Colbertism of the Whigs.4

Notes

  1. 1. This sketch of the East India trade is confined mainly to the commerce carried on by England with the East Indies. Barbosa, De Laet, Faria y Sousa, Maffeius, Major, Monserrate, Pyrard, Father Hosten, Maclagan, Yule, Varthema, Bernier, Sewell, Della Valle, Hawkins, Peter Mundy, Roe, Coryat, and John Marshall are known to all students of seventeenth century Indian history, and the writer has derived considerable help from the priceless information contained in their writings ; but his object in writing this essay is not so much to sketch the organization of Indian industry as to trace the course of English commerce with India, and estimate its effect on the economic and foreign policy of England. Hence, these writers occupy only a subordinate place in the development of this essay.
  2. 2. Monson's Naval Tracts, printed in Churchill's Collection of Voyages, vol. iii, p. 408.
  3. 1. Weare's Cabot's Discovery of North America, pp. 144–50.
  4. 2. Narratives of Voyages, by Rundell; Sainsbury, vol. i, Introduction i–xxxiv, passim; The Three Voyages of Frobisher, by Collinson.
  5. 3. History, vol. i, p. 236.
  6. 4. Bruce, vol. i, pp. 136–9; Shaw's Collection of Charters granted to the East India Company; Letter Book, pp. 163, 189; Anderson's Annals of Commerce, vol. ii, pp. 196–7; Sainsbury, vol. i, pp. 115–18.
  7. 5. Shaw, Charters granted to East India Company, pp. 1–26.
  8. 6. Sainsbury, vol. i, no. 258; Bruce, vol. ii, pp. 112–13.
  9. 1. Constitution and Finances of the Joint Stock Companies, pp. 96–7.
  10. 2. London's Lord Have Mercy Upon Us, in Somers' Tracts, vol. vii, p. 54.
  11. 3. Sambrooke's Report on the Progress of the East India Trade, printed in Sainsbury, vol. ix, pp. 360–3.
  12. 4. In Sainsbury, ib.
  13. 5. Court Book, vol. ii, 27th February 1607.
  14. 1. There is not a single exhaustive treatise in English on the subject. George Edmundson’s article on the subject (Cambridge Modern History, vol. v, pp. 510–14) is very valuable, but it does not give us sufficient information. Motley’s United Netherlands contains acute remarks on the subject, and is indispensable (vol. iii, p. 652; vol. iv, pp. 148–51). Hunter’s History of British India (vol. i) has a valuable chapter on the subject. Professor Egerton’s chapter in the Cambridge Modern History (vol. v, chap. xxv, pp. 729–46) is useful and accurate. The most trustworthy information is, however, to be sought in the dispatches of the factors and Court Minutes of the English Company.
  15. 2. Sainsbury, vol. i, no. 440; Court Minutes, Book II. 125–7; Shaw, Charters, &c., pp. 27–53.
  16. 1. It is instructive to compare the amount given by Dudley Digges in his Defence of Trade, pp. 43–4, with those in Mun, vol. v, pp. 276–7.
  17. 2. George Edmundson, op. cit.; Sainsbury, vol. ii, nos. 268, 463, 666; vol. iii, nos. 156, 267, 370; Bruce, vol. i, p. 155. The figures given by Mun have been verified by comparison with those in Sainsbury.
  18. 3. Brit. Mus. 509. h. 4, 1686, pp. 53, 54.
  19. 4. Ib. 522. m. 20, 1700, pp. 18–24.
  20. 5. Ib. 509. h. 4, p. 54.
  21. 1. Dudley Digges, op. cit., p. 44.
  22. 2. Malynes, op. cit., p. 54.
  23. 3. Mun, Discourse of Trade, Purchas, vol. v, pp. 268–9.
  24. 1. Digges, p. 43. Later on the Company, to avoid seizure of its merchandise by the State, sold its pepper at Genoa, and other Italian towns. See below. Sainsbury, vols. vii, viii, passim.
  25. 2. Venetian Calendar, 1613-15, p. 160. Compare Piero Contarini's dispatch, in volume dealing with 1617-19. The number of articles desired by Chamberlain was seventy. The list in Macpherson, vol. ii, p. 131, is large enough. Compare p. 106. Mun's list is by far the most accurate and concise, pp. 265-6. Sainsbury, vols. i-v, passim. The references to spices in the Court Minutes, &c., are so frequent that I have deliberately left them unnoticed. It would have considerably increased the bulk of this essay. Only the most important are given below.
  26. 3. See below.
  27. 1. Mun, p. 266.
  28. 2. Ib.
