By the treaty with the Great Mughul, the Company had not only gained full access to the continent of India, but been enabled to arrange a regular course of interchanges, from which a great increase of mercantile profits was anticipated. At Surat, though the sales of English imports were limited, reasonable purchases could be made of the cloths and other goods which were in great demand at Bantam and other stations established in the Indian Archipelago, and could, in consequence, be advantageously exchanged against pepper and other spices, which were at first regarded as the most important staples of the Eastern trade. With the view of extending these exchanges, other stations along the coast of India were gradually adopted, and the vessels of the Company began regularly to frequent all the leading ports both on the Malabar and the Coromandel coasts, and still further north to the mouths of the Ganges.
The ample scope for traffic thus afforded was more than sufficient to give full employment for all the capital which the Company had yet been able to raise; but their ambition appears always to have been larger than their means, and they resolved to turn their attention to Persia. An important trade with this country had long been carried on by the Levant Company, but war had begun to rage between the Turks and Persians, and the usual channel of intercourse being thus interrupted, it was resolved to take advantage of the circumstance, and endeavour permanently to transfer the trade from the Levant to the Persian Gulf. The attempt thus to interfere with the monopoly of another British chartered company was rather ungenerous; and it may have been partly on this account that Sir Thomas Roe not only decidedly disapproved of it, but endeavoured, on his own responsibility, to prevent it from being carried into effect. The flattering representations of the factors of Surat, however, prevailed; and a vessel was despatched to the port of Jask, situated a little east of the entrance of the Persian Gulf, with a small sum of money, and a cargo of English broadcloths, kerseys, lead, tin, iron, cutlery, &c., to be exchanged for Persian silks. The adventure proved successful; and ultimately a regular trade was established between the Persian Gulf, Surat, and Bantam.
It had been foreseen that this trade could not be established without coming into fierce collision with the Portuguese, who had long possessed it as an exclusive monopoly; but the signal successes which had been gained over them when they attempted to prevent the establishment of an English factory at Surat, appear to have satisfied the Company and their agents that Portuguese hostility was rather to be courted than feared, as, in all probability, a rich harvest of prizes would be made. The event proved as had been anticipated. The Portuguese, now in a state of rapid decline, made pretensions, and endeavoured to support them by hostilities, which only led to their discomfiture, and they had the mortification of seeing the English not only secured in their trade, but in high favour at the Persian court, and formally leagued with its monarch in an offensive and defensive alliance.
The favourable aspect which the affairs of the Company now bore had a visible effect in filling up the subscription to a new joint stock, which started in 1617-18, with the large capital of £1,600,000. At this time the number of proprietors of stock amounted to 954, and the number of ships possessed by them is stated at thirty-six, of 100 to 1,000 tons burden. The capital subscribed was allotted to three voyages, the first consisting of nine, and each of the other two of eight ships. Before the last of these voyages was undertaken, a remarkable change took place in the arrangements of the Company.
In the Eastern islands the Dutch not only claimed supremacy, but had actually established it. They had, however, tacitly acknowledged the Company’s right of traffic, at least to a limited extent, and nutmegs, mace, and cloves formed part of the usual returns imported from the East into England. The larger scale on which the Company’s operations were now about to be carried on having afforded the Dutch a pretext for interfering, they plainly intimated their determination to reserve the trade in the finer spices as an exclusive monopoly. They rested their claim on the fact that they had conquered the Spice Islands from the Portuguese, and being in actual possession of them, had a right recognized by the very charter of the London East India Company to debar all other parties from frequenting them. So satisfied were they with the validity of this claim, that, instead of regarding themselves as unlawful aggressors in the violent steps which they had taken to exclude the English, they assumed the character of complainers, and in 1618 presented a memorial to King James, in which, after stating what they called their grievances, they prayed for redress of past, and a prohibition of future encroachments. The London East India Company told a very different tale; and after enumerating the various forms of obstruction and oppression to which they had been subjected in carrying on their trade at Bantam, where their right of factory could not be disputed, and in endeavouring to extend it to islands over which the Dutch could not pretend to have established any exclusive authority, they besought the king to interfere in their behalf, and protect them against a violence which, though unprovoked, had become intolerable.
