CHAPTER VII.

New treaty with the Nizam—State of affairs among the Mahrattas—The treaty of Bassein—A new Mahratta war—Operations in the Deccan—Victory of Assaye—Operations in Gujarat and Cuttack—Operations in Hindoostan under General Lake—Storming of Alighur—Battle and occupation of Delhi—Capture of Agra—Battle of Laswaree—Conquest of Bundelcund—Battle of Argaom—Siege of Gawilghur—Peace with Scindia and Ragojee Bhonsla.

MARQUIS WELLESLEY, in agreeing to prolong his stay in India, had been influenced, not so much by the request of the directors as by the menacing aspect which affairs were rapidly assuming. It required little political sagacity to perceive that the peace of Amiens could not be lasting, and both the dissensions which prevailed among the Mahrattas, and the hostile spirit manifested by several of their leaders, made it impossible to say how soon a new Indian war of a very formidable description might become inevitable. Under these circumstances the governor-general, even before the flattering request of the directors reached him, had so far retracted his intention of resigning, as to intimate that he would remain until there was a greater prospect of permanent tranquillity. The causes of threatened disturbance must now be briefly traced. The Mahrattas, who had marked the Nizam for their prey, were greatly disappointed and offended at the treaty, by which he dissolved his connections with the French, and placed himself entirely under the protection of the Company. Of course, they were still more disappointed and offended when they found that treaty superseded by another, which established an absolute identity of interest between the contracting parties, and made the Nizam not so much the ally of the Company as their vassal. By this latter treaty, concluded 12th October, 1800, the Nizam was furnished with two battalions of sepoys and a regiment of native cavalry, as an addition to the former subsidiary force, and agreed to cede to the Company in perpetuity as much territory as would yield a revenue equal to the amount of subsidy which he would otherwise have been bound to pay. The possibility of arrears, and of the disputes to which they might have given rise, was thus precluded, and at the same time the sacrifice made by the Nizam was felt to be comparatively slight, because the territories ceded consisted almost entirely of those which he had acquired from Mysore, in the wars of 1792 and 1799, and scarcely trenched at all on his hereditary dominions, the integrity of which was henceforth guaranteed. While the British government were pledged not to interfere in any way with his children, relations, or subjects, and declared that in regard to these they would always consider him absolute, they engaged not to permit any power or state whatever to commit with impunity any act of unprovoked aggression on his territories. As a necessary counterpart of this obligation, he engaged neither to commit hostilities against other states, nor to enter into negotiation with them, without informing and consulting the Company, and in the event of differences arising between him and any other state, he was taken bound to submit them to the Company, and acquiesce in their final decision.

In the above treaty the Mahrattas were not entirely overlooked, for it was expressly stipulated, that in the event of either the peishwa, Ragojee Bhonsla, or Dowlut Row Scindia, desiring to become a party to it, all or either of them should be admitted to all its advantages. Whatever these might be, the Mahrattas were little disposed, and even if disposed would scarcely have been able to avail themselves of them. Nana Furnavese, who had long conducted the government at Poonah in name of the peishwa, with so much ability and craftiness as to merit the surname of the Indian Machiavelli, died at a very advanced age, on the 13th of March, 1800. He was undoubtedly a great statesman, and during the latter part of his life compensated by wisdom, moderation, and a patriotic spirit, for the errors into which an inordinate ambition had led him. His death was the signal for new dissensions. The peishwa and Dowlut Row Scindia, bent on seizing the immense treasures which he was believed to have accumulated, quarrelled over them. Other disputes followed, and disorders everywhere prevailed. After a kind of anarchy, Scindia re-established his ascendency, and while pretending the utmost deference for the peishwa, Bajees Row, kept him virtually a prisoner in his palace, by placing a guard over him. This was a thraldom from which Bajees Row was of course anxious to be delivered, and he looked anxiously about for the means. These he could only obtain by two courses of policy, of which the one was to counterbalance the power of Scindia by encouraging some rival confederate, and the other to accept of a subsidiary force with which the governor-general was willing on certain conditions to furnish him. He preferred the former course, and at one time hoped to be able to carry it out by means of Jeswunt Row Holkar, who, without possessing any legitimate claim, had succeeded in placing himself at the head of the Holkar family. As he will soon occupy a prominent place in our narrative, a brief account of that family, and of the means by which he became its head, may now be given.

The Holkar family are Sudras of the Dhoongur or shepherd tribe, and take their name from their native village of Hull or Hohl, on the Neera, forty-five miles south-east of Poonah. The first member who acquired distinction was Mulhar Row Holkar. He was born about 1693, and owing to his father’s death was removed at the age of five to Candeish, where he was brought up by his maternal uncle. His first employment was to tend his uncle’s sheep. One day as he lay asleep in the fields, a cobra-da-capello was seen to interpose its crest between his face and the rays of the sun. This was deemed so favourable an omen that he was sent to push his fortune as a horseman in the service of a Mahratta chief of the name of Kuddum Bandee. He soon attracted notice, acquired some wealth by the marriage of Golama Baee, his uncle’s daughter, and entered the service of the peishwa Bajee Row, who at once gave him the command of 500 horse. Shortly afterwards, he accompanied Chimnaaje, the peishwa’s brother, on an expedition to the Concan, and greatly assisted in wrestling Bassein and various other places from the Portuguese. So rapid was his subsequent progress, that in 1728 he received a jaghire of twelve, and in 1731 another jaghire of no fewer than seventy districts, north of the Nerbudda. In 1750, after Malwah was conquered, nearly the whole of its territories were divided between Holkar and Scindia, the former receiving 74½ lacs (£745,000), and the latter 65½ lacs (£655,000) of revenue. Mulhar Row now fixed his residence at Indore, which in consequence assumed the dignity and importance of a capital. As the Mahrattas were bent on extending their arms northwards, Mulhar Row was chiefly employed in Hindoostan, and took the lead in most of their operations in that quarter. He was one of the few Mahratta chiefs who escaped unhurt from the disastrous battle of Paniput. It has been alleged that on this day he did not perform his part, and drew off, offended with Sedasheo Bhow, the Mahratta commander-in-chief, who, when urged by him to delay the action for a day or two, disdainfully exclaimed—“Who wants advice from a goatherd?” Another and more probable account is that Mulhar Row owed his escape to the superior manner in which he kept his troops together, and conducted their retreat. He subsequently acquired considerable tracts in Rajpootana and in the Deccan. His merit as an administrator was not less than his skill and courage as a soldier, and he possessed many estimable qualities which have fixed his memory in the affections of his countrymen. He died at the age of seventy-six.

Mulhar Row Holkar having had only one son, Kundee Row, who predeceased him, was succeeded by Kundee Row’s only son, Mallee Row, who was considered of weak and unsettled intellect, and is said to have died in a paroxysm of madness brought on by remorse, for having on unjust suspicion put an innocent man to death. His mother Ahalya Baee, famed for her talents and virtues, immediately assumed the government, and conducted it for thirty years with singular ability and success. By the selection of Gungadhur Jeswunt, the able Brahmin minister of Mulhar Row, as her dewan, and of Tookajee Holkar, who though of the same tribe was not otherwise related to the family, as her commander-in-chief, she secured an administration which under her immediate superintendence secured the prosperity and happiness of her subjects. Tookajee, to whom she left the succession, being much older than herself, could not well be adopted as her son, and was therefore styled by her command Tookajee the son of Mulhar Row Holkar. He remained always in close connection with Mahadajee Scindia, and was usually found fighting along with him in the first Mahratta war. Latterly, however, he began to pursue a more independent course, and on more than one occasion engaged in open hostilities against him. He outlived Scindia, but had reached so advanced an age that he wanted the vigour necessary to cope with Dowlut Row, Scindia’s successor, and died in the midst of the dissensions which followed the death of Mahdoo Row.

Tookajee Holkar left two legitimate sons, Casee Row and Mulhar Row, and two illegitimate, Jeswunt Row and Etogee. Casee Row was of course the legal heir, but incapable of ruling, because both weak in intellect and deformed in body, while his brother was a bold aspiring youth. An arrangement was attempted by which the elder brother was to hold the government, and the younger to command the army, but this arrangement, though it had the sanction both of Ahalya Baee and Tookajee, proved impracticable, and the two youths were soon found plotting against each other’s lives. The elder courted the protection of Dowlut Row Scindia, the younger that of Nana Furnavese, and the dominions of Holkar were in consequence torn asunder by intestine faction. A reconciliation was sought for, and was not only concluded, but confirmed by a solemn oath between the brothers. There was no sincerity in it. In the course of the following night, Scindia’s disciplined battalions surrounded the camp of Mulhar Row and slew him. Among those who escaped was the illegitimate son Jeswunt Row, who fled for protection to Nagpore, the capital of Ragojee Bhonsla, Rajah of Berar. He had a few horsemen with him, and was reported to have carried off some of the family jewels. Whether with the hope of extorting these from him, or conciliating the favour of Scindia, the rajah was ungenerous enough to seize and imprison him. After nearly eighteen months he made his escape, and arrived in great destitution at Dhar, where he was hospitably received by Anund Row, the head of the family of Puar. Scindia no sooner heard of his asylum than he threatened Anund Row with vengeance if he were not seized or expelled; and Jeswunt Row, to spare his benefactor, departed of his own accord with a few attendant horsemen and a small sum of money, which enabled him to raise about 120 half-armed foot. With these he surprised a small body of Casee Row’s household troops, and completely defeated them. This first success was followed by others, but as he knew that his illegitimacy would prevent the great body of the adherents of the Holkar family from joining his standard if he made war in his own name, he professed to have espoused the cause of Kundee Row, the infant son of Mulhar Row, who, since Casee Row’s incapacity made him a mere tool in the hands of Scindia, was, he maintained, the true heir. This profession did him good service, and he began to collect an army, composed indiscriminately of adventurers of all kinds—Mahrattas, Rajpoots, Afghans, Bheels, and Pindarries.

