Part II

— The Assam Company (1839–1856)

The Early History of the Tea Industry, Harold H. Mann, 1918 · from page 19 · about 30 minutes

Read by machine, not yet checked by a person. It may hold small errors.

II.

In my last article I traced the history of the tea industry in north-east India to the time when tea from the plantations in Assam was really on the market. This point was reached by the end of 1838 or the beginning of 1839, though the public were hardly satisfied of the soundness of the undertaking till a year or so later. At that time it must be remembered the whole of the so-called plantations in the Assam Valley, chiefly consisting of groups of indigenous tea plants in the jungle which had been cleared of other growth and weeds and had been cut down so as to form leaf-bearing bushes, were in the hands of Government under a Superintendent of tea culture. This Superintendent, Mr. C. A. Bruce, the real founder of tea cultivation in Assam, had opened out such areas in many places. Many of his gardens were near Dibrugarh, more near the Tingri and other smaller rivers in Upper Assam, others were at the foot of the Naga hills as far to the south-east as the well-known garden of Gabro Purbut.

All that had been proved, however, by 1839 was that tea would grow, and that commercial tea could be made for which a market existed in London. But the matter was getting beyond the stage at which the Government wished to control it. Their idea was only to prove its success and then hand it over to private enterprise. Early in 1839, hence, both in Calcutta and London, a number of capitalists apparently approached Government for the transfer of the existing plantations to themselves and for the creation of a monopoly of tea cultivation in the Assam Valley in their favour.

The first move was made in Calcutta, where a company termed the Bengal Tea Association was formed in February 1839, with the approbation of the Government.1 Almost immediately after another company of London merchants came forward for the same purpose. The Times, in April 1839, wrote as follows:—"A joint stock company is forming in city for the purpose of cultivating the newly discovered tea plant in Assam. Their intention is, in the first instance, to open a treaty with the Supreme Government in India for the purchase of the East India Company's plantations and establishments in Assam, and afterwards to carry on the cultivation of tea there, for the purpose of importing it into this country. The project has been taken up with so much avidity, principally by the mercantile houses trading with India and the leading firms in the tea trade that all the shares were appropriated in a few days and before any public notice of it had appeared. The capital to be raised is £500,000 and it is stated that a communication has already been opened with the Board of Trade and the East India Company, preparatory to a negotiation for the purchase of the Assam territory."

The two—that is to say the Calcutta and the London companies —combined their forces almost immediately. It was obvious that at the stage things had reached there was no room for two such ventures and by the middle of 1839 they had agreed to join interests. This was suggested, as was stated in a meeting of the Calcutta branch,2 in order that "the junction of such interests as were now combined would induce His Honour in Council to consider that no better guarantee could be given to the Government of Bengal for the early establishment of this important trade upon a bold and energetic scale." At this meeting a resolution was passed "that the Bengal Tea Association do form a junction with the London company on condition that the local management be conducted by a committee of directors to be elected exclusively in this country." Thus was originated the peculiar constitution of the pioneer tea company—the Assam Company—in its early days whereby it had two controlling bodies—one in London and another in Calcutta,—an arrangement which seems almost to have invited disaster.

In the meantime, the formation of the Assam Company in London, though it received the approval of the heads of the East India Company, did not do so without opposition. This was apparently partly due to a fear that the Company would be given a monopoly, and partly to a belief that it had been engineered for reasons not given out to the world. At a meeting of the proprietors of the East India Company (June 19th, 1839) the opposition was led by Sir Charles Forbes, and he got an assurance that no exclusive privilege in Assam would be granted to the Company. This did not satisfy him, however, and he stated that "he feared, although they were told of the immense advantage which must result from this plan, although it was said that the people of this country, as well as the people of India, Mahomedans and Hindoos, would profit to an infinite extent by this scheme,—that it, notwithstanding, would all turn out to be a humbug."3

It was recognised that apart from actual technical difficulties in the cultivation and manufacture which were not, as we shall see later, sufficiently considered at the time, the chief obstacles to the success of a truly commercial enterprise were the lack of labour and capital. Captain Jenkins, the administrator of Assam, described the country as a land flowing with milk and honey, with provisions abundant and easily procured, and only lacking these two necessaries. The capital was now provided by the Assam Company, the lack of labour remained, and as we know, has remained almost till to-day one of the chief obstacles to the development of the tea industry.