It was impossible that matters could remain as they were; but King James, in accordance with his usual policy, only temporized by engaging in a course of intricate and protracted negotiation. Ultimately, a kind of understanding was arrived at, and an agreement, acquiesced in by all parties, was formally concluded at London on the 7th of July, 1619. The leading stipulations were, that all excesses on either side should be forgiven; that the ships and property which had been seized should be mutually restored; that each nation should have the free privilege of trade to the East, without any limitation as to the capital which might be employed; that both companies should strive to diminish customs and other exactions, and regulate the market by purchasing at prices previously arranged by common agents; that, in sharing the purchases thus made, the pepper should be equally divided between the companies, but only a third of the finer spices should be apportioned to the English; that the forts actually built should remain with their present possessors, but that all future forts acquired in the Moluccas or elsewhere by the common industry or common force should be possessed and garrisoned jointly; and that attempts should be made at the common expense to establish trade in new places, and especially in China. In order to give effect to this treaty, which was to last for twenty years, a special machinery was obviously required. Accordingly, a “Council of Defence” was instituted. It consisted of eight members, four from each company; and to make the equality still more complete, the members of each company were to preside alternately. To this council large powers were committed. Twenty ships, furnished in equal portions by each company, were to be maintained for war purposes, and not permitted, except under special circumstances, to be employed in the transport of merchandise. These ships, and more if necessary, were to be placed under the immediate authority of the council of defence, which was empowered to distribute them at different stations, and provide for the maintenance of the sailors and soldiers employed, by handing over the proceeds of the dues and customs, particularly in the Moluccas, to the treasurers of the companies. When the vessels employed sustained damage by storm or similar misfortune, the loss was to be borne by the company to which they belonged; but when they suffered in the common cause, as in war, a different rule was to be observed, and reparation was to be made at the common expense. To prevent the disputes which might thus arise, each ship, when placed on the station, was to be valued, in order that, at any future time, the amount of deterioration produced during its employment on active service might be easily ascertained. All questions arising between the companies were to be settled by the council of defence, and in the event of their being equally divided, the sovereigns of the companies were to act as arbitrators.
Had this treaty been honestly and candidly acted upon, it would not only have given the Dutch and English a complete supremacy in the East, but provided equitably for their separate interests. The two-thirds of the finer spices allotted to the Dutch could scarcely be considered more than their exertions in rooting out the Spanish and Portuguese entitled them to expect; and the English, who saw themselves in danger of being excluded altogether, might have been satisfied when they were secured in a certain portion, which could not be diminished. The management, too, was fairly adjusted; and it is not easy to see how it was possible, under such a management, for one of the companies to overrule the other. Such, however, was the charge brought against their colleagues by the English, who complained that everything vague in the treaty was interpreted to their disadvantage, and that their funds were seized and appropriated to purposes in which they had no special interest. The truth seems to be, that though both companies professed to acquiesce in the treaty, neither of them was satisfied with it; and hence both, while eager to avail themselves of all the advantages which the treaty conferred, had no scruple in endeavouring to evade the obligations which it imposed. The Dutch, who believed that they could easily have driven their rivals out of the Molucca trade altogether, grumbled at being compelled to cede a whole third of it; while the English, who had never at any former period fitted out ten vessels on a single voyage for mercantile purposes, found it impossible to carry on their trade, while the larger portion of their capital was required to fit out vessels for war purposes only. The interest of the parties being thus apparently adverse, it is easy to understand how their former rivalry revived, and their enmity, instead of being suppressed, became more inveterate. This fact was soon to be demonstrated by a fearful tragedy.