Jeswunt Row’s force continuing to accumulate, some leaders of note began to join him; and he added greatly to his strength by entering into an arrangement with Ameer Khan, a Mahometan predatory chief, who was then encamped with 1500 foot in the vicinity of Bhopaul, a city of Malwah situated on the northern slope of the Vindhya Mountains. The terms of the agreement concluded in 1798 were, that the two chiefs should unite their fortunes, and share equally in all future conquest and plunder. The work of depredation was immediately commenced, and considerable sums were obtained by levying forced contributions. After a successful encounter with one of Casee Row’s officers, Jeswunt Row moved directly against Mhysir, which was then considered the capital of the Holkar dominions, and obtained a large sum in money and jewels. While at Mhysir, the accidental bursting of a musket in his hand deprived him of the sight of one of his eyes, and three months elapsed before he was again able to take the field. The time, however, was not lost, as it enabled him to give a more perfect organization to his army, while Ameer Khan successfully carried on the predatory warfare. At Saugur, in particular, where the work of unrestrained pillage was carried on for nearly a whole month, an enormous booty was obtained. Under such a mode of warfare discipline was impossible, and Ameer Khan’s force degenerated into a mere rabble. The fact was not unobserved, and an unexpected attack by an officer of the Rajah of Berar gave him a severe check. A timely reinforcement by Jeswunt Row saved him, and by means of their united forces the half of Malwah was overrun before Scindia could take any effectual steps for its protection.

As soon as Scindia was in the field with his battalions the war assumed a different form, and several well-contested battles were fought. One of these, which took place in 1790, in the vicinity of Oojin, Scindia’s capital, was gained mainly by Jeswunt Row’s courage and talent. The capture of Oojin itself followed. On this occasion Jeswunt Row showed how superior his discipline was to that of Ameer Khan. Instead of giving up the city to indiscriminate plunder, he took the more effectual plan of replenishing his treasury by a heavy contribution levied upon the inhabitants, in proportion to their real or supposed wealth. The victory of Oojein was ere long followed by a reverse, which deprived Jeswunt Row of all its advantages, and brought him to the very brink of destruction. He had left his success, in another pitched battle fought near Indore, to depend on the success of a stratagem which failed, and was obliged to flee with a mere remnant of his army, leaving his guns, camp, and capital in the hands of the enemy. So disastrous was this defeat, that on his arrival at Mhysir he plainly informed his adherents that his means of giving them regular pay was at an end, that all he could now do was to lead them to plunder. The announcement is said to have been received with acclamations, as no doubt was entertained that under his leadership far more than regular pay would in this way be obtained.

Under this new system, Jeswunt Row’s ranks were rapidly recruited, and he again assumed so formidable an appearance that Scindia, who found himself unable to save his provinces from devastation, would willingly have made peace with him on favourable terms. The peishwa, who had at one time intended to use Jeswunt Row’s influence as a counterpoise to that of Scindia, had by an act of barbarism made this impossible. Etojee or Wittoojee Holkar, the only full brother of Jeswunt Row, having, during the distractions which prevailed at Poonah, joined a body of insurgent horse, was taken prisoner. Considering the services which his father Tookajee had rendered, some mercy might have been shown him, but Bajee Row was of an implacable temper, and forgetting all that Tookajee had done for him, remembered only that he had once been leagued with Nana Furnavese against him. This was enough, and nothing but an atrocious execution would satisfy him. Having seated himself with his favourite at a window of his palace, he ordered Etojee to be brought out and tied to the foot of an elephant. The unhappy victim cried for mercy, but the peishwa, turning a deaf ear to his supplications, looked on with composure, while the elephant dragged him forth from the palace-yard to crush him to death in the public street. Besides glutting his revenge, he meant by this barbarous proceeding to please Scindia, who had him completely in his power. In this he may have succeeded, but he appears to have forgotten that he was at the same time provoking the just vengeance of a formidable enemy. Jeswunt Row loved his brother, and vowed not to rest till he had retaliated on those whom he held to be his murderers. The cowardly peishwa would have stooped to any means of propitiating his wrath. He offered to release the young son of Mulhar Row who was detained at Poonah, or to recognize himself as the heir of the Holkar family; but Jeswunt Row rose in his demands in proportion to the concessions offered, and finding himself strong enough determined to change the seat of war to the Deccan. When at last, after pillaging the territories of Scindia and the peishwa without distinction, he was seen advancing on Poonah, the consternation was extreme, and the peishwa, driven from all other resources, made overtures for a British subsidiary force. As yet, however, he was not so far humbled as to accept the only terms on which the governor-general was willing to grant it, and having once more made common cause with Scindia, he determined to wait the result of an appeal to arms. An attempt was made to oppose Holkar at the Ally Beylah Pass, but he avoided it by making a circuit to the east, passed Ahmednuggur, and finally on the 23rd of October encamped near Loone, a few miles east of Poonah. Two days afterwards the encounter took place. The field was well contested and the issue so doubtful, that Holkar, seeing part of his army seized with panic, exclaimed, “As for me, I have no intention of surviving this day; if I do not gain the victory, where can I flee?” His words were well seconded by his actions. Bringing forward his best infantry, and heading his cavalry in charge after charge, he at length carried all before him. Scindia quitted the field in the utmost disorder, leaving all his guns, stores, and baggage behind. The road to Poonah was now open, but Holkar would not allow his troops to enter, and when some of the Afghan marauders attempted to force their way he drove them back by turning his guns upon them.

The peishwa, who had made sure of victory, quitted his palace in the morning, with the intention of taking part in the action. On hearing the noise of the firing his courage failed, and he turned off to the southward to await the result. The moment it was determined he hastened off to Singhur, and sent a message to Colonel Close, the British resident, binding himself to subsidize six battalions of sepoys, and cede territory of the annual value of twenty-five lacs (£250,000) for their support. After remaining three days at Singhur, he continued his flight, first to Raghur and then to Mhar, from which he despatched a letter requesting the government of Bombay to send shipping to convey him thither. Before a reply was received he repaired to Severndroog, and finally embarked at Rewadunda in a British ship, which carried him to Bassein, where he arrived on the 6th of December, 1802.

The day after the action, Colonel Close at Holkar’s request paid him a visit, and found him “in a small tent, ankle deep in mud, wounded by a spear, and with a sabre cut in the head.” He expressed himself in the most friendly terms towards the British government, and solicited Colonel Close to mediate in settling his differences with Scindia and the peishwa. His subsequent proceedings cast some doubt on his sincerity. Be this as it may, Colonel Close, after being detained by him nearly a month, quitted Poonah. Passports for this purpose were granted with much seeming reluctance. Holkar’s moderation after his victory was not of long continuance. He had hoped by means of it to induce Bajees Row to return. Having failed in this object he threw off disguise, and not only levied a contribution on Poonah for the purpose of paying his troops, but placed Amrut Row, the peishwa’s brother by adoption, on the musnud, and began a course of indiscriminate extortion and plunder. Having discharged the arrears of pay and replenished his treasury with the booty thus obtained, he marched off towards Central India.

Colonel Close arrived at Bombay on the 3rd of December, and proceeded to Bassein. On the evening of the 6th, the very day on which the peishwa landed, he waited upon him, and entered on the subject of the proposed treaty. Its various articles were discussed for the first time on the 18th, and by the 31st everything was arranged. The treaty, consisting of nineteen articles, is of great length. Its leading provisions were, that a subsidiary force of six battalions of native infantry, with the usual complement of field-pieces and European artillerymen, should be stationed by the Company within the peishwa’s territories, and that to meet the annual expense the peishwa should cede to the Company in perpetuity territory yielding a revenue of twenty-six lacs—that the contracting parties would reciprocally protect the territories of each other, and of their allies, the Company engaging in the event of war to furnish as large a force as possible, and the peishwa to furnish, in addition to four of the subsidiary battalions, at least 6000 foot and 10,000 horse, to be employed as circumstances might require—that the peishwa would not make any aggression on other states, nor negotiate with them, without informing and consulting the Company—and that both in regard to existing, and in the event of future differences, he would allow the Company to arbitrate, and submit to their award. By other articles the peishwa engaged not to allow any Europeans belonging to a nation at war with Great Britain, or engaged in intriguing against British interests, to reside within his territories, and agreed to commute or abandon certain Mahratta claims on Surat and other districts. The subsidiary force was “to be at all times ready for such services as the due correction of his highness’s subjects and dependants, and the overawing and chastising of rebels, or exciters of disturbance;” but the Company were “to have no manner of concern with any of his highness’s children, relations, subjects, or servants; with respect to whom his highness is absolute.”