It was well, however, that the difficulties in the provision of labour and in the technical management of tea gardens and the manufacture of tea were not fully realised by the promoters of the proposed company. As it was, there was much enthusiasm both in London and Calcutta, and as a result of the union of the two sets of interests, the Government agreed to hand over two-thirds of the experimental tea gardens in Assam to the new company. This being the case, a "deed of settlement" was made among the subscribers to the Company to remain in force until a charter, or an act of Parliament, was passed constituting them a company as was the usual custom in those days.

The organisation of the Company was peculiar. As already stated it had a double board of directors whose powers were divided as follows. The duties of the Calcutta local directors were "the local management of affairs in India in the purchasing, improving, and clearing lands in Assam and elsewhere in India and of buying, renting, or building necessary warehouses, offices, and other buildings in India and in obtaining, employing and removing officers, managers, clerks, servants, labourers and generally in superintending and conducting all the business and affairs of the Company there, and fulfilling contracts for that purpose. "Provided always," as the deed goes on to say, "that they shall in all respects conform to these presents and any rules and regulations made by a general meeting . . . . and any directions for their guidance given by the General Directory of the Company."4

The Company having been formed, two-thirds of the experimental plantations in Assam were handed over to the Company on March 1840, and Mr. Bruce joined them as Superintendent of the Northern Division with headquarters at Jaipur. The other division of the Company's plantations had its headquarters at "Nazeerah"5 which has remained to this day the headquarters of the Company. A gentleman named Masters was appointed as Superintendent of this division. The arrangement with Government was that the lands were to be occupied for the first ten years rent free, and at the end of this time the assessments were not to be higher than for rice lands generally. The cultivation of the poppy for opium was entirely prohibited.

Labour difficulties began from the first day. Bruce had used local labour, aided by a few Chinese. But in the first report from Masters it was stated that there was little local labour, but that the Assamese were beginning to work, "and for the important art of tea manufacture, they seem particularly adapted, and likely to supply eventually all the labour that will be required."6 This was obviously, however, not enough and great efforts were made to get labourers from outside. It must never be forgotten that Assam had been almost depopulated before it came under British protection by civil war and by an invasion from Burma. Any large enterprise had therefore in a very large measure to provide its own labour.

The first attempt to fill this need was by the import of Chinese coolies. A large number of Chinese coolies were brought round from Singapore, but "they were selected without discretion. Every man with a tail was supposed to be qualified to cultivate, manipulate, and prepare tea. They were sent up without adequate control. At Pabna they quarrelled with the natives, or the natives with them: some sixty were captured by the magistrate, and consigned to jail, and the rest refused to proceed without their brethren. Their agreements were therefore cancelled and they returned to Calcutta committing depredations in their progress. On their arrival in the City of Palaces, they seemed to revenge themselves on society, for the papers were daily filled with police reports of the outrages they committed. They were at length caught and sent off to the Isle of France, the planters of which will doubtless consider that it is an ill wind, indeed, which blows no one any good."7 The London report of the Assam Company put it more shortly when it said that the Calcutta Board imported "several hundreds of Chinese." "These men turned out to be of a very bad character; they were turbulent, obstinate, and rapacious. Indeed they committed excesses which on occasions endangered the lives of the people among whom we had sent them, and it was found almost impossible to govern them. So injurious did they seem likely to prove that their contracts were cancelled and the whole gang with the exception of the most expert tea makers dismissed." Thus ended the first attempt to bring Chinese labour to the Indian tea plantations.

But labour had to be obtained if development was to go on, and hence a large number of "Dhangar Coles" were recruited. But misfortune dogged the footsteps of the pioneers. Cholera broke out among six hundred and fifty-two of them who were proceeding to Assam, and the survivors disappeared in one night and no trace of them was ever found. Labourers from Chittagong were also useless. And among such coolies as were on the plantations in Assam, the mortality was very high indeed. Deaths occurred with appalling frequency also among the European and other planters. In the first year the Company lost the services of Dr. Lumqua, a Chinese doctor long established in Calcutta who had consented to assist the Company in its early stages in Assam and of four Europeans from its small staff. The Assam Company, indeed, began very early to feel the difficulties of climate and of labour supply which have been among the greatest which the industry has had to fight.