  29. 3. The first mention of the name in the East India Company’s records occurs under date August 1602 : ‘Book Calicoes, bought in certain Junks near Socotra at 4s. a piece. They are worth here at 12s. a piece’ : Sainsbury, vol. i, nos. 309, pp. 135, 271. ‘Inquiry to be made how Calicoes and Pinlathoes will sell in England, that directions may be given to factors in the East Indies to buy and send them over’ : p. 317. ‘Indigo, Calicoes, &c., the Chief Commodities in Surat’ : ib., p. 328, nos. 776, 792 ; vol. ii, p. 73, nos. 88, 608, 750 ; Mun, op. cit., pp. 265–80. Sainsbury’s Court Minutes, vols. vi to x, show the increasing popularity of the calicoes. There was a reduction in demand owing to the Civil War, the Interlopers, and the famine in India in 1630. After 1657 we find a noticeable change.
  30. 4. Mun, op. cit., p. 272.
  31. 5. Court Minutes, 22–25th Sept. 1619, Book IV ; Sainsbury, vol. ii, pp. 155–9. A very accurate account of the Persian trade.
  32. 1. Sainsbury, vol. ii, p. 156.
  33. 2. Foster, op. cit. ; Sainsbury, vol. i, nos. 840–2, 859, 865, 921, 922 ; vol. ii, pp. 44, 45, 55, 57, nos. 403, &c. ; Mun, op. cit., p. 269.
  34. 3. Lex Mercatoria, p. 54.
  35. 4. Ib., p. 54.
  36. 1. Sainsbury, vol. iv, nos. 10, 12, 18, 25, 69, 110, 314, 315, pp. 172, 173; vol. vi, p. 140. 'Saltpetre, of which there are about 50 or 100 tons to be sold at £4. 10s. per cwt.' In February 1611 it was sold at £40 a cwt., pp. 149, 164. The price varied from £4 to £4. 10s., pp. 221–2, 232, 253–5; vol. viii, pp. 325, 346, 350.
  37. 2. Scott, op. cit., p. 113.
  38. 3. Dictionarium Rusticum, 1717. Compare H. Townshend, Historical Collections, p. 251, 1680.
  39. 4. D'Ewes, Journals, p. 653, &c. A very vivid account of the patents granted by the Queen.
  40. 1. Sainsbury, vols. ii and iii, passim.
  41. 2. Ib., vol. ii, p. 159, nos. 339, 753. See the price of wool on p. 65 of vol. iv, and nos. 230, 767, 803. Ib., vols. vi to x contain many references to wool.
  42. 3. See Sir Thomas Roe’s Advice to the Company about the proper articles to be exported to India, Sainsbury, vol. ii, nos. 316, 317, 402, pp. 145–6.
  43. 4. Digges, Defence of Trade, p. 46.
  44. 1. By adding up the amounts of tonnage in Digges, pp. 19–22.
  45. 2. Sainsbury, vol. i, nos. 474, 476, 730, 731, 862.
  46. 3. Venetian Calendar, vol. xv, p. 415. Compare vol. x, pp. 237, 394.
  47. 4. Ib., vol. xiv, p. 443.
  48. 5. Digges, p. 46.
  49. 6. Abstract of Stock, Marine Records.
  50. 1. Abstract, op. cit.
  51. 2. Historical MSS. Commission, Report II, Part I, p. 91, 6th November 1626.
  52. 3. Sainsbury, vol. i, no. 1021; ib., vol. iii, nos. 165, 570.
  53. 4. Ib., vol. iii, no. 347.
  54. 5. Ib., p. 412.
  55. 6. Ib., nos. 51, 351, 640.
  56. 1. Public Record Office, C.O. 77, vol. ii, nos. 24, 25.
  57. 2. Sainsbury, vol. iii, nos. 165, 540.
  58. 3. Ib., vol. i, nos. 763, 768.
  59. 1. Practically all the accounts of the Portuguese falling under the dates 1550–1660 are unanimous on the above points. The most remarkable account is in Danvers' Portuguese Empire in India, vol. ii.
  60. 2. Sainsbury, vol. i, nos. 350–1, 369.
  61. 3. Ib., nos. 931, 935, 946.
  62. 1. Sainsbury, no. 314. Bruce’s Annals, vol. i, p. 252, October 1602.
  63. 2. Cal. State Papers, Domestic, Jac. I, vol. lxxv, nos. 31, 38, p. 214.
  64. 3. Sainsbury, vol. i, nos. 596, 662; Roe’s Journal in Churchill’s Collection; Sainsbury, vol. ii, no. 750; Foster’s Embassy.
  65. 4. Sainsbury, vol. i, no. 760,
  66. 5. Ib., p. 309, nos. 751, 753, 804, 823.
  67. 6. Ib., no. 1180; vol. ii, nos. 963 and p. 461.
  68. 1. Sainsbury, vol. i, nos. 779, 789; vol. ii, nos. 313, 819, p. 495; nos. 105, 315, 930.