In the island of Amboyna the English, under the authority of the treaty, had established a factory and several agencies. The whole power, however, was in the hands of the Dutch. The strong castle of Amboyna, which they possessed at the date of the treaty, remained under their own entire control; throughout the island they far outnumbered all other Europeans, and in its harbours were ships of war as well as merchant vessels, on whose assistance they could confidently calculate in any emergency. In such circumstances there was no external force from which they could seriously apprehend any danger; and yet, on the ground that a conspiracy had been formed for the purpose of wrestling the island from them, the Dutch authorities proceeded, in the name of law and justice, but in gross and manifest violation of both, to perpetrate an atrocity which has left a stain on the national character.
According to their own account, part of their garrison in the castle of Amboyna consisted of natives of Japan. One of these, having incurred suspicion by the minuteness of his inquiries as to the state and defences of the place, was apprehended, and on examination divulged a plot, into which other eight of his countrymen and the English in the service of the London East India Company had entered, for the purpose of seizing the castle of Amboyna, and thereby making themselves masters of the island. The Japanese, whose names their countryman had mentioned while under torture, were first apprehended, and being subjected to the same horrible process, not only confessed their own guilt, but implicated the leading members of the English factory. After a short interval the English thus denounced were seized; and, partly under the terror of being tortured, and partly under the actual application of it, confirmed the statements of the Japanese. On the evidence thus extorted, a conviction was obtained; and sentence of death was not only pronounced, but actually inflicted on nine natives of Japan, one Portuguese, and twelve Englishmen. Among the last were Captain Gabriel Towerson, the English agent at Amboyna, and several of his factors and assistants.
In endeavouring to defend this proceeding, the Dutch dwell particularly on the uniformity of the confession made by the unhappy sufferers; but they omit to mention that, at the time when torture was inflicted, the answers desired to be obtained were actually suggested, and the accused, instead of being simply called upon to state the truth, were asked, while writhing in agony or threatened with it, whether they had not entered into the plot with which they were charged—whether such and such proposals had not been made—whether such and such plans had not been arranged—and whether a particular day, also named, had not been fixed for carrying them into execution. In this way, not by fair interrogatories, but by a series of leading questions, the answers were made to assume a degree of consistency well calculated to conceal or disguise the monstrous absurdities which the whole charge carried on the face of it. It ought also to be borne in mind, that the confessions which had been extorted were afterwards solemnly retracted in the interval between the sentence and the execution, and that all the victims died protesting their innocence.
Even admitting that the suspicion of some kind of plot was not altogether groundless, the extreme measures adopted by the Dutch authorities are utterly incapable of vindication. The danger, if it ever existed, vanished the moment it was discovered. Where, then, was the necessity of hurrying on the trial while the accused remained without the means of providing a proper defence; or of executing it, without allowing them the opportunity of bringing a sentence which they held to be iniquitous under review? The Council of Defence, to which all questions affecting the interests of the companies had been specially referred, was still in existence. Where was the danger of a delay which would have submitted the judgment to its revisal? These are questions which the Dutch have found it impossible to answer; and the bloody deed of Amboyna, perpetrated on the 27th of February, 1623, therefore remains to this day justly branded as a massacre.
When tidings of the massacre reached England, the public indignation was inflamed to such a pitch that all idea of amicable arrangement was abandoned; and even King James, forgetting his lethargic and mean-spirited policy, began to talk openly of war. He had even issued letters of reprisal, authorizing the injured parties to seek redress at their own hands, and seemed bent on measures still more decisive, when his inglorious career was brought to a close. The Dutch dexterously availed themselves of the opportunities afforded by a new reign to protract negotiations, and managed to spin out a series of years, making fair promises of giving redress, but always evading the performance of them. This crafty line of policy was only too successful, in consequence of the embarrassments in which Charles I was soon involved. The seeds of a civil war had been thickly sown in England even during his father’s lifetime; and all other questions became comparatively insignificant when once public attention began to be fixed on the great contest which was to decide the fate of the English monarchy.