The absolutely unoccupied character of the country, at any rate in the area worked from Nazira is illustrated by two letters from Masters. In the first of these he says "I have now been in this district eighteen months, and know comparatively little about it, owing to the dense tree forest and coarse high grass jungle with which the land is all overrun, so that when travelling one can see nothing but what lies in his immediate route and I am continually finding fresh patches of ground occupied by the sites of former villages or gardens or temples or tanks of beautiful water or small patches of tea plants and immense tracts of waste land." A second letter illustrates another aspect of condition. "It was with great difficulty that I could procure elephants when I first came here: I could not purchase one at any rate. . . . A herd of elephants, however, having gone off from Jorehaut in that direction" (towards Gabro) "they were followed and thirteen of them secured."

Nevertheless in spite of the labour and health difficulties the Company had a considerable area of tea in cultivation by the end of 1840, and at the annual meeting in Calcutta (August 12th, 1841) there was stated to be 2,638 acres in actual production. The production was, however, by no means intense, for the average number of plants per acre was only 457! As has already been indicated, most of the area consisted of groups of tea plants found in the jungle, cleared and cut down for leaf yielding. The total amount of tea made this year was 10,712lbs. The cost had, however, been enormous up to the end of 1840. £65,457 had been sent to India from London. Naturally a good deal of this had, however, been absorbed in capital expenditure. A steam boat had been built and purchased in Calcutta of which we shall hear later. A saw mill had been sent to Assam, to be set up at Jaipur, and no less than Rs. 1,23,275 is put down in the Calcutta Board's report for "Labour, lost and unproductive."

At this stage the Company was still sanguine in spite of difficulties, and they ventured to estimate production in future years, as rising to 40,000lbs. in 1841 and to 320,000lbs. in 1845!8 We shall see how this estimate was falsified in every particular.

The condition of the whole enterprise at this time, the way in which the management was in the hands of their Chinese tea makers, and the unsatisfactory character of the European assistants sent to Assam are well shown in the following quotations from letters from Mr. Masters. On February 12th, 1842, he writes to the Directors :—"You will please to observe that these tea makers (Chinese) are very great gentlemen; even those who receive but Rs. 3 per month consider themselves so, and object to do anything else but make tea. When spoken to, they threaten to leave the service if they are insulted by being asked to work. Gradually this will wear away as we shall soon have them under our control, and if they continue saucy, we may take a convenient opportunity of making a strike for two or three months, and when they lose their pay, they will probably become sensible that they are dependent on the Assam Company for their livelihood." Mr Masters hardly gives one the idea of a tactful manager!

With regard to the European assistants who had been sent he wrote in another letter. "Hitherto I have been overwhelmed with assistants many of whom have been unaccustomed to agricultural employment, but the greatest inconvenience attending the assistant establishment is the unhealthiness of the climate; it so often happens that after much difficulty has been experienced, and the assistant is becoming acquainted with his duty, and he and the natives are becoming a little reconciled, the assistant falls sick, and is obliged to leave his post: if another is sent, the same difficulties and inconveniences are repeated .... It must be evident to the Directors that a passionate European entirely ignorant of the language and entirely ignorant of every part of his duty can but be worse than useless." I can quite understand Mr. Masters' annoyance, but my sympathy goes out to the young Englishman, landed in a very unhealthy country, absolutely in the jungle, with nothing to relieve the tedium of continually driving coolies to work at a job which neither he nor they understand. When we remember that the amount allowed for an assistant's house was but Rs. 300, that there was no sanitation, and that the unacclimatised European was planted down, and got fever, most probably, before he had been there more than a few days, and was never afterwards really free from it, —we could hardly expect anything but despair, irritability, illness and often a speedy death.

In the second London report,9 though things are still stated to look promising, there begins to be a doubt. Nothing more is said about the labour question and so we may consider that this is temporarily solved. The kind of gardens at this time is well illustrated by figures given both by Masters and Bruce. I quote some at any rate of the names of the gardens, as they may interest those in Assam at the present time. Gabro Purbut consists of 44 poorahs,10 of which 10 poorahs were large plants, 20 poorahs middling plants, and 14 poorahs small plants and seedlings. Satseia had 213 poorahs. Cherideo had 23 poorahs. Rokanhabbi had 350 poorahs nearly all just planted. Deopani had 20 poorahs. All these names will be recognised as being still included in the Assam Company's property. Masters states that he planted his seedlings five feet apart, and he considers that the cost of clearing and planting a poorah of tea will be Rs. 100, while the annual cost of upkeep would be Rs. 50 per poorah. Taking a poorah as 1·21 acres, these will be equal to Rs. 83·3 as capital cost and Rs. 41·7 as annual cost of upkeep, per acre.