  69. 2. Compare the extracts from the Hague Archives in the India Office. They are quoted by Hunter, vol. i. The treaties of December 1605, 17th May 1606, 3rd July 1596, June 1607, in the Java MSS., show the leading features of the Dutch policy in the East. Mr. Edmundson, Cambridge Modern History, vol. v, p. 710, gives a clear, though necessarily brief, account of that monopoly. Compare also, p. 732, ib. Motley calls it 'a Mighty Monopoly', United Netherlands, vol. iii, pp. 651-2. This is, perhaps, the truest description of the Dutch Company.
  70. 1. Purchas, vol. ii, pp. 456–62.
  71. 3. Ib., pp. 320–1.
  72. 2. Ib., pp. 523–49.
  73. 4. Ib., pp. 422–3.
  74. 1. Walter Peyton’s Second Voyage, Purchas, vol. iv, pp. 302–3.
  75. 2. Collection of Voyages and Travels. Printed by Thomas Astley, vol. i, p. 301. In 1605 there was a dispute with the Dutch in Java. ‘The Flemings were drubbed home to their very gates.’ Ib., p. 304.
  76. 3. Sainsbury, no. 609. The Hollanders used every possible endeavour to debar the English from trade with Acheen, ‘but the more they sought, the less they prevailed’. Nos. 671, 673. ‘The island of Machian was offered to Sir Henry Middleton ; the inhabitants expected his return for three years, when they were forced to yield to the Flemings.’ No. 630. William Adams’s letter from Japan, pp. 231–2. The fifth volume of Purchas, pp. 1–232, is full of ‘Dutch force and fraud’, ‘their lying devices’, ‘their cruelties’, ‘the base dealings of the Dutch’, ‘their cunning tricks in Banda’.
  77. 4. The Journals of Captain Pring (Purchas, vol. v, chap. vii), of Master Nathaniel Courthop, chap. ix, and of other travellers in the East, teem with details of the Anglo-Dutch rivalry in the East.
  78. 1. English Industry, vol. ii, p. 1.
  79. 1. Camden Society, Letters of John Chamberlain, edited by Sarah Williams, 1861, p. 12 et passim. There are a number of references to Holland.
  80. 2. Brit. Mus. 103. l. 20, 1751.
  81. 3. Ib., pp. 5–6.
  82. 1. 12 barrels to the last.
  83. 3. Ib., pp. 19–22.
  84. 5. Harleian Miscellany, 1615, pp. 224–7.
  85. 2. Brit. Mus. 103. l. 20, p. 7.
  86. 4. Ib., p. 17.
  87. 6. Ib., p. 226.
  88. 1. Ib., p. 405.
  89. 2. Ib., p. 407.
  90. 3. A copy of this pamphlet is among the invaluable tracts relating to trade, Brit. Mus. 712. m. 1 (8).
  91. 4. Brit. Mus. 712. m. 1 (17).
  92. 5. See below.
  93. 1. Brit. Mus. 712. m. 1 (17), pp. 3-4.
  94. 2. Ib., p. 4.
  95. 3. Ib., p. 7.
  96. 1. Hakluyt Society, series II, vol. xi.
  97. 2. Conway, op. cit., pp. 35–41.
  98. 4. Ib., p. 40.
  99. 6. Ib., p. 24.
  100. 3. Ib., p. 4.
  101. 5. Purchas, vol. xiii, pp. 1–31.
  102. 7. Ib., p. 25.
  103. 1. There are numerous references to it in Conway’s Early Voyages to Spitzbergen, Hakluyt Society, vol. xi, series ii.
  104. 2. Lex Mercatoria, p. 1.
  105. 3. Malynes quoted Tobias Gentleman’s pamphlet, and his whole chapter is merely a summary of that writer’s most forcible arguments.
  106. 4. Brit. Mus. 103. i. 20, pp. 33–9.
  107. 5. De Pontalis, De Witt, Eng. trans.
  108. 1. Ib., p. 34.
  109. 2. See above, p. 25.
  110. 3. The Advocate, Brit. Mus. 712. m. 1 (1), 1651.
  111. 4. Ib., p. 2.
  112. 5. See above.
  113. 1. Brit. Mus. 712. m. 1 (1), pp. 3–5.
  114. 2. Ib., p. 12.
  115. 3. See below.
  116. 4. Brit. Mus. 103. l. 20, pp. 45–73.
  117. 1. Ib., p. 47.
  118. 2. Ib., p. 48.
  119. 3. Ib., pp. 68–9.
  120. 1. See the admirable translation of the book in Professor Magoffin's volume, published in 1916 by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
  121. 2. Grotius, p. 7.
  122. 1. Ib., p. 8.
  123. 2. Ib., chap. iii.
  124. 3. Ib., p. 27.
  125. 4. Ib., p. 28.
  126. 5. Ib., p. 32.
  127. 1. Grotius, p. 64.