The peishwa had no sooner purchased security at the expense of independence, than he began to waver and question the propriety of the course which he had adopted. He was well aware how obnoxious the treaty would be to Scindia, and Ragojee Bhonsla, Rajah of Berar, had repeatedly warned him against any step which would increase British influence, and yet he had now rendered himself entirely subservient to it. Ostensibly for the purpose of explaining the treaty and urging them to become parties to it, but really for the purpose of excusing himself for having sought European protection, he despatched an envoy to each of them with a letter, in which he urged them to march with all speed to Poonah, and punish the rebel Holkar. With his usual craft he said nothing of the British, calculating that in the event of a collision, which he evidently anticipated, he would be able, by not having committed himself, to obtain the protection of the winning party. The governor-general, who had repeatedly urged Scindia to conclude a treaty similar to that of Bassein, was in hopes that he would see the necessity of giving in his adherence to it, and sent him an invitation to that effect through Colonel Collins. At first Scindia evaded discussion, but on being pressed declared that he would neither join the defensive alliance nor obstruct it, though he expected that, as the guarantee of the treaty of Salbye, he would have been consulted before new arrangements were made. His intentions, however, he declared, were in every respect friendly to the British government. So far was this from being true, that he had despatched an envoy to Ragojee Bhonsla, for the purpose of cementing a general Mahratta confederacy against the British as the common enemy.

No time was lost in making the necessary preparations to re-establish the peishwa at Poonah. On the 25th of March, 1803, Colonel Stevenson, at the head of the Nizam’s subsidiary force and two regiments of native cavalry, mustering in all above 8000 men, and accompanied by 15,000 of the Nizam’s own troops, took up a position at Purinda on the peishwa’s frontier, about 100 miles east of his capital, and at the same time Major-general Wellesley (such was now his rank) arrived on the northern frontier of Mysore, at the head of 8000 infantry and 1700 cavalry. On the banks of the Kistna, General Wellesley was joined by numerous Mahratta jaghiredars in the peishwa’s interest, and began his advance on Poonah. Holkar’s troops retired precipitately as he approached, and as it was learned that he had left only a small garrison in the capital, with instructions to burn it before leaving. General Wellesley hastened forward with his cavalry, and took possession of it without opposition, on the 20th of April. Colonel Stevenson, whose co-operation was no longer required, moved north towards the Godavery to protect the country against Holkar’s marauders. On the 13th of May the peishwa arrived from Bassein, and resumed his seat on the musnud amid general rejoicings.

Scindia, who proceeded to the north after his defeat, had in the meantime returned, crossed the Nerbudda, and encamped at Boorhanpoor on the Nizam’s frontiers. Though his professions were still friendly, he had through his ministers remonstrated against the British advance on Poonah, and was busily engaged in concert with Ragojee Bhonsla in preparing for war. It was even understood that he had made overtures to Holkar, and was aiming at nothing less than a general Mahratta confederacy, the object of which was obvious. From letters afterwards discovered, it appears that his designs were countenanced by the peishwa himself. Under these circumstances, the resident at his court was instructed that he should retire from the threatening position he occupied on the Nizam’s frontier, or give some unequivocal proof that his intentions were not hostile. As the most effectual means of seconding the remonstrances of the resident, General Wellesley advanced a few marches to the northward of Poonah, so as to have an opportunity of daily communication with him, and also of co-operating if necessary with Colonel Stevenson. On the 27th of May, the resident at an interview with Scindia formally communicated to him the treaty of Bassein. He went over it article by article, and admitted that he saw nothing which trenched in the least on his legitimate authority. When pressed as to his intentions, he not only refused to explain them, but put an end to all further discussion by the following astounding announcement:—“After my interview with the Rajah of Berar, you shall be informed whether it will be peace or war.”

As war seemed now to be inevitable, the governor general vested General Wellesley and Lord Lake, the respective commanders of the armies of the Deccan and of Hindoostan, with the most complete military, civil, and political powers. General Wellesley was specially authorized to negotiate with Scindia, Holkar, and Ragojee Bhonsla, with a view to their retirement within their own territories, or the granting of some sufficient pledge of pacific intentions within a certain number of days; should they by their refusal make war inevitable, he was to carry it on in the most active manner, and listen to no proposals of peace till the chiefs against whom the war was directed should be rendered incapable of further mischief. Lord Lake was informed that if war took place its objects were to be the complete reduction of the power which the French were establishing in Hindoostan by means of Scindia’s brigades, the occupation of the whole of the Doab and of Bundelcund, and the possession of Delhi, Agra, and a chain of posts on the right bank of the Jumna.

On the 14th of July General Wellesley addressed a letter to Scindia, in which, after pointing out the friendly purposes of the treaty of Bassein, and the apparently hostile intentions manifested by the confederate chiefs, he called upon him to separate his army from that of Ragojee Bhonsla and recross the Nerbudda. This being done, he would on his part withdraw the British troops to their ordinary stations. Four days after writing this letter he was made acquainted with the above powers conferred by the governor-general; he communicated them to Scindia, and at the same time instructed the resident, in the event of his former demands not being complied with, to withdraw instantly from the Mahratta camp. Scindia at first seemed disposed to yield, but after a conference with Ragojee Bhonsla, and a delay of a few days, returned for answer on the 25th of July that they were within their own territories, and would promise not to pass the Adjunta Hills, nor march to Bonah; as to the treaty of Bassein, they had already assured the governor-general that they would not interfere with it. After a number of promises and evasions, by which they managed to spin out the time till the 3d of August, the resident quitted the Mahratta camp, and General Wellesley prepared to commence hostilities by the attack of the fortress of Ahmednuggur. The pettah or town, which had a lofty wall flanked with towers, but no rampart, was defended by a number of Arabs, supported by a battalion of Scindia’s regular infantry, and a body of horse, who lay encamped in an open space between the town and fort. The resistance was vigorous, the enemy retiring to the houses after the wall was forced, and keeping up a destructive fire from them. The capture, however, was completed in a single day. On the following day, the 9th of August, the general, after reconnoitering the fort, seized a position within 400 yards of it. In the course of the night a battery of four guns was erected, and in the morning at daylight it opened with such effect that the killedar offered to treat for surrender. Immediate submission was demanded; and at last, on the 11th, he surrendered, on being permitted to depart with his garrison and private property. The possession of this place was of great importance, from its position on the Nizam’s frontier, and the facilities it afforded for future operations, by furnishing a large and secure depôt for provisions and military stores.

After this capture, and the occupation of the adjoining districts, General Wellesley moved to the Godavery, and crossed it on the 24th of August, Colonel Stevenson in the meantime moving northwards in the direction of Aurungabad. Scindia and the Rajah of Berar were now also in motion. After penetrating the Adjunta Pass, they had marched eastward, and seized Jalnapore, or Jaulna, about forty miles east of Aurungabad, and then, on finding

that General Wellesley had arrived at Aurungabad on the 29th, turned suddenly to the south-east, as if intending to cross the Godavery and make a dash at Hyderabad, where the death of Nizam Ali on the 6th, and the succession of his son Secunder Jah, were perhaps supposed to favour their attempt. To counteract this design, and either bring them to a general action, or compel them to a retreat, General Wellesley followed close on their track, and so completely checked their operations to the south, that they hastened back and took up a position to the north of Jalnapore. On the 2d of September this fort was taken by Colonel Stevenson, who, being now in the immediate vicinity of the confederates, endeavoured to bring them to action. In this he failed; though he afterwards succeeded by a night attack in throwing their camp into the greatest consternation, and in inflicting upon them a considerable loss.

On the 21st of September the whole of the Mahratta army, joined by their infantry, which consisted of sixteen battalions of regular infantry, was encamped in the neighbourhood of Jafferabad, twenty-two miles north of Jalnapore, while General Wellesley and Colonel Stevenson had formed a junction at Budnapoor, about ten miles west of the latter place. The two camps were thus only about twenty-five miles distant from each other, and a decisive battle was consequently anticipated. The plan adopted by the British was to move their army in two divisions, and make an united attack on the enemy on the morning of the 24th. They accordingly separated on the 22d, Colonel Stevenson taking the western, and General Wellesley the eastern route. On the 23rd, when about to encamp at Naulnye, General Wellesley learned from his spies that the confederates were encamped within six miles of him, on the banks of the Kailna. His resolution was immediately taken. In another day the enemy would in all probability have sent off their infantry, and continued to carry on a desultory and protracted warfare with their horse, watching every opportunity to attack the baggage of the British, and hamper their movements. This was the very thing which General Wellesley was anxious to avoid, and he therefore determined, instead of waiting for Colonel Stevenson, to risk a general action with his own division, notwithstanding an immense disparity of numbers, still further increased by the necessity of leaving a detachment at Naulnye to protect the baggage.

General Wellesley having moved out at the head of the pickets to reconnoitre, ascended a rising ground from which the host of the confederates was seen extending along the north bank of the Kailna, within the fork formed by the junction of this river with the Juah. Their right, posted westward towards the village of Bokerdun, consisted wholly of cavalry, and was protected by the high and rocky banks of the stream, which, except at some particular spots, was wholly impassable for guns; their left, consisting of the infantry and artillery, was placed more immediately within the fork, and close to the fortified village of Assaye, from which the battle about to be fought afterwards took its name. The position was admirably adapted for defence; but in the event of its being forced, left no means of retreat, and hence General Wellesley’s exclamation after surveying it, “They cannot escape me!” As the British had previously marched fourteen miles to Naulnye, and when there were still six miles distant from the enemy’s camp, it was one o’clock in the afternoon before they reached their destined position.