In the other division, in the control of Mr. Bruce, the sites of several of the gardens will be recognised as being now in the Tingri Tea Company's estates, and also in the company's working near Jaipur. Kahung had 31 poorahs of tea, 11 poorahs newly sown. Tingri (including Ballyjan and Tipling) had 34½ poorahs. Hoogrijan had 31½ poorahs, with an area of newly planted tea. The famous tea seed garden, "Bazaloni" appears in this group in 1841. Near Jaipur we find other gardens whose names still exist. In this section we hear first of the definite planting of China seed. An interesting estimate by Mr. Bruce is that it required one man coolie on Rs. 4 per month to keep one poorah of tea in cultivation.

The presage of coming disaster seems to pervade the atmosphere during 1842 and 1843 both in the reports of the Assam Company and in the remarks on the subject in the Calcutta newspapers. There were evidences of mismanagement everywhere. The steamer built for the Company as their means of transit to Assam proved a failure. "The Assam Tea Company," says the Friend of India,11 after having sent their new steamer on one trip up the Berhampooter, have, on her return, offered her for sale. The cause is not made known,—probably her inability to steam the current of the Berhampooter." The amount of tea made in 1842 was far less than might have been anticipated, and only amounted to 30,000 lbs., while the net cost of the undertaking had been £160,000. Mr. Masters from Assam, evidently feels, from his letters, that there is something unsatisfactory in the methods of tea growing and plucking adopted.

By the latter part of 1843 it was certain that something was amiss. The Calcutta directors sent a commissioner to Assam to see what was wrong.12 Both Mr. Bruce and Mr. Masters were summarily dismissed, and the report presented for the year 1843 is doleful indeed. “Since we last met,” says the report,13 “your directors have seen much to diminish the confidence which they expressed at the last meeting in the ultimate success of the Company; that confidence was necessarily founded on statements and calculations prepared in the Province where our operations are carried on. These data have since been altered by the parties who supplied them in many material respects, and the produce of the year has fallen short of the estimate in respect to quantity by one-third; at the same time, the current expenses of the Company appeared not to be diminished.” They went even further than this, and wrote:—“We have positively forbidden the local board in Calcutta to pass any more bills upon us, and have enjoined them to reduce their expenditure to the level of the means at their immediate command. We can, therefore, safely pledge ourselves that no further call shall be made upon the shareholders until your directors have shown sufficient grounds for recommending you to prosecute the enterprise in which we have embarked with renewed vigour.”

The position was truly perilous for the shareholders. But, to all appearances, a change for the better occurred. The Company had so far not been under limited liability. But a special Act of Parliament was passed in 184514 which settled their position. It was only to last till April 30th, 1854, declared a capital of fifty lakhs of rupees in shares of five hundred rupees. The cultivation of opium, sugar and coffee was prohibited.

In the meantime expenses at least had been reduced, and this was something. The relationship between expenses and yield was as follows :—

TBL-001 · FOLIO 31Diplomatic CSV · Tidy CSV
Yield of Tea.Expenditure.
1841.10,505 lbs.£12,984
1842.31,398 „£16,560
1843.87,705 „£13,146
1844.120,422 „£7,284

This so pleased the directors that they very foolishly, as is now clear, declared a dividend of 10s. per share in January 1846, though no profit whatever had been made. This was the only dividend the shareholders saw till 1852.

There seems, however, to have been a renewed burst of confidence as a result of the full incorporation of the Company, and of the reduction of expenditure. This spread to the East India Company. Their experiments now having reached what they considered to be a complete success, they now decided to withdraw entirely from their connection with the industry, and the portion of their experimental gardens which they retained were ordered to be sold. The occasion is of such general interest that we may quote their orders on the subject. “The information contained in these proceedings is very satisfactory and gratifying to us. The sales of the tea, both in Calcutta and London, judging from the statements of the cost per pound15 . . . . confirms the opinion . . . . expressed that the article may under proper management be cultivated at a real remunerative price, and we accede to your16 proposal that the Government should withdraw from any further connection with the cultivation or manufacture of tea in Assam.”