  128. 2. Grotius's Mare Liberum was published anonymously in November 1608. It formed the twelfth chapter of his work, De Iure Praedae, which was written in 1604–5. The manuscript of this work, written when the author was only twenty-one years of age, was not discovered till 1864, and was published in 1868. Walker (History of the Law of Nations, pp. 278–83); Hall, International Law (6th edition), pp. 140–51, and Oppenheim, International Law (1905), pp. 300–8, have treated this subject lucidly. It is interesting to note that William Wellwood anticipated some of the arguments of Selden in his Sea Law of Scotland (Bodleian Library, Oxford), and an Abridgement of all Sea Laws, and subjected Grotius's book to keen criticism. He appeals to the Scriptures; quotes the Roman lawyers; and has frequent recourse to history to prove his points, and to demolish the foundations of Grotius's arguments. But he lacked the charm of his style, and the width of his intellect, and though the comparative failure of his book was due to the elaborate and eminent work of Selden, the faulty arrangement and the scholastic pedantries which disfigure his chapter on 'the Community and propriety of the Seas' contributed to their failure. (See also Fulton, Sovereignty of the Seas.)
  129. 3. Walker's History of the Law of Nations, vol. i, pp. 278–83, 1899. The case of the Louis, decided by Lord Stowell, in 1817.
  130. 1. Ib., p. 38, ed. Conway.
  131. 2. De Witt’s Account of Dutch Fishery, Brit. Mus. 103. l. 20, p. 34.
  132. 3. The Dominion of the Seas, translated by the notorious henchman Marchmont Needham, and published in 1652 ‘by the special Command’, presumably of the Council of State. Brit. Mus. 502. f. 12, chapters i–vii.
  133. 1. The influ nce of sixteenth-century political thought on Selden is remarkable. See Dr. Figgis's chapter in vol. iii ; also his Gerson to Grotius.
  134. 2. Selden, Book I, chap. v.
  135. 3. Chapters ii and vi.
  136. 4. Book II, chapters xxvii, xxix.
  137. 1. England’s Exchequer, or A Discourse of the Sea and Navigation. Brit. Mus. 533. d. 2 (1), p. 7, 1625.
  138. 2. Ib., p. 8.
  139. 3. Ib., p. 13.
  140. 4. Ib., p. 26.
  141. 5. Petition of the East India Company, Brit. Mus. 1029. c. 30, p. 17, 1628.
  142. 6. Lex Mercatoria, chap. xxxiii.
  143. 1. Lex Mercatoria, p. 134.
  144. 2. Ib., p. 137.
  145. 3. The Sovereignty of the British Seas, proved by Records, History, &c., Brit. Mus. 509. h. 4, 1686.
  146. 1. Gardiner, vol. v, chap. xliv, pp. 78–88.
  147. 2. Op. cit.
  148. 1. Childe, The East India Trade is the most National of all the Foreign Trades, Brit. Mus., pp. 1–4.
  149. 2. Op. cit.
  150. 3. Compare Pollard, Factors in Modern History, Julian Corbett's two books, Successors of Drake and England in the Mediterranean. Chapters xiv, xv, xix, xx of the latter bring out the importance of this dependence of commerce upon the Navy. Admiral Mahan's Influence of Sea Power upon History is less satisfactory from this point of view. It is indispensable for the eighteenth century. For the seventeenth century, chapters i and ii are useful. Oppenheim's Administration of the Royal Navy is well known.
  151. 1. Essay on the East India Trade, see the last chapter, pp. 35–8.
  152. 2. Constitution and Finances of the Joint Stock Companies, vol. ii, Division III, pp. 361–79.
  153. 1. Harleian Miscellany, vol. iv, p. 218.
  154. 2. See Burleigh’s letter to the Marquis of Winchester, State Papers, Domestic, Elizabeth, vol. vii, nos. 11, 21 (October 1559); vol. cxxxvi, nos. 6, 8, 9, 22, 33, 65, 71, 79.
  155. 1. Ib.
  156. 2. Ib.
  157. 3. Ib.
  158. 4. Journals of the House of Commons, vol. i, pp. 218–21.
  159. 5. Childe, The East India Trade is the most National of all the Foreign Trades, 1681, India Office Tracts, vol. lxxxiii.
  160. 1. See below, chapter iv.
  161. 2. Sainsbury, vol. i, pp. 381, 385, nos. 902, 912.
  162. 3. Defence of Trade, from one of that Societie, Brit. Mus. 1029. c. 19, 1615.
  163. 4. Ib.
  164. 5. Ib., pp. 23–6.
  165. 1. Sainsbury, vol. iii, p. 267.
  166. 2. Abstract of Stock, Marine Records, op. cit.
  167. 3. Sainsbury, vol. iii, p. 267. Compare Mun, Discourse, who puts the figure at £100,000 a year, p. 277.
  168. 4. Macpherson, History, p. 107. I have compiled this list from the Abstract laid before the Parliament in 1624. Compare also Sainsbury, vol. iii, p. 267.
  169. 5. Canker of England's Commonwealth, Brit. Mus. 1391. a. 15, 1601.
  170. 6. Ib., p. 3.
  171. 1. Canker of England's Commonwealth, p. 76.