While this dispute was pending, the affairs of the Company were often at a very low ebb. In the Indian Archipelago, station after station was abandoned in order to escape from the oppression of the Dutch; and in various other quarters so many untoward events occurred, that the Company, unable to prosecute any regular system of trade, were obliged to rest satisfied with shifting expedients, sometimes successful, but oftener productive only of disappointment. Their stock in consequence, instead of commanding a premium, could with difficulty be sold at a considerable discount. It cannot be denied that, amidst these discouragements, much perseverance was displayed. Every opening for trade was eagerly embraced. When that with Persia threatened to prove unproductive, the Red Sea was again resorted to; and when misunderstandings with the Mughul endangered the factory at Surat, new stations were found on the opposite coast of the Indian peninsula. Here for some time the principal factory had its seat at Masulipatam; but the extortions of the governor having become intolerable, a new locality was obtained, in 1628, at Armegon, situated on the Coromandel coast about seventy miles north of Madras. The factory established at Armegon was substituted for that of Masulipatam, and is remarkable as the first station on the continent of India which the Company were permitted to fortify. The advantage which it thus possessed promised at one time to make it a great emporium; but the situation proved inconvenient, and the governor of Masulipatam, anxious to recover the revenue which he had lost by the withdrawal of the Company’s trade, offered terms so favourable, that they were again induced to make that port their principal station.
During these transactions the Dutch question continued open, and many attempts were made, by commissioners appointed for that purpose, to obtain an equitable adjustment. In proportion, however, as the domestic difficulties of the king increased, the Dutch were emboldened to refuse redress; and the Company, losing patience, took the remarkable step of placing themselves in direct communication with parliament. Hitherto they had existed merely as creatures of the crown, and on several occasions had been made to feel how little dependence was to be placed on its countenance and support. King James, at the very commencement of his reign, virtually ignored Queen Elizabeth’s charter, in the license by which he empowered Sir Edward Michelborne to trade within the prohibited limits; and on a subsequent occasion, even after he had made the charter his own by renewing and confirming it, he leagued with his worthless favourite, the Duke of Buckingham, in arresting the ships of the Company, for the purpose of extorting a share in the prize money which they were alleged to have gained when assisting the Persians against the Portuguese in the capture of Ormuz. As yet, King Charles had not been implicated in any overt attack on the privileges or interests of the Company; but the sluggish manner in which he urged their claim to redress for the injuries sustained from the Dutch must have satisfied them that, at the best, he was a very lukewarm friend. It is not surprising, therefore, that when, in 1628, the great struggle between the king and the parliament assumed a definite shape by the presentation of the celebrated Petition of Right, the Company, impatient of the interminable delays to which they had been subjected, took the bold step of withdrawing their case from the exclusive cognizance of the crown by bringing it directly under the notice of the legislature. Their memorial, prepared with this view, besides enumerating the hardships under which they laboured, founded their claims to public support on the benefits which they had, as a company, conferred on the nation. The question as to the expediency of the peculiar privileges which their charter conferred was thus fairly raised, and would doubtless have been fully discussed had not the parliament been suddenly dissolved before the memorial could be taken into consideration.
The memorial, implying, as it obviously did, a censure on the dilatoriness of the crown, and amounting to what many regarded as an interference with the royal prerogative, must have been very offensive to the king; but more urgent concerns engrossed his attention, and he so far concealed his displeasure as not only to leave the chartered rights of the Company unimpaired, but occasionally to issue proclamations in their favour. One of these proclamations, dated 19th February, 1631, deals with an internal abuse, and gives a striking manifestation of the helpless, or at least desponding state into which the Company must have fallen before they deemed it necessary to seek the protection of the king against their own servants. The plan originally adopted of giving an interest in each voyage to all the persons employed in it had never been abandoned, and accordingly even common soldiers and sailors had been permitted to trade on their own account in certain specified articles. The quantity of space allowed to each for this private trade was a chest 4 feet long, 1½ feet wide, and 1½ feet deep. Under the cover of this permission, it appears that smuggling was carried on to such an extent as both to defraud the public revenue and diminish the Company’s legitimate profits. The proclamation specially directed against this smuggling, “whereby the said Company’s general affairs are of late much declined and decayed, and the adventurers therein much discouraged,” intimates that in future greater vigilance will be exercised, and calls upon all officers to exert themselves to the utmost against those who, not satisfied with the specified amount of licensed traffic, and “the extraordinary great wages which they (the Company) are accustomed to pay in their employments,” were ungratefully and ungenerously undermining their employers by “driving a secret underhand trade.” The abuse thus denounced was surely one with which the Company themselves ought to have been fully prepared to deal, and it is almost piteous to see them virtually confessing their incompetency by calling in extraneous aid to assist them in their internal management. Even without the aid of government, it could not have been difficult to strike at the root of the evil by withdrawing the licence which made its detection almost impossible, and declaring that in future all the servants of the Company would be paid by fixed salaries and wages. The very opposite course was adopted; and the proclamation, while denouncing the evil, proceeds very preposterously to increase it, by announcing that the licence to carry on private trade, instead of being prohibited, would remain as before in the case of the lower classes of servants, and in the case of the higher classes would be extended, so as to give many of them double the quantity of private tonnage which had previously been allowed.