Though the Government, by these orders, indicated that they considered that the industry was established, yet I do not think that this was by any means the case. Certainly after the first extravagance and mismanagement, the prospects appeared a little more hopeful. But though a dividend had been paid, no real profits had been made. The estimates of yield had been considerably falsified, and the same or a greater area showed signs of giving less yield than in previous years. There seems to have still been hopeless mismanagement, but, even more than this, it became increasingly evident that nobody knew how to grow tea so as to maintain the yield of the bushes, let alone increase the amount of tea which could be made for them. The concern had now in fact reached the stage when the method of planting and plucking tea which had been learnt from the Chinese who had taught the pioneers, had definitely broken down, and it was evident that unless new methods could be found which would yield more tea and maintain the yield of the bushes better, the industry must close.

The London Directors were the first to see this. Concentration on a smaller area till success was obtained in this matter was their policy, and in 1846 they, hence, closed down altogether the so-called northern and eastern divisions of the company (the Tingri group and the Jaipur group of gardens). But the position was first really faced in the report for 1847, published in 1848. In this the Directors definitely confessed failure, threw the blame on the Calcutta Board, and they go so far as to confess that they are doubtful whether it is worth while to continue, as even with a policy of great economy and very great care over expenditure, it was only just possible to keep the concern from showing a loss. There seemed no confidence as to its future capacity for profit It is curious to find this only two years after Government had, with a great flourish of trumpets, declared the industry established.

The position is well shown by the following extracts from the Report of the Assam Company for 1847. "The General Directory .... think it proper to mention to you that they find among the proprietors, and even among their own body, a difference of opinion prevails upon the vital question whether it is desirable or not to continue the operations of the Company. On the one hand it is contended that under the present system of management there is at all events no loss, and that the last year was the first in which the expenses in the province were kept within the estimate or nearly so, and the anticipated outturns of produce was not only realised but exceeded, while at the same time there is every reason to expect an annual increase in produce from seedlings, and the vacant spaces in our present cutivation being filled up .... and therefore it would be unwise to throw away all that has been spent on the enterprise at a moment when there appears so little chance of further loss and much reason to hope that some part of the money spent may be redeemed. On the other hand, it appears to be thought by many that there are too small hopes of success and too limited an amount of profit to be anticipated to render it advisable to continue our operations."

The London directors actually in the sequel asked the Calcutta Board to make them an offer for the whole company, and stated that they " would feel inclined to recommend to their shareholders the acceptance of any proposition that would give them a moderate sum per share, rather than depend on the distant prospect of a larger benefit." No offer was, however, made, and both the London and Calcutta authorities determined to risk another year (1848) of work.

We have now reached the lowest point in the fortunes of tea cultivation in Assam. The great hopes and prospects of a successful tea industry seemed to have almost disappeared. The recovery from that position was primarily due in the first instance to two men,—one in Calcutta and one in Assam,—whose confidence in the undertaking, whose business capacity, and whose integrity of character drew the Assam Company from the brink of despair and made a future tea industry in Assam immediately possible. These were Mr. Henry Burkinyoung in Calcutta and Mr. Stephen Mornay who took charge in Assam in 1847. In five years these men made a bankrupt concern into one which it was recognised could at least pay its way. There then followed the improved technical skill and methods introduced and carried out by Mr. George Williamson on the gardens in Assam, which made it into a very profitable industry.

The state of things into which affairs had drifted in 1847 was well described in a Calcutta paper, a year or two later, when the worst was over, as follows17 :—

“ The mismanagement of Joint Stock Companies in India has been so general, and its effects so disastrous to all concerned with, or interested in them, that we regret we cannot afford space at present to detail the measures by which the rapid downward progress of this Company has been so timely arrested, and its rescue from destruction on the very brink of ruin so promptly effected. We presume that all the old hands, when they perceived the inevitable fate awaiting their reckless mismanagement, with the instinct of rats, left the concern, for we find none of their names in the present board or in the management.