  172. 2. Laughlin's treatise on Money, in the History of Quantity Theory of Money, ignores Malynes, Mun, and other seventeenth-century economists, who anticipated Hume in his formulation of the theory.
  173. 3. Mun, England's Treasure by Forraign Trade, India Office Library, 1664, chapters xii–xiv, pp. 94–142 ; Misselden, The Circle of Commerce, 1623, Brit. Mus. 1029. b. 2, pp. 20–1 ; Free Trade, 1622, Brit. Mus. 712. c. 2 ; Malynes, The Maintenance of Free Trade, a reply to Free Trade, 1622, Brit. Mus. (1622) 712. c. 30.
  174. 4. Circle of Commerce, pp. 20–1.
  175. 5. Compare also pp. 37–8, part ii, of the Treatise.
  176. 6. Ib., p. 43.
  177. 1. Ib.
  178. 2. England's Way to Win Wealth.
  179. 1. Mun, op. cit., p. 11.
  180. 2. Ib., p. 42.
  181. 3. Ib.
  182. 4. Treasure, p. 34, chap. iv. Compare the Petition of the East India Company, 1628, Brit. Mus. 1029. c. 30, p. 32.
  183. 5. Petition of the East India Company, op. cit., p. 3.
  184. 6. Ib., p. 13.
  185. 1. Ib., pp. 13, 17, 19, 22, 24, 25.
  186. 2. Discourse of Trade, p. 265.
  187. 3. Ib., pp. 276-7.
  188. 4. Petition of the East India Company, pp. 27-8.
  189. 5. Mun’s Treasure, op. cit., p. 50.
  190. 6. Ruding’s Annals of Coinage, vol. ii, p. 216.
  191. 1. Ruding’s Annals of Coinage, vol. ii, p. 225; Proceedings and Debates of the House of Commons, 1620 and 1621, Oxford, 1766, vol. i, pp. 17, 239.
  192. 2. This is taken mainly from the Court Minutes of the East India Company, 8th March 1624. The only reference to the above debate in the Commons’ Journal is to the following effect: ‘Sir Thos. Estcourt moveth to search the East Indian ships for money’, p. 678. The above circumstances were, however, reported to the House of Commons by Mr. Wandesford, in the Parliament of 20th April 1626, as ‘exactions by the Duke of Buckingham’. Commons’ Journal, pp. 846, 847. Compare also Sainsbury, vol. iii, pp. 256–7, no. 425.
  193. 1. Venetian Calendar, vol. xv, p. 415.
  194. 3. Ib., p. 524.
  195. 4. Free Trade, 1622, Brit. Mus. 712. c. 2, p. 13.
  196. 5. Ib., p. 14.
  197. 6. Ib., p. 20.
  198. 2. Ib., vol. xvii, p. 423.
  199. 7. Ib., p. 29.
  200. 1. Maintenance of Free Trade, 1622, Brit. Mus. 712. c. 30, pp. 27, 28.
  201. 2. Compare Sainsbury, vol. iii, nos. 331, 665, 682; vol. iv, no. 729, ‘Will not have any further dealings with the East India Company’s affairs’.
  202. 3. Circle of Commerce, by E. M. (Misselden), Merchant, 1623, Brit. Mus. 1029. b. 2. Compare also Malynes’s Centre to the Circle of Commerce, a reply to the above.
  203. 4. Ib., p. 38.
  204. 1. Downing's expression.
  205. 2. Public Record Office, East Indies, vol. i, no. 34.
  206. 3. Winwood to Salisbury, Sainsbury, vol. i, p. 234.
  207. 4. Ib., no. 641.
  208. 1. Public Record Office, East Indies, vol. i, nos. 38, 39.
  209. 2. Smythe to Winwood, 16th May 1613. Historical MSS. Commission, MSS. of the Duke of Buccleuch at Montagu House, vol. i, p. 132.
  210. 3. Sainsbury, vol. i, 2nd Dec. 1613.
  211. 4. Court Minutes, Book III, pp. 28–34, 8–11th Feb. 1614.
  212. 1. Sainsbury, vol. i, no. 860.
  213. 1. See Corbett, Drake and the Tudor Navy.
  214. 1. Historical MSS. Commission. MSS. of the Duke of Buccleuch at Montagu House, vol. i. A Brief of the Proceedings which have passed betwixt His Majesty's Commissioners, and those others of the States touching the Trade into the East Indies, pp. 166-70. Sainsbury, vol. i, nos. 854, 855, 860, 874, 976.
  215. 2. Winwood, Memorials, vol. iii.
  216. 3. Court Book, vol. iv, 3rd Jan. 1615, pp. 328-31.
  217. 4. Court Minutes, Book III, pp. 419-22, 5th May 1615.
  218. 1. Court Minutes, Book III, pp. 419-22, 28th June 1615.
  219. 2. Court Minutes, Court Book, vol. iii, 28th June 1615, pp. 432-8; Public Record Office, East Indies, vol. i, no. 48; Court Book, 18th Aug. 1615, pp. 463-7.