When the British arrived on the field their position was on the south side of the Kailna, in front of the enemy’s right; but as the attack in this direction would have been against cavalry only, while the great object was the capture or destruction of the infantry and guns, General Wellesley moved eastward till beyond the enemy’s left, and then forded the Kailna near the village of Pepulgaon. He thus arrived in the very angle of the fork, and drew up his infantry in two lines, with the British cavalry immediately behind them in a third line as a reserve. The peishwa’s and the Mysore cavalry was left on the south side of the river to check the movements of the enemy’s horse, of which a considerable number had crossed the Kailna, and followed the British in their movement eastward. This was the ostensible reason—but there is said to have been another. Intelligence had been received that the peishwa’s cavalry intended to join Scindia, instead of attacking him, and were therefore placed where they could do the least mischief. The first line of British infantry consisted of the advanced pickets to the right, two battalions of sepoys, and his majesty’s 78th Highlanders; the second of his majesty’s 74th regiment and two battalions of sepoys; and the third of his majesty’s 19th dragoons and three regiments of native cavalry; in all 4500 men. Opposed to them were Monsieur Pohlman’s brigade of 6000 men, Dupont’s of 2500, and four battalions, mustering 2000 men, belonging to the Begum Sumroo. These, forming 10,500 disciplined troops, commanded by European officers, were exclusive of the artillerymen, Scindia’s irregular infantry, and the infantry of the Rajah of Berar. In addition to all these was a well-appointed train of artillery, exceeding 100 guns, and large bodies of horse, estimated at nearly 40,000.

The battle began with a cannonade on the British as they were moving to ford the Kailna. Previous to this movement the infantry and guns of the enemy were arranged along the north bank of the river; but as soon as it was discovered to be preparatory to an attack on the left, they changed their position, one line stretching from south to north, between the rivers, so as to face the British, and another at right angles to it, extending from Assaye westward along the south bank of the Jauh. General Wellesley, as soon as his dispositions were completed, ordered his troops to advance under cover of his artillery, which opened on the enemy at the distance of 400 yards. In this way, however, little progress could be made. Owing to the tremendous cannonade of the enemy, the British loss in men and bullocks was so great that their guns could not be moved forward. They were therefore ordered to be left behind, and General Wellesley placing himself at the head of the line, advanced to close combat. When the Mahrattas saw the comparatively insignificant band marching steadily and intrepidly towards them, they stood astonished and appalled, as if uncertain whether to risk the encounter or save themselves by flight. Shame rather than courage seemed to detain them, till the order to charge with the bayonet was given. Its effect was irresistible. The first line the moment bayonets were crossed gave way, and fell back closely pursued on the second line placed along the Jauh. During the struggle the pickets of the infantry and the 74th regiment posted on the right of the British first and second lines had been so much thinned by the artillery stationed near Assaye, that a body of Mahratta horse were emboldened to charge the regiment. They paid dearly for their presumption. Their charge was instantly met by a counter-charge of the British cavalry under Colonel Maxwell, who drove them with great slaughter into the river. Meanwhile the bayonet continued to do its work, and the enemy’s second line gave way still easier than their first. The flight was now general, and the victory complete, though an incident occurred which, but for the cool intrepidity of the commander, might have converted it into a defeat.

The cavalry having crossed to the north of the Juah, were following the fugitives with great slaughter along the banks, and the infantry were also in eager pursuit, when they suddenly heard a cannonade in their rear. The cause was soon explained. A considerable number of Mahrattas had thrown themselves down among their guns, where they lay like heaps of dead. Believing them to be so, the British line passed them without notice, and were continuing the pursuit in disorder, when the fancied dead suddenly sprung up, and turned the cannon upon the pursuers. Before the mistake could be retrieved, some of the enemy’s corps, who had been retreating in good order, faced about, while several bodies of their cavalry kept hovering at a short distance. The battle had in a manner to be fought over again, till General Wellesley put himself at the head of the 78th regiment and the 7th regiment of native cavalry, and charged the Mahrattas who had seized the guns. He succeeded, but only after a bloody contest, in which he had a horse shot under him, and was in the most imminent peril. Colonel Maxwell, though equally successful in charging the infantry of the enemy, who had halted and formed a line, was not personally so fortunate, for the charge cost him his life.

The battle lasted upwards of three hours, and was not gained without a heavy loss. The number of killed and wounded in the British army was 1566, rather more than a third of all the troops engaged; the enemy left 1200 dead on the field of battle, and the country covered with their wounded, though the small number of the victors, and the incident above mentioned, prevented them from reaping the full fruits of their success. Their trophies were seven standards, the camp equipage, a number of bullocks and camels, a large quantity of military stores and ammunition, and ninety-eight pieces of ordnance. Colonel Stevenson having joined with his division on the evening of the 24th, was despatched in pursuit of the enemy, who had fled in the direction of the Adjunta Ghaut. On the 8th of October a letter was received from Balajee Khoonjur, now one of Scindia’s, though formerly one of the peishwa’s ministers. It was addressed to General Wellesley, and purported to be written by Scindia’s authority. It requested that an envoy might be sent to his camp for the purpose of negotiating a peace. It was impossible to listen to such a proposal. The writer showed no proper authority, and his previous character makes it doubtful if he had received any. It seemed expedient, however, not to leave it unanswered, and therefore General Wellesley, while declining the overture in the form in which it had been made, declared his readiness to receive at the British camp, with every mark of distinction, any person duly authorized by the confederates to open a negotiation with a view to the termination of hostilities.

The confederates having collected the remains of their army, moved westward along the banks of the Taptee, apparently intending afterwards to turn south for Poonah. General Wellesley therefore remained to regulate his movements by theirs, and directed Colonel Stevenson to proceed north to Boorhan-poor. It yielded to him without opposition on the 16th of October, and as the enemy on his approach retired towards the Nerbudda in complete disorganization, he determined to lay siege to the strong fortress of Aseerghur, situated about ten miles farther north. On the 18th he gained possession of the petah, and effected a lodgment within 150 yards of the lower fort. A protracted defence might have been made, as the place, crowning an elevated summit of the Satpoora range between the valleys of the Taptee and the Nerbudda, was strong both by nature and art. No sooner, however, had the batteries opened than the killedar agreed to the terms, or rather accepted the bribe which had been offered him, and delivered up the place, the garrison being not only permitted to depart with their private property, but receiving, moreover, 20,000 rupees as arrears of pay. Aseerghur was the last place which Scindia possessed in the Deccan, and as his prospects were now gloomy in the extreme, he desired, or deemed it expedient to profess a desire for peace. He accordingly sent an ambassador to the British camp. General Wellesley, though aware that Scindia’s real object was to gain time for recruiting his strength, received his ambassador with every demonstration of satisfaction, and after various conferences agreed on the 23d of November to a truce, of which the principal condition was, that Scindia should occupy a position forty miles east of Elich-poor, and that the British should not advance farther into his dominions.

As the Rajah of Berar was not included in this truce, Scindia’s agreement to it was equivalent to a dissolution of the confederacy. So important an event could scarcely have been produced by the campaign of the Deccan alone, and it is therefore necessary in accounting for it to attend to the military operations which had been simultaneously and successfully carried on against the confederates in other quarters.

When the Mahratta war had become inevitable, Marquis Wellesley, with characteristic energy, made his preparations for it on a very extensive scale, and was ready to commence operations with a British force amounting in all to about 55,000 men. It was impossible, however, from the nature of the war, to concentrate this force so as to enable it to act as a single army, and it was therefore necessary to break it up, and station it in localities so widely distant from each other, that the subdivisions became in fact separate armies. The principal localities were the Deccan, Gujarat, Hindoostan, and Orissa or Cuttack. The operations carried on in the Deccan, from the commencement of the war to the truce with Scindia, under General Wellesley, at the head of about 10,000, and of Colonel Stevenson at the head of about 8500 men, have just been detailed. We now turn to the operations in Gujarat, which are properly an appendage to those of the Deccan, as the chief command of both forces belonged to General Wellesley.

The force employed in Gujarat amounted to rather more than 7000 men, furnished by the presidency of Bombay, and commanded by Colonel Murray. After providing for the safety of Surat, Baroda, the Guicowar’s capital, and other places, the number left to operate against Scindia’s possessions in the province amounted only to 4281 men. These were formed into two detachments, the one of which, consisting of 2187 men, was stationed in front of Baroda, while the other, consisting of 2094 men, took up a position south of the Taptee, between Surat and Soneghur. The former detachment, under Colonel Woodington, marched on the 21st of August against Baroach, situated on the right bank of the Nerbudda, thirty miles above its mouth in the Gulf of Cambay. The petah was gained on the 24th, a breaching battery of two eighteen pounders opened on the 26th, and a breach effected, which was pronounced practicable on the 29th. The assault, delayed till three o’clock in the afternoon for the co-operation of a gun-boat, which was, however, unable from the shallowness of the water to approach, was successful, after a vigorous resistance made chiefly by Arabs, who formed part of the garrison. The capture of the town was followed by the occupation of the whole district, the revenue of which was estimated at eleven lacs (£110,000). Colonel Woodington next reduced Champaneer, and then summoned the adjacent fortress of Powanghur. It consisted of a lower and an upper fort, occupying the sides and summit of an immense rock, so lofty and precipitous as to be accessible only on the north side. The killedar, after seeing a breach made in the lower fort, happily lost courage, and a place which might have held out for months was obtained by capitulation in the course of a few days. The whole operations in Gujarat had been skilfully planned, and were executed with so much celerity and success, that before the end of September Scindia had not a foot of ground within the province.