“ If we are rightly informed, when the present authorities of the company took charge of its affairs, they found that upwards of 21 lakhs of rupees had been expended upon buildings and cultivation, which it was found, on sending a new superintendent to Assam ought not, under judicious and careful management, to have cost one-tenth of that sum; buildings which ought not at that stage of their operations to have been erected, had been so slightly constructed that they were already tumbling down, and but little was to be found of the extensive clearing and planting which had been reported from Assam, and paid for, and even those in existence were in such a neglected state, that another rainy season would have obliterated every trace of them. The credit and resources of the company were exhausted : they were £7,000 in debt in London, Rs. 40,000 in Calcutta, while the indispensable outlay required in Assam to save the miserable wrecks there, almost drove the then local directors to despair, and the more so, because the London Board urged upon them the closing or even total abandonment of the concern. They, however, possessed discernment enough to perceive the capabilities of the enterprise under better management and with a spirit, firmness, and confidence that does them infinite credit, raised funds on their own individual credit and responsibility to make one more effort to retrieve the affairs of the company.”

That this was not too dark a picture can be seen from the official documents of the company. Mr. Burkinyoung, the Chairman of the Calcutta Board of Directors, wrote in 1848: “You as well as ourselves, have of course long been aware that whilst the paid up capital of the company had been entirely sunk by the close of the year 1844 or nearly so, its expenditure had not been devoted to the true interests of the undertaking, and the extended properties which such a sum should have opened out so far from having been raised, a most limited and insufficient area of tea cultivation was in possession of the company, the chief portion of the capital having been devoted to extraneous and useless purposes, and, in effect, so far hopelessly squandered.” It does seem remarkable, in fact, to find that the area really under cultivation in 1848 was only 400 to 500 poorahs (say 300 to 600 acres).

With business management, however, the concern showed a profit of £3,000 in 1848, and the report for that year18 shows new hope, and new confidence. Out of the debt of £7,000, £2,000 were paid. And the prospects was sufficiently promising to propose a new call of £1 per share (£10,000) to extend the real cultivated area.

On the technical side the production of tea, as will be recognised by all who know tea in Assam in these later days, the authorities were still only feeling their way. The maximum yield per acre on the company in 1848 was 275lbs. of tea. The largest yield in the year was obtained in April and the season finished in September. The actual yield month by month was as follows :—

TBL-002 · FOLIO 36Diplomatic CSV · Tidy CSV
March18,269 lbs.
April41,125 „
May36,391 „
June37,523 „
July31,920 „
August26,079 „
September19,345 „

To us nowadays this would appear, even with China plant, to show that the bushes were being overplucked in the early part of the season, and were never allowed to grow properly before the leaf was taken. This state of affairs continued, however, for some years longer.

Progress was very gradual. The Calcutta directors wished to go ahead: the London Board, having had their fingers burnt so many times, held them back. In 1849 the northern and eastern divisions (Tingri, Jaipur, etc.) were re-opened: on this the London Board expressed “their fear as well as displeasure.19 But the area was slowly extended, and what was more, in spite of the expenditure on this, small profits were made. The crop in 1849 was 216,000lbs. The debt was reduced in this year to £2,500, and in the next season, with a net profit of £5,025, the whole disappeared. At last the first genuine dividend out of profits was paid in 1852 (for the 1851 season).20 It only amounted to 2½ percent., but it proclaimed to the world that the company, having made consistent though small profits from 1848 onward, was no longer the bankrupt concern it had been supposed to be, and had, at least, possibilities of success.

This was followed by a dividend of 3 per cent. in the following season21 and then the two men who had brought the Company from despair to a moderate amount of success—Stephen Mornay in Assam and Henry Burkinyoung in Calcutta—retired. One cannot exaggerate the debt which the tea industry owes to them. Their successors improved their results,—but they it was who made a tea industry appear possible in north-east India.

The new manager in Assam was Mr. George Williamson, perhaps the greatest figure in the development of the Assam tea industry, and afterwards the founder of the Calcutta firm of Williamson Magor & Co.; the managing director in Calcutta was Mr. W. Roberts, afterwards well known for his connection with the Jorehaut and other very successful tea companies. Williamson's report in 1853, after taking charge, was very interesting. He had been there under Mornay and had studied tea planting as nobody had done up to that time. He found a yield over the whole of the gardens of 196lbs. of tea per acre22 only. The local cost of tea was between five and six annas a pound. He recognised the evil of China plant which had been used in putting out many extensions. Speaking of one garden (Kachari Pookri) he says "it also possesses an advantage . . . . in having no China plant, the inferior yielding of which in respect to quantity, is now a well established fact." He notes the great lack of labour, and the unhealthiness of the places, and speaks of serious attacks of cholera "which continued with unremitted virulence for three months."