  220. 3. Sainsbury, vol. i, nos. 1004, 1006, 1023.
  221. 1. Ib., vol. ii, pp. 384–6.
  222. 2. The whole volume of State Papers, East Indies, 1617–21, is full of them. So is Purchas, vol. v, op. cit.
  223. 3. Public Record Office, East Indies, vol. i, no. 7; Domestic, Jac. I, vol. civ, no. 62, p. 607.
  224. 4. James’s foreign policy has been exhaustively dealt with by Professor Gardiner in his first five volumes of the History of England. It is evident, however, that the Anglo-Dutch struggle in the East has not received the same attention that he devoted to James’s policy towards Spain and the Palatinate. Though he refers to the struggle in chap. xxvi, the account he gives of it is not completely satisfactory. Again, though he mentions the East India papers calendared by Sainsbury in the preface to vol. iii, it does not appear that all the voluminous material collected therein was thoroughly digested. He relies greatly upon the Add. MSS. 17677. The transcripts from the archives of the Hague are undoubtedly important; but the study of the original correspondence of the Company’s factors and the Court Minutes of the East India Company are of no less importance. I find him deficient in the latter.
  225. 5. Chamberlain to Carleton, 30th Jan. 1619. Sainsbury, vol. ii, no. 572.
  226. 1. Doncaster to Carleton, 12th May 1619. Sainsbury, vol. ii, no. 665.
  227. 2. Court Book, vol. iv, pp. 347–50, 21st May 1619.
  228. 3. Court Minutes, vol. iv, pp. 345–7, 14–17th May 1619.
  229. 4. Viz. one-third of all the spices in those parts, and all the pepper at Bantam, Court Minutes, ib.
  230. 5. Chamberlain to Carleton, 31st May 1619. Sainsbury, vol. ii, no. 677.
  231. 1. Sainsbury, vol. ii, nos. 668, 673.
  232. 2. ‘There can be no better moderator than James I, who, after hearing the Ambassadors of the States and his Council, decided absolutely in favour of the Dutch.’ Venetian Calendar, vol. xvii, p. 465.
  233. 3. See James’s Peacemaker, British Museum, 1618.
  234. 4. Chamberlain to Carleton, Domestic Correspondence, Jac. I, vol. cix, no. 75, p. 51. Compare also the petition of the English Company ‘touching questions of forts’ immediately after the conclusion of the landed treaty, Public Record Office, East Indies, vol. i, nos. 77–8.
  235. 5. Carleton to Chamberlain, 16th June 1619.
  236. 6. Winwood, op. cit.
  237. 7. Sainsbury, vol. ii, nos. 238, 443.
  238. 8. Court Minutes, Book IV, 14–15th Dec. 1618.
  239. 1. British Museum, 1618.
  240. 2. Sainsbury, vol. ii, nos. 529, 547, 609, 733, 761, 767.
  241. 3. Coen’s Instructions, Sainsbury, vol. iii, no. 243.
  242. 1. Court Minute Book, vol. iv, p. 379, 2nd July 1619.
  243. 1. Sainsbury, vol. iii, pp. 13, 29, 32, 64.
  244. 2. 19th July 1622. Sainsbury, vol. iii, no. 114.
  245. 3. See next chapter.
  246. 4. Public Record Office, East Indies, vol. ii, nos. 26, 28.
  247. 1. Ib., nos. 27, 32.
  248. 2. See a copy of the Treaty in the Calendars of State Papers, East Indies, 1622–4, pp. 106–7.
  249. 3. Sainsbury, vol. iii, no. 233. The Secretary of State himself told Carleton that ‘we had at last made an end and parted good friends, though with much loss and disadvantage to the English Company as was conceived’. Carleton’s dispatch of 5th Feb. 1623 shows that the Dutch were elated by the ‘favourable usage’ received from James. Sainsbury, vol. iii, no. 257.
  250. 4. They have been exhaustively dealt with by Gardiner, in vols. iv and v of his History of England.
  251. 5. History, vols. iv and v.
  252. 1. Sainsbury, vol. iii, nos. 511, 524, 534, 574. Copies of the pamphlet published by the Company were presented to the Lords of the Council and the principal nobility. The Venetian Ambassador in England testified to the intensity of hatred against the Dutch, Venetian Calendar, vol. xviii. The pamphlet was dispersed in all parts of England, as well as in the Netherlands, ib., pp. 463, 660, 688. Copies were much asked after by Members of Parliament, ib. 544.
  253. 2. East Indies, 1622–4.
  254. 3. Court Minutes, 22–24th Nov. 1624.
  255. 4. Ib. 22–24th Nov. 1624.
  256. 1. Sainsbury, vol. iv, pp. 503–8.
  257. 3. Ib., nos. 640, 641.
  258. 2. Ib., nos. 701, 706.