In Orissa, on the opposite side of India, war was carried with equal success into the territories of the Rajah of Berar. Though the whole of Orissa was included in the grant of the dewannee obtained by Clive, the Company had been obliged to rest satisfied with only a portion of it. The district of Cuttack was held by the Mahrattas, who, fully aware of its importance, refused to part with it. Had the Company possessed it they would have had a continuous line of coast stretching from the mouths of the Ganges to Madras. The value of such a communication had been long recognized, and negotiations had been repeatedly entered into for the purpose of acquiring it, either by exchange or purchase. The war into which the Rajah of Berar had rashly entered seemed to afford an opportunity of acquiring it by conquest, and it was accordingly determined to wrest it from him. With this view the governor-general, in fixing the localities which were to be made the seat of war, allotted an important detachment for Cuttack, which, when held by an enemy, not only enabled him to cut off the land communication with Madras, but brought him into dangerous proximity to Bengal. Indeed, during the first Mahratta war, the part assigned to the Rajah of Berar by his confederates was to ruin the Company’s interest in their most valuable province, by leading an invading army direct to Calcutta.

The force designed to operate in Cuttack consisted of 573 Europeans, and 2468 native infantry and cavalry, with some artillery, under Colonel Campbell. Besides these, 500 Bengal volunteers under Captain Dick, and the same number under Captain Morgan, were embarked at Calcutta, the former to land at Ganjam, to support the main body which had previously assembled at that place, and the latter to seize the port of Balasore, which then belonged to the rajah. At Jellasore, situated on the north bank of the Subanreeka, which bounded the Company’s and the rajah’s territories on the north, as the small river at the mouth of which Ganjam stands bounded them on the south, was assembled under Colonel Ferguson another detachment of 750 sepoys, and 81 cavalry of the governor-general’s body-guard; while at Midnapore, forty miles further north, a reserve of 800 sepoys and 500 native Bengal volunteers had been formed, for the double purpose of supporting the advanced corps, and checking any inroads of the rajah’s predatory horse. On the 8th of September Colonel Campbell moved forward with the main body towards Cuttack, but a severe illness under which he was suffering obliged him to resign the command to Colonel Harcourt, the governor-general’s military secretary. On arriving at Manickpatam, which was occupied without resistance, Colonel Harcourt despatched a letter to Brahmins of Juggernaut, recommending them to place their temple under British protection. They at once complied. The city of Juggernaut was occupied by the British troops on the 18th, and the British connection with Hindoo idolatry, afterwards so justly reprobated, began to be formed. The difficulties of the march were now greatly increased, both by the badness of the weather and considerable numbers of the enemy, who hovered on the British rear and flanks without venturing to come to close quarters. Still, Colonel Harcourt continued to make steady progress, and arrived in the beginning of October at the fort of Barabuttee, only a mile distant from the town of Cuttack. The fort, though possessed of considerable strength, was taken by storm on the 14th with little loss. Previous to this capture, important reinforcements had been made to the main body by the junction of the detachments under Colonel Ferguson and Captain Morgan. The latter had been completely successful at Balasore, which was gained with the loss of only one sepoy killed and three wounded. The capture of the fort of Barabuttee was immediately followed by the submission of the whole province of Cuttack, and Colonel Harcourt immediately prepared to proceed westward, through the defile of Bernath, into the other territories of the rajah, for the purpose of co-operating with General Wellesley.

Hindoostan, though the account of the military operations carried on within it has been reserved for the last, was in some respects the most important seat of the war. The main army, under the personal command of General Lake, commander-in-chief, assembled in the Doab—the fertile province so called from lying between two rivers, the Jumna and the Ganges—and amounted to 10,500 men, exclusive of 3500 collected at Allahabad for the purpose of invading Bundelcund. The first object aimed at was the overthrow of the regularly disciplined brigades, commanded by Monsieur Perron, and which, though belonging nominally to Scindia, were to all intents independent, and entirely devoted to French interests. Instead of depending on periodical pay, they had obtained the assignment of a large tract of valuable territory in the very heart of the country for their maintenance, and as if they had been absolute sovereigns, not only ruled it with despotic sway, but were extending their influence on every side, by means of treaties offensive and defensive with the neighbouring chiefs. According to the statement of Mr. Stuart, a British officer, who quitted Scindia’s service shortly after the commencement of hostilities, Perron’s brigades mustered in all 43,650 men and 464 guns. The portion of this force with Scindia in the Deccan was estimated at 23,650 men, and consequently the remainder opposed to General Lake did not exceed 20,000. This, however, was exclusive of the troops employed in garrisons.

On the 7th of August, 1803, General Lake marched from Cawnpore the infantry on that station, commanded by General St. John, and the cavalry by Colonel St. Leger. On the 12th the whole army, which had moved northward along the right bank of the Ganges, encamped on the plains of Aroul, not far from Canouge. From this encampment the army quitting the river proceeded westward. Hostilities were not yet actually declared, but on the 26th, when at Secundra, General Lake received despatches from the governor-general, authorizing him to commence active operations against Scindia, Perron, and their allies, should intelligence of a pacific settlement not be in the meantime received from General Wellesley. On the 28th, the army, reinforced by the detachment from Futtehhur under General Ware, encamped on the Mahratta frontiers, within sight of the mosque of Coel, where Perron was seen strongly posted, not far from the fortress of Alighur. At four in the morning of the 29th, the army entered the Mahratta territory, and advanced to the attack of Perron, who immediately brought the whole of his horse, amounting to 20,000 of whom 4000 were regular cavalry, into the plain. The position was strong. On the right was the fort of Alighur, in front a deep morass, and on the left difficult ground, and some villages affording good cover. The last being evidently the weakest point, General Lake selected it for his attack. In proportion, however, as the British advanced the enemy receded, and finally abandoned the field without hazard, a general action. M. Perron retired towards Agra, leaving the command of Alighur to M. Pedron, with instructions to defend it to the last extremity.

General Lake having taken possession of Coel, and encamped on its north side, summoned M. Pedron to surrender the fort. The answer was, in terms of his instructions, that he was determined to defend it. As delay would only have rendered the capture more difficult, it was resolved to lose no time in making the assault. The morning of the 4th of September was fixed upon, and the attack was to be led by the Honourable Colonel Monson. On the previous night two covering batteries, each of four eighteen-pounders, were erected to protect the approach of the storming party, which left the camp at three in the morning, and by making a circuit, arrived within 4000 yards of the gateway, without being discovered. Having halted here till the signal was given, they moved on under cover of a heavy fire from the batteries, till they were within 100 yards of the gate. A traverse recently erected in front of it was mounted with three guns, but the enemy were dislodged before they had time to fire them, and Colonel Monson pushed forward with the two flank companies of the 76th regiment, in the hope of being able to enter the fort with the defenders of the traverse. On arriving, he found the first gate shut, while the entrance was raked by guns, which kept up a destructive fire of grape. Two ladders were instantly applied, but a formidable row of pikemen made it impossible to mount. An attempt to force the gate, first by a six and then by a twelve pounder, did not succeed, till after a delay of twenty minutes, during which the storming party stood exposed to a severe fire of grape and musketry. During this delay the enemy actually crowded the scaling ladders, and came down by them to engage their assailants hand to hand. It was at this time that Colonel Monson was wounded by a pike and the British sustained their heaviest loss. As soon as the first gate was forced the storming party advanced along a narrow circular road, defended by a round tower, loopholed for musketry, which plied incessantly, while showers of grape were poured down from a neighbouring bastion. Happily, the second gate was easily forced, and a third was gained before the enemy, now becoming confused, had time to close it. A fourth gate threatened to be a fatal obstacle. The twelve-pounder, after some delay in bringing it forward, failed to force it. At length an entrance having been gained by the wicket, the whole party rushed forward, and having gained the ramparts soon rendered further resistance vain. In the course of an hour they had made themselves masters of a fortress long deemed impregnable. The total British loss in killed and wounded was 223; that of the garrison in killed alone, not so much by the sword of the assailants as by desperate attempts to escape, exceeded 2000. M. Pedron, the commandant, was among the prisoners. The fortress was a most valuable acquisition, not merely on its own account, but from the quantity of military stores which it contained, the French having made it their chief depôt in the Doab. This selection was certainly justified by the natural and artificial strength of the place. Its site on an elevated plain surrounded by swamps, made it perfectly inaccessible in the rainy season, and everything which the skill of French engineers could devise had been employed to add to its natural strength. One serious mistake they had made, in allowing the entrance by a causeway to remain. Had they joined the two sides of the ditch, by cutting it across, and substituting a drawbridge, it never could have been carried by an assault, without regular approaches. The number of guns found in the fort was 281.