It would have been strange if the Company, while proclaiming their own incompetency and sanctioning gross mismanagement, could have prospered even under favourable circumstances; and unfortunately at this very time a series of events took place which placed their affairs in great jeopardy. The Dutch had made good their footing at Surat, and greatly reduced the profits of the trade by a formidable competition. In the Persian Gulf, where, in addition to the ordinary profits of trade, the Company had obtained a permanent grant of half the customs levied at the port of Gomberoon, their position was endangered not only by a new succession to the throne, but by an attempt of the Portuguese to recapture Ormuz. In the Eastern Archipelago the spice trade had been almost extinguished, and the factory of Bantam, which, as it was the earliest, had long held precedence of all the other stations of the Company, became so unimportant as to be reduced to an agency dependent on Surat, which alone was now governed by a president and council. While thus beset with difficulties, the trade of the Company was brought almost to a stand in India by the devastation of a large portion of the country by a famine, followed as usual by a pestilence; and in England by the state of ferment into which all minds were now thrown by the approaching civil broils.
The best thing that can be said for the Company during this gloomy period is that they never abandoned themselves to despair, and even while losing ground, were always on the alert to take advantage of any favourable opening which might occur. In this way their success was often greater than they could have ventured to anticipate. The new Persian monarch, Shah Sufi, issued firmans reinstating them in all their former privileges, including the grant of the customs of Gomberoon, which, in 1632, yielded as the Company’s share 550 tomands, a sum equal to £1,650 sterling. In the same year the factory at Masulipatam, which had been abandoned in consequence of the extortion and oppression of the governor, was re-established on favourable conditions by the express authority of the King of Golkunda, to whom the territory belonged; while Armegon, though abandoned as a commercial emporium, acquired new importance from the additional strength given to its fortifications. A secure asylum was thus obtained within the Bay of Bengal, to which the attention of the Company was now more especially directed.
During Sir Thomas Roe’s embassy to the Great Mughul Jahangir, a firman had been obtained, in general terms authorizing the English to trade in Bengal. The importance of the permission thus granted appears not to have been appreciated, and no use had been made of it when Jahangir’s reign terminated by his death in 1627. During the reign of his son Shah Jahan, whose favour the English generally enjoyed, the idea of a Bengal trade was revived; and in 1634 a firman was obtained, which threw the whole trade of the province open to the Company, subject to the restriction that their ships were to resort only to the port of Piply or Peipley. This place, situated on the Subunreka ten miles above its mouth, and within a short distance of the estuary of the Hughli, had a very indifferent harbour, but possessed the important advantage of giving immediate access to a country of almost inexhaustible resources, with an immense industrial population, from whom an indefinite supply of the fine white cloths suited equally for the English, the Persian, and the south-eastern markets, might at all times be obtained. The prospect of a revival of trade seemed in consequence so promising, that new efforts were made; and Bantam, with the view of being again made a central emporium between the Indian peninsula and the Spice Islands, was once more restored to the dignity of a presidency. In the midst of this apparent success, an event took place by which the very existence of the Company was threatened.