  259. 4. Ib., no. 719.
  260. 1. East Indies, vol. iv, nos. 51 and 51. 1.
  261. 2. Sainsbury, vols. v, vi. The usual petitions by the East India Company for redress and satisfaction. The King promises but never performs.
  262. 3. Ib., vol. iv, p. 555, nos. 640, 641, 719.
  263. 4. Ib., no. 612.
  264. 5. Ib., nos. 701, 706.
  265. 6. Ib., p. 521.
  266. 7. See Court Minutes, vols. vi and vii, with a masterly Introduction by William Foster.
  267. 1. Ib., vol. vi, p. 188.
  268. 2. Darrell puts his share at £150,000. Strange News from the Indies, Brit. Mus. 1029. g. 20, p. 5.
  269. 3. Lex Talionis, Brit. Mus. 712. g. 18 (2), Dedication, p. 19; A brief Narrative of the Cases of Sir William Courteen and Sir Paul Pyndar, by E. Graves, 1679, Brit. Mus. 515. k. 21 (5), p. 3. Compare also Mr. Courteen's Catastrophe, 1652, Brit. Mus. 1029. g. 19, which describes the wretched state of Courteen's factors in India, and estimates their whole loss at £50,000.
  270. 4. Sainsbury, vol. vi, pp. 127, 274–5, 282–3, 294–5, &c.
  271. 5. Ib., Preamble to the grant.
  272. 6. Ib., vol. i, p. 157.
  273. 7. Ib., vol. vi, pp. 219, 220, 294, 295, 337.
  274. 1. Sainsbury, vol. vi; see fears of the East India trade being monopolized by the Dutch, pp. 139, 271, 272, 273 295, 303, 336, 341, &c.
  275. 2. Ib., passim.
  276. 4. Ib., p. 272.
  277. 3. Ib., pp. 270-4.
  278. 5. Ib., p. 273.
  279. 1. Ib., pp. 273-4.
  280. 2. For Mauritius and Madagascar see Sainsbury, vol. vi, pp. 322, 323, 330, 338, 340.
  281. 3. See the Report in Sainsbury, vol. vi, pp. 31-2.
  282. 4. See the document in Sainsbury, vol. vi, p. 352.
  283. 5. Public Record Office, East Indies, vol. iv, no. 65.
  284. 1. Court Minutes, 5th June 1628; Sainsbury, vol. iv, p. 637.
  285. 2. Sainsbury, vol. iv, nos. 283, 444, 555, 688.
  286. 3. Ib., p. 730.
  287. 4. Ib., pp. 500, 616, nos. 656, 693–5.
  288. 5. Ib., no. 716.
  289. 6. Ib., no. 56.
  290. 1. Ib., nos. 162, 203, 250.
  291. 2. Ib., nos. 852, 857.
  292. 3. Court Book, vol. xi, pp. 337–46, 2nd March 1629.
  293. 4. Court Minutes, 3rd Oct. 1634, Book xv, pp. 57–64.
  294. 1. Court Minutes, 30th Aug. 1633, Book xiv, pp. 58-62.
  295. 2. Ib., 20th Sept. 1633, Book xiv, pp. 86-91.
  296. 3. Macpherson, p. 117.
  297. 4. English Historical Review, July 1904.
  298. 1. Sainsbury, Court Minutes, 1640–3, pp. 187–8.
  299. 3. Ib., pp. 276–8.
  300. 5. Ib., 1644–9, pp. 271, 278.
  301. 2. Ib.
  302. 4. Ib.
  303. 1. Third Report, pp. 64 et seq. The papers are wrongly dated.
  304. 2. Ib., pp. 64–5.
  305. 3. See Foster's Introductions to Court Minutes, 1635–9, 1639–43, on Smethwick. Also Sainsbury, vol. v. And compare his petition, in Appendix to the Fourth Report, 1641, p. 71.
  306. 4. Journals of the House of Commons.
  307. 5. Lords' Journals, vol. ix, p. 81; Historical MSS. Commission, Appendix to the Sixth Report, p. 143 b.
  308. 1. Court Minutes, 19th March 1647, pp. 196–7.
  309. 2. See the Papers from the Company in the Appendix to the Sixth Report of the Historical MSS. Commission, p. 194.
  310. 3. Ib.
  311. 4. England’s Safety in Trade’s Increase. Most humbly presented to the High Court of Parliament, 1641. Brit. Mus. E. 167 (5).
  312. 1. England's Safety in Trade's Increase, p. 22.
  313. 2. Ib., p. 24.
  314. 1. The Treasure of the Traffike. MacCulloch’s Collection of Scarce Tracts on Commerce, p. 105.
  315. 3. Ib., p. 105.
  316. 2. Ib., pp. 65–8.
  317. 4. See above on the Anglo-Dutch rivalry.
  318. 1. Sainsbury, vol. vii, p. 132. Compare also pp. 24, 32, 51, 53, 132, 178.