After securing Alighur, and by the substitution of a drawbridge making the improvement which the French so fatally for themselves had omitted, the army set out on the 7th of September for Delhi. On the same day General Lake received a letter from M. Perron, stating that he had quitted the service of Scindia, and requesting permission to proceed with his family and property to Lucknow, under the escort either of a British or of his own body-guard. Both escorts were at once granted him, and he ultimately settled in the neighbourhood of Chandernagore. Whatever the motive of his resignation may have been, it did good service to the British, from its being generally believed that he had despaired of Scindia’s success. The capture of Alighur had made so strong an impression, that several places which might have made a good defence were abandoned as the army approached them. Intelligence, however, was received which made it almost certain, that it would not be permitted to reach Delhi without a struggle. Sixteen battalions of regular infantry, 6000 cavalry, and a large train of artillery, under M. Bourquieu, were said to have crossed the Jumma for the purpose of giving battle. The intelligence proved correct. On reaching the place of encampment, near the Jehna Nullah, about six miles from Delhi, the tents were scarcely pitched when the enemy appeared in front in great force. On reconnoitring, General Lake found their whole force strongly posted on a rising ground in order of battle. Each flank was covered by a swamp, and while the cavalry were stationed beyond it, the front was defended by a line of entrenchments and numerous artillery.

General Lake, on reconnoitring, had taken with him the whole cavalry, consisting of three regiments. On making himself sufficiently acquainted with the numbers and position of the enemy, and perceiving that they could only be attacked in front, he sent instant orders for the infantry and artillery to join the cavalry. As the latter were two miles in advance of the camp, an hour was lost before this junction was effected, and in the meantime the enemy kept up a cannonade which caused a considerable loss in men and horses. The general himself had a horse shot under him, as had also his son, Major Lake, at a later period. After a time it seemed doubtful if success could be obtained while the enemy kept their position, and an attempt was therefore made to draw them from their entrenchments by means of a feint. The cavalry accordingly were ordered to retire, with the double object of alluring the enemy into the plain, and covering the advance of the infantry. The manoeuvre succeeded. The enemy, convinced that the withdrawal of the cavalry was the commencement of a retreat, rushed forward, shouting as if they had gained the victory. Meanwhile, the British infantry having come up, the cavalry opened in the centre and allowed them to advance to the front. Great was the surprise and consternation when the enemy, instead of finding the confusion of a retreat, saw themselves face to face with a firm and impenetrable line of infantry. The order to advance was immediately given, General Lake himself leading in person, at the head of the 76th regiment, in the face of a tremendous fire of round grape and chain shot. On arriving within a hundred paces, the whole line fired a volley, and then rushed on with the bayonet. The result was not for a moment doubtful. The enemy, as if a general panic had seized them, fled with precipitancy in all directions. The cavalry and galloper-guns, taking up the pursuit, followed the fugitives to the banks of the Jumma, in which prodigious numbers of them perished. The loss of the British in killed and wounded was 409; that of the enemy was roughly estimated at 3000. The immediate trophies of the victory were sixty-eight pieces of cannon, two tumbrils laden with treasure and thirty-seven laden with ammunition, besides twenty-four which were blown up. The battle, which was fought within sight of the towers of Delhi and takes its name from it, was followed by the evacuation of this celebrated capital of the Moguls by the enemy, and the undisputed occupation of it by the British forces.

Some time previous to the battle a secret communication had been opened with Shah Alum, assuring him, if he could place himself under the protection of the British government, “that every demonstration of respect and attention would be paid towards his majesty on the part of that government, and that an adequate provision would be made for the support of his majesty, and of his family and household.” He returned an answer expressive of a wish to avail himself of this offer, and accordingly, when the army crossed the Jumma on the 14th of September and proceeded to take possession of the city, they were hailed as deliverers. The interview of General Lake with Shah Alum took place on the 16th, and must have seemed to the governor-general very important, since he has condescended in one of his despatches to describe it circumstantially. The Prince Mirza Akbar Shah, the heir-apparent, was deputed to conduct the commander-in-chief to the royal presence. He was to have arrived at twelve o’clock, but oriental etiquette made him late, and he did not arrive till half-past three. The governor-general’s description thus continues:—“By the time his royal highness had been received, remounted on his elephant, and the whole cavalcade formed, it was half-past four o’clock. The distance being five miles, the commander-in-chief did not reach the palace of Delhi until sunset. The crowd in the city was extraordinary; and it was with some difficulty that the cavalcade could make its way to the palace. The courts of the palace were full of people, anxious to witness the deliverance of their sovereign from a state of degradation and bondage. At length the commander-in-chief was ushered into the royal presence, and found the unfortunate venerable emperor, oppressed by the accumulated calamities of old age, degraded authority, extreme poverty, and loss of sight, seated under a small tattered canopy, the remnant of his royal state, with every external appearance of the misery of his condition.” From the sympathy here expressed, and his afterwards talking of the capture of Delhi as “delivering the unfortunate and aged emperor Shah Alum, and the royal house of Timour, from misery, degradation, and bondage,” one is almost prepared to expect that the governor-general was to re-establish the Mogul empire, or at least to give back to Shah Alum all that the Company themselves had wrested from him since the grant of the dewannee—the reserved revenue of £250,000 sterling, which they had ceased to pay him on some flimsy pretext, but in reality because they found payment inconvenient—and the two provinces of Allahabad and Corah, which, while holding them nominally as his trustees, they sold for their own behoof to the Nabob of Oude. Nothing of the kind was intended; it would have been bad policy; it was totally inconsistent with the governor-general’s schemes; and hence all his pompous language was only a prelude to his final instruction, that such “regard should be paid to the comfort and convenience of his majesty and the royal family as was consistent with the due security of their persons.” Shah Alum appears to have repaid his benefactors in their own coin. “In addition to other marks of royal condescension and favour,” says the governor-general, “the emperor was graciously pleased to confer on General Lake the second title in the empire, Sumsam-u-Dowlah, Ashgar-ul-Moolk, Khan Dowran Khan, General Gerald Lake Behauder, Futteh Jung—’the Sword of the State, the Hero of the Land, the Lord of the Age, and the Victorious in War.’” Merely to show that the governor-general was not permitted to monopolize the pompous verbiage used on this occasion, we quote the following observation on it by Major Thorn:—“In whatever light distinctions of this nature may appear to those who consider the blaze of power alone as the highest legitimate source of glory, without any regard to the means by which it is acquired or the consequences produced, the mind of nobler sentiments and more delicate feeling will estimate them according to the merits by which they have been earned, and the spirit from whence they flow. Though these lofty titles were conferred upon the British general by a sovereign destitute of wealth, and shorn of the beams of regal majesty, the importance of the service and the gratitude of an enfranchised people gave a splendour to the grant equal, if not superior, to the glittering rewards of renown.” At the time when Shah Alum performed his part in this empty ceremony he was eighty-three years of age. He lived other three years, and at his death in 1806 was succeeded by the above prince, Mirza Akbar Shah, “who,” says Thorn, “ascended the throne without molestation, a circumstance unparalleled in the history of Hindoostan.” He could not add, what will afterwards be seen, that he was destined to be the last who sat upon it, and to end his days on a savage island as a just punishment for atrocious crimes.

Leaving Colonel Ochterlony in charge of Delhi, General Lake, on the 24th of September, 1803, commenced his march southward along the right bank of the Jumma. His object was Agra, which was in the hands of Scindia’s adherents. He arrived before it on the 4th of October, and by the 7th had cut off its communications with the surrounding country. On the 9th he concluded a treaty offensive and defensive with the Rajah of Bhurtpoor, who immediately sent him a reinforcement of 5000 cavalry. The garrison of Agra had previous to the war been commanded by British officers, who since its commencement were so much suspected by the troops that they had placed them in confinement. So great was the confusion which prevailed in consequence of this proceeding, that when General Lake summoned the place on his arrival no answer could be returned. It was determined, however, to make a vigorous defence. Seven battalions of Scindia’s regular infantry were encamped on the glacis, and were in possession of the town and the ravines surrounding the south and south-west faces of the fort. Though Thorn makes no mention of the circumstance, Duff says that they were thus encamped without the fort because “the garrison were afraid to admit them, lest they should plunder a rich treasury which they wished to reserve to themselves.” It was necessary to dislodge these troops before approaches could be made. They were accordingly attacked on the morning of the 10th, and, after a severe struggle, completely defeated, the town, twenty-six fine brass guns, and as many tumbrils laden with ammunition, remaining in possession of the victors. Two days afterwards the remainder of the battalions outside the fort, amounting to 2500 men, surrendered. The siege was immediately commenced, and made rapid progress. A grand battery of eight eighteen-pounders opened on the 17th, and with such effect on the south-east bastion that a practicable breach would soon have been effected. The garrison, who had previously employed their British officers to make terms for them which they did not keep, were now in earnest in offering to capitulate on the morning of the 18th. The terms allowed them to depart with their clothes. Their number amounted to about 6000. Within the fort were found tumbrils laden with treasure to the amount of twenty-two lacs (£222,000), together with 164 pieces of ordnance, 76 of them brass, and large quantities of ammunition and stores.