But so far as I can judge, Williamson's success was primarily due to his recognising that if tea leaf is to be plucked, the tea bushes must first be allowed to grow. The season thus tends to become later. Little tea is obtained in March and April, and when the Directors get alarmed, he re-assures them that all is right. "Injudicious and ignorant plucking may seriously injure the plant and even cause its death by rendering it more liable to be attacked by white ants and worms." The result of his policy was a singular increase of yield per acre. Apart from bad business methods, the non-recognition of that on which Williamson now insisted was, I feel, the biggest cause of the early failures. The lack of technical skill and knowledge had made large success impossible until 1852.

But now with business management, and a man, who had studied the tea bush and its yielding, in charge, things went ahead. The area, crop profit and dividend for the years following are shown below :—

TBL-003 · FOLIO 38Diplomatic CSV · Tidy CSV
Year.CropProfitDividend.
1852............3 per cent.
1858366,687 lbs.£13,2625 ”
1854478,258 „£20,6416 ”
1855558,628 „£11,4807 ”
1856............8 ”

With 1856 we reach a point when the pioneering days were over, and at this stage we may leave our study of the early days of the tea industry. It had proved itself so profitable that other companies were being formed, that prospectors for tea were all over the province, and that a regular industry was in the full course of development. It had, however, taken twenty-two years to reach this stage from the time when Government appointed its tea committee in 1834, as I have shown, the establishment of the industry had had by no means a plain course. The Government undoubtedly gave up their experimental work too soon, before the best method of growing tea had been discovered, or any way was really known of maintaining the crop from tea bushes. The Assam Company entered the field too early, before the knowledge of the subject was far enough advanced to make success really possible. It was mismanaged no doubt. The extravagance from 1840 to 1847 was colossal, and deserved the failure it got. But the technical knowledge required for success was hardly there, and even when business methods became perfectly satisfactory there was still only very moderate success until the technical advance had been made which was required for large and continued yields of tea.

The pioneers of the tea industry are nevertheless men of whom we may well be proud. Jenkins who got the experiments established; Bruce who showed that tea making in Assam was possible; Mornay and Burkinyoung who proved that tea would at least pay; and Williamson who showed how to cultivate tea in a really profitable manner,—all these names deserve remembrance and recognition. Building on their foundations progress was rapid. The next ten years showed an almost inconceivable development, and such profits as led to speculation and almost to ruin in 1866 and the years following. That is, however, another story. The foundations of one of the greatest of Indian agricultural industries had been well laid by 1856, and tea cultivation and manufacture had been placed on the track which had led, through many vicissitudes, to the position which it holds to-day.

Notes

  1. 1. Englishman, June 29th, 1839.
  2. 2. On May 30th, 1839.
  3. 3. Asiatic Journal. Meeting held June 19th, 1839.
  4. 4. Report Assam Co., for 1840 (London), dated May 7th, 1841.
  5. 5. Now generally written Nazira.
  6. 6. Letter quoted in report dated May 7th, 1841 (London).
  7. 7. Friend of India, September 9th, 1841,
  8. 8. Calcutta Board Report, Assam Co., published in Friend of India, 9th September 1841. The Shareholders' meeting was held on 11th August 1841.
  9. 9. Report dated 9th May 1842.
  10. 10. The figure given for the area of a poorah varies. It is sometimes spoken of as 3½ acres. In the present report it is given as 1·21 acres which I think is the figure which should be taken in these reports.
  11. 11. 19th May 1842.
  12. 12. Mr. J. M. Mackie. He reached Assam in October 1843.
  13. 13. Presented (London) 23rd April 1844.
  14. 14. Act XIX of 1845.
  15. 15. The cost of a crop of 96,000lbs. in 1845 is given as 14 annas per pound with all expenses, including freight and insurance.
  16. 16. The Government of Bengal.
  17. 17. Friend of India, 9th May 1850.
  18. 18. Dated London, May 4th, 1849.
  19. 19. Report dated May 3rd, 1850.
  20. 20. Report dated May 7th, 1852.
  21. [Unlinked note, p. 34] Report dated May 6th, 1853.
  22. 22. The figures are given per poorah. I have converted these into yields per acre.