  319. 2. See Firth, Introduction to Clarke Papers, Cromwell's Army, chapter on ‘Politics in the Army’; Gooch, English Democratic Ideas in the seventeenth century, pp. 206–26. Political naturally led to social equality, and we are therefore quite prepared to find the ‘Anabaptists’ and Levellers as opponents of the monopoly of the East India Company. There is hardly any mention of the East India Company among the economic theories of the period. Yet what little there is seems to confirm the view. Many of the Cromwellian soldiers went out to India. Evelyn said that the refusal of some members to take the oath prescribed by the Charter was due to the ‘Anabaptists’, whose object was to be able to continue their private trade to the East.
  320. 1. See Andrews, British Committee of Trade, an account of Noell and Povey; Sainsbury, Calendar of State Papers, West Indies, 1570-1660. Several references to Thomson in Sainsbury, vols. viii, ix, x.
  321. 2. Public Record Office, C. O. 77, vol. vii, no. 6, cited here as C. O.
  322. 3. Cunningham, vol. ii. Compare Prothero, Statutes, Discussion on Monopolies, 1601.
  323. 4. Andrews, op. cit.
  324. 1. Public Record Office, C. O. 77, vol. vii, no. 8.
  325. 2. Compare the Agreement, C. O. 77, vol. vii, no. 9.
  326. 3. Ib.
  327. 4. Commons' Journals, vol. vi, p. 253.
  328. 5. Professor Scott's statement (pp. 120-1, Constitution of Joint Stock Companies, vol. ii) that the capital subscribed was only £125,000, is based on inadequate information. See Foster's Introduction to Sainsbury, vol. ix.
  329. 6. Sainsbury, vol. ix, pp. 49, 113, 182, 257, 331.
  330. 1. Ib., pp. 314, 324.
  331. 2. Ib., pp. 340, 352-5, 364, 373; vol. x, pp. 122-6, 142, 143.
  332. 3. Ib., p. 122.
  333. 4. Public Record Office, C. O. 77, vol. vii, no. 85.
  334. 1. Public Record Office, C. O. 77, vol. vii, no. 79.
  335. 2. Brit. Mus., Sloane MSS., 3271, A. D. 1654.
  336. 1. Public Record Office, C. O. 77, vol. vii, no. 92.
  337. 2. State Papers, vol. iii, p. 80. Compare Firth's chapters x, xv, xvi, in The Last Years of the Protectorate.
  338. 3. Sainsbury, vol. ix, pp. 6, 357–60; vol. x, pp. 129–34, 137, 139, 142.
  339. 4. Foster, Introduction to Court Minutes, 1655–9, p. xii.
  340. 5. O. C. 2610, quoted by Foster.
  341. 6. Ib.
  342. 7. Britannia Languens (MacCulloch, Collection of Economic Tracts).
  343. 1. Public Record Office, C. O. 77, vol. viii, no. 46.
  344. 2. Seasonable Observations humbly offered to His Highness, 1658: Somers Tracts, vol. vi, pp. 446–65.
  345. 3. Ib., p. 452.
  346. 4. Ib., p. 448.
  347. 5. Ib., p. 462.
  348. 1. Sainsbury, vol. ix, p. 124.
  349. 2. Andrews, British Committees of Trade.
  350. 3. There are several references to Noell in Andrews and State Papers, West Indies, op. cit.
  351. 4. Public Record Office, C. O. 77, vol. viii, no. 39.
  352. 5. Commonwealth and Protectorate, vol. ii.
  353. 6. Britannia Languens, in MacCulloch’s Collection.
  354. 1. Court Book, vol. xxiii, 14th Oct. 1656.
  355. 2. Ib., p. 556.
  356. 3. For Cromwell’s Charter see Foster’s Introduction, Court Minutes, 1654-9.
  357. 4. Foster, op. cit., p. xvii.
  358. 1. Court Book, vol. xxiv, p. 114, 29th June 1658.
  359. 2. Foster's Introduction, Court Minutes, 1655–9, p. xxiii.
  360. 3. Court Minutes, 1655–9, p. vi.
  361. 1. Gardiner, Commonwealth and Protectorate, chap. xxx, p. 341.
  362. 2. See above, on the naval rivalry and the herring fishery.
  363. 3. See especially his speech to his Parliament, in Carlyle's Letters and Speeches.
  364. 4. Compare Ranke, History of England, vol. iii, and Gardiner, op. cit., with Cunningham, op. cit., sections 183-4; Wolff, Introduction to Manesseh Ben Israel; Beer, ‘Cromwell's Economic Policy’, in Political Science Quarterly, vols. xii, xvii; Andrews, British Committees of Trade, op. cit.; Foster's Introductions to Court Minutes, 1650-4 and 1655-9; Firth, The Last Years of the Protectorate, chapters x, xv, and xvi. Compare the pamphlets cited above, on the naval rivalry with the Dutch, and on the question of the herring fishery.