“Among the ordnance,” says Thorn, “was one enormous brass gun, which, for magnitude and beauty stands unrivalled. Its length was 14 feet 2 inches, its calibre 23 inches, the weight of its ball when of cast iron 1500 lbs., and its whole weight 96,600 lbs., or a little above 38 tons.” Though called brass, it was, according to common report, composed of a mixture of the precious metals. The shroffs seem to have been of this opinion, for they offered £12,000 for it, merely to melt it down. General Lake meant to transport it to Calcutta and thence to England, but it proved too heavy for the raft on which it was placed, and sunk in the river. The whole of the twenty-two lacs of treasure was modestly claimed by M. Perron, on the ground that it was his private property, and was guaranteed to him by the terms of his surrender, by which his private property was reserved. The claim, though scarcely entitled to notice, was examined and found groundless, and the whole amount was shared by the captors.

At an early stage of the campaign Scindia had detached seven regular battalions from the Deccan, under the command of a French officer of the name of Dudernaigue or Dudreuec. These had been joined by three of Bourquieu’s battalions, who had not been engaged at Delhi, and by the other battalions formed of the fugitives from Delhi and Agra, the whole amounting to about 9000 infantry, accompanied by a body of about 1500 good cavalry and a superior equipment of artillery. Dudernaigue had given up the command and surrendered to the British, and the force was now commanded by a Mahratta officer, under whom, during the siege of Agra, they had occupied a position about thirty miles distant. It was understood that they were intending to attempt the recapture of Delhi, and General Lake therefore moved against them from Agra on the 27th of September. He proceeded in a south-west direction to Futtehpoor, where he left the heavy guns and baggage under the charge of two battalions of native infantry. Turning westward he arrived on the 31st of October at Cutumbo, which the enemy had only quitted on the preceding evening. As he was thus close upon their track he determined, in order to prevent their escape, to pursue them with his cavalry, now consisting of eight regiments, three of them European dragoons. He accordingly set out at eleven o’clock at night, directing the infantry to follow at three next morning. After a march of twenty-five miles in little more than six hours, on the 1st of November he came up with the enemy, now mustering about 9000 infantry, 72 guns, and 5000 cavalry. As they appeared to be in retreat and in some degree of confusion, General Lake determined to attack at once, without waiting for his infantry. By cutting a large tank the enemy so much impeded the progress of the cavalry as to gain time for taking up an advantageous position near the village of Laswaree, about forty miles west of Bhurtpoor. Their right was in front of the village, and in their rear was a rivulet with very steep banks; their left was upon the village of Mohulpoor; and their whole, concealed by high grass, was defended by a formidable line of artillery, the pieces chained together, the more effectually to resist a cavalry charge. The change which they had made in taking up this position was only imperfectly ascertained, in consequence of the dense cloud of dust raised by the approach of the cavalry. Thus moving somewhat in the dark, General Lake ordered the first brigade of cavalry to move upon the point where the enemy had previously been seen in motion, while the rest of the cavalry were ordered to follow up the attack in succession as fast as they could form after crossing the rivulet. The point thus attacked had, in consequence of the enemy’s change of position, become their left, and the resistance proved so obstinate and destructive that the commander found it necessary, after a heavy loss, to desist and wait the arrival of the infantry.

During this delay the enemy again changed their position, and drew up in two lines, the one in front and the other in rear of the village of Mohulpoor. As soon as the British infantry arrived the Mahratta commander was so much disconcerted that he endeavoured to escape with the loss only of his guns, and made an offer to surrender them on certain conditions. These were granted, provided they were fulfilled in an hour. Meanwhile the British infantry, composed of the 76th regiment and six battalions of sepoys, were formed into two columns on the left, close to the village of Laswaree, the first composed of the right wing under General Ware, and the second forming the left wing under General St. John. After the hour expired without the fulfilment of the conditions, the infantry began to move along the banks of the rivulet nearly at right angles to the enemy’s position. The object of this attack was to turn their right flank. For some time, owing to the high grass which intervened, they did not perceive it, but the moment it became known they frustrated it by throwing back their left wing, and covering the movement by a destructive cannonade, which greatly thinned the 76th regiment, while the nature of the ground impeded its advance. General Lake, perceiving this state of matters, determined to hasten the attack, and, placing himself at the head of the regiment and a battalion and five companies of sepoys which had closed in front, moved rapidly forward. On arriving within reach of canister shot, it was so showered upon them that a regular advance was impossible, and the Mahratta horse ventured to charge. After gallantly repulsing them, General Lake ordered the British cavalry to charge in turn. This service was performed by the 29th dragoons, who dashed through both lines of the enemy’s infantry, wheeled round upon their cavalry, driving them from the field, and then attacked the rear of their second line. The enemy’s first line had in the meantime been driven back by the British infantry upon the second. Both lines were thus mingled together, and attacked at once in front and rear. On this occasion Scindia’s veteran brigades proved themselves worthy of their high reputation. Disdaining to yield, they continued an unequal fight with desperate valour; and, with the exception of about 2000 who were broken and made prisoners, perished where they stood with their arms in their hands. The British loss amounted to about 800; but the victory, though dearly purchased, was most complete. Except the 2000 prisoners, the whole of the enemy’s battalions, to the amount of at least 7000 men, lay dead on the field. Most of their cavalry shared the same fate. The trophies of victory included the whole of the enemy’s bazaars, with the camp equipage and baggage, a considerable number of elephants and camels, above 1600 bullocks, 72 pieces of cannon, 5000 stand of arms, 44 stand of colours, 3 tumbrils laden with treasure, 64 tumbrils laden with ammunition, and 57 carts containing stores of various descriptions. The effect of the victory was to give the British undisputed possession of all Scindia’s territories north of the Chumbul.

On the 8th of November the army quitted Laswaree, where the air had become tainted by the number of the dead, and began to retrace its steps by proceeding eastward in the direction of Agra. On the 14th the sick and wounded with the captured guns were sent off to that city, but the army halted at Paiashur. During a fortnight spent here the effect of the recent successes was manifested by the number of rajahs who hastened to court the British alliance. Defensive treaties were formed with the Rajah of Macherry, called the Ram Rajah, the Rajahs of Jeypoor and Jodpoor, and the Begum Sumroo. The last was rather a singular connection, as she was the widow of the villain by whose hands mainly the massacre of Patna was perpetrated. Vakeels or ambassadors also arrived from different quarters, among others one from Delhi, bearing a khelut or dress of honour from Shah Alum to General Lake, and congratulations on his recent victory. “Desirous,” says Thorn, “of receiving this high mark of distinction in a manner that should at the same time make a general impression in favour of the British arms and show respect for the emperor,” General Lake made the ambassador’s reception as pompous as possible, and returned public acknowledgments, testifying his high sense of the honour which the emperor had conferred upon him. “This,” adds Thorn, “highly pleased and gratified the ambassador and all the Mussulmans who beheld the ceremony.” The army again moved on the 27th November, and finally turning southward took up a position at Biana.

One of the great objects originally contemplated by the war was the conquest of Bundelcund, a province so called from its being in possession of the Bundela race. It consisted of a level and a mountainous country, the former lying on the north-east along the right bank of the Jumma, and the latter stretching backward from it through rugged and elevated tracts connected with the Vindhya Mountains. This country belonging nominally to the peishwa, a new agreement was made with him in August 1803, by which he ceded the greater part of his claims in it to the Company, in lieu of Savanore and Benkapoor in the southern Mahratta country, and Oolpar in the neighbourhood of Surat. The districts which he thus received yielded little more than nineteen, while those which he ceded were estimated at upwards of thirty-six lacs; but still the exchange was not unequal, because he received districts of which the revenue was sure, whereas those which he gave up were in such a position that the first thing which the Company had to do was to fight for them. The arrangement included various other stipulations affecting the relative positions of the parties, and were therefore afterwards drawn up in regular articles, which were signed on the 16th of December, 1803, and termed supplemental articles to the treaty of Bassein.

After ceding Bundelcund, or rather the rights which he either possessed or claimed in it, the peishwa sent orders to his officers in the province enjoining them to co-operate with the British forces.

them to surrender the territories under their charge to the British government. Shamsheer Bahadur, who claimed by descent from Bajeer Row, the first peishwa, and by grant made to his ancestor, questioned the validity of the cession, and prepared to resist it. The governor-general, on the contrary, was determined to enforce it, and thus war became inevitable. On the 6th of September, 1803, Colonel Powell, at the head of a detachment, which had been assembled at Allahabad, crossed the Jumma, and entered Bundelcund. Hemmat Bahadur, another Bundela chief, who was at once a gosain or religious character, and a soldier of fortune, had previously given in his adhesion to the British government, and on the 14th of September joined Colonel Powell with 8000 irregular infantry, 4000 horse, three regular battalions, commanded by an European officer, and twenty-five guns. On the 23d of September, when they reached the Cane, which flows past the fort of Callinger, and joins the Jumma a little below Corah, they found Shamsheer Bahadur strongly posted on the opposite bank. After reducing several places in the vicinity, the united forces crossed on the 10th of October, and after a fatiguing march of six hours, over a rugged country, saw Shamsheer’s army drawn up in order of battle. Though he presented a bold front he fled at the first onset, and by his superior speed escaped with very little loss. All his courage, however, appeared to be gone, and he professed a strong desire for peace. He could not have been sincere, as he managed to spin out the negotiation for two months, and at last broke it off at the very time he had fixed for his arrival in the British camp.

Hostilities were of course immediately renewed, and Colonel Powell resumed offensive operations by laying siege to Calpee, which capitulated on the 4th of December. The capture of this place, and the defection of his chief officers, at last convinced Shamsheer that he had nothing to hope from continuing the war, and he threw himself on the mercy of the British, who treated him with a generosity which he could scarcely have anticipated. Several other chiefs, some of them adherents of Shamsheer, and others independent of him, now gave in their adherence. Of the latter, the two most important were the ruler of Jhansi, and the Mahratta chief Ambajee Inglia, who had acted as Scindia’s minister, and held under him possession of extensive territories, including those of the Rana of Golud. With the ruler of Jhansi, who really had pacific intentions, a treaty was immediately concluded; with Ambajee Inglia matters were not so easily settled.

Ambajee, in the month of October, 1803, offered to renounce his dependence on Scindia and become tributary to the British on certain conditions. After some time spent in negotiation, a treaty was concluded with him on the 16th December, 1803, by which he resigned the fortress of Gwalior and all the lands in his possession to the north of it to the Company, and was recognized as independent sovereign of all the other territories in his possession, except those of the Rana of Golud, to whom they had, by a previous treaty, been guaranteed. In accordance with this treaty, General Lake, on the 21st of December, despatched a corps under Colonel White to take possession of Gwalior. On arriving before it, Colonel White delivered the orders of Ambajee, but the commandant refused to give up possession. Circumstances afterwards transpired to prove that the commandant’s apparent contumacy originated with, or was at least countenanced by Ambajee himself, and it was therefore resolved to enforce compliance without delay. A considerable reinforcement, with siege artillery, was immediately sent off to Colonel White, who was also empowered to call in additional aid from the troops serving in Bundelcund. Batteries were accordingly erected, and having opened a fire which soon effected a breach, so intimidated the garrison that they capitulated. In order to complete the account of the operations in Hindoostan, including the conquest of Bundelcund and the capture of Gwalior, it has been necessary for a time to lose sight of the important transactions which were in the meantime taking place in the Deccan. To these we will now return.

The virtual dissolution of the confederacy between Scindia and Ragojee Bhonsla took place on the 23rd of November 1803, when General Wellesley concluded a truce with the former, and excluded the latter from any participation in it. By the terms of the truce, Scindia was bound to remove his troops to the eastward of Elichpoor, but ocular evidence was given that he had not fulfilled them, for on the 28th of November a large body of his cavalry was seen united with that of Ragojee Bhonsla, and accompanied by the greater part of the regular infantry, and a large portion of the artillery belonging to the latter. General Wellesley, holding this to be equivalent to a violation of the truce, resolved to attack them, notwithstanding the remonstrances and protestations of Scindia’s ambassador, who had not yet left the British camp. He accordingly set out at once, and after a long and fatiguing march, overtook them in the vicinity of Argaon, a village about thirty-five miles W.S.W. of Elichpoor. They had drawn up as if prepared for battle, and were commanded by Scindia in person, and by Munnoo Bappoo, the Rajah of Berar’s brother. In their rear stood the village with the gardens and inclosures of Argaon, and in front its plains much cut by watercourses. The main resistance was made by a body of Persian troops, who attacked the 74th and 78th regiments, and maintained a desperate struggle till they were almost totally destroyed. The rest of the enemy speedily gave way, and though evening had come on, were pursued in the moonlight with great slaughter by the cavalry, who captured all their elephants and baggage. The British loss in killed and wounded was 346.

It was determined to follow up this victory by the siege of Gawilghur, a fortress belonging to the rajah, and situated about fifteen miles north-west of Elichpoor, on a lofty precipice of a mountain ridge stretching between the sources of the Taptee and the Poornah. It consisted of an outer and an inner fort, both strongly built, inclosed by ramparts flanked with towers, and entered by three gates, one to the south leading to the inner fort, one to the north leading to the outer fort, and the third merely communicating with an interior wall. The ascent to the south gate is very steep and difficult; the road to the north gate was the one in common use, but was extremely narrow, and from passing round the west side of the fort was everywhere exposed to its fire. Notwithstanding these disadvantages the attack by this road seemed preferable to every other, and was adopted. Colonel Stevenson, who had equipped his corps at Aseerghur for the purpose, was to conduct the siege, while General Wellesley was to cover his operations, and if necessary assist them by attacks on the south and west. On the 12th of December, after much laborious service in dragging the heavy ordnance and stores, by hand, over mountains and ravines for thirty miles, Colonel Stevenson erected two batteries fronting the north face of the fort, and General Wellesley erected a battery to breach the wall near the southern gate, or at least divert the attention of the garrison. These batteries opened their fire on the morning of the 13th, and, by the evening of the following day the breaches in the walls of the outer fort were practicable. On the morning of the 15th, the assault was given and the place carried. Though the garrison was numerous, and the resistance vigorous, the loss of the British was only 126. In the fort were found seventy-two pieces of ordnance, 2000 stand of English arms, and 150 wall-pieces, carrying balls from half a pound to one pound each.

The operations of the British throughout the campaign had been so completely successful, that the war, if continued, must ere long have totally ruined the confederates. Nothing, therefore, remained for them but to sue for peace. The truce made with Scindia on the 23rd of November was considered to be still subsisting, and hence Ragojee Bhonsla, as the confederate more immediately in danger, made the first overtures. His vakel accordingly arrived in the British camp immediately after the capture of Gawilghur, and as he had no alternative but to accept the terms which General Wellesley dictated, the negotiation, commenced on the 16th December, occupied only one day, and the treaty was concluded on the next. Scindia being forthwith informed that the truce with him must expire on the 27th of December, had no idea of exposing himself to new disasters. His ambassadors arrived in the British camp on the 23rd of December, when the terms were immediately dictated, and on the 30th the treaty was concluded. This war, one of the shortest, was also one of the most decisive on record. In the short period of four months, four general battles had been fought, eight fortresses besieged and captured, and whole provinces subdued. The disparity of forces added greatly to the lustre of these achievements. The whole British army never exceeded 55,000 men, that of the enemy averaged at least 250,000, exclusive of a corps of 40,000 formed into regular brigades, disciplined by French officers, and obviously intended, if this war had not prematurely destroyed them, to form the nucleus of a larger army by which the French would have attempted once more to gain the ascendency in India.

By the treaty concluded at Degaom on the 17th December, Ragojee Bhonsla, the Rajah of Berar, ceded the whole of Cuttack, including the port of Balasore, and the whole of his territories and shares of revenue west of the Wurda, and south of the hills on which the forts of Nurnalla and Gawilghur are situated. By the treaty concluded at Surjee Anjengaom on the 30th of December, Dowlut Row Scindia ceded all his territories in the Doab, and all those northward of the Rajpoot principalities of Jeypoor, Jodpoor, and Gohud, the forts of Ahmednuggur and Baroach, with these districts, and his possessions between the Adjunta Ghaut and the Godavery. He also renounced all claims on the Mogul, and on the Company, or its allies the peishwa, the Nizam, and the Guicowar. Both chiefs engaged not to entertain within their territories any European or American of a nation hostile to the British, or any British subject without the consent of the British government, and to send and receive accredited ministers to reside at the respective courts of the contracting parties. By a special article in Scindia’s treaty a defensive alliance was contemplated, and it was provided that in the event of a subsidiary force being furnished to him, the expense should be defrayed from the territories which he had ceded. Effect was given to this article by a treaty concluded on the 27th of February, 1804, by which a corps of six battalions of sepoys were to be furnished, and stationed at Scindia’s option, either within his territories or at a convenient frontier fort within those of the Company. By another article of the Surjee Anjengaom treaty, pensions to the aggregate amount of fifteen lacs were granted by the Company to the principal of Scindia’s officers, who suffered loss by his cessions of territory in Hindoostan.

The results anticipated from the conclusion of these treaties, and the glorious termination of the war, were thus glowingly described by the governor-general in answer to a congratulatory address from the inhabitants of Calcutta:—“The foundations of our empire in Asia are now laid in the tranquillity of surrounding nations, and in the happiness and welfare of the people of India. In addition to the augmentation of our territories and resources, the peace manifested exemplary faith and equity towards our allies, moderation and lenity towards our enemies, and a sincere desire to promote the general prosperity of this quarter of the globe. The position in which we are now placed is such as suits the character of the British nation, the principles of our laws, the spirit of our constitution, and that liberal policy which becomes the dignity of a great and powerful empire. My public duty is discharged to the satisfaction of my conscience by the prosperous establishment of a system of policy which promises to improve the general condition of the people of India, and to unite the principal native states in the bond of peace, under the protection of the British power.” These views were so far shared at home that the thanks of parliament were voted to the governor-general, and to the several armies which shared the glory of the contest. General Lake was raised to the peerage by the title of Baron Lake of Delhi and Laswaree, and General Wellesley received the riband of the military order of the Bath. The courts of directors and of proprietors, though known to be not at all friendly to the policy of Marquis Wellesley, yielded to the general current, and gave him a vote of thanks, as well generally for the discharge of his public duty as specially for the success of the military